







*Kneller.*

*Hindson.*

*Duchess of Marlborough*

MEMOIRS  
OF THE  
DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH,

WITH  
HIS ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE :  
COLLECTED FROM THE FAMILY RECORDS AT BLENHEIM,  
AND OTHER AUTHENTIC SOURCES

BY  
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# MEMOIRS

OF

## JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

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### CHAP. LI.—MINISTERIAL CRISIS.—1706.

DURING the greater part of 1705, the whole nation had been kept in suspense by the struggle in the cabinet, and by the contention between the two parties relative to the office of lord keeper. The present year did not less teem with similar feuds, and Marlborough was exposed to superior disquietude, in consequence of the struggle which arose from the determination of the Whigs to persist in their purpose of transferring the seals of the secretaryship of state from Sir Charles Hedges to the earl of Sunderland.

On returning from the embassy to Vienna, which he had filled with great prudence and ability, Sunderland expected to be rewarded by an immediate admission into the ministry; and his hopes were encouraged by the other Whig leaders, who had promoted his appointment to the embassy, as an introductory step to an office of trust and dignity at home.

We have already mentioned the opposition of Marlborough to the appointment of Sunderland, and his unwillingness to wound the feelings of the queen, by pressing his admission into the cabinet. This opinion he strongly manifested to the duchess, who displayed even more than usual zeal for the advancement of her son-in-law.

*“ Helchin, August 9.— \* \* \* \* You know that I have often disputes with you concerning the queen; and by what I have always*  
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observed, when she thinks herself in the right, she needs no advice to help her to be very firm and positive. But I doubt but a very little time will set this of Lord Sunderland very right, for you may see by the letter that she has a good opinion of him. I have writ as my friends would have me, for I had much rather be governed than govern. But otherwise I have really so much esteem and kindness for him, and have so much knowledge of the place you would have for him, that I have my apprehensions he will be very uneasy in it; and that when it is too late, you will be of my opinion, that it would have been much happier if he had been employed in any other place of profit and honour. I have formerly said so much to you on this subject, and to so little purpose, that I ought not now to have troubled you with all this, knowing very well that you rely on other people's judgment in this matter. I do not doubt but they wish him very well; but in this they have other considerations than his good, and I have none but that of a kind friend, that would neither have him, nor my daughter uneasy. Writing this by candle light, I am so blind that I cannot read it, so that if there be any thing in it that should not be seen, burn it, and think kindly of one who loves you with all his heart."

Notwithstanding the reluctance which he here manifests, he suffered himself to be overcome by the importunities of the treasurer, and wrote to the queen, urging the appointment with all the arguments which the circumstances of the case suggested. Supported by this recommendation, Godolphin renewed his instances with additional zeal, proposing to remunerate Sir Charles Hedges for the loss of his office, by a place of a more permanent and profitable nature. But the queen still continued inflexible, and, dreading a personal altercation, expressed by letter the poignancy of her feelings and her aversion to the meditated change.

"August 30.—Sept. 10. — I think one should always speak one's mind freely to one's friends on every occasion, but sometimes one is apt to hope things may not come to that extremity, as to make it necessary to trouble them, and therefore it is very natural to defer doing so as long as one possibly can. The difficulties I labour under at this time are so great, and so uneasy to me, that they will not suffer me any longer to keep my thoughts to myself; and I choose this way of explaining them to you, rather than endeavour to begin to speak, and not be able to go on. I have been considering the business we have so often spoke about, ever since I saw you, and cannot but continue of the same mind, that it is a great hardship to persuade any body to part with a place they are in possession of, in hopes of another that is not yet vacant. Besides, I must own freely to you, I am of the opinion, that making a party man secretary of state, when there are so many of their friends in employment of all kinds already, is throwing myself into the hands of a party, which is a thing I have been desirous to avoid. May be some may think I

would be willing to be in the hands of the Tories; but whatever people may say of me, I do assure you I am not inclined, nor ever will be, to employ any of those violent persons, that have behaved themselves so ill towards me. All I desire is, my liberty in encouraging and employing all those that concur faithfully in my service, whether they are called Whigs or Tories, not to be tied to one, nor the other; for if I should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of either, I shall not imagine myself, though I have the name of queen, to be in reality but their slave, which as it will be my personal ruin, so it will be the destroying all government; for instead of putting an end to faction, it will lay a lasting foundation for it. You press the bringing Lord Sunderland into business, that there may be one of that party in a place of trust, to help carry on the business this winter; and you think if this is not complied with, they will not be hearty in pursuing my service in the parliament. But is it not very hard that men of sense and honour will not promote the good of their country, because every thing in the world is not done that they desire! when they may be assured Lord Sunderland shall come into employment as soon as it is possible. Why, for God's sake, must I, who have no interest, no end, no thought, but for the good of my country, be made so miserable, as to be brought into the power of one set of men? and why may not I be trusted, since I mean nothing but what is equally for the good of all my subjects? There is another apprehension I have of Lord Sunderland being secretary, which I think is a natural one, which proceeds from what I have heard of his temper. I am afraid he and I should not agree long together, finding by experience my humour and those that are of a warmer will often have misunderstandings between one another. I could say a great deal more on this subject, but fear I have been too tedious already. Therefore I shall conclude, begging you to consider how to bring me out of my difficulties, and never leave my service, for Jesus Christ's sake; for besides the reasons I give you in another letter, this is a blow I cannot bear." \*

Convinced from this declaration that farther arguments would be fruitless, Godolphin recurred to his resolution of withdrawing from a post which he could no longer maintain with honour to himself or advantage to his sovereign. He declared his purpose in a letter which exhibits an interesting picture of his feelings.

*"Saturday Morning, at nine. — I come this moment from opening and reading the letter which your majesty gave yourself the trouble to write to me last night. It gives me all the grief and despair imaginable, to find that your majesty shows inclination to have me continue in your service, and yet will make it impossible for me to do so. I shall not therefore trouble your majesty with fruitless repetitions of reasons and arguments. I cannot struggle against the difficulties of your majesty's*

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\* From a copy by the duchess.

business, and yourself at the same time ; but I can keep my word to your majesty.

"I have no house in the world to go to but my house at Newmarket, which I must own is not at this time like to be a place of much retirement ; but I have no other. I have worn out my health, and almost my life, in the service of the crown. I have served your majesty faithfully to the best of my understanding, without any advantage to myself, except the honour of doing so, or without expecting any other favour than to end the small remainder of my days in liberty and quiet." \*

Unwilling to lose a tried and zealous servant, the queen endeavoured to compromise the dispute and save her own feelings, by offering to nominate Sunderland a privy counsellor, with a pension, and to confer on him an office superior in emolument to the secretaryship of state, but which would not entitle him to constant access to her person. This proposal being, however, regarded by the Whigs as a mere expedient to exclude them from power, they persisted the more firmly in their purpose, and began to foster new suspicions of the sincerity of the treasurer. Accordingly Sunderland rejected the offer, as injurious to his honour, and Somers and Halifax announced the resolution of their party to enter the lists of opposition, if their demand was not granted without farther delay. Their decision was communicated in a letter from Sunderland to the duchess.

"*London, Sept. 17-28.* — Lord Halifax and I reckoned to have set out to-morrow for Woodstock, and it is with a great deal of regret that we are obliged to put off our journey thither ; but when you know the reason of it, I dare say you won't think us in the wrong. When I writ to you last, I gave you some account of a conversation Lord Halifax and the lord treasurer had together ; but since that, Lord Halifax has told Lord Somers and me several particulars of that conversation, and among other things, of the great offers of any place, or any other advantage whatever that the lord treasurer was pleased to make to me, in lieu of the thing in question. I can't but think, and we are all of the same mind, that for me to hearken to any such offer, would be in effect to be both fool and knave. Lord Somers, Lord Halifax, and I, have talked very fully over all this matter, and we are come to our last resolution in it, that this and what other things have been promised must be done, or we and the lord treasurer must have nothing more to do together about business ; and that we must let all our friends know just how the matter stands between us and the lord treasurer, whatever is the consequence of it. If the lord treasurer comes to town, either to-night or to-morrow, both Lord Somers and Lord Halifax will let him know this resolution in the plainest words,

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\* Draught in the hand of Lord Godolphin.

and in the fullest manner they can. If he does not come, Lord Halifax will go to Windsor to him, and let him know it in Lord Somers's name, as well as his own, so that a few days will determine whether it is to be a breach or not. But whether it is or not, you must be assured that every honest Englishman will acknowledge, that whatever good has been done is entirely owing to you; and that whatever is not done is for want of your power to do it.

"There is another reason which makes Lord Halifax not think it so proper for us to go to Woodstock whilst this matter is in suspense, and Lord Somers is of the same mind; that is, that since it is plain that you are very ill with the queen, purely for acting and speaking honestly and sincerely your mind, nobody knows how far some people might make the queen believe that we were gone only to influence and engage you to be more and more uneasy to her. I beg you would let us know whether we are right in this thought or no; for nothing can be a greater mortification than to be prevented of the pleasure of waiting upon you."

The letter of Sunderland was instantly communicated to Marlborough, and the resolution of the Whigs not only aggravated his embarrassments, but increased his dissatisfaction with the party. His feelings were still more deeply wounded by the reproaches and taunts of the duchess, who inveighed against the tenderness which he manifested towards the queen, as well as against his lukewarmness towards the Whigs. Hence his letters are filled with complaints of their unreasonable demands and unjust suspicions; and he solemnly declares his resolution to support the treasurer to the utmost, and to consider as his own enemies those who should show themselves the enemies of his colleague.

*To the Duchess.*

"What you write me concerning the queen and the lord treasurer gives me a great deal of trouble; for should the consequence be what you say, that there is no relying upon the Tories, and that the Whigs will be out of humour, it must end in confusion, which will have the consequence of the Dutch making peace with France. I am afraid this is what will gratify many of the Tory party; but I can see no advantage that can come to the Whigs by the ruin of the lord treasurer; so that I hope they are too wise a people to expose themselves and the liberties of Europe, because some things are not done with a good grace. I would not have you mistake me; for as far as it is in my power, for the sake of my country and the queen, for whom, had I a thousand lives, I would venture them all, I would have every thing that is reasonable done to satisfy the Whigs, of which I think the lord treasurer is the best judge. \* If it

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\* This part of the letter is taken from a copy written by the duchess, the remainder from a copy in another hand.

were not for my duty to the queen and friendship to lord treasurer, I should beg that somebody else might execute my office. Not that I take any thing ill, but that the weight is too great for me, and I find a decay in my memory. Whatever may be told to you of my looks, the greatest part of my hair is grey, but I think I am not quite so lean as I was."

Marlborough, as we have just seen, sympathised in the embarrassments of Godolphin, and was not less alarmed than the queen at the design which he had announced of retiring. Without delay he deprecated his resolution as no less injurious to his friends and country than to Europe in general.

"*Vilaine, Sept. 9.* — In yours of the 20th, you say it would be an ease to you to retire from business, the weight of which you cannot bear, if you are not allowed some assistance. I hope the queen will do every thing for your ease, but that of parting with you, in which, should you have a serious thought, you could not justify yourself to God or man; for without flattery, as England is divided, there is nobody that can execute your place but yourself."

"*Grametz, Sept. 16.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 30th, from St. Alban's, and am very much concerned that those of the 27th are lost, since you tell me you had in that given me an account of a conversation with Mrs. Morley. \* Lady Marlborough's letter of the 28th, which mentions that conversation, has very much alarmed me; for, without flattery, I am positively of the opinion, that should you quit the service of the queen, you would not only disturb the affairs of England, but also the liberties of Europe; so that I conjure you not to have a thought of quitting till we have obtained a good peace; and then I hope the queen's interest may be so well settled that she may allow of our living quietly. But as the affairs of Europe, and those of the queen in particular, are at this time, I think both you and I are in conscience and honour bound to undergo all the dangers and troubles that is possible, to bring this war to a happy end, which I think must be after the next campaign, if we can agree to carry it on with vigour.

"We have not as yet any particulars of what has passed at Turin, but we may be assured by the French silence that they are not pleased.

"I shall be very uneasy till I hear from you that every thing is easy between Mrs. Morley and yourself; for without that I shall have no heart to act in any thing, being sure that all things must go to destruction."

After alluding to some embarrassment in his military operations, he adds, in another letter, dated Grametz, Oct. 12. :—

"This has given me some trouble, but nothing of what I now feel by a letter I have received this morning from the duchess, concerning the temper and resolutions of the Whigs, by which I see all things like to go to confusion. Yours of the same date mentions nothing of it, which makes me fear you have taken your resolution, which if it be to retire I must lay the consequence before you, which is, that certainly the Dutch

will make their peace, which will be of fatal consequence, especially considering the advantages we now have; for in all probability one year's war more would give ease to all Christendom for many years."

Godolphin was as anxious to communicate as Marlborough to learn his sentiments and situation. He could not, however, convey more satisfactory information than in the preceding letters; but with a disinterested zeal which does him honour, he laboured to soothe the dissatisfaction fostered by his friend against the Whigs.

"Windsor, Sept. 10-21. — There being now four posts wanting from Holland, you will not expect one should trouble you very long from this place, from whence one can tell you nothing that is agreeable. The uneasiness betwixt the queen and myself continues as it was; nor do I see how it can ever be mended, unless you were here to do it, either by your credit with the queen, or by your authority and influence with Lord Sunderland and Lord Somers, and their friends. Not that I think them so much to blame, because they do really not see the difficulties as they are, and one cannot go about to show them those difficulties, without too much exposing the queen. Now though I really think you might be able to ease all this, yet negotiation not being my talent, I doubt it may be past cure before you come, and there is no reason to hope for the least assistance from Mrs. Freeman in this matter. \* \* \*

"The same blustering winds which keep your letters from us continue to keep the fleet still in Torbay, which is no small mortification."

In another letter, dated Windsor, Sept. 18-29., after alluding to the eagerness manifested in Holland for peace, and the difficulty of persuading the Dutch to *carry on the war with vigour*, he adds: —

"As for England, though the generality is entirely for doing it, yet the plain unwillingness in the queen to do any thing for those who have shown themselves most forward and zealous in promoting all the present advantages, is a discouragement not to be overcome by me alone. And there is not one besides in any ministerial office of the government that must not be spoken to ten times over before any thing can be executed, even after it is ordered, as I said before, with all the slowness and difficulty imaginable. When I have given you the trouble of telling you this, assure yourself that if you saw me I would tell you it is very short of the disagreeableness I find upon the subject."

To relieve the perplexity of his friend, Marlborough wrote another pressing letter to the queen, employing every argument which appeared likely to weigh with her prejudices or to influence her decision. The letter itself is missing, but an extract is preserved in his correspondence with Godolphin.

" Oct. 7. 1706. — As I am persuaded that the safety of your government, and the quiet of your life, depend very much upon the resolution you shall take at this time, I think myself bound in gratitude, duty, and conscience to let you know my mind freely; and that you may not suspect me of being partial, I take leave to assure you, in the presence of God, that I am not for your putting yourself into the hands of either party. But the behaviour of Lord Rochester, and all the hot heads of that party, is so extravagant, that there is no doubt to be made of their exposing you and the liberties of England to the rage of France, rather than not be revenged, as they call it. This being the case, there is a necessity, as well as justice in your following your inclinations in supporting lord treasurer, or all must go to confusion. As the humour is at present, he can't be supported but by the Whigs, for the others seek his destruction, which in effect is yours. Now, pray consider, if he can, by placing some few about you, gain such a confidence as shall make your business and himself safe, will not this be the sure way of making him so strong that he may hinder your being forced into a party? I beg you will believe I have no other motive to say what I do, but my zeal for your person, and friendship for a man whom I know to be honest, and zealously faithful to you " \*

But it was to the duchess that he most fully expressed the poignancy of his feelings, and his chagrin at the unjust suspicions which she and the Whigs entertained of his sincerity, at the very moment when he had advocated their cause with so much zeal and frankness. After stating his conviction that the queen could place no reliance on the Tories, but must give her confidence to those who would carry on the war and support the lord treasurer, he adds: —

" I will frankly own to you, that the jealousy some of your friends have that I and the lord treasurer do not act sincerely, makes me so weary, that were it not for my gratitude to the queen, and concern for him, I would now retire, and never serve more. For I have had the good luck to deserve better from all Englishmen, than to be suspected of not being in the true interest of my country, which I am in, and ever will be, without being of a faction; and this principle shall govern me for the little remainder of my life. I must not think of being popular, but I shall have the satisfaction of going to my grave with the opinion of having acted as became an honest man; and if I have your esteem and love, I shall think myself entirely happy. Having writ thus far, I have received your two letters of the 20th and 21st, which confirm me in my opinion before. And since the resolution is taken to vex and ruin the lord treasurer, because the queen has not complied with what was

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\* In this extract, Marlborough has, for the sake of brevity, omitted the title of majesty, and the forms of ceremony, which he never failed to use in his correspondence with the queen herself.

desired for Lord Sunderland, I shall from henceforth despise all mankind, and think there is no such thing as virtue; for I know with what zeal the lord treasurer has pressed the queen in that matter. I do pity him, and shall love him as long as I live, and never will be a friend to any that can be his enemy.

"I have writ my mind very freely to the queen on this occasion, so that whatever misfortune may happen, I shall have a quiet mind, having done what I thought my duty. And as for the resolution of making me uneasy, I believe they will not have much pleasure in that, for as I have not set my heart on having justice done me, I shall not be disappointed, nor will I be ill used by any man."\*

"*Grametz, October 7.* — I am to return you my thanks for five of yours, all from Woodstock. I could wish with all my heart every thing were more to your mind; for I find when you wrote most of them, you had very much the spleen, and in one I had my share, for I see I lie under the same misfortune I have ever done, of not behaving myself as I ought to the queen.

"I hope Mr. Hackmore will be able to mend those faults you find in the house, but the great fault I find is, that I shall never live to see it finished; for I had flattered myself, that if the war should happily have ended this next year, I might the next after have lived in it; for I am resolved to be neither minister nor courtier, not doubting the queen will allow of it. But these are idle dreams, for whilst the war lasts I must serve, and will do it with all my heart; and if at last I am rewarded with your love and esteem, I shall end my days happily, and without it nothing can make me easy.

"I am taking measures to leave the army about three weeks hence, so that I shall have the happiness of being above one month sooner with you than I have been for these last three years."

In a letter to Godolphin himself, he expresses in stronger terms the same friendship and attachment which he had repeatedly announced.

"I have writ my mind with freedom to the queen, so that having done my duty, let what will happen, I shall be more easy in my mind. Allow me to give you this assurance, that as I know you to be a sincere, honest man, may God bless me as I shall be careful *that whatever man is your enemy shall never be my friend.* As soon as you receive this, I conjure you to let me have your thoughts freely, for till then I shall be very uneasy."

In the meantime reflection seemed to strengthen the determination of the queen, and she regarded the threat of the Whigs as a proof of their design to monopolise all the offices of state, and reduce her to dependence. Instead, therefore,

\* This letter is printed in the *Conduct of the duchess*, but was deemed too important a document to be omitted here.

" These things make me much concerned to trouble you majesty with repeating so often, that the future quiet and happiness of your whole life depends upon what is done in this winter, and you have an opportunity of making your government strong, which you will never have again.

" Your majesty will have me think you are desirous of my advice, and of the continuance of my service, and yet you are not pleased to have any regard to it, in a time, and upon an occasion of the greatest consequence that can ever happen to you. By what your majesty says of some particulars in my letter, I find I have not expressed myself so as that your majesty seems to have rightly apprehended my meaning in them. I must, therefore, endeavour to explain myself better as soon as I can: but since to go about it now would make this letter too tedious, I hope you will allow me to do it in words, when I have the honour to wait upon you."

The coldness and brevity of the queen's reply will show the slight impression which this remonstrance produced.

" *Kensington, Sept. 28.* — Though I hope to see you on Wednesday, I cannot help writing a few words, to thank you for your letter, and I beg you would believe I am as sensible as any body can be, that the particular things you mention are of the greatest consequence imaginable, and that this is a very critical time; upon which subject I think there is a great deal could be said, but I shall defer telling you my poor opinion till we meet, and only now assure you, that I am, with all sincerity, yours." \*

## CHAP. LII. — MARLBOROUGH IN ENGLAND. — 1706.

THE projected change inflamed the political variance between the queen and the duchess, to which we have already referred. The duchess, who on no occasion was temperate, was warmed with additional zeal, when it was in agitation to raise to one of the highest offices of state, a nobleman who was not only an ardent Whig, but her own son-in-law. It is now, therefore, that we perceive the splenetic effusions of both parties changed into the strongest expressions of resentment, contempt, and indignation, and observe the foundation laid of an enmity as violent and inveterate, as their friendship had been ardent and excessive. To detail their incessant disputes does not fall within the compass of this

\* Copy, in the hand-writing of the duchess.

work ; but we shall interweave a few extracts, which will serve to show the character of their epistolary intercourse.

*The Duchess to the Queen.*

" I conclude your majesty will believe my arguments upon this subject proceed chiefly from the partiality which I have for my lord Sunderland, though I solemnly protest that I never had any for any person to the prejudice of what I believed your interest. And I had rather he had any other place, or none at all, if the party that most assist you would be satisfied without it ; for, besides the very great trouble of that office, executed as it should be, he is not of a humour to get any thing by such an employment ; and I wish from my soul that any other man had been proposed to you, that you could not have suspected I had any concern for. But 'tis certain that your government can't be carried on with a part of the Tories, and the *Whigs disoblged, who, when that happens, will join with any people to torment you, and those that are your true servants.*\* I am sure it is my interest, as well as inclination, to have you succeed by any sort of men in what is just, and that will prevent what has been done from being thrown away. Your security and the nation's is my chief wish, and I beg of God Almighty, as sincerely as I shall do for His pardon at my last hour, that Mr. and Mrs. Morley may see their errors as to this *notion* before it is too late ; but considering how little impression any thing makes that comes from your faithful Freeman, I have troubled you too much, and I beg your pardon for it."

The queen was naturally irritated as much by this opposition to her will, as by the intemperance of such language. Mistaking, or affecting to mistake, the word *notion* for *nation*, she treated the observation as a studied affront, refused to reply, and assailed Lord Godolphin with complaints against such disrespectful behaviour. Hence the duchess was induced to write an explanatory and expostulatory letter, although she could not desist from employing the same improper and indecorous style.

" *August 30.*—Your majesty's great indifference and contempt in taking no notice of my last letter, did not so much surprise me, as to hear my lord treasurer say you had complained much of it, which makes me presume to give you this trouble to repeat what I can be very positive was the whole aim of the letter, and I believe *very near* the words. It was in the first place, to show the reason why I had not waited upon your majesty, believing you were uneasy, and fearing you might think I had some private concern for Lord Sunderland. I therefore thought it necessary to assure your majesty that I had none so great as for your service, and to see my lord treasurer so mortified at the necessity of quit-

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\* The ardour of the writer makes her reckless of consequences. The duchess was a Whig ; and what a picture of her confederates ! — Ed.

ting it, or being the ruin of that and himself together. Then I took the liberty to show, as well as I could, that it was really no hardship nor unkindness to Sir Charles Hedges; and I think I might have added, tho' I believe I did not, that your majesty, to carry on your government, must have men that neither herd with your enemies, nor that are in themselves insignificant. At last, I concluded, if I am not more mistaken than ever I was in my life, with these following words, that I did pray to God Almighty with as much earnestness as I should at my last day for the saving of my soul, that Mrs. and Mr. Morley might see their errors. This is the whole sense of the letter; and having had the honour to know your majesty when you had other thoughts of me than you are pleased to have now, and when you did think fit to take advice and information, I could not reasonably imagine that you should be offended at my earnest endeavours to serve you, and pray that you nor the prince might not be deceived. But finding that no proofs nor demonstrations of my faithfulness to your interest can make any thing agreeable to your majesty that comes from me, I will not enlarge upon this subject. I will only beg one piece of justice, and that I fancy you would not refuse to any body, if you believed it one, that you will show my lord treasurer the letter of which your majesty has complained; and I wish from the bottom of my heart, that he, or any body that is faithful to you and the prince, could see every word that ever I writ to your majesty in my life."

Godolphin, who was charged with the unpleasant office of delivering this curious epistle, thus communicates the result of his audience.

*"Windsor, Sunday.* — According to your commands, I gave your letter to Mrs. Morley. As she was going to put it in her pocket, I told her that you had made me promise to beg of her to read it before I went out of the room. She did so, and then said she believed she had mistaken some words at the latter end of the former letter, which she seemed to think had a different sense from that which I had given her from you; but because you desired I might see it, she would look for it, and give it me, which she did, and desired me to return it to her to-day. I come now from giving it back into her hands, and I think I have convinced her that her complaint was grounded upon her having misapprehended the sense of your letter, by not reading it right, that is to say, by reading the word *notion* for *nation*. To explain this the more clearly to you, I send you a copy of the conclusion of your first letter to her, taken as far back as I thought was enough to show the plain sense and meaning of your letter. At the same time I must own that in your original letter, that word *notion* was not so distinctly written, but that one might naturally read it *nation*, if the sense of two or three lines together before did not fully explain your meaning. As to the main point, she has only told me that she had written a letter to me, as she said she would, to explain her difficulty, but she must write it out before she could give it me."

The interposition of Godolphin, aided by more deliberate reflection, contributed to soothe the resentment of the queen;

but, contrary to her usual custom, she suffered a week to elapse before she replied.

*"Friday morning.* — Since my dear Mrs. Freeman could imagine my not taking notice of her letter that was writ before she went to St. Alban's, proceeded from indifference or contempt, what will she think of my not answering her other in another week's time? But I do assure you it was neither of the reasons you mention that hindered me from writing, *nor no other*, but the concern I have been in since the change of the secretary was proposed to me. I have obeyed your commands in showing your letter to my lord treasurer, and find my complaint was not without some ground, a mistake any body might make upon the first reading; for you had made an *a* instead of an *o*, which quite altered the word. I am very sensible all you say proceeds from the concern you have for my service, and it is impossible to be more mortified than I am, to see my lord treasurer in such uneasiness; and his leaving my service is a thought I cannot bear, and I hope in God he will put all such out of his own mind. Now that you are come hither again, I hope you will not go to Woodstock without giving me one look, for whatever hard thoughts you may have of me, I am sure I do not deserve them, and I will not be uneasy if you come to me; for though you are never so unkind, I will ever preserve a most sincere and tender passion for my dear Mrs. Freeman."

Several other letters passed, which it would be needless to insert, as they all bear the same tone and character. The queen, indeed, became disgusted with this epistolary controversy, and gradually delayed her replies, till the correspondence on the unpleasant subject was discontinued.

The lord treasurer was now sensible that the interference of the duchess was become as fruitless as his own, and that their different appeals had served only to render the queen more pertinacious. He had, therefore, no other alternative than to renew his instances to Marlborough, with the conviction that nothing but his just and temperate arguments, supported by the merit of his great services, could produce the expected effect.

Before, however, his application could reach the camp, we find a letter from the duke to the duchess, written in a style which shows his perplexity and concern.

*"Cambron, Oct. 18.* — \* \* \* \* I hope you will order it so, that after I have been some days at London, we may go to the lodge and be quiet, for I am quite weary of the world; and since I am afraid there is a necessity of my serving in this country as long as this war lasts, let me have a little more quiet in England than I have been used to have, and then I shall be the better able to go through what I must endure in this country; for upon the success we have had this year, our friends grow

less governable than when they were afraid of the French. \* \* \* \*  
 As I have no farther prospect of doing any more service to the public this campaign, but that of putting Courtray in a condition, every day is very tedious; and for the two or three days I shall be at Brussels I shall be torn to pieces, there being twenty pretenders to every place that must be given; for I have not been able to prevail with the deputies to declare them before my arrival, which would have given me ease.

"Having writ thus far, I have had the happiness of your kind letters of the 23d, 26th, and 29th of the last month, from Woodstock. The express you mention which the lord treasurer writ me word from St. Alban's he would send, yet I hear nothing of it, though I have received another letter of his from Newmarket. I have already more than once writ my mind very freely, so that my conscience is at ease, though my mind is very far from it; for I did flatter myself that my zeal and sincerity for the queen were so well known to her, that my representations would have had more weight than I find they have. But nothing can ever hinder me from being ready to lay down my life when she can think it for her service; for I serve with an entire affection, as well as the utmost duty; for you and I, and all ours, would be the most ungrateful people that ever lived, if we did not venture all for her good. By this, do not mistake me; for I am very sensible that if my lord treasurer be obliged to retire, I cannot serve in the ministry. But when these projectors have put all in confusion, I shall then readily not only venture my life, but all that I have, to show my gratitude. When the express comes, by which I shall see all that has passed, I shall once more write, as becomes me, and will yet hope it may have its effect; if not, God's will be done."

On the arrival of the expected messenger, Marlborough did not hesitate to fulfil his promise, though hopeless of success. He again wrote to the queen a letter, at once firm and respectful, displaying in detail the mischiefs which she must expect to encounter, if she persisted in consulting rather her own personal prejudices, than the public interest. At the same time he inclosed a letter from the treasurer, which he supposed would give additional weight to his instances.

"*Cambrom, Oct. 24.* — I have had the honour of your majesty's of the 27th and 1st of this month. The last has mortified and troubled me very much, since by it, I see the little effect my letters have had with your majesty, so that I was resolved to have been silent, till I should have had the honour of being near your person. But finding by the lord treasurer's letters, as well as by others, that the measures you must take before the meeting of the parliament will have the consequence of making every thing go easy, or ruining your business, I could not avoid troubling you on this subject. The lord treasurer assures me that any other measures but those he has proposed must ruin your business, and oblige him to quit his staff, which would be a great trouble to him, and I am afraid will have the fatal consequence of putting you into the hands of a

party, which God only knows how you would then be able to get out of it. It is true that your reign has been so manifestly blessed by God, that one might reasonably think you might govern without making use of the heads of either party, but as it might be easy to yourself. This might be practicable if both parties sought your favour, as in reason and duty they ought. But, madam; the truth is, that the heads of one party have declared against you and your government, as far as it's possible, without going into open rebellion. Now, should your majesty disoblige the others, how is it possible to obtain near five millions for carrying on the war with vigour, without which all is undone. Your majesty has had so much knowledge and experience yourself of the capacity and integrity of the lord treasurer, that you cannot but know you may safely rely upon his advice, and if there be any opinions different from his, your majesty will allow me to say, they neither know so much of these matters, nor can they judge so well of them.

"I take the liberty of sending a copy of a letter the lord treasurer writ to me on the 13th of the last month. I shall repeat nothing in it, but earnestly desire you will once more read it. And as I would in return for your many favours, die to make you and your government easy, makes me take the liberty, with all submission on my knees, to beg for your own sake, the good of your country, and all the liberties of Europe, that you would not lose one day in giving the lord treasurer that necessary assistance he thinks proper, for carrying on of your business in parliament, by which you will not only enable him to make your business go well, but also that of governing the only party that can be made use of. I am very confident the lord treasurer thinks he shall be able to govern them to your satisfaction, or he would not say so much as he does; and as for myself, I beg your majesty's justice in believing that I shall take all the care I can to make them sensible of the obligations they have to you, so that you may never have reason to repent the measures, I hope in God, you will now take. I can have no ease nor quiet till I have the honour of hearing from your majesty, being with the utmost duty and respect, &c. I do most humbly beg you will be pleased to keep the inclosed letter till I have the honour of waiting upon you."

The purport of this letter was of course communicated to Godolphin; and to him Marlborough observes: —

"October 25. — You will see by the inclosed copy what I writ to the queen, and I hope you will not disapprove of my sending a copy of yours to the queen, writ on the 13th of the last month. If the queen has complied with your desires, you will be the best judge of what may be proper to be done with my letter, either to deliver it or to burn it."

A subsequent letter indicates still more strongly his despair of success: —

"Brussels, Oct. 29. — If the letter I sent you by the express has no effect with the queen, I shall conclude that God intends that way to punish us for our faults; for I think what you write in yours of the 13th of September is not to be answered; for in England no minister can, or ought

to govern without help. God preserve her, and send you to serve her long."

These letters, as well as similar appeals at a future period, did not produce the expected effect. We find, from a letter of Godolphin to the duchess, not only that the queen continued indisposed towards her, but that she still manifested the same repugnance against the admission of Sunderland:—

"Mrs. Morley sent for me this morning, and complained much of Mrs. Freeman's letter, and particularly of the last two or three lines upon that part which related to 110.\* She appealed to me, upon which I said I could not but remember she had some difficulties, and I believe she liked this man better than she expected to do; and from thence I went on to tell her that I knew very well all Mrs. Freeman's complaints proceeded from having lost Mrs. Morley's kindness unjustly, and her telling her truths which other people would not; to which she said, as she has done forty times, how could she show her any more kindness than she did, when she would never come near her. I said, she had tried that several times, and complained it was always the same thing. Upon that she said, Mrs. Freeman would grow warm sometimes, and then she herself could not help being warmer than she ought to be, but that she was always ready to be easy with Mrs. Freeman. I said, I hoped then she would be so, for that I would die, with all my soul, to have them two as they used to be. Then she said she would send me a letter for you, and so she did last night, intending I should have sent it by the post, but I thought it was better to keep it for this messenger. But when all this is done, you may see by her letter to Lord Marlborough, which he sent me, that she leans still towards expedients, though I have told her, that to satisfy her, I had tried how far that would go, and the thing was not capable of any expedient, and that I was convinced by what had been said to me by Lord Somers and Lord Halifax, that it was infinitely more for her advantage not to think of any such thing as an expedient. But she told me the other day, she believed I thought it strange that she said nothing upon my showing her Lord Marlborough's letter; but it was, that though she was very uneasy to see what he writ, she could not, for her life, be convinced but her expedient was better; and when he comes over she will certainly talk so to him; but if he holds firm to what he has written and said, as I do not doubt he will, I dare say she will do the thing."

The concluding observation of Godolphin was verified; for although the parliament was on the point of assembling, the queen still continued to protract her final decision.

The repugnance which the queen manifested to these changes, notwithstanding the instances of two ministers, turned the suspicions of the Whigs into a new course.

\* The cipher probably for Lord Chancellor Cowper.—Ed.

Justly ascribing to Harley the opposition made to their views, they were anxious to involve him in the disgrace of Sir Charles Hedges, and thus to exclude still more the remnant of the opposite party from the ostensible offices of state. With this intention the agency of the duchess was employed, to inspire the duke and Godolphin with similar jealousies of a minister who abused their confidence, and was exerting his favour with the queen to their detriment. Their representations, though founded on fact, did not make the desired impression on the two friends. Marlborough, in particular, was fascinated by the zealous professions and apparent candour of Harley, and treated the imputation as the usual fruit of party spirit. With Godolphin, also, the accusation seems to have had little weight, for we find him at this very moment appealing to Harley for information concerning the relative strength of the contending parties.

Harley indeed was not without hope of gaining the two ministers, and turning their influence against the Whigs; and his replies prove his anxiety to revive the Tory propensities of the treasurer. After adverting to their original principle of uniting the moderate and able of both parties, he endeavours to prove that no concession would gratify the Whigs, till they had usurped the whole power of the state; he hinted that their preponderance was more apparent than real, and contended that in a new parliament, if supported by the favour of the crown and the influence of the ministers, the Tories would certainly regain the ascendancy. One of these letters to Lord Godolphin has been already printed\*; the other is here given as a striking specimen of the adroit, supple, and insinuating character of the writer.

" My lord,

Nov. 16.

" I received the honour of your lordship's letter, and shall be very ready, whenever your lordship thinks it a proper time, to receive your commands about Vienna, or any thing else; for I do assure your lordship I have no thoughts but for the queen's service and your lordship's, neither would I ever mention any thing disagreeable to your lordship, if I was not persuaded that the public interest were concerned in it. I have no obligation to any party; I have no inclination to any one more than another; I have no animosity to any. But I think I should not do the duty of a public servant to your lordship, if I did not tell you what

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\* See Somerville's *Queen Anne*, p. 622. From the *Hardwicke Collection*.

your lordship may hear if you please, from people of undoubted credit, from Whigs themselves, that all that has been done has not obliged the party; whether it has their pretended leaders, will be shown hereafter. I have no concern; but only that what has been done, I wish the best of the Whigs had been the better for it. As for the violence of the other side, I hope I have showed myself as zealous against them as any one whatever. I think the distinction of the tackers was what they justly deserved. But, my lord, this is now carrying farther. Not only the 134\* are to be persecuted, but all the rest; not only those who upheld them, but those without whose assistance these gentlemen could not have been an equality, much less a majority. They have endeavoured their ruin; nay, they have proceeded so far as to proscribe (to use the words of a zealous Whig and no *whimsical*†) many of their own party. In short, the lay and ecclesiastical policy is, by misrepresentation, to make those they do not like desperate; they are doing their best to turn the pyramid on its point. But I hope your lordship will rescue us from the violence of either party; and I cannot forbear saying, I know no difference between a mad Whig and a mad Tory, and as for the inveteracy of either party,

*Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.*

“There is no need of going back two years, nor scarce four months, to hear the most inveterate, malicious things said by their leaders against the queen, my lord duke, and your lordship, that tongue could utter, besides what the last parliament could produce from their undertakings; and this is so notorious, that it is very common to match one malicious story from a Tory with another from a Whig. I will trouble your lordship no more; but there is a disposition to do every thing that is reasonable, without any previous engagement; there is no need of faith, where works only are to be the proof. It will be very hard ever to bring the nation to submit to any other government but the queen's. In her they will all centre, and another election will show that the party, as a party, are very far from being a majority, though clothed with all manner of authority that can be given it. I must now beg your lordship's pardon for this tedious letter, which is dictated by a heart unfeignedly devoted to your service.”

Not content with these insinuations to the treasurer, Harley wrote to the general, censuring the Whigs, and making a more direct and explicit offer of the services which the Tories were prepared to render.

“My lord,

*Sept. 6.*

“The last of the Scots lords are gone down this week; I hope they will be in earnest to carry the union thro'. It is so just and beneficial to both nations, that none can be against it, but those who do not understand it, or are ill-intentioned to the common good. It is plain the duke

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\* The number of those who voted for the tack.

† This epithet was applied to the violent of all parties.

of Hamilton has it more his interest than any one man in that nation, that the union should succeed, yet I believe he is gone out of Lancashire into Scotland resolved to oppose it. I do not understand that country, and therefore cannot tell what will be the success; but I think, in my poor opinion, it is very easy to have the next session pass very well in all respects; yet it is plain some persons are endeavouring to make every thing difficult, by pursuing their old maxim, to make as many people as they can desperate. This being now obvious, I hope those who can hinder it will do it. I can only add, that I will obey your grace's commands without reserve."

"My lord,

*Whitehall, Nov. 12-23.*

"I was detained in the country till Saturday last, by excessive floods. I had the honour to receive your grace's letter, with one inclosed to my lord keeper on Sunday last, which I immediately sent to his lordship. This morning I am honoured with your grace's letter from the Hague, of the 20th. I heartily wish your grace a prosperous voyage, and a speedy arrival here, where I am sure you will find such a disposition to do every thing that is reasonable, as I never did remember formerly; and they ask nothing, but only not to be exposed, and that their service may be accepted. I doubt not but your grace's true sense and superior genius will dispel all those clouds that hang about us, and show the true path to a lasting well-founded settlement, clear of the narrow principles and practice of the heads of both factions. I doubt not but your grace has had all the requisite powers sent to you during my absence, and I am sure your grace will manage and improve every thing for the glory of the queen, and the common benefit of the nation."

A similar appeal, conceived almost in the same terms, had been previously made by St. John, in whom Marlborough reposed peculiar confidence.

"I do not hear of any besides my Lord Guildford and Mr. Bertie, but what intend to act in the lieutenancy of Oxfordshire, and am confident your grace will make that county reasonable, and your own. The same methods that your grace takes there would produce the same effects all over England. There are some restless spirits who are foolishly imagined to be heads of a party, who make much noise and have no real strength,—that expect the queen, crowned with success abroad, and governing without blemish at home, should court them at the expense of her own authority, and support her administration by the same shifts that a vile and profligate one can only be kept up with. Nothing but unnecessary compliance can give these people strength; and their having that, is the great terror of those who are trusty servants to the queen, and who are entirely attached to your grace and to my lord treasurer. We have had some instances of late, how they would use power; and your grace cannot but know that in the distribution of employments, they have insisted on the scum of their own party. If this was only my private sense, I should not presume to trouble your grace with it; but it is the sense, and the discourse too, of every man in England, that wishes the

queen's glory and prosperity, and that loves and honours my lord treasurer and your grace. I am too well acquainted with your grace's goodness to suspect you will not pardon me for saying so much, since I have no interest or view of my own that shall come in competition with the queen's service, and my gratitude and duty to you, who have tied me to be, ever, my lord, your grace's most devoted, faithful, humble servant."

These letters will supersede the necessity of whole pages of comment, and perfectly display the temper and state of the administration. Harley, and the few moderate Tories yet in power, were striving to undermine their political antagonists, and to draw the two ministers to their party. The Whigs, on the contrary, were not satisfied, but jealous of Marlborough and Godolphin. Each successive point which they gained was considered only as a prelude to another; and they were eager for an opportunity of forcing the ministers, whose confidence they were well aware they did not possess, to rely on their single efforts for support. Both were equally averse to resign themselves to either party. They were inclined to the Tories, though disapproving their violence; but compelled by necessity to identify themselves with the Whigs, without whose assistance they could not carry on the government. The queen was disappointed that Marlborough had not rescued her from the bondage of the Whigs, and beginning to withdraw from him and the treasurer that confidence and gratitude which she had hitherto entertained for their persons and services. Her alienation was increased by the acrimonious reproaches of the duchess, who, in her zeal for the advancement of the Whig interest, over-stepped the bounds, not only of respect, but of prudence, and aggravated the embarrassment of her husband and the treasurer.

In the anxiety of Harley to profit by these feuds, and form an independent interest, he at length forgot his usual caution, and awakened the suspicion of Godolphin, whose reliance on his attachment neither the suggestions of the Whigs, nor the insinuations of the duchess, had hitherto been able to shake. He communicated his sentiments to his friend, though with a mixture of doubt and hesitation:—

"Oct. 18–29. — Lady Marlborough told me this morning, and promised to write to you, that Mr. Harley, Mr. St. John, and one or two more of your particular friends, were underhand endeavouring to bring

all the difficulties they could think of upon the public business in the next sessions, and spoke of it to me as taking it for granted, it was what I could not have heard of before. I am apt to think they may have made some steps toward this, which are not justifiable, out of an apprehension that others would have all the merit; but whatever be their motive, the thing is destructive and pernicious. I have had a long letter this very day, full of professions of being guided in these measures, as in all others, by you and me; but at the same time, I doubt so much smoke could not come without some fire."

From implicit confidence in the discernment of his friend, Marlborough seems at length to have become sensible of the petty intrigues and aspiring views of Harley; but still he regarded his cabals with indulgence, and was only anxious to render this discovery the means of repressing the encroachments of the Whigs, and maintaining the balance between the two parties.

"*Hague, Nov. 9.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 15th, 18th, and 21st, by the express. In one of them I find you have received a letter from Mr. Harley, full of expressions. I beg you will lay hold of the occasion, and when he is with you, that you would acquaint him with the business of Sir Charles Hedges and Lord Sunderland, and give him your reasons for the change; for he must not be suffered to go on in the project that Lady Marlborough acquainted you with; and by gaining him you will govern the others without taking any pains with them. I have not heard from Lady Marlborough, but I believe the thing is true. However, if you take this method, I am very confident when I shall be with you, you will be able to make Mr. Secretary Harley very useful to yourself and the queen's business; and by it you will enable me to make the others sensible of their error."

The secret cabals of Harley were not, however, to be restrained by the fear of displeasing his two patrons, for he still continued to oppose with success the transfer of the secretaryship. As late as October 18. Godolphin thus wrote to the duchess: —

"*Friday night, at eleven.* — I can't help making haste to thank you to-night, for the favour of your letters, both of Wednesday and Thursday in one packet; tho' this day has been a day of so much hurry of all kinds, that 'tis but just now I have been able to sit down to write to you. I have written a long letter to Lord Marlborough, and inclosed yours in it, tho' it was as thick as it was long, which, with my handiness at making up a packet, gave mine a particularly graceful figure. The uneasiness which Mr. Montgomery complained of lately to you, is too long a story to be written, and must be kept till I have the happiness to see you, which I still hope is not far off. The lodge is a very pretty place, and Lord Marlborough, I see in his letter, desires to find or carry you thither

very soon. I return you his letter, with my opinion, that it should be sent to Mrs. Morley; for, tho' it be no news to her, it may be of use to see he continues of the same mind, and will be so when he comes hither; for which reason, as well as others, I confess I am extremely impatient to have him here. I am glad you did not send him word of Lord Sunderland's apprehensions, since there is not the least ground for them, and they would only have made him uneasy with him. I am sorry he and his friends continue so uneasy, since we have no other bottom to stand upon. Nothing shall be omitted by me to make them easier, tho' the queen is very far yet from being sensible of her circumstances in that particular.

"Our letters to-day from Scotland are full of hopes to carry the union. Lord Sunderland is much pleased with this news, and Lord Somers much more, which shows me the other would be so too, if he had not uneasiness upon the other account. All Mr. Johnston's friends have behaved themselves well, so I am now as fond of him as you are of his letter."

In this state of suspense, the presence of Marlborough produced an instantaneous effect. Departing from the Hague, he landed at Margate on the 16th of November, and reached London on the 18th. The recollection of his services, and the burst of popularity which his appearance awakened, gave weight to his personal representations. In his first private audience, the queen again recurred to the compromise which she had before proposed to Godolphin, but without effect. At length dreading, lest farther hesitation should provoke the Whigs, not only to turn their attacks against Harley, but to oppose the measures of government, she reluctantly acquiesced in the removal of Sir Charles Hedges, and the promotion of Sunderland. His appointment was announced only on the 3rd of December, the very day fixed for the meeting of parliament.

This important step being taken, less difficulty remained on inferior points. Several promotions were made in the peerage, in favour of the Whigs, among which we particularly notice Mr. Cowper and Sir Thomas Pelham, who were created barons, and Lord Wharton and Lord Cholmondely, who were raised to earldoms. The same rank was also conferred on Godolphin himself.

Soon afterwards farther changes were made. Sir James Montagu, brother of Lord Halifax, was appointed solicitor-general; and Lord Stamford, with Lord Herbert of Chisbury, and Mr. Pulteney, were constituted commissioners of trade, in the room of Viscount Weymouth, Mr. Monkton,

and Mr. Prior. In consenting to this arrangement, Marlborough proved that neither political expedience, nor party interest, outweighed his respect for merit. He not only continued to manifest the same friendship toward the disgraced poet, but procured him a pension, as some compensation for the loss of his post, and laboured to soothe his chagrin by marks of personal regard. Indeed Prior, for a considerable period, looked up to his noble patron for advancement, and by his interest endeavoured to obtain first an increase of his pension, and afterwards the post of envoy at the Hague or Brussels.\* But on the decline of Marlborough's favour, and the restoration of his former friends to office, Prior was among the earliest who abandoned the fallen commander, and vied with Harley and St. John in repaying his past kindness with ingratitude.

The queen also removed from the privy council the chiefs of the Tory party, among whom we particularly notice the duke of Buckingham, the earls of Nottingham, Rochester, and Jersey; Lord Gower, and Sir George Rooke. The administration now therefore assumed a new character, and may be considered as established on a Whig basis; Harley and St. John being the only Tories of any note, who were suffered to retain a place of distinction and responsibility.

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CHAP. LIII. — PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. — 1706, 1707.

THIS triumph over the prejudices of the queen, and the combined efforts of the violent Tories, as well as over the secret, but powerful opposition of Harley, stimulated the Whigs to exert all their influence in favour of the government, and to continue, with unabating zeal, their support of the war and the political system of Marlborough. They also vied with Godolphin in bestowing due reward on his eminent services. As their party predominated in the House of Lords, and was considerable in the Commons, the session passed with unusual

\* Letters from Prior to the Duke of Marlborough, in 1707 and 1708. — *Marlborough Papers*.

the confederates had taken the field, so your faithful commons have granted subsidies, before the enemy were apprised that the parliament had assembled."

During these proceedings the Duke of Marlborough was greeted with those marks of national gratitude and honour which his services so well deserved. On taking his seat he was welcomed by the lord keeper, in a speech expressing the thanks of the house, not in the formal style of parliamentary proceedings, but in the language of the heart.

"My Lord Duke of Marlborough,

"I am commanded by this house to give your grace their acknowledgment and thanks for the eminent services you have done since the last session of parliament, to her majesty and your country, together with their confederates in this just and necessary war. Though some former successes against the power of France, while it remained unbroken, gave most reasonable expectation that you would not fail to improve them; yet what your grace has performed this last campaign has far exceeded all hopes, even of such as were most affectionate and partial to their country's interest and your glory. The advantages you have gained against the enemy are of such a nature, so conspicuous in themselves, so undoubtedly owing to your courage and conduct, so sensibly and universally beneficial in their consequences to the whole confederacy, that to attempt to adorn them with the colouring of words would be vain and inexcusable; and therefore I decline it, the rather because I should certainly offend that great modesty which alone can, and does add lustre to your actions, and which, in your grace's example, has successfully withstood as great trials as that virtue has met with in any instance whatsoever. And I beg leave to say, that if any thing could move your grace to reflect with much satisfaction on your own merit, it would be this, that so august an assembly does, with one voice, praise and thank you: an honour, which a judgment so sure as that of your grace's, to think rightly of every thing, cannot but prefer to the ostentation of a public triumph."

The reply of the duke was brief and modest.

"I esteem this a very particular honour, which your lordships are pleased to do me. Nobody in the world can be more sensible of it than I am, nor more desirous to deserve the countenance of your favour and good opinion."

On the 4th a committee of the Commons also waited on the duke to convey the thanks and congratulations of the lower house for his eminent services and late glorious victory. His reply was given in similar terms to that which he had delivered in the House of Peers.

The gratulation of both houses was the prelude to another

public recompence, — a regulation to render permanent in his descendants the title as well as the pension and territorial property annexed to the ducal honour. Having lost his only son, and being without hopes of farther issue, the duke was naturally anxious that the rewards which had been granted for his meritorious services should be extended to his daughters and their posterity. This extension was made in a manner no less gratifying than honourable. On the 17th of December the House of Lords presented an address to the queen, requesting her majesty to perpetuate the memory of the great actions of the Duke of Marlborough, by continuing his titles and honours in his posterity, by act of parliament, and soliciting that the queen would please, in virtue of her prerogative, to indicate in what manner they should be so limited.

The queen, in reply, having expressed her resolution to extend the titles and honours of the duke to his daughters and their heirs male, in succession, so as to comprise all his posterity, recommended that the honour and manor of Woodstock, with the house of Blenheim, should always descend with the title. In the course of the deliberation, the Duke of Marlborough addressed the house, in terms indicative of his gratitude and satisfaction.

“ My lords,

“ I cannot find words sufficient to express the sense I have of the great and distinguished honour which the house has been pleased to do me in their resolution and their application to her majesty. The thoughts of it will be a continual satisfaction to me, and the highest encouragement; and the thankful memory of it must last as long as any posterity of mine.

“ I beg leave to say a word to the house in relation to that part of her majesty's most gracious answer which concerns the estate of Woodstock and the house of Blenheim. I did make my humble request to the queen, that those might go along with the titles, and I make the like request to your lordships, that after the Duchess of Marlborough's death, *upon whom they are settled in jointure*, that estate and house may be limited to go always along with the honour.”

This request was speedily gratified. The requisite bills being prepared and approved by the peers, were transmitted to the Commons on the 19th. On the ensuing day they were thrice read, for the sake of form, and being passed unanimously, received the royal sanction without delay. The settlement consisted of two acts: the first rendered the ho-

nours and dignities of John Duke of Marlborough permanent in his posterity, and annexed the manor of Woodstock, with the house of Blenheim, to the ducal title, after the death of the duchess. The second was to entail in perpetuity the annual sum of 5000*l.* from the Post-office, first upon the duchess, and afterwards upon his eldest daughter, Lady Harriet Godolphin, and her heirs male; and in failure of such issue, successively to the three other daughters and their heirs male: namely, Anne, countess of Sunderland; Elizabeth, countess of Bridgewater; and Mary, marchioness of Mounthermer.\*

The duke appears, in this instance, to have lost the anxiety which he had formerly manifested for the perpetuation of his name; for, instead of the clause, which he had inserted in the draught of his will, in 1703, binding his representatives in succession to assume the name and arms of Churchill, this act contains no such stipulation. Another singularity is, the confirmation of the settlement made by jointure on the duchess, and the extension of the grant of 5000*l.* annually to her during her life. This provision was suggested by the affection of the duke, who, as he himself observed, had made it his particular request to the queen, and urged his son-in-law to propose and support it in the House of Lords.† Among the papers of the duchess we find her thanks to the queen, written in a cold and formal style, which shows, that either the irritation of their recent dispute was not calmed by this act of munificence, or that the duchess did not deem herself so much indebted to the friendship of the sovereign as to the intercession of her husband.

“Whether I have or have not the honour to see your majesty, I find

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\* Journals of both houses. The two acts of parliament are printed in the statutes at large, for 1706. Their titles are:

“An act for the settling of the honours and dignities of John Duke of Marlborough upon his posterity, and annexing the honour and manor of Woodstock, and house of Blenheim, to go along with the said honours.”

“An act for settling upon John Duke of Marlborough and his posterity, a pension of 5000*l.* per annum, for the more honourable support of their dignities, in like manner as his honours and dignities, and the honour and manor of Woodstock, and the house of Blenheim, are already limited and settled.”

† Letter from the duchess to Mr. Hutchinson in 1713.

must always be something which obliges me to return you my humble thanks. The concern I have in the settlement made to Lord Marlborough's family, by the act of parliament, makes a necessity of my giving you the trouble of them upon this occasion; and though it is not natural to me to make you so many fine speeches and compliments as some others can do, yet nobody has a heart fuller of the sincerest wishes for your constant happiness and prosperity than your poor forsaken Freeman."\*

During the discussion relative to these grants, the duke experienced from the city of London the same testimonial of national gratitude as after the battle of Blenheim. At the request of the city, the standards and colours taken at the battle of Ramilies were transferred with military pomp from Whitehall, where they had been first deposited, to Guildhall. The procession commenced with a body of horse grenadiers and guards, in the centre of whom were twenty-six gentlemen, each bearing a standard. It was closed by the foot guards, who escorted a party of one hundred and twenty-six pikemen, bearing the same number of colours taken from the infantry. As the cavalcade traversed the Park and Mews of St. James's, the queen appeared at one of the windows of the palace, at once to witness the procession, and give it additional honour. Passing through the Strand, and the principal avenues leading to the place of destination, the cavalcade was hailed by innumerable crowds, who beset the streets, and filled the windows and balconies, rending the air with their shouts and acclamations.

At the moment when the triumphal cavalcade had awakened the popular enthusiasm, the duke himself traversed the streets in one of the royal coaches, accompanied by the lord treasurer and the chief officers of the royal household, and attended by a splendid train of coaches filled with the foreign ministers and nobility, and with the principal officers, who had shared the honours which he acquired in the field of Ramilies. At Temple Bar he was received by the city marshal, with the

[Indorsed by the Duchess.]

\* "This letter to the queen shows that I did not omit taking any reasonable occasion to please her, even when I saw she was changed to me; for it is certain that she never took any care of me in the settlement; and if I am ever the better for it, it is not owing to her friendship. But whatever the world said of my behaviour to her, I never failed in performing all manner of decencies and faithful services to her, while it was possible for me to do it."

same formalities as are shown towards the sovereign. With difficulty pursuing his way through the crowded streets, where every eye was eager to behold his person, and every tongue to hail his presence, he was conducted to Vintners' Hall, and partook of a splendid entertainment, given by the lord mayor and magistracy of the city.

The renewal of this public spectacle increased the popularity of the victorious general, and not only silenced the malice of his enemies, but gave additional zeal and energy to the administration of which he was the principal support.

Amidst these scenes of exultation and festivity, the important business of the state was not suffered to languish. The failure of all attempts to secure the Protestant succession, by the guarantee of the confederate powers, rendered the ministers doubly anxious to promote that object at home by the union with Scotland. As this was a domestic measure, and principally confided to Godolphin, it belongs rather to the province of the national historian than to that of the biographer. It is, therefore, sufficient to observe, that Marlborough, though engaged in military and diplomatic transactions, yet took a warm interest in an arrangement which he considered as involving, not merely the actual, but the future prosperity of England, and the permanent tranquillity of Europe. For this purpose he exerted his influence with the duke of Argyle, Lord Mar, and the Scottish nobility and gentry, and uniformly pressed Godolphin to employ no one in the administration of that country who was even suspected of disaffection, but in all cases to regard the paramount interests of England. A single extract from his correspondence, written at the time when the measure was yet in agitation, strikingly exhibits the warmth of his sentiments on a subject of such national moment.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Helchin, August 9.* — What you say of both parties is so true, that I do, with all my soul, pity you. Care must be taken against the malice of the angry party; and notwithstanding their malicious affection of crying the church may be ruined by the Union, the Union must be supported; and I hope the reasonable men of the other party will not oppose the enlarging of the bottom, so that it may be able to support itself. \* \* I had last night the honour of yours of the 13th, and am very glad to find that the commission has so unanimously agreed. I do with all my heart wish the parliament of both nations may do the same, so that her

majesty may have the glory of finishing this great work, for which she will not only deserve to be blessed in this, but also in future ages."

Before his departure for the Continent, the measure had been matured by Godolphin and the Whigs; and the commissioners, who had been already appointed in behalf of the two nations, had proceeded with such address and promptitude, that the difficulties arising from the leaven of Jacobitism in Scotland, as well as from the independent character of a high-spirited nation, were gradually overcome. The conditions were prepared for the deliberation of the English legislature early in the spring.

It may easily be imagined that an arrangement of this nature called forth all the hostility of the violent Tories, who found warm auxiliaries in the Jacobites. The arguments of Nottingham, Rochester, and their adherents, were, however, successfully combated by the treasurer and the Whig lords, in the House of Peers, and in the Commons by the ablest of the same party, as well as by the plausible eloquence of Harley and St. John, and the legal acuteness of Sir Simon Harcourt, who framed the bill of ratification. The combined efforts of the Whigs and moderate Tories vanquished all opposition, and it was carried through both houses with a vigour and despatch which has seldom distinguished any public measure of equal moment. Finally, on the 6th of March it received the sanction of the queen, who addressed the legislature in a speech strongly expressive of her satisfaction, declaring it a peculiar happiness that in her reign so full provision was made for the peace and quiet of her people, and for the security of the national religion, by so firm an establishment of the Protestant succession throughout Great Britain.

No national measure more deeply involved the welfare of the whole island; nor were the interests and even prejudices of two nations, once in the highest degree hostile, ever more happily combined. The act of security was repealed, and the same order of succession, in the Protestant line of Hanover, established in both kingdoms. The two legislatures were blended and consolidated, and the share assigned to Scotland in the national representation was so liberal as to make ample amends for the loss of her own independent parliament. Similar address was evinced in arranging the

delicate point of a religious establishment; and the permanence of the two distinctions of Protestantism, which existed in both countries, was secured by collateral provisions, rendering each system of worship independent and predominant in the respective kingdoms.

On points of trade, the subjects of both countries were admitted to the same privileges; the burden of taxation was regulated according to the means and revenues of each; and in matters of justice and police, care was equally taken that the prejudices of the Scots might not be shocked by the introduction of new laws and regulations, even though superior to their own.\*

The greatest blow was thus given to the hopes of the Stuart family, which had been struck since the revolution; and it may be recorded as an answer to the numberless accusations and surmises against the principles of Marlborough and Godolphin, that such a measure was accomplished by them, in opposition to the efforts of a powerful combination of Tories and Jacobites, both in England and Scotland, and under a queen who not only detested the Hanover line, but who was beginning to turn with renewed affection towards the surviving members of her unfortunate family.

Marlborough remained in England as long as the foreign affairs would permit, and assisted at several of the discussions which arose on the subject of the union. He had the satisfaction to observe the legislative provisions completed before his departure, and quitted England in full confidence that the same harmony which had proved of such advantage in the important transactions of this session, would continue to subsist between the Whigs and moderate Tories.

Scarcely, however, had he reached the Continent, before he received the unwelcome intelligence of a misunderstanding between Harley and the Whigs. Fears being justly entertained that advantage would be taken of the interval before the establishment of the Union, on the first of May,

\* Numerous volumes have been written on the Union, which it would be endless to specify. We may, however, refer the curious reader for the secret history of that transaction to the work of De Foe, the Stuart Papers, printed by Macpherson, for the year 1707, and the Lockhart Papers, recently published, which contain many curious particulars of this great event. But the most satisfactory, as well as candid and impartial account, appears in Somerville's History of Queen Anne.

to evade the duties on import, which were then to be common to both countries, a law was proposed in the lower house to prevent the expected abuse. On the third reading of the bill, Harley introduced a clause, tending to render the provisions more complete by a retrospective effect. This regulation greatly offended the Scots in general, who regarded it as an infraction of the Union, and was no less obnoxious to the Whigs, either from national or personal motives. By the interest of the whole Tory party it was, however, carried through the House of Commons, but thrown out by the Whigs in the Lords. Harley still persisted in his design, and to give time for digesting a new regulation, the queen was induced to adopt a proposal for a temporary recess. Accordingly she repaired to the house on the 8th of April, and announced a prorogation till the 14th. On the resumption of business, the measure was again brought forward, and a new law passed the Commons; but as it created great disputes and difference of opinion, it was quietly withdrawn.

Marlborough received notice of this transaction from Harley, St. John, Godolphin, and Sunderland. The two former merely announced the fact, without a comment. Godolphin, though briefly, assigned it to the true cause. "The close," he observes, "of the best session of parliament that England ever saw, has been unhappily hindered by a broil between the two houses, which is not yet ended. It would be tedious to trouble you with all the particulars, but it is chiefly imputable, as most other ill accidents, to private animosities." But Sunderland bitterly inveighed against the duplicity of the secretary, in a tone which shows the incurable jealousy reigning between the two parties. "I believe," he says, "you will be surprised at this short prorogation. It is entirely occasioned by him who is the author of all the tricks \* played here. I need not name him, having done it in my last letter to you. I will only say, no man in the service of a government ever did act such a part. I wish those for whom he has acted it were ever capable of thinking him in the wrong, for I fear it may be, some time or other, too late. I don't write so full of professions to you as some do, but I am sure my heart is more sincere."

\* Meaning Harley, who is often called in the Whig pamphlets and ballads "*the Trickster*."

## CHAP. LIV. — CHARLES XII. OF SWEDEN. — 1707.

THE great advantages which the allies had gained in the preceding campaign were suddenly exposed to imminent danger, by the appearance of a new and extraordinary actor on the theatre of affairs. Charles XII., king of Sweden, at an age when the mind scarcely begins to display its faculties, or the body its vigour, suddenly rose into distinction, as a hero and a statesman. Attacked at once by the three northern sovereigns, his latent energies were roused into action. The youthful warrior not only repelled the invaders, but turned the tide of war on his enemies, with an energy and success which had not been shown since the days of Alexander the Great, whose enterprising character he both studied and emulated. Gathering strength from exertion, and extending his views in proportion to his success, he first reduced the king of Denmark to sign a dishonourable peace; and then bursting into the Russian territories, on the shores of the Baltic, he defeated the czar, Peter, in a series of victories, which assume the character of romance. Turning next into Poland, he dethroned King Augustus, and gave the crown to Stanislaus Letzinski, a nobleman whom accident first offered to his notice. He next directed his course into Germany, and leading his invincible army into Saxony, the electoral territory of the dethroned monarch, forced him to resign the crown to Stanislaus, to renounce his alliance with Russia, and to grant quarters and accommodations to the army which had effected his humiliation, allowing him only the name and honours of a king. As if meditating new enterprises, he took up his quarters at Alt Ranstadt, and imperiously required the European powers to acknowledge Stanislaus, and to guarantee the treaty of peace concluded with Augustus.

The appearance of this military meteor, and the presence of a numerous and victorious army, attracted the attention of all the states who were engaged in the mighty struggle for the Spanish monarchy. It was evident that the accession of so considerable a force would give the preponderance to the party whose cause its chief should espouse. The king

of France, in his distress, was anxious to gain the aid of so powerful a coadjutor, and spared neither money nor intrigues to tempt the king of Sweden, either to become the arbiter of peace, or to direct his hostilities against the allies. The ancient connexion of France and Sweden was recalled to his remembrance; the glory of Gustavus Adolphus was held forth to dazzle his imagination; and attempts were not spared to work on the hereditary jealousy which he entertained of the house of Austria. The allies also felt similar hopes and fears; and the greatest solicitude was evinced by all parties to penetrate the mysterious designs, and conciliate the vain-glorious character of the Swedish monarch.

While Charles continued in this commanding attitude, and while he wrought on the hopes or fears of all parties, he brought forward various complaints for real or fancied injuries, from different powers, as well as a series of demands for the reparation of several infractions in the constitution of the Germanic empire, of which he considered himself the guarantee, as heir to the crown and fame of Gustavus Adolphus.

The first related to the conduct of Denmark in a contested election for the see of Lubeck. This see being among the ecclesiastical territories secularised at the Reformation, a stipulation was introduced in the peace of Westphalia, that the six next bishops should be chosen from the house of Holstein Gottorp. The disposition was ratified by the treaties of Gluckstadt and Travendahl, and sanctioned by a recess of the diet, as well as by an imperial rescript issued in 1701. It was, however, secretly opposed by the king of Denmark, and a double election took place for the coadjutorship or reversion of the see; Christian Augustus, prince of Holstein, being chosen by one part of the chapter, and Prince Charles of Denmark by the other. \* By the recent death of the bishop, this contest was aggravated into an open rupture. The king of Sweden warmly espoused the cause of his relation, the Prince of Holstein, whose pretensions he maintained with his usual arrogance and pertinacity. Appeals were made to the emperor, and to all the powers who

\* Augustus was administrator to his nephew Charles Frederick, duke of Holstein, then a minor. It has been erroneously supposed that this dispute related to the duchy only.

were considered as interested in the arrangement; and the elector of Hanover, in particular, not only testified great indignation against the Danish court, but even manifested a resolution to join the king of Sweden in enforcing a regulation, which had been guaranteed by a solemn treaty, and embodied in the Germanic constitution.

This grievance was, however, lost in the more vehement complaints which the Swedish monarch advanced against Joseph, both as chief of the empire, and head of the house of Austria. The first of these complaints was against the infraction of the religious privileges secured to the Protestants of Germany, by the introduction of an article in the treaty of Ryswick, which declared the Catholic the dominant religion in all places where it had been once re-established after the peace of Westphalia. The second was for the suppression of the numerous Protestant churches in Silesia.

To these other causes of complaint were added, before Marlborough could accomplish his journey to the Swedish camp. The first was the connivance of the emperor in permitting the departure of 1500 Muscovites who had sought refuge in the Austrian territories, after one of the recent battles with the czar. The second regarded an affront offered to the Swedish ambassador, by Count Zobor, an Hungarian nobleman, who, at a public entertainment, impudently used an expression derogatory to the king of Sweden. Although the insult was resented on the spot by a blow, and afterwards punished by imprisonment, Charles was not satisfied, but insisted on the delivery of the offender, that he might himself inflict the chastisement due to his injured honour. The third was the massacre of two Swedish officers, who had fallen in some popular brawl, while recruiting at Breslau.

The effects arising from these contentions threatened the most serious consequences. The troops of all the sovereigns and states, who were near the scene of danger, were diverted from co-operation with the allied powers; and the attention of the emperor in particular seemed more engrossed by the peril which he apprehended from Sweden, than by the advantages which he hoped to acquire by a vigorous prosecution of the war against France. The complaints on the subject of religion appeared even likely to produce a schism

in the empire. Charles not only laboured for the formation of a Protestant league, but infused similar sentiments into the king of Prussia; he also endeavoured to gain the concurrence of the elector of Hanover, whose example was likely to operate on the minor princes and states. The emperor and the Catholics, on the other hand, caught the alarm, and active steps were taken for the formation of a counter-alliance, to preserve the Catholic faith and interest.

These jarring pretensions and mutual jealousies gave scope to the intrigues of the French monarch. He fomented the dissatisfaction of both parties, made overtures to both, and was ready to join with either, as soon as the combination had attained sufficient consistency to forward his views. Finding difficulties in opening a negotiation with the emperor, he doubled his assiduities towards the king of Sweden. He sent to his camp the *Sieur de Ricoux*, a distinguished officer, whom he furnished with a series of instructions, suggesting such arguments as were likely to weigh with a sovereign of such a romantic and imperious temper. He even solicited his mediation, which he declared the allies would not venture to reject. To give effect to these representations, the agent was authorised to gratify Count Piper, the prime minister of Charles, with a sum of 300,000 livres, if he could persuade his royal master to hasten a peace by his intervention; and bribes in proportion were offered to the two subordinate ministers, *Hermelin* and *Ciederholm*, who were deemed favourable to the French interest.\*

The attention of Marlborough was deeply occupied by the alarming predicament in which the allies were placed. He so vigilantly watched the intrigues of the French court, that from some of his numerous channels of communication, he obtained a copy of the instructions furnished to the *Sieur de Ricoux*. He anxiously endeavoured also to gain an insight into the character and views of the Swedish monarch. Among other means employed for this purpose, he recurred to the agency of General *Grumbkow*, who had been despatched by the king of Prussia on a mission to the head-quarters. The letters written by this adroit and intelligent observer,

\* Instructions pour le *Sieur Ricoux*, &c. A copy of these instructions is preserved in the curious collection of the *Cardonel Papers*.

exhibit a curious picture of the habits of a warrior, who has been no less the wonder of posterity than of his own age.

\* "My lord duke, Berlin, Jan. 11. 1707.  
 † "I returned yesterday from Leipsic, and I deem it my duty to give your highness an account of my journey. Last Sunday week I departed from hence, and arrived the Monday at Leipsic. On the next day I waited upon the king at his dinner. I was much surprised at the manner in which the table was served; and I do assure your highness that the fare with which M. de Hompesch regaled you was divine in comparison with this. On the following day I saw King Augustus at dinner with the king of Sweden: the latter appeared pleased and contented, the other disconcerted and pensive. The repast continued, according to custom, only a quarter of an hour, during which an unbroken silence was preserved, which I attributed to the consideration that there was only time to swallow some morsels in haste. On Sunday I visited Count Piper, and after an hour's conference we sat down to dinner; and as his fare was much worse than that of his royal master, your highness may judge of my wretched situation. Count Piper is rude and boisterous, and has all the manners of a pedant, without his learning. He resembles, in his person and manners, M. \* \* \*, excepting that he has not a martial voice. I conversed with him on all subjects, and particularly dwelt on the confidence which your highness reposes in the word of the king his master. He said, that English lord is a brave and intelligent man; the English and the allies are extremely fortunate that he is their general: the king, my master, esteems him infinitely. He then said that his master was not prodigal of promises, but kept his word most religiously; adding, that those who were not inclined to believe him need only let him follow his own way.

"Having insensibly turned the discourse on the great designs of the king, his master, he said, 'we made war in Poland only to subsist; our design in Saxony is to terminate the war; but for the Muscovite, he shall pay *les pots cassés*, and we will treat the czar in a manner which posterity will hardly believe.' I secretly wished that he was already in the heart of Muscovy.

"After dinner he conveyed me in his carriage to the head-quarters, and presented me to the king. His majesty was standing in a small apartment, dressed in the Swedish fashion. I made my bow, and, having received proper instructions, accosted him boldly, that I esteemed myself very fortunate in paying my respects to a sovereign, who was so renowned in Europe for his distinguished actions, valour, and equity. He asked me whence I came, and where I had served. I replied, and mentioned my good fortune in serving three campaigns under your highness. He questioned me much, and particularly about your highness and the English troops; and you will readily believe that I delineated my hero in the most lively and natural colours. Among other particulars, he asked me if your highness yourself led the troops to the charge. I replied, that as all the troops were animated with the same ardour for fighting, your highness was not under the necessity of leading the charge, but

that you were everywhere, and always in 'the hottest of the action, and gave your orders with that coolness which excites general admiration. I then related to him that you had been thrown from your horse; the death of your aide-de-camp, Brinfield, and many other things. He took such pleasure in this recital, that he made me repeat the same thing twice. I also said that your highness always spoke of his majesty with the highest esteem and admiration, and ardently desired to pay your respects. He observed, 'that is not likely, but I should be delighted to see a general of whom I have heard so much.'

"The conversation continued more than an hour, to the great annoyance of Count Piper, who came in three or four times, but the king always turned his back to him. It was at length interrupted by a singular accident. The king, leaning upon a small table, it broke, and his majesty fell down upon the floor. The noise of the fall, and the crash of the table, brought in Count Piper and Hermelin; and as they entered at the moment while I held the king in my arms, and was assisting him to rise, their frightened countenances induced me to think that in the first moment of surprise they imagined the Prussian was in the act of assaulting his serene majesty. The king laughed heartily at the accident, and after a conversation of some minutes, dismissed me with a gracious smile."

"*Berlin, Jan. 31. 1707.* — \* \* \* After taking leave of the king of Sweden, I paid a visit to field-marshal Count de Reinschold. He was sickly, but the weakness of his body made no impression on his mind. He conversed with a precision and vivacity very uncommon; he seemed to me well informed of public affairs, and not inclined to France. The king, his master, he observed, instead of dissuading King Augustus, would rather exhort him to furnish troops to the empire; and if ever he concluded a peace with the Muscovite, he himself would supply his contingent. He dwelt on the extraordinary manner in which his master made war, saying that he placed great reliance on his cavalry, and was extremely fond of his dragoons, whom he occasionally employed like infantry; adding, that next March, the king would have on foot 2000 dragoons and 8000 horse. He farther observed, that the principle of the king's motions was always to undertake what was most difficult; because the enemy were less on their guard, and took less precautions. He related several movements which appear incredible; such as marching eighty leagues without unsaddling the horses, and feeding them on the thatch of the houses. In a word, I remarked as well from this discourse, as from that of Count Piper, that they intend vigorously to attack the Muscovites, and expect to dethrone the czar, compelling him to discharge all his foreign officers and troops, and to pay several millions as an indemnification. Should he refuse such conditions, the king is resolved to exterminate the Muscovites, and make their country a desert. God grant that he may persist in this diversion, rather than amuse himself with demanding the restitution, as some people assert, of the Protestant churches in Silesia. \* \* \* \*

"As to the character of the Swedes in general, they are modest, but

do not scruple to declare themselves invincible, when the king is at their head. \* \* \*

"I have received the honour of your highness's letter of the 28th of December, and read it to the king, my master. His majesty orders me to assure your highness, that he is fully convinced of your good inclinations, but he refers to your own judgment, if he can prudently send away his troops at a time when he cannot penetrate the designs of the king of Sweden, nor foresee the effects which may result from the abdication of King Augustus. He requested your highness's opinion; and convinced as he is of your sincere affection, will listen with pleasure to your advice, well aware that his interests are indissolubly blended with those of the queen.

"P. S.—Mr. Pratt is arrived from the court of Sweden, and his majesty is satisfied he has nothing to fear from that quarter." \*

For the same purpose Marlborough maintained an intimate correspondence with the elector of Hanover, from whom he received repeated declarations that the king of Sweden was by no means inclined to favour the cause of France. The other allies were, however, too much alarmed, to be satisfied with indirect assurances, even from so high and respectable a quarter; particularly as reports were hourly circulated, that Charles was on the point of concluding a subsidiary treaty with Louis; and not only meditated the restoration of the elector of Bavaria, but was preparing to kindle a civil war in the empire, and consolidate the revolution in Hungary. Marlborough, therefore, was importuned by his friends in England and Holland, and above all by the court of Vienna, to visit the Swedish monarch, and penetrate his designs.

In this dilemma he recurred to the advice of the elector of Hanover, expressing his readiness to undertake the journey at his recommendation, and requesting information on the best means of gaining the Swedish ministers. The elector, in answer, not only intimated his acquiescence, but hinted that an annual pension of 2000*l.* should be granted to Piper, and 1000*l.* to Hermelin, and the first year paid in advance. If he could not himself undertake the journey, he recommended that this negotiation should be intrusted to the British envoy, Mr. Robinson, the confidential friend of Count Piper.†

\* Translated from the French originals.

† Letter from the elector to the Duke of Marlborough, March 18. 1707; Macpherson, v. ii. p. 90.

Considering, however, the shortness of time, and the necessity of maturing the military preparations, Marlborough left London in a state of hesitation. While he was detained at Margate by contrary winds, we find several letters proving the perplexity in which he was involved by this critical situation of affairs, and the general reliance placed on his interposition. As the object of more immediate interest was to induce Charles to suspend his offer of mediation, Marlborough opened a correspondence on that subject through Mr. Robinson. His first idea was, to conduct the negotiation by the agency of some confidential person, and draughts of letters to the king of Sweden and his ministers were transmitted to the cabinet. The method was approved with some trifling alteration; but the more he reflected on the delicate and arduous task, the more he felt the necessity of a direct and efficient application. He deemed it imprudent to consign to writing instructions of so delicate a nature as it was necessary to employ. He discovered also that he had not merely to soothe the high spirit of the king of Sweden, but to satisfy the emperor, who considered his dignity as humbled; and the Dutch, who apprehended that any engagement with Sweden, or any acknowledgment of Stanislaus as king of Poland, might eventually implicate them in a new contest. His resolution was finally decided by a declaration of Charles, that he would treat with no other person except with the Duke of Marlborough.\* This proposal being warmly approved by the cabinet, he announced his intention through Mr. Robinson, under the condition of the strictest secrecy; and on his arrival at the Hague, prepared for his journey.

In Holland he first communicated his design privately to the pensionary, and afterwards to the deputies from Holland and Friesland, assembled at the Hague, leaving the communication to the other provinces to be made after his return. He gave an account of this delicate transaction to the treasurer, in a confidential letter, dated Hague, April 9-20.

“ After four tedious days I got to Helvoetsluys, and with difficulty made these people easy as to my journey to Saxony; but as to the acknowledging of Stanislaus, and the guarantee of the peace, they dare

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\* Lediard, vol. ii.

not give me any powers, without the consent of the States, and for that the form of the States does require their sending to the provinces, which would require too much time. But the truth is, they are unwilling to come into the acknowledging and guarantee for fear of obliging the czar.

"Since my being here I have received letters from Vienna, by which I see they persist in the expedition for Naples, and at the same time they complain of the king of Sweden. I find that the behaviour of the French has given occasion to these people to wish heartily for good success in this campaign.

"In two conversations I have had with M. de Buys, he has been very plain in telling me that he should think it a very good peace, if we could persuade the duke of Anjou to be contented with Naples and Sicily. I am afraid there are a great many more in Holland of his mind; but as we are very sure, I think, of making this campaign, there may be many alterations before winter.

"The ambassador of Muscovy has been with me, and made many expressions of the great esteem his master has for her majesty; that he would do every thing to merit her friendship, and, as a mark of it, he had resolved to send his only son into England; but he desired nobody but the queen might know it, since he must pass *incognito* through several countries. He is also very desirous of the honour, as he calls it, of the queen's appointing him a house. As it can be of no precedent to any country but their own, and as the expense is so very inconsiderable, I hope her majesty will do it; for it is certain you will not be able to gratify him in any part of his negotiation.

"I have undertaken this journey to Saxony to comply with the great desire of our friends; but I own to you that the pensioner and Slingeland have shown me several intercepted letters, which have been deciphered, that show very plainly that almost all about the king receive French money except Count Piper.

"The agreement for 3390 foot and 1125 horse is almost concluded with the Saxon ministers. Mr. Secretary will have a particular account of it from Mr. Stepney. The 70,000 crowns that are to be given, to put them in a condition to march, must be speedily paid, for the troops can't march till one month after the payment. I have this afternoon received a letter from the king of Spain, of the 6th of March, concerning some employments in the Low Countries. He also tells me that he is resolved to go to Barcelona for some short time, till his presence may be necessary in the army. I have not time to have his letter copied, but by my next you shall have it. I have left orders that the first letters that come from England should be sent after me, there being now six posts due."

## CHAP. LV.—MISSION TO CHARLES XII.—1707.

SATISFIED with the partial acquiescence of the Dutch, Marlborough hastened his military arrangements, and taking his departure from the Hague on the 20th of April, traversed Osnaburg in his way to Hanover. He reached that capital on Sunday, the 23rd, and spent the remainder of the day in visits of respect to the electoral family, and private conversations with the elector. At four, the ensuing morning, he resumed his journey, and passed through Halberstadt to Hall, where he was met by Count Zinzendorf, by Cranenburg the Dutch minister, and by the British envoy Mr. Robinson. After a short, but interesting conference, he proceeded in the evening to the camp, at Alt Ranstadt, accompanied by Mr. Robinson and Cranenburg.

His grace immediately drove to the head-quarters of Count Piper, with whom he held a conversation of an hour, and from whom he received assurances that the king was highly gratified with his arrival. In this interview he gained the confidence of the minister, acquired considerable insight into the character and views of the monarch, and arranged the mode in which he was to treat on the subjects of his mission. The time of his audience was fixed at ten the ensuing day, after the king had attended divine service. He then repaired to the quarters assigned to him, which were about half a league distant from those of the king.

Early on the 28th Count Piper conveyed the duke in his carriage to the royal head-quarters; and he was immediately introduced into the cabinet, by the minister, accompanied by Mr. Robinson, who acted as interpreter. He found the king surrounded by his senators and generals, and was received with becoming marks of regard and attention. Presenting letters of credence from the queen and the prince of Denmark, he made a short compliment in English, which was interpreted by Mr. Robinson.

"I present to your majesty," he observed, "a letter, not from the chancery, but from the heart of the queen, my mistress, and written with her own hand. Had not her sex prevented it, she would have crossed the sea to see a prince admired by the whole universe. I am in this par-

ticular more happy than the queen, and I wish I could serve some campaigns under so great a general as your majesty, that I might learn what I yet want to know in the art of war."\*

This flattering address from so illustrious a commander pleased the monarch, whose foible was a passion for military glory. His satisfaction was visible in his countenance, and he returned, through Count Piper, an answer unusually gracious.

"The queen of Great Britain's letter and your person are both very acceptable to me, and I shall always have the utmost regard for the interposition of her Britannic majesty, and the interests of the Grand Alliance. It is, likewise, much against my will if I have been obliged to give the least umbrage to any of the parties engaged in it. But your excellency cannot fail to be convinced that I had just cause to come into this country with my troops. On the other hand, you may assure the queen, my sister, that my design is to depart from hence, as soon as I have obtained the satisfaction I demand, but not sooner. However, I shall do nothing that can tend to the prejudice of the common cause in general, or the Protestant religion in particular, of which I shall always glory to be a zealous protector."

At the conclusion of this reply, the duke continued the conversation in the French tongue, which the king understood, but did not speak, either from prejudice or timidity. The discourse turned on military and political subjects, and lasted till mid-day, the usual hour of dinner, when the king graciously invited the duke to partake of his repast. At table he was placed on the right hand of the monarch, and Count Piper on the left, and the sitting was prolonged more than half an hour beyond the usual time, in honour of so distinguished a guest. On rising from table, Charles again retired with Marlborough into his closet, accompanied by

\* The authenticity of this speech has been questioned, merely on the ground that it was too adulatory to have been spoken by the Duke of Marlborough. But, with the French biographer, I see nothing in it too extravagant to be addressed by a skilful negotiator to so vain-glorious a monarch as Charles XII. I have, therefore, adopted it as genuine, because it is given in the periodical publications of the time preserved by Lamberti, and, above all, repeated by Lediard, who was then in Saxony, and asserts, that he heard the substance from several officers in the suite of the duke.

Since this note was written, I have discovered an account of this discourse which was transmitted by Besenval, the French envoy at Leipsie, to Louis XIV., and which strikingly corroborates the preceding statement.

Piper, Hermelin, and Robinson. The conversation was continued with great animation, the king listening to his illustrious visitor with the utmost attention and interest.

In the course of this address the duke entered into a full exposition of the state of affairs, and a discussion equally full on the demands of the king. He justified the principle on which the queen had entered into the war, and enlarged on the dangers to be apprehended, from the usurpations and preponderance of France. His arguments and manly eloquence wrought so powerfully on the king, that he even went farther than Marlborough had anticipated. He censured the domineering spirit of the French monarch, and dwelt on the mischiefs resulting from the extent of his empire. He even argued that France, although humbled, was not yet brought to listen to reasonable terms, and added, there could be no safety to Europe till she was reduced to the same condition as she was left by the peace of Westphalia. On the subject of Dunkirk, to which Marlborough adverted, he evinced the same sentiments. The duke observing, that although Dunkirk once belonged to England, yet the queen was not desirous to retain it at a future peace, but thought it necessary that the fortifications should be demolished; the king perfectly concurred in the remark, adding, that it had proved equally injurious to his own trading subjects, whom he recommended to the indulgence of the queen.

On the delicate point of religion Marlborough evinced consummate address. The king having expressed his anxiety for the Protestant interest in general, and particularly his wish to revive the privileges guaranteed to the German Protestants, by the peace of Westphalia, Marlborough represented the queen as equally interested in the Protestant cause, but deprecated any interference in the religious system of Germany, as tending to create jealousy among the Catholics and frustrate the object of the Grand Alliance, which was to preserve the balance of power and prevent the destruction of religious liberty. He suggested that the proper time and means for furthering such views would occur in the treaty for a general peace, for which the queen was ready in due time to accept his mediation, and would join with his majesty in all measures conducive to their mutual benefit.

After some farther discussion, the king not only acknowledged the weight of his arguments, but even proposed a secret connexion with England, for the promotion of the Protestant interest. This embarrassing proposal was, however, parried with equal dexterity. Marlborough delicately hinted that it would appear inconsistent with the character of a mediator, which the king of Sweden was desirous to sustain. At the same time he offered to communicate to the queen any proposal which his majesty might think proper to make.

This discussion embraced the personal demands of the king respecting his dispute with Denmark on the bishopric of Lubec, in which he appeared to take great interest. It also comprised his complaints against the emperor, on which he dwelt with peculiar emphasis. The affair of Lubec was referred to a discussion with Count Piper and Goertz, minister of Christian Augustus, the candidate supported by Charles. The most difficult point was the dispute with the emperor; but the conciliating eloquence of Marlborough in some degree soothed the irritation of the king, and afforded hopes that an accommodation might be ultimately effected through the mediation of England.

In the course of this conversation Charles expressed the greatest esteem for the queen, and declared that he would accept no proposal of mediation till informed by Marlborough that it was agreeable to her Britannic majesty. The conversation continued until the kettle-drums announced the hour of evening prayer, when Charles took leave and retired to his customary devotions.

Marlborough passed the afternoon in visits of ceremony to the ministers and generals, and did not fail to pay his respects to the two ladies of Count Piper and Marshal Renschoeld, who held assemblies in honour of the illustrious visitor.

The greatest difficulty which he perhaps experienced during this delicate negotiation was the conduct to be observed towards the dethroned monarch. On his entry into Saxony, Augustus had sent a nobleman to compliment him, and the ensuing day a messenger appeared with an invitation for an interview at Leipsic. It required all the matured prudence of so able a negotiator to show proper attention to

the sovereign from whom the allies had derived such essential advantage, and yet to avoid exciting the jealousy of the captious prince, by whom he had been expelled from his throne. Marlborough, however, not only managed this interview without giving umbrage to Charles, but employed, with the happiest effect, his influence over Augustus. We give the account of this conference in his own words.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"May 6. — I must now acquaint you that I had an audience of King Augustus, at Leipsic, the day before I came away; at which, besides many repeated assurances of his respect for the queen, and of his strict adherence to the interest of the allies, he complained to me of the great hardships and extortions he had suffered from the Swedes, and insinuated his desire that the guarantees, at the same time as they accepted the guarantee of his treaty, would take care that he might have some satisfaction for seven millions of crowns, he pretends, they have exacted, beyond what the treaty allows. To which I gave him my opinion, that it was no ways advisable for him to offer at any thing at this juncture, that might give the least handle to the king of Sweden to delay his march out of Saxony. You will have heard when the treaty was concluded here by Mr. Stepney, for the Saxon troops, upon the notice I had of it, and the pressing instances the king made me; I was prevailed with to give Sir G. Wachembart, who is to command there, a bill on Mr. Sweet for 40,000 crowns, payable at fifteen days' sight, to enable them to hasten their march, which he promised should be done before the time appointed by the treaty; so that I must pray your care in ordering timely remittances for this service. The rest of the king's troops I find are a greater burden to him than he is able to bear, his country being very much exhausted; so that, at his desire, I have pressed the court of Vienna to take three or four thousand horse into their pay, which they assure me are in a good condition."

Returning from Leipsic, the duke dined at the quarters of Count Piper, and the afternoon was spent in a conference with that minister and Count Goertz, on the affair of Lubec. On this delicate point Marlborough testified the inclination of the queen to gratify the wishes of the king; and it was finally referred to a discussion at Hamburg, which was to take place under the mediation of Mr. Robinson, in whose integrity Charles expressed perfect confidence. After this satisfactory arrangement, the duke concluded the evening by supping with Field-marshal Renschold, where he was met by the courtiers and officers of high rank.

On the 29th he received a final visit from Piper and

Ciederholm, the result of which is best related in his own words.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“On Friday, the 29th past, which was the day I left Alt Ranstadt, the count came to me, accompanied by M. Ciederholm, the secretary de cabinet, to recapitulate, in the king's name, the essential of all that had passed before, Mr. Robinson being with me at the same time. He began by acquainting me with the great esteem his master had for the queen, and how sensible he was of the obligations he owed her majesty, for the assurances I had brought him of her majesty's friendship, which he would endeavour, by all possible means, to improve, by making such returns as might be most acceptable to her. He was very particular in the king's acknowledgments for the communication he had received by me, of the reasons which induced her majesty to come into the present war; which, as he allowed to be very just, so he wished the like glorious successes might attend her majesty's arms as hitherto, in order to the restoring a due balance of power in Europe, and securing and supporting the Protestant religion, wherein he said his master was entirely of the queen's opinion. He added farther, that the king agreed the treaty of Westphalia ought to be the foundation of a future treaty of peace, as to the affairs of Germany; and that what has been done in derogation thereof by subsequent treaties, especially in point of religion, ought to be redressed and reduced to that standard; his master being likewise of opinion we ought to go one step farther, by explaining the right of reforming, which by the treaty Westphalia is reserved to each German prince in his own territory, by virtue whereof, any Protestant Prince that turns to the Romish religion, has a kind of right to oblige his Protestant subjects to change theirs. This he would have explained in such manner, and with such limitations, as the safety of the Protestant religion may require.

“This point of religion was what the king seemed most warmly bent upon; and it was not without difficulty that I convinced him and Count Piper of the necessity of deferring every thing of this nature till we come to treat of a general peace, for fear of weakening the alliance, by creating unreasonable jealousies among such of the allies as are of the Romish religion. Hereupon I took occasion to acquaint Count Piper, that as the king and his ministers had a better insight than we could be supposed to have in the affairs of Germany, if his master would, on occasion, freely open himself to the queen, her majesty, on her part, would be ready at all times to concur with him in every thing that might be judged for the mutual interest and benefit of each other; that I should gladly charge myself with laying before the queen whatever his master might think fit to communicate to her majesty; and that with all the secrecy and faithfulness the matter should require. To this, Count Piper assured me I might depend upon the queen's being informed of whatever offers should be made to the king, with reference to the peace, that their majesties might take just measures together, against we came to a general treaty.

“Here you will allow the caution he gave me of keeping this under

the greatest secrecy ; since it may otherwise seem in the eyes of all others concerned, a little too partial in a mediator, as well as inconsistent with his neutrality."

After this interview, Marlborough dined with Count Goertz, in the same illustrious company as before ; and in the afternoon was admitted to his audience of leave. On this occasion Charles evinced, if possible, still higher respect and esteem than on the former ; and, in particular, testified his satisfaction with the arrangement which had been made on the preceding day, relating to the affairs of Lubeck. Their parting was marked by those sentiments which their characters mutually inspired.

At this audience an event occurred which called forth no less management and dexterity than the interview with Augustus. When Marlborough was quitting the closet, news arrived that King Stanislaus was in the ante-chamber. A meeting with a sovereign who was not only not acknowledged by England, but the successful rival of Augustus, was an affair of peculiar delicacy. To withhold from him the respect due to his rank, might have produced an unfavourable impression on the mind of the Swedish monarch ; to acknowledge him might be construed into an instance of disrespect towards Augustus. Charles, by whom this interview was planned, seems to have felt this delicacy, and desired Count Piper to make the proposal to the duke. Marlborough bowed assent, and the king, advancing to the door, himself introduced the dependent monarch. The British general paid his respects to Stanislaus without compromising the dignity of his own sovereign ; and the countenance and manner of Charles showed the gratification which he derived from this proof of attention.

Before his departure he did not neglect to gain an influence with Piper and Hermelin, in whom the king appeared to repose the greatest confidence. Finding them favourably inclined, he adopted the advice of the elector of Hanover, in securing their good will, by the promise of annual pensions, of which he offered a year's advance. Piper, indeed, affected to make some difficulty ; but his scruples were overcome by his countess, with whom Marlborough had an interview for the purpose. A pension of 1000*l.* a year was also bestowed on Ciederholm.

The good effects of this well-timed liberality appeared in his interview with the minister, Count Piper. He observes, in the conclusion of his letter : —

“ Count Piper, at my taking leave of him, promised to acquaint me, for the queen’s information, with whatever offers might be made to his master from the court of France. Whereupon I assured him he might certainly depend on the like returns from us, the king himself having been pleased to give me particular assurances that he would adhere to no proposals that might be made him in relation to the mediatorship, until he heard from me that the queen thought it seasonable. He also declared his opinion very freely, that the French were not yet reduced to such an ebb as would make them reasonable.

“ I shall trouble you, “ he adds, “ but with one observation more, that is, the uneasiness I perceive in the king of Sweden at the conduct of the court of Vienna. He complains of three particulars, on which he expects satisfaction : the first, for the affront offered to his minister at that court ; the next, on account of the two Swedish officers killed at Breslaw ; and the third, in relation to the Muscovites on the Rhine, whom he insists to have delivered up to him : but as for this last article, I hope an expedient may be found, by returning the Muscovites to King Augustus, and the Swedes engaging at the same time, that upon the czar’s releasing the like number of Swedes, these shall be set at liberty. I have pressed the ministers at Vienna to endeavour to satisfy the king on these articles, as fearing, otherwise, when he comes to march through Silesia, in his way to Poland, he may make them very uneasy. It is certain the king designed likewise to have insisted on that court’s giving satisfaction to the Protestants in Silesia, for the usurpation and innovations committed in that province, had I not had the good fortune to convince him, as I told you before, of the unseasonableness of it at present. This is the substance of all that passed between me and the court of Sweden, which I hope will meet with her majesty’s approbation, it being very much for the public good and her majesty’s service, that we are sure the king has not, nor will have any engagements with the French, so as to disturb us in the prosecution of the war.”

At the conclusion of this important negotiation, the duke received a mark of favour which was not only peculiarly flattering, but highly advantageous. Although Charles, with that jealousy which he always manifested in his military operations, would permit no foreign minister to attend him in the field, he yet relaxed so far from his general rule as to allow Mr. Jefferys, the secretary of Mr. Robinson, to accompany the army in the character of a volunteer, by which means a constant communication was maintained by the British commander.\*

\* This narrative is principally drawn from some brief letters of Marl-

In his return Marlborough complied with the earnest request of the king of Prussia \*, by paying a visit at Charlottenburg. Here his presence was peculiarly necessary to counteract the petty intrigues of Lord Raby, who not only endeavoured to sway the Prussian court, but imprudently threw reflections on the conduct of the ministers most attached to England, by representing them as sacrificing the interests of Prussia to gratify the Duke of Marlborough. It would have been easy to procure the recal of a minister who was personally disagreeable to the king and disliked in the court; but it was difficult to fill his place, as well from his connexions and interest with the grand chamberlain, as from his rank and diplomatic abilities and favour with his sovereign. Marlborough, therefore, overlooked his own complaints, and laboured to restore Lord Raby to such a cordiality with those whom he had offended, as might enable him to fulfil the object of his mission; and although he could not obliterate, he suspended the effects of their mutual jealousies. He prevailed also on the king to desist from his instances for the removal of so obnoxious a minister. During the pause of a day, which was the limit of his stay at the Prussian court, he received from the king many proofs of regard, and settled some points of delicacy. He, in particular, obtained his consent for the restoration of the Upper Palatinate to the elector palatine, and for putting the duke of Mantua to the ban of the empire. "At parting," the duke observes, "he forced on me a diamond ring, valued at 1000 pounds;" an unusual instance of liberality in a prince by no means extravagant in presents.

Pursuing his journey with his usual diligence, he passed through Hanover, only to acquaint the elector with his success, and reached the Hague on the 8th of May, having accomplished his disagreeable journey and delicate negotiation within the short space of eighteen days.

borough, written during his continuance in the Swedish camp, and from a more detailed account sent to Godolphin after his return to the Hague. — Some information has also been derived from a letter written by Mr. Robinson to the earl of Manchester, and printed in Cole's *Memoirs*; and from Lediard. These authentic sources render it unnecessary to detain the reader with any refutation of the idle and improbable narratives which Voltaire and others have given of this transaction.

\* Letter from the king of Prussia to the duke, April 25.

This important mission succeeded in every point beyond his expectations. The Swedish monarch was highly flattered by the attention of so celebrated a general, and not only repeatedly expressed his regard and admiration for his person, but acknowledged with pleasure and gratitude the conviction he had drawn from the force of his arguments, and the correctness and extent of his information. Marlborough himself, on his part, was struck with the chivalrous character of the young warrior, and under the rusticity of his manners and eccentricity of his character, saw much to admire and esteem. In a letter to the duchess he observes:—

*"Hague, April 29.—May 10. — I returned to this place last Sunday, by which you will see that I have used such diligence, that I was but eighteen days on the journey. Now that it is over, I am extremely well pleased to have made it, since I am persuaded it will be of some use to the public, and a good deal to the queen. I shall not enter into particulars, having writ at large to lord treasurer. This journey has given me the advantage of seeing four kings\*, three of whom I had never seen. They seem to be all very different in their kinds. If I was obliged to make a choice, it should be the youngest, which is the king of Sweden."*

In a conference held with the deputies of the States-general the day after his return, Marlborough repeated the assurances of friendship and good-will which he had received from the king of Sweden. He thus dissipated the alarm which the Dutch had conceived of the hostile designs and supposed engagements of the Swedish monarch with France, which was hourly fomented by the French emissaries, and had already operated with a sinister effect on the minds of so timid a people.

All his friends in England, and every well-wisher to the Grand Alliance, concurred in applauding his success and in giving due praise to the ability and judgment which he had manifested in the negotiation. Godolphin, in particular, expressed his satisfaction in the unstudied language of friendship.

*"May 3.—14. 1707. — I can never thank you enough for the pains you have taken, in writing so much and so exact a relation of all that has passed; and I think the kingdom can never thank you enough for having settled all things where you have been, so much to your own satisfaction and to our advantage."*

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\* The king of Sweden, Augustus, Stanislaus, and the king of Prussia.

Harley also expressed similar sentiments in his usual style of respect and devotion.

"April 15-26. — Though I am very sorry that your grace has had so much fatigue as in this journey to Saxony, yet I am sure there was no expectation of any success from any other sort of negotiation. Your grace is born to do those great things for your country, which no man else ever did, or can do ; and therefore to your greater share of glory there falls out a greater share of fatigue."

"May 3. — It is a fatiguing journey, but I hope your grace will not receive any detriment or prejudice to your health by it. It is your grace's peculiar felicity to have your noble undertakings crowned with success ; and it would be a public calamity that you should suffer in your health while you are serving the public."

"May 6. — I hope this will find your grace safely returned to the Hague after your troublesome journey. But as you have a zeal for the public, which makes you refuse no trouble to serve your country, so your grace has a felicity and faculty to do that for the honour of the queen and the nation, which nobody else could perform."

But the best eulogium on his conduct was conveyed in the language of his enemies. The king of France contemplated his mission with a mixture of hope and anxiety. He flattered himself that Charles would not readily forego so honourable a mediation ; and he expected that the high spirit of Marlborough would not bend to circumstances, but that, by recurring to menaces, he would wound the pride of a monarch who was no less vain of his success than tenacious of his purpose. These sentiments are strongly expressed in two letters, one from the king himself, and the other from Torcy to Besenval, the French envoy to the king of Sweden, which were intercepted in their passage, and transmitted by the duke to Godolphin.

The reply of Besenval not only dissipated these hopes, but detailed, in the most distinct manner, the heads of the discourse held by Marlborough. It was written under the feigned character of a merchant or tradesman, and transmitted under a cover to M. de Monasterolle, with the address "*Pour le Principal*," which is evidently intended to designate Louis XIV. It is dated Leipsic, April 28., the day after the audience, and the substance must have been derived from the communications either of Piper or Hermelin, but most probably of the latter.\*

\* This letter was either intercepted in its passage through Germany, or surreptitiously copied by some spy at the court of France, and is one

"A gazette written by a tradesman, who has no share in the secrets of the times, cannot relate what the king of Sweden replied, or caused to be replied, in secret, to the Duke of Marlborough, on the propositions, remonstrances, or solicitations which he may have made in the name of the queen, his mistress, or on the part of all the allies; since the king of Sweden and his ministers are accustomed to observe silence on all such subjects, and since the Duke of Marlborough will not readily communicate to any others, but to the parties concerned, the result of his mission. Yet it is allowable to imagine what sort of language the British general must have held at the court of Sweden, particularly as he must have employed different channels to insinuate indirectly, and under the guise of conversation, the principles with which the allies have endeavoured for some time to inspire his Swedish majesty. That English lord, who is sense and politeness itself, would doubtless begin by persuading his Swedish majesty *that her sex alone prevented Queen Anne from waiting on the king in person*; and that the fame of his great and heroic virtues, of his numerous victories, and of his transcendent genius, both in the art of war and in the science of government, was the motive which induced the Duke of Marlborough to quit England, where his important occupations would otherwise have detained him longer, to visit the bravest and most glorious king in the world, and to avow, in his presence, that all the advantages granted by the grace of God to the arms of the allies against France, in the glorious reign of Queen Anne, and under the command of the Duke of Marlborough, must yield to the illustrious exploits of his Swedish majesty.

"By the opening of so elegant a discourse, to which the pen of a

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among many proofs of the accurate and extensive intelligence which Marlborough obtained from every court of Europe. The person by whom it was transmitted, and who was actually the principal agent in this correspondence, was Robethon, who, from an humble origin, raised himself to the post of confidential secretary, first to the duke of Zell, and afterwards to the elector of Hanover. For this purpose he was supplied with large sums of money by the Duke, and the number and value of his communications prove that these largesses were not ill bestowed. To him Marlborough was also principally indebted for a disclosure of the communications between Louis and the French agents in Saxony; and his own correspondence, which this year is extremely voluminous, contains an ample detail of the secret proceedings, and even the private sentiments entertained by the different courts of Europe.

From the papers published by Macpherson, we also find Robethon engaged in an active correspondence, as well with the ministers as with the Whig leaders in England.

The events of the time gave consequence to so active and intelligent a secretary; and he was among those confidential servants who accompanied George I. on his accession to the British throne. Growing presumptuous from the royal favour, he interfered in political transactions, and excited the jealousy of Sir Robert Walpole. — *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, chap. xv.

tradesman is unequal, we may more readily judge of the rest. Besides, the maxims which he would insinuate are not difficult to divine, from the first principles here laid down, which he attempted to establish.

"After speaking of the preparations for the approaching campaign, he affected to dread the superior forces of the two crowns in the Netherlands, and represented them as the more formidable, because they are under the command of two brave chiefs, the elector of Bavaria and Vendome, who are perfectly in unison.

"That Louis XIV. had concluded the treaty for the neutrality of Italy only to deceive the allies, and that the general propositions and the offer of holding a congress, made through the elector of Bavaria, were merely illusory.

"That the king of France affects to be too much humbled, in order to separate the allies, by raising mutual jealousies of their respective interests, and draw to his support the sovereigns of the north. With this view he had offered the mediation to the king of Sweden, although he had previously made the same offer to the Pope, and lastly to the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, and the Venetians. Finding it rejected, he has now recourse to the king of Sweden, hoping that he will either force the allies to accept his mediation, or in case of their refusal, will take revenge for the rejection by force of arms.

"That the king of France has doubtless endeavoured to cover his secret views, and to touch his serene majesty with compassion for the house of Bavaria, to which the king of Sweden is allied. That he has also excited the princes of the empire to profit by this occasion, and in conjunction with the Swedish monarch, to vindicate the infraction of their privileges, against the exorbitant authority exercised by the emperor, as well as to animate the zeal of the king for the Protestant religion, persecuted by the emperor, and to irritate his majesty still more against the elector palatine.

"That the allies well knew that this last commission employed the attention of the colonel, who is now at Leipsic, on the part of the elector of Bavaria, and that the other instructions have been executed during the winter by the secretary of Bonnac, and by another person whom France maintains among the Poles.\*

"That the allies are conscious the king of Sweden will not give any credit to these false representations, and are convinced that he is too wise to be prejudiced unfavourably, and against his own interests; since France ardently endeavours to create a civil war in the empire, and to gain by the ruin of the Germanic body.

"That it is not the object of England and Holland to lower France too much; because if from any motive, commercial or otherwise, the two maritime powers should be at variance, it is their common interest that France should be as powerful as the house of Austria would be, if possessed of the Spanish monarchy, as it was before the death of Charles II.

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\*One of these doubtless alludes to the Sieur de Ricoux, whom we have mentioned in the preceding chapter.

For should Spain support one of the contending parties, France might support the other, and thus maintain the equilibrium of Europe.

"That this balance is the sole object of the allies, and particularly of England; and for this reason it was necessary to take from France the power of making offensive war, daily, and alone, against all Europe, insulting her neighbours, invading their territories, and rendering the will of her king an universal law.

"That the queen is ready to acknowledge King Stanislaus, and to guarantee the peace of Alt Ranstadt, and will use all her efforts to remove the objections of the Dutch, against concurring jointly with her majesty in regard to those two points.

"That her Britannic majesty well knows the king of Sweden has no reason to be satisfied with the Dutch; perhaps she is not so herself, and does not know what may in future happen; that she relies most on the king's friendship, and desires him to be well convinced of her friendship on all occasions.

"That the conduct of the emperor in Italy opens the eyes of all the world; while the absolute principles with which the court of Vienna affects to govern the whole empire, are neither consonant to the interest nor to the inclination of England and Holland; but it is not yet time to announce this sentiment. That it is allowed the emperor has given many causes of resentment to the king of Sweden, and that the latter has a right to protect the college of princes, and the Protestant religion, unjustly persecuted in Silesia and in the palatinate, as well as to obtain satisfaction for the elector palatine.

"That the queen entreats the king of Sweden to take no public cognizance of these affairs, until the general peace, and in that case promises to act in concurrence with him for the affairs of the empire, to confine the emperor within just bounds, and to exact full satisfaction, in regard to religion, to the Germanic empire, and to his Swedish majesty in particular.

"That if the king of Sweden will permit the allies to make this campaign without interference, by withdrawing his army from Germany, and undertake nothing which may directly or indirectly divert them, the next winter they may listen to propositions of peace; because France may become more weary of war, when she sees the allies resolved to continue it. While the king of Sweden, who is justice itself, is well inclined to support the equilibrium of Europe and the common security; France will not fail to make more equitable propositions for the re-establishment of general tranquillity. That if the king of Sweden maintains a corps in the empire or on the frontiers, it will create alarm in some, and jealousy in others.

"This is the political rhapsody of an idle tradesman, who loves to exercise his ingenuity in divining what were the arguments which, *perhaps*, the Duke of Marlborough employed at the court of Sweden, to persuade the king not to accept the mediation offered by France."\*

## CHAP. LVI. — BATTLE OF ALMANZA.—1707.

THE satisfaction which Marlborough experienced from the happy result of his journey to Saxony, was considerably abated by intelligence which announced the fatal defeat of the allied forces at Almanza, and by the perverse and selfish conduct of the court of Vienna.

The extraordinary success of the allied arms in Italy inspired the court of Vienna with new hopes and new plans, which contributed to increase their misunderstanding with the duke of Savoy, as well as to excite the displeasure of the English cabinet. Hitherto embarrassed by the rebellion in Hungary, and alarmed at the preponderance of the French in Italy, the emperor had strained every nerve to maintain the war, and zealously co-operated in a system which deeply involved his own safety, as well as that of the allies. But no sooner was Italy liberated and the frontier on the side of the Tyrol secured from attack, than he began to render the interest of the Grand Alliance subservient to his own. He first cavilled with the duke of Savoy, and resorted to every artifice to avoid the cession of the provinces which had been promised as the price of his defection from the Bourbon alliance. He also affected to regard the Milanese as no part of the Spanish dominions, and endeavoured to substantiate an eventual claim to the duchy, by conferring it on his brother as a fief of the empire. But, above all, his jealousy was roused by the overtures which Louis had recently made to the maritime powers to resign Spain and the Indies, together with the Netherlands, in return for the cession of Naples and Sicily to the duke of Anjou. Knowing that this plan was strongly favoured by the Dutch government, and dreading that it might be carried into effect, he took the resolution to frustrate it by an immediate invasion of Naples, where his numerous partisans called for assistance.

On the other hand, the duke of Savoy transferred his apprehensions and jealousy of the French to his late deliverers, and laboured secretly and earnestly for the re-establishment of that system which had enabled him to hold the balance of power between the houses of Austria and Bourbon. Aware,

also, that Austria was no less desirous to rule in Italy than the French, he clamoured for the fulfilment of the promises made under the guarantee of England, and rejected with scorn the evasive expedients of the imperial court. From the same principle he was anxious to prevent the occupation of Naples and Sicily, unless his acquiescence was purchased by an equivalent in Lombardy. He was, at length, gratified by an accommodation effected through the agency of Marlborough, by which he obtained the promise of the emperor to fulfil the treaty of 1703.\* Joseph also renounced his claims to the Milanese as an imperial fief, and agreed to consider it as part of the Spanish dominions.

The great object of the maritime powers was to employ the combined forces in Italy in an invasion of Provence, with the view of ruining the naval power of France in the Mediterranean, by the capture of Toulon, which was in an ill state of defence. Marlborough was now engaged in arranging the plan of operations and accumulating the means of attack. With this view he obtained the consent of the German princes for the continuance of their troops in Italy, and persuaded the Dutch not only to furnish pecuniary assistance, but to join their fleet in furtherance of the design. He found, however, great and unexpected obstacles. Both the emperor and the duke of Savoy were less solicitous for the destruction of the French navy, which they considered as the peculiar object of the maritime powers, than for an attack against Dauphiné and the Lyonnois, which would more effectually contribute to the safety of Italy. Their consent was, however, at length extorted, and preparations were made for the execution of this momentous enterprise as soon as the return of the season opened the passages of the Alps.

But neither party entered cordially into the design, and the emperor, in particular, resolved to render it secondary to his own views on Naples. With this intention he secretly concluded with France, on the 13th of March, a treaty of neutrality for Italy; and for the sake of accomplishing the speedy reduction of the Milanese and Mantuan, permitted the French garrisons to withdraw unmolested. This accommodation was not disclosed until it was too late to prevent its completion; and the consent of the duke of Savoy being ex-

\* See Chapter XVII.

torted, the maritime powers had no other alternative than to acquiesce in an arrangement of which they foresaw the fatal consequences.

The primary object of the emperor became now apparent by the orders issued for a detachment of the Austrian army to take the route towards Naples. The consequences were also equally felt in every part of the theatre of action. Relieved from the constant drain occasioned by the war in Italy, the king of France not only reduced his army on the side of the Alps, but sent the troops which he could thus spare, as well as those which he drew from the blockaded fortresses in Lombardy, to swell the army on the Upper Rhine, to give new energy to the contest in Spain, and to complete the unexpected successes which had marked the close of the last campaign. His designs were favoured by the imprudence of the allied generals and the disputes in the court of Barcelona, which had already marred their operations. In conformity with the resolution adopted in the preceding year, Lord Galway and Das Minas were anxious to profit by their supposed superiority of force. The news which arrived of the neutrality concluded for Italy, and the march of reinforcements from France, induced them to commence their operations before the Gallo-Spaniards could receive the expected succours. Unable to obtain intelligence in a country where every peasant was a spy or an enemy, they collected their troops, and made a hasty attempt to break up the quarters of Berwick at the very moment when he was joined by part of his reinforcements.

After a fruitless attempt to reduce Villena, they descended into the plains of Almanza, under the walls of which town they found the army of Berwick encamped. They hurried to the attack on ground highly favourable for the manœuvres of cavalry, in which the enemy were greatly superior. This desperate, but ill-judged, effort was repelled; and the Portuguese cavalry, being seized with a panic, abandoned the field in the utmost confusion. The foot, left without support, were broken on all sides, and the rout became complete. Thirteen battalions of infantry, after cutting their way through the hostile lines, took post in a wood, but were surrounded and reduced to surrender. Great part of the baggage and artillery, with a hundred and twenty standards,

fell into the hands of the enemy. Galway was severely wounded in the onset of the battle; and the remnant of the army, amounting to scarcely 6000 men, effected their escape by a disorderly retreat towards Tortosa. This stupendous victory was purchased by the enemy with the loss of only 2000 men. A more striking picture of the misfortune cannot be drawn than in the words of the defeated commander.

*Lord Galway to Lord Sunderland.*

"*Alegre, April 27.* — My lord, — Your lordship will have heard by my letters, as well as by Mr. Stanhope's, that in all the councils held at Valencia this winter, it was resolved we should march to clear this frontier, ruin the enemy's magazines, and destroy the country between them and us, in case they retired, thereby to secure this kingdom and our march into Aragon; but that if the enemy did assemble upon this frontier, we should fight them. Accordingly, our forces removed from their garrisons the 6th instant: we were all joined the 10th. We marched to Yecla, and from thence to Montealegre, the enemy's troops retiring before us. We consumed and destroyed their magazines in both these places. We afterwards marched to Villena; the enemy, in the mean time, joined all their force, and marched to Almanza. All the generals were of opinion to attack them there, our army being then in a better condition than it would be any time during the campaign, for it daily weakened by sickness. So we marched the 25th, and fought the enemy close to Almanza.

"I am under deep concern to be obliged to tell your lordship we were entirely defeated. Both our wings were broke, and let in the enemy's horse, which surrounded our foot, so that none could get off. I received a cut in the forehead in the first charge. The enemy did not pursue their advantage, so that all the baggage got off. Major-general Shrimpton, Count Dohna, and some other officers, got into the mountains with a body of English, Dutch, and Portuguese foot, where they surrendered the day after the battle, being, I suppose, surrounded by the enemy's horse. I have sent a trumpet to inquire after the prisoners.

"I cannot, my lord, but look upon the affairs of Spain as lost by this bad disaster: our foot, which was our main strength, being gone, and the horse we have left chiefly Portuguese, which is not good at all. Most of our English horse that got off were of the two new raised regiments of dragoons, who did not do their duty. All the generals here are of opinion that we cannot continue in this kingdom, so I have desired Sir George Byng to take on board again the recruits he had just landed at Alicante, and to call at Denia or Valencia for our sick, wounded, and baggage, and have sent all to Tortosa, where we shall march with the remnant of our horse."

On the first receipt of this melancholy intelligence, the attention of Marlborough was employed to obviate the fatal consequences which the defeat was expected to produce, and

it became the subject of immediate deliberation, in a conference which he held the same day with the deputies of the States.

"At this last conference," he writes to Secretary Harley, "we had also under consideration what measures were to be taken upon the news from France of the defeat of our army in Spain; and it was agreed that the court of Vienna should be immediately written to, to dissuade them from the expedition to Naples, and to press them in the most earnest manner to proceed with the greatest vigour on the design of entering France, as the only means left to redress our affairs in Spain. This I have already done, as you will see by the copy of my letter to Count Wratislaw. The States have written to the same effect, as I hope the queen will do, by the first return of the post; and that her majesty will please to order you to speak very seriously to Count Gallas, that he may make the same representations."

This melancholy reverse gave redoubled energy to the feuds which had reigned in the petty court and army of the Austrian prince, even in the midst of success. The different parties endeavoured, as on the former occasion, to throw the odium of their misfortune on each other, and appeals and accusations poured in to Marlborough from all quarters. The most vehement of these complainants was the king himself, from whom we find numerous letters filled with invectives against the British generals, ascribing his misfortune to his want of authority, means, and influence, earnestly soliciting new succours, and requesting the removal of Lord Galway, whose fidelity he even questioned.

The effect of this defeat was scarcely less felt in Portugal than in Spain. The court of Lisbon was not only unable to make exertions proportionate to so critical an emergency; but fears were justly entertained, lest from a sense of weakness, and a desire to relieve themselves from the pressure of a long and tedious war, they should listen to the overtures secretly made by France.

The immediate consequences of the disaster were still more fatal than had been foreboded. Before a month had elapsed, the Bourbon commanders recovered Valencia, Murcia, and Arragon, except the strongholds of Lerida and Tortosa, and the maritime fortresses of Denia and Alicante. The authority of Charles was confined to the province of Catalonia, where his collective force did not exceed 10,000

regular troops, and this single campaign appeared likely to terminate the unequal struggle between the two rival candidates for the Spanish throne.

But notwithstanding the despondency manifested by the defeated commander, Marlborough saw that the contest was not yet hopeless, though it was difficult to select a general who, with abilities and energy to stem the torrent of misfortune, possessed the temper and address suited to so delicate a situation. He was fully convinced of the integrity of Galway; but he felt the impropriety of continuing him in a post where his fidelity was suspected, and his person disliked, by the sovereign under whom he was appointed to act, particularly as the accusations against him were warmly seconded by Eugene, in the name of the Austrian court. In this predicament he concurred in the proposal of Lord Godolphin, to offer the command to Lord Rivers, who had found means to obtain such flattering recommendations from King Charles. His pretensions being, however, deemed inadmissible, Marlborough next recommended the appointment of General Erle, or some officer of similar rank; and suggested the policy of confiding to the young monarch himself the same authority as the king of Portugal exercised over the forces in his dominions. But in these views he was thwarted by the Whigs, who strenuously opposed the removal of Lord Galway. He accordingly employed the interposition of the queen to allay the suspicions which still rankled in the mind of Charles, and to restore that cordiality and union, which alone could remedy the misfortune.

The difficulty of choosing a general, who possessed all the requisites for so perplexing a situation, was still less than that of furnishing reinforcements to save the eastern provinces of Spain. England, which had already supplied so large a proportion of force, was unable to increase her contingent; and the Dutch, wearied with the contest, were lukewarm in the cause, and seemed to regard the defeat of Almanza less as a misfortune than as an event, which might relieve them from the burden of a distant and expensive war.

No other resource remained but in the court of Vienna, who had hitherto left to the maritime powers the maintenance of hostilities in Spain. The strongest appeals were made by

the British commander, both to the affection of Joseph, as a brother, and to his interest as the chief of the empire, and head of the house of Austria; but these appeals were counteracted by the perverse spirit which impelled the Austrian cabinet. The means of the emperor were exhausted by the civil war in Hungary, which he was unable to terminate by force, and unwilling to close by concessions, which he deemed a sacrifice of his sovereign rights. He was also in hourly apprehension of an attack from the king of Sweden; yet, at this moment, he was consulting rather his feelings and dignity, than his strength or interest, by meditating plans of aggression, and hoping for the aid of the maritime powers. He had consented also to spare part of his forces for the invasion of Provence; yet, instead of prosecuting that design, with a vigour which might counterbalance the disasters in Spain, his principal attention seemed absorbed in his plans for the acquisition of Naples. In vain Marlborough and the British cabinet represented the danger and impolicy of this ill-timed enterprise. The imperial court pursued their object with a perseverance which seemed to acquire strength from opposition. Every post brought letters from the prince of Salm, Wratislaw, and Zinzendorf, vindicating the measures of their sovereign, and expatiating on the advantages which would accrue, not merely to the emperor, but to the common cause, from the occupation of Naples. One of these epistles we select, as a proof of the infatuation which reigned at Vienna.

Count Zinzendorf, by a letter dated May 21st, informs the duke that he could not give a positive answer to his request for immediate reinforcements; but that on the first appearance of the business, he was of opinion that the reverse in Spain was an argument for hastening the expedition to Naples; because the army would march on the 14th, and before the orders of recall could reach them, they would have advanced to the vicinity of Rome, and the Austrian partisans in Naples would have already declared themselves.

"As to the affairs of Spain," he adds, "though I consider them as much deranged, yet they are not entirely ruined. The diversion which you are desirous of making for their advantage will no longer avail, as that army is not in a situation to march to Madrid. Nevertheless, it will be attempted, and there will be troops enough, if Sweden leaves us

in repose. At least the conquest of Naples will in some degree indemnify us for this fatal loss.

"Notwithstanding the defeat, the remains of the army must have retired to Barcelona; and as we are superior by sea, that city can always be provisioned by the fleet, and the enemy will not be able to besiege it, for want of heavy artillery, and other necessities. The king, therefore, may remain there in safety, until means can be taken to succour him with fresh troops towards the autumn, on the return of the fleet. These troops may be the palatines, in the pay of the two powers; and if the agreement be made in time with the elector, they may be left for the defence of Piedmont, and be in better condition when they are conveyed to Spain. His imperial majesty, in that case, may perhaps be induced to detach some regiments, but under the condition that the two powers shall furnish their subsistence, which we cannot provide.

"I can suppose that Valencia and Arragon will be lost before the arrival of those succours; but I ask you if they are not already lost? and you cannot but recollect how often you anticipated that our diversion in Italy would be of no advantage to Spain; since you well knew, that according to your own project, and the nature of the country to be passed, the movements could not commence before the middle of June, at which time the French would either have struck the blow, or suspended it on account of the excessive heats.

"But the misfortune is, that we are eager to act in conformity with our wishes, and not according to what is practicable; and unless taught by a reverse, we never relinquish our eager desires. The examples of Bavaria, Hungary, and Spain prove this truth, and God grant that Sweden may not afford a similar instance! The chimerical prospect of a premature peace draws us on to wish for an accommodation. To that end all things appear feasible. Meanwhile we lose whole months in inactivity, and when from experience things are found to be impossible, we are compelled to take in hand, with risk, that which we might have done with security and ease, if we had acted with resolution and concert at the beginning.

"I do assure you that, in my opinion, there is no other part to take for the purpose of remedying the affairs of Spain, than that which I propose. Communicate my thoughts to whomsoever you please, but do not haggle; and be convinced that the emperor is not in a situation to maintain the troops in Spain.\*"

Mortified by these untoward events, and anxious to remedy the effects by his own efforts, Marlborough hastened his arrangements at the Hague, and on the 13th of May reached Brussels. From this place he communicated to Godolphin his reflections on the melancholy situation of affairs.

"*Brussels, May 15.* — Since my last, I have seen several relations of the unfortunate battle given in Spain, and am sorry to tell you the news

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\* Translation from the French original.

does no ways mend on our side. The enemy pretend to have taken five English, five Dutch, and three Portuguese regiments prisoners, with all our cannon and baggage, and 120 colours and standards, which last I think almost impossible. However, we must expect the worst, and begin to take our measures for repairing this great loss. When we come to hear directly from Spain, I fear we shall find our people confine themselves to the preservation of Alicante and Catalonia.

"The States received the news of this fatal stroke with less concern than I expected. However, it is very likely their deputies may have orders to act here with more caution than the urgency of affairs requires; and I can't but take notice, that 'tis observed this blow has made so little impression in the great towns in this country, that the generality of the people have rather shown a satisfaction at it than otherwise, which I don't attribute so much to the inclination they have for the French, as to their aversion to the present government, and the disorders it lies under, to which I do not foresee any proper remedy can be applied during the war. In the meantime it will make us uneasy.

"I do from my heart pity you for all the trouble you are forced to undergo, and should be glad it were in my power to give you any ease.

"Upon Saturday the army will be encamped at Hall, so that by the end of this month I shall be able to guess at what the French intend. The Dutch think they are stronger than we are; if they continue in that opinion, we shall do nothing."

At Anderlecht, Marlborough found the combined forces assembled, to the amount of 97 battalions and 164 squadrons; and was apprised that 102 battalions and 168 squadrons were collected in the vicinity of Mons, under the command of the elector of Bavaria and the duke of Vendome.

It has been generally asserted, that the remarkable inactivity of this campaign in the Netherlands was owing to the superiority of the French, which curbed the enterprising spirit of the British commander. It appears, however, that in the early movements, his army was equal, if not superior, in effective force, though the French enumerated more squadrons and battalions; that his troops were in the highest spirits; and that he himself was indignant at suffering the confidence of a victorious army to evaporate in defensive operations. The real causes, therefore, to which we may ascribe the peculiar character of this campaign, are the timid policy of the Dutch, and the renewal of that system of control and restraint which had before palsied his efforts.

Vendome, though anxious to signalise his military reputation, may rather be said to have been awed by the skill of his antagonist; for while he spread rumours of his superior

force, which gained credit with the Dutch, and while he occasionally assumed an attitude which gave colour to these rumours, he carefully avoided committing the fate of France to the decision of another battle, though he, as well as the cabinet of Versailles, knew that the Dutch government would not suffer the British commander to display the same spirit of enterprise which he had manifested in the preceding campaign.\*

These preliminary considerations are requisite to explain the operations of this campaign, and the correspondence of Marlborough.

On the 21st of May the duke joined the army at Anderlecht. Hearing that the French commanders had publicly declared their intention of offering battle, he approached their lines by moving to Lambeck. From hence we find a letter to the duchess, in which he complains of the violent effects of party spirit in England, and the exultation shown by the disaffected on the misfortune in Spain.

*"Lambeck, May 25. — If I were in the place of the lord treasurer, I should take it very unkindly of the city to drink confusion to generals. If it were not for the concern I have for the queen and England, I could wish they had Peterborough and such like favourite generals, and that the lord treasurer and I were at quiet. But I am afraid there must be some time before that will be allowed of; for this ill success in Spain has flung every thing backwards; so that the best resolution we can take is to let the French see we are resolved to keep on the war till we can have a good peace. As to what you desire to know of the strength of the French army, I am afraid they think they are strong enough to hinder us from doing any thing; but I believe they have not so good an opinion of their army as to venture a battle."*

Receiving intelligence that the enemy had occupied a position behind the Haine, their left supported on Mons, and their right extending to St. Pol; he on the 26th advanced to Soignies, that he might be enabled to take advantage of their movement; but, notwithstanding their apparent resolution,

\* The anonymous biographer of Marlborough is almost the only writer who has assigned the true cause of this inactivity. He observes,—"Not that the Duke of Marlborough himself was for sitting still, but the States were so frightened with the invasion of Germany, and the battle of Almanza, that they would not let him stir. Thus his grace was not permitted to make fresh conquests, or to act with his accustomed vigour."—*Lives of Marlborough and Eugene*, p. 113, 114.

he considered their advance as a mere bravado: for he observes to Lord Godolphin:—

“*Soignies, May 26.* — The superiority the French persuade themselves to have, has encouraged them to quit their lines. Their camp is very strong, and I believe they will not stay in any place where they may with reason be attacked; for tho' they have more squadrons and battalions than we, yet I believe we have as many men; and for certain, our troops are better than theirs. We do hope that their strength here makes them weak both on the Rhine and in Dauphiné; so that we flatter ourselves they can't be long before they will be obliged to make detachments, and then we may act with more advantage. Being obliged to be on horseback at four o'clock to-morrow morning, I shall give you no farther trouble at this time.”

The Bourbon commanders, however, instead of awaiting the advance of their antagonist, moved laterally into the plains of Fleurus, and extending themselves from Fleurus to Sombreuf, evinced an intention of attacking the great towns of Brabant. On this movement, Marlborough advanced from Soignies, with twelve squadrons of horse, to reconnoitre the enemy; and having called a council of war, obtained the approbation of the Dutch deputies to march towards Nivelles and attack them. But, unfortunately, a detachment being sent forward to examine the pass of Ronquieres, through which the army must approach the enemy, brought back a report, that it was occupied by a hostile corps, and from its strength and situation, could not be forced without great loss. This communication being laid before the council, with an exaggerated account that the enemy had considerably increased their disposable force, by draughts from the neighbouring garrisons, a general opinion prevailed, that it would be advisable to remove to their former position, in order to cover Brussels and Louvain, which were then exposed to plunder. To this opinion Marlborough prudently, though reluctantly, yielded, from a conviction that no arguments would conquer the apprehensions of those with whom he was associated. Accordingly, he retreated to Beaulieu, from whence he detailed to Lord Godolphin the motives of his conduct.

“Since my last, the French have not only drawn as many troops as was possible out of their garrisons, in order to make themselves stronger than we; but they have also abandoned their lines, so that we have it in our power to attack any of their towns. But as we could not have our cannon in less than a fortnight, and that we had not troops enough to

make a siege and cover it, we thought it best to make this march, in order to hinder the farther designs of the French, which you will see by the inclosed copy of my letter to the pensioner. The true meaning of my letter to the pensioner is to let him see that I am not of the opinion to venture a battle, unless the advantages be on our side. This caution of mine is absolutely necessary; for instead of coming to this camp, I would have marched yesterday to Nivelles, but the deputies would not consent to it, telling me very plainly, that they feared the consequence of that march might be a battle. So that unless I can convince the pensioner that I am not for hazarding, but when we have an advantage, they will give such orders to their deputies, that I shall not have it in my power of doing good, if an advantage should offer itself; besides, the news which we have from the Rhine will make the Dutch, I fear, persist in their opinion of not venturing. I am also apprehensive that M. Vendome knows, from the French partisans in Holland, that the States are against venturing a battle, which encourages him to act as he does; for he can't but know that our army is better than his, and that if we should beat him, his master must submit to such terms as the allies should think reasonable. I take care not to let the army know that the Dutch are not willing to venture, since that must have an ill effect; and though it be a very unpleasant thing not to have full power at the head of an army, yet I do please myself that I shall do some considerable service this campaign; for I do believe we shall find the elector and M. Vendome grow insolent, by which they will either attack, or give me occasion of attacking them.

"I am sorry to tell you that we have every day instances that the greatest part of this country are much more inclined to 45\* than to king Charles, which is occasioned by the unreasonable behaviour of the Dutch."

In the letter to the pensionary, after describing the movements which had taken place, he continues :—

"M. Vendome's quarters are at Sombref, a proper camp for their horse, on which they put their greatest hopes, thinking they have the superiority; but I am very confident ours are much better, and as many, if not more, in number. They have more battalions than we, but ours are stronger. Upon the whole, I believe our army is stronger than theirs; but considering the circumstances of France, which I take to be much worse than ours, I shall not be for venturing, unless we have the advantage on our side, in order to which we must lose no time in taking an advantageous camp near them, which will also have the good effect of disheartening their army, and encouraging our own. Besides, it will hinder them from ravaging the country, which otherwise they must do, their army being ill paid.

"I beg you to believe I do not say this in order to venture, for I am very sensible of the many difficulties France labours under; but if we

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\* Probably the duke of Anjou, or France.

do not act with some vigour, they will be so encouraged, that they will force us to some action, which may be to our disadvantage, which cannot happen, if we keep the army in the heart they are now in, for 'tis impossible to see finer troops."

Still farther to secure the open towns east of the Senne, Marlborough did not linger at Beaulieu ; but moving again the 31st, he crossed the Dyle below Louvain, and advanced to the strong position of Meldert, which covered the opening into Brabant, between the Dyle and the Gheets. The French, who had spread rumours of their design to besiege Huy, were satisfied with preventing his advance, and encamped in the vicinity of Gemblours. His friends in England could not, however, contemplate the awful situation in which he appeared to be placed, without the deepest anxiety; and knowing the magnanimity with which he always exposed his person, they expected every post the intelligence of a battle, which, from the equality of the two armies, and the spirit of the respective commanders, could not fail to be in the highest degree desperate and bloody. Godolphin writes :—

" *May 23.—June 3.* — I have just now received the favour of yours of the 26th and 30th of May, by which I find the French act otherwise then you expected, and the Dutch no otherwise than you expected. I wish you may have an opportunity of as much advantage as you seem to hope for. In the mean time, I am eased at present of a good deal of agitation of mind for the event of an immediate action, which I did not think so remote as it now seems to be ; for whether M. de Vendome has any notice of the States' inclinations or not, I never looked upon him as a man that would care to be cooped up within lines, having so great an army. I wish the duke of Savoy may be so forward as to oblige them to make a detachment very soon ; but if you should have any opportunity, in the mean time, it may be of ill consequence to baulk your own troops, while they are in so good heart. I make no question but you will have every thing in your thoughts, and I hope God will direct you for the best, and keep you in his protection."

On this also, as on former occasions, the duchess evinced her tender solicitude for his safety, by importuning him not to expose his person. We find an affectionate letter, in which he calms her apprehensions, by assuring her that the French would not venture a battle, although their numbers had been recently increased by the junction of the reinforcements from Italy, which rendered their army superior in strength, though not in courage.

“ *Meldert, June 13.* — I have had the happiness of yours of the 27th of the last month, by which I find you were still under the apprehensions of a battle. My former letters, as well as this, ought to put you at ease; but for the public good, it were to be wished it might be had, for our affairs go very ill in Germany as well as in Spain. For my own part, notwithstanding the noise the French have made, I think they would less care to venture a battle than our friends; for if they had a real mind to do it, it must have been decided before this time. In the army, I must do them right, that there is all the desire imaginable to venture their lives for the public good; but all other sorts of people on this side of the water are so very wise, that I am afraid at last they will bring us to a bad peace. For myself, I am old, and shall not live to see the misfortunes that must happen to Christendom, if the French be suffered to get the better of this war.”

Then alluding to the building at Blenheim, he adds, —

“ By the inclosed, which I received but yesterday, though it be of an old date, you will see the country takes notice that the work does not go on as they expected. Say nothing, but burn the letter; for when it is half-built, it may be enough for you and me; and I do from my heart assure you, that I should be much better pleased to live with you in a cottage, than in all the palaces this world has without you.”

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#### CHAP. LVII. — INACTIVITY AT MELDERT. — 1707.

THE inactivity of the campaign gives but little interest to the letters of Marlborough on military transactions. On the contrary, his negotiation with foreign powers are of high importance; and the political intrigues which agitated the court and cabinet of England, form a prominent feature in his correspondence. As, therefore, the few military incidents are completely blended with diplomatic and domestic business, we shall present the letters in a continued series, prefixing such explanations, notices, and details, as appear necessary to connect the whole, and explain particular passages and allusions.

The ill-timed expedition to Naples was not the only subject of contention with the imperial court; for the arrangements relative to the command of the German army produced delays and difficulties, which operated with a sinister effect, at a time when concert and decision were doubly necessary to retrieve the late disasters.

After a tedious illness the margrave of Baden closed his long and laborious career on the 4th of January. Although his dilatoriness or jealousy had repeatedly marred the splendid designs of the British commander, his death was peculiarly unfortunate at so critical a period as the opening of the campaign; for his high rank and eminent services gave him a degree of consideration in the empire, which it was difficult to supply. By a concordate among the German States, it had been stipulated that the direction of the army should be alternately vested in a Catholic and a Protestant; and, accordingly, after some delay, the choice fell on the margrave of Bareith, a prince of the house of Brandenburg.\* The new general was, however, more aged and inactive than his predecessor, and far inferior in influence and military skill. The petty states and princes taking advantage of the embarrassments arising from the change, withheld or withdrew their contingents; and the army was reduced to such a weak and disorganised condition, that the French were encouraged to depart from the defensive system which they had lately maintained on the Rhine. On the 22d of May, Villars attacked and forced the lines of Stollhoffen, destroyed the magazines, and ruined the dikes and sluices. Leaving a body of cavalry on the Lauter, he followed the margrave to Gemund, and after levying contributions, and spreading terror on every side, pushed his predatory parties as far as the plains of Hochstedt.

The diet, which was then sitting at Ratisbon, was seized with a panic, and the most earnest appeals were made to the court of Vienna for protection against the impending danger. The two circles of Suabia and Franconia, as well as several of the imperial towns, even evinced a disposition to accept the neutrality which was offered by France.

Active measures were therefore adopted to awe the Bavarians, and collect the contingents of the circles; but the most obvious expedient was, to remove the margrave of Bareith from a situation to which he had proved himself incompetent. Marlborough turned his attention to the elector of Hanover, as the most proper person to succeed in the command; not only from a wish to throw lustre on the house next in succession to the British throne, but with the

\* Barre, *Histoire de l'Empire*, t. x. p. 510.

hope that a prince, in the prime of life, would retrieve the military honour of the Germans. The greatest difficulty, however, occurred in effecting this change; for the elector, though ambitious of military fame, was unwilling to accept a command, where the want of force, and the deficiency of money and supplies, as well as the jarring interests of the German States, afforded but little prospect of success. On the other hand, the margrave of Bareith laboured to avert the disgrace of a forced resignation, by attempting to interest the Prussian court in his cause, and ascribing his misfortune to the lamentable deficiency of his army. The emperor also was unwilling to transfer the command to another Protestant, and hoped to secure the direction of the war on the Rhine, by associating with the margrave one of his own generals of distinguished skill and activity. For this purpose he sent General Heister, who had signalised himself in the Hungarian war, and issued orders for the army to make a retrograde march through the mountains of Wirtemberg, with a view to join the troops from Westphalia and the northern circles, and compel Villars to retrace his steps towards the Rhine.

The delay in the nomination of a new general augmented the fear and confusion which reigned throughout the empire, and aggravated the dissatisfaction which the impolitic conduct of the imperial cabinet had already excited in England and Holland. It likewise suspended the operations of the German army, till a great portion of the summer had elapsed. At length the sense of common danger operated on the fears of the German States; and even the Catholic princes, with the electors Palatine and Mentz at their head, concurred in urging the elector of Hanover to accept the command. But still the selfish views of the court of Vienna obstructed a definitive arrangement; and it was not till the season was considerably advanced, that Marlborough had the satisfaction of attaining an object for which he had so long laboured in vain.

Other causes of disquietude continued to arise in the intercourse with the court of Vienna. Though apprehensive of an attack from the king of Sweden, and though dreading his co-operation with the insurgents in Hungary, the emperor was so far transported by the impulse of personal resent-

ment, as to listen to a project of the czar, for deposing Stanislaus, and giving a new king to Poland. To forward this chimerical scheme, Peter the Great had offered the crown to Prince Eugene, whose illustrious birth and military fame were calculated to captivate a chivalrous people, and whose influence was likely to sway the decision of his own sovereign. The prince himself was too prudent to give countenance to this chimerical project \*; but the emperor did not so easily recede from a design, which he conceived likely to mortify and embarrass the king of Sweden. After in vain attempting to gain the concurrence of the allies, he declined announcing his refusal to the czar, until the long-pending negotiation at Alt Ranstadt was nearly brought to a conclusion.†

Although the Swedish monarch had yielded to the instances of Marlborough, in agreeing to conclude an arrangement with the emperor, and had even appeared inclined to recede from his demands relative to the Protestant religion in Silesia; yet his haughty tone and hostile threats of entering the Austrian dominions, deeply wounded the pride of the imperial court, and the dispute continued in a state of suspense. Appeals, on both sides, were made to the British chief, and his interposition was employed in soothing the contending parties, and endeavouring to restore cordiality. Above all, he laboured to impress the imperial court with a due sense of their weakness, and enforced the necessity of yielding, in points of formality and minor importance, to a monarch who held in his hands the fate of Germany. At length he succeeded in inducing the emperor again to depute his minister, Count Wratislaw, to the Swedish head-quarters; and the king to give ear to a proposal for a final settlement. When, however, Wratislaw arrived at Alt Ranstadt, Charles refused to admit him to his presence, either from motives of pride, or from resentment for the attention which the emperor had shown to the chimerical proposal of the czar. Instead of the demands relative to the affair of Count Zobor, the massacre of the Swedish officers at Breslau, and the escape of the Muscovites, which were now deemed the only

\* Letter from Eugene to Marlborough, Milan, May 11. 1707.

† Count Wratislaw to the Duke of Marlborough, Vienna, May 23. 1707.

points in dispute, a new series of complaints was brought forward, and urged in a manner the most ungracious towards the first sovereign in Europe. Charles required the emperor to ratify, without delay, the election of the prince of Holstein as bishop of Lubeck, and insisted on an immediate acquittance for the contingent, which Sweden had neglected to furnish as a member of the empire, as well as an exemption during the continuance of his war with Russia. He also claimed the sequestration of the county of Hadelen, and the subsistence of the Swedish troops, in their intended passage through Silesia. At the instances of the Silesian Protestants, he renewed his demands for the restoration of their religious privileges, and even sent four regiments of horse, to take free quarters, for the protection of their worship.

These new and unexpected pretensions, as well as the aggravating mode in which they were urged, created the highest indignation in the breast of the emperor, and he resented with peculiar warmth the forcible interference in favour of the Silesian Protestants, which he regarded as a premeditated act of hostility. He importuned the British and Dutch plenipotentiaries\* to consider this aggression as a breach of the public peace; and would probably have been driven to act with the rashness of desperation, had not Marlborough soothed his wounded feelings, and pledged himself that the Swedish monarch would enter into no engagement with France. The British commander even found it necessary to check the vindictive spirit of Charles, by mixing firmness with conciliation, and hinting that England and Holland, though anxious for an accommodation, yet could not suffer the constitution of the empire to be violated, nor the dominions of the emperor to be endangered. By his discreet, yet dignified intervention, he thus soothed, without offending the haughty Swede, and at length effected an accommodation.

Charles accepted an apology for the escape of the Muscovites, on the condition that a similar number of his own captive troops should be liberated. The town of Breslau paid a compensation of 4000 crowns to the representatives of the officer who was killed; Count Zobor was delivered up, but, in virtue of a tacit promise, he was afterwards

\* Mr. Robinson to the Duke of Marlborough, August 31. 1707.

restored to liberty. In regard to the bishopric of Lubec, the same compliance was shown to the wishes of the king. Marlborough induced the British and Dutch governments to answer for the renunciation of Prince Charles, and to guarantee the succession in the house of Holstein; and the emperor at once saved his own honour and satisfied the Swedish monarch by summoning the deputies of the Silesian Protestants to Vienna, and voluntarily confirming their privileges.

Both parties were satisfied with this accommodation, and grateful to the able negotiator by whom it was effected. The pride of Charles was soothed by the indulgence shown to his wishes, on points which he had particularly at heart; even the emperor did not deem his sacrifices ill repaid by the removal of a danger, which might have produced a revolution in his Hungarian dominions, and kindled a civil war in Germany; and he repeatedly acknowledged that the intervention and influence of Marlborough had saved him from farther humiliations. On the 1st of September, the long-pending transaction was completed. Charles received the ratification of the treaty on the 12th, and on the 25th his whole army passed the Oder, in his advance towards the Vistula. The danger which had threatened the dissolution of the Grand Alliance was thus happily averted; and the prince, who had held in his hands the fate of Europe, and raised the admiration of the world, led his veteran army to perish in the wilds of Muscovy, and himself became a fugitive and a suppliant in a distant and barbarous land.

In the midst of the important negotiations with the court of Vienna, other points of minor importance occupied the attention of the British commander. We have already adverted to the difficulty which he had experienced in influencing the court of Berlin; but at this period an incident occurred which afforded an opportunity of gaining additional credit with the Prussian monarch. On the death of the duchess of Nemours, the succession to the principality of Neufchatel and the county of Vallengin was contested by numerous claimants. The most considerable, however, were the king of Prussia and the duke of Orleans. In the actual situation of France, the claims of a French prince admitted but little chance of success, in opposition to the interests of

the house of Brandenburg, which, at the instigation of Marlborough, were warmly espoused by the maritime powers and the emperor. The pretensions of the king were therefore solemnly acknowledged by the states of the country, as well as by the Swiss diet; and before the close of the year, he was formally invested with a sovereignty, which was more flattering to his vanity, than advantageous to his interests.

In the course of the correspondence, we find the name of Peterborough recur in a manner which shows the disquietude occasioned by his conduct, in the midst of the weighty affairs which pressed on the consideration of the British ministry. Excluded from the direction of the war in Spain, and recalled by his own sovereign, he sought the gratification of his restless and intriguing spirit, in wandering from court to court, and interfering, without authority, in military and political transactions. Again quitting Spain, he repaired to Turin, where he hoped to renew that confidence which he had acquired in his former visit with the duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene; and as he was discountenanced by his own government, he endeavoured to acquire consideration by the nominal credentials which he had obtained from the king of Spain. He also intruded himself into all deliberations, and affected to correspond with the secretary of state, in the same tone as if accredited by his sovereign. We trace his unaccountable behaviour, in an extract from a letter of Mr. Chetwynd, the British envoy.

*To Lord Sunderland.*

"*Turin, May 4.* — As soon as his lordship had left this place, his royal highness was pleased to send for me, to inform me of all that had passed between them, which he did with great confidence, showing, through all his discourse, a great respect for the queen. His royal highness told me, that his lordship, after having communicated to him a sort of credential from the king of Spain, began to expose his commission, which was a project for penetrating into Roussillon, &c., which his royal highness perceiving, did not give him time to conclude, but told him that the projects of the campaign being already settled with the queen and the rest of the allies, he would not enter into any new measures which might be contrary to those projects. And farther, that he would not treat with his lordship as a subject of the queen, till he had justified himself in England of what he seems to be accused; and then advised him, as a friend, to lay aside all thoughts of any thing else, but making the best haste he could to lay himself at the queen's feet, which,

after a great deal of reasoning, all which tended to his lordship's justification, he promised his royal highness that he would do as he advised him. He went from hence in that resolution, which, I hope, for his own sake, he will put in execution."

We next find him at Vienna, acting a similar part, and by an affected zeal for the expedition to Naples, acquiring temporary favour. He even so far ingratiated himself with the imperial ministers, that he was requested by Count Wratislaw to repair to the Swedish camp, with the view of acquiring more distinct information, respecting the intentions of the king, than could be gained by a mere diplomatic agent. The degree of interest which he soon inspired, will appear from a letter written by Wratislaw to the Duke of Marlborough.

"*Vienna, July 2.*—\* \* \* \* I am very much vexed to observe in the printed account, that the English are inclined to support Lord Galway. To you I can speak with freedom; and if I know any thing of affairs in England, believe me the lord treasurer will be ruined, if he supports Lord Galway, and it will afford fine sport for Lord Rochester and his party, should the ministry of England impute to the king of Spain the loss of that fatal battle. It is more natural to confess the truth, and to allow that Lord Galway and Das Minas, either from incapacity or some other reason, are the cause of the misfortune; for otherwise, it will appear inconsistent, to support in England a French general at the head of an English army, who is become the abomination of the king and the Spaniards.

"Lord Peterborough is on the eve of his departure to visit you. He has shown himself sufficiently humble, although his ardour has occasionally transported him beyond the limits of moderation. I have persuaded him not to publish his manifesto, before he converses with you; and if the court does not persecute him, he will not do it. I believe it will be dangerous to offend him, as he is an Englishman, and has been supplanted by a Frenchman, who has been the cause of this irreparable loss. When you have spoken to him, you will probably be more satisfied with him than you imagine; for Prince Eugene has written to me, that his lordship thinks like a general, although he does not always express himself with propriety; and it is likewise true, that he predicted the misfortunes which have come to pass. Moreover, attempts have been made to persuade me, that you are no longer the same friend to me as you used to be. I am convinced I have nothing to reproach myself with on your account, and I am inclined to serve you with the same attachment. Difference of opinion on the affairs of the world ought not to affect our personal regard, and time will best decide which of us is in the right. You know my disinterestedness, and that I do not desire any thing for myself; but I protest that I shall always feel a sensible pleasure in giving you proofs of my esteem and veneration."

After acquiring such favour at Vienna, Peterborough anticipated the most welcome reception from the hero of the North, to whom he imagined that his high reputation as a soldier would prove an infallible recommendation. But in this hope he was grievously disappointed; for the stern and inflexible temper of Charles was proof against those blandishments which had been seldom exerted without effect on persons of a different character. His adventure is well described by Besenval, the French agent at Leipsic, in one of his intercepted communications.

"My Lord Peterborough departed last week to return to England. Some days after his arrival, having come to Leipsic in a carriage, to the quarters of the chancery, to pay his respects to the king of Sweden, they would not suffer him to enter the apartment where that prince had shut himself up with Count Piper. He did not conceal his chagrin at this disappointment; and while he amused himself with conversing in a parlour, he was informed that the king of Sweden was going out. He ran to present himself to that prince; but found him gone, and mounting the horse of a groom, he made so much diligence, that joining him as he was going out of the village, he told him he was come to have the honour of paying his respects to him, and that his design had been to follow him for that purpose, to his head-quarters of Alt Ranstadt. 'The weakness of my horse,' he added, 'obliges me to take the liberty of requesting your majesty not to go so fast, a liberty I would not have taken, if I were mounted on the smallest of the horses with which your majesty's stables are filled.' The king laughed, and listened to him afterwards, all the way to Alt Ranstadt, as he understood enough of French to comprehend what his lordship said.

"M. Hermelin told me, that my Lord Peterborough, not being content with explaining his ideas in discourse, had written them down, and given them in the form of a memorial to the chancery. He added, that they were contrary to those of the English and Dutch ministers, because they tended to engage the king of Sweden to intermeddle in the affairs of Europe, in quality of arbitrator, by the facility which he would find in it from all quarters, the English being so little in a condition to support the war, that they would be obliged, the ensuing year, to solicit peace, if France could preserve the advantages which she had gained this campaign.

"This lord, who is bold, and has been treated as a madman, by those among the Swedish ministers who are suspected of being pensioners of England, has sought opportunities of speaking to the king, their master, and has found one, as you may have seen by what goes above, and I hope he has not failed to profit by it. I do not know, however, whether his too great vivacity, and the ill offices of some Swedish ministers, may not have discredited his opinions."

From the Swedish camp we find a long and singular letter

written by Lord Peterborough to the duke. It deserves more particular notice, because it is filled with professions of attachment, and offers of service, at the very moment when he was secretly labouring to frustrate the plans of his former patron, for restoring peace between the emperor and the king of Sweden.

*“Ranstadt, near Leipsic, July 22. —* However unfit for a journey, I was resolved to make the utmost diligence to your grace; but hearing upon the road that her majesty had resolved upon my Lord Rivers's return with the forces appointed for the service of his Catholic majesty, I concluded that general had given the queen and the ministers sufficient information as to the affairs of Spain.

“Not knowing that your grace had sent passports for me to Cologne, as I have since been informed, I take the road by Bohemia, Dresden, and Hanover, the persons and circumstances in those countries giving sufficient curiosity; believing I might inform myself so as to be able to give your grace fuller accounts than letters can afford, all accesses being cut off from the Germans. Count Wratislaw was desirous of what lights I could get in a court, where private persons have the advantage of ministers, especially if they will put on a blue coat and a black cravat.”

“Mr. Robinson, at Leipsic, has all the good qualities a minister can have, and is a man of great integrity. I fear he is apt to confide too much upon the least favourable appearances, and therefore, at present, seems persuaded that the Swedes will pass Silesia without halting, in order to pursue a regular war with the Muscovites, having accepted the queen's mediation relating to the disputes with the emperor. It is somewhat strange the king will not admit Count Wratislaw into his presence, which makes me doubt a longer stay in Silesia than some imagine. From Hanover I shall wait on your grace in the army. \* \* \* \* \*

“To what relates to myself, I am sure I shall give your grace satisfaction as to all my actions, and show how little I deserved any hardships. I have always depended upon your impartiality, but demonstration is the best security. If I have not done my duty, I desire no favour; if I have served well, I hope I may meet with a suitable protection, at least justification, as to all absurdities raised to my prejudice. I should be glad to have it from the queen, and I have waited with great patience to that end. If not, my lord, I can give it myself at any time; and cannot doubt but that the queen will permit me to employ myself elsewhere, if her majesty has no occasion for my services.

“I cannot but think Mr. Stanhope's politics have proved very fatal, having produced our misfortunes, and prevented the greatest successes. If my poor thoughts had taken place, her majesty's fleet had had the honour of the conquest of Naples, instead of complaining of the attempt, which could not but succeed; and that force which has now prevailed, had been employed against France. The addition of my Lord Rivers's forces at Valencia did but procure our defeat, which was certain in the measures they took. I hope our good fortune is but delayed, and heartily wish

your grace may finish this war with the same glory with which you have hitherto maintained it."

Discovering, at length, that the camp of Alt Ranstadt was as unpromising a theatre as Turin, Peterborough directed his course to Hanover, where the bickerings of the electoral family with the British court seemed to afford ample scope for intrigue. He was honoured with unusual marks of favour, and gained the attention of the Electress Sophia, by flattering her inclination to visit England; but his cabals awakened the displeasure of the elector, and he had the mortification to discover, that he could not acquire the consideration to which he aspired abroad, while he continued in disgrace with his own sovereign.

His last expedient was, therefore, to conciliate Marlborough, whose character he had alternately lauded and censured. Accordingly, he repaired to the confederate camp in the Netherlands, under the plea of justifying his conduct to the commander, by whose interest he had obtained his appointment, and with whose friendship he had once been honoured. The result of their interview, and his subsequent proceedings will appear hereafter.

After these explanatory remarks, we resume the correspondence.

*To the Duchess.*

"*Meldert, June 6.* — I find by your last letter, that Lord Halifax is not well pleased with Lord Rivers, which I am not surprised at. However, remember when he is dissatisfied, you will find that the Whigs will be of his side, for partiality will show itself when party is concerned. I have received a letter from Lord Rivers, with one enclosed from King Charles. As the whole letter concerns Lord Rivers, I send him a copy of it by this post, though I in no ways doubt his having seen it before it was sealed. God knows what is to be done for the recovery of the great disorders that are now in Spain; for by what Lord Rivers says, it is too plain King Charles apprehends that Lord Galway betrays him, which can never enter into my head; however, if they believe it, it will poison all the undertakings on that side. Your kind expressions in yours of the 16th have given me infinite pleasure, and it is true what you say of Woodstock, that it is very much at my heart, especially when we are in prosperity, for then my whole thoughts are of retiring with you to that place. But if every thing does not go to our own desire, we must not set our hearts too much upon that place, for I see very plainly, that whilst I live, if there be troubles, I must have my share of them. This day makes your humble servant fifty-seven. On all accounts I could wish myself younger; but for none so much as that I might have it more in

my power to make myself more agreeable to you, whom I love with all my soul."

To add to the indignation which the British cabinet felt at the conduct of Austria, in consulting its impotent resentment against Sweden, and still more in sacrificing the cause of Spain to its selfish views on Naples, some rumours appear at this period to have reached the lord treasurer, of a design, on the part of the emperor, to conclude a more general neutrality for Italy, which involved the relinquishment of the expedition against Toulon. In the height of his indignation, he proposed to forestal the design of the imperial court, by making overtures to France, through the agency of the elector of Bavaria. He expresses this opinion in a letter to the duke, dated May 17-28.

"It was but yesterday that I troubled you with two letters; however, I have so many thoughts concerning the obstinate proceedings of the court of Vienna, after all the obligations they have to the allies, that I cannot help observing to you, that in case, by the answer you expect from the prince of Salm, you should find reason to be confirmed in M. Robethon's suspicions, of their being inclined to a neutrality for Italy, which I look upon as a separate peace, I cannot see any good objection why it might not be worth your considering with the pensioner, whether measures might not be taken to be beforehand with them.

"I am sensible this matter is very nice, but I mention it only upon supposing you are thoroughly satisfied of their intentions; and then I should think, by restoring the elector of Bavaria to his country, which would be no small mortification at Vienna, he might be induced to prevail with France, rather to gratify England and Holland in the terms of the peace, than the house of Austria.

"And upon this supposition, taking it for granted that they will put themselves quite out of the war, and stick to their acquisitions in Italy, and apply themselves to reduce Hungary, I must own very freely, I do not see how the rest of the allies can carry on the war without great disadvantage; nor can I hope the Dutch would be long afterwards before they followed that example; though at the same time I agree France is in so ill circumstances at home, that they must necessarily sink if the allies would but hold together. And this consideration makes the *contretems* of the imperial court so much the more unfortunate, and the more grievous to the whole alliance. When all this is said, if the duke of Savoy can or will go on, notwithstanding this detachment for Naples, I shall not quite despair but the project may succeed; yet, in all events, I think we ought, at least, to be very watchful of the steps of these gentlemen, and take every occasion, great and little, to let them see we are very far from being satisfied with all their late behaviour.

"I ought to ask you a great many pardons for persecuting you with such repeated trouble upon this subject. I am sure it gives me a great deal of trouble myself, and I wish there may be no occasion of my having given it you.

"The greatest objection I can find myself against what I have here hinted is, your telling the pensioner that we are capable, in any case, of receding from the preliminaries settled with Holland. But I make you judge of that, as of all the rest; and if you please, when you have read my letter yourself, though you should never think of it again, I shall be very well contented.

"It is with the same submission that I trouble you with the enclosed reply, which I made to Count Wratislaw's letter, of which he sent you a copy. You may seal and send it forward to him if you think proper, and if not, you may please to burn it.

"Our last French letters brag that they will venture a battle in Flanders. I think it is what we ought to wish for; but, at the same time, one cannot help being in a great deal of pain, till we know their intentions more certainly, and that you are not like to be much exposed."

"June 1-12.—\* \* \* I think your letter to Count Piper† is as right as is possible, and I hope you will approve as well the queen's letter to the king of Sweden, of which Mr. Secretary Harley said he would send you a copy by the last post. If these letters come in time, or are in themselves sufficient to prevail with the king of Sweden, I think we are very lucky; for in case they do not, the court of Vienna seems to me neither to do one thing nor to have one thought, that is not directly opposite to the interest of the allies; and by all the copies of the letters you send me, it is not only plain that they persist with more obstinacy than ever in sending their detachment to Naples, but it seems to me as plain, that if the king of Sweden be uneasy to them, they will encourage the chimerical proposal to Prince Eugene, and send for him and all his troops in Italy to support it, leaving the expedition against France to take care of itself. I take these consequences to be extremely probable, and that nothing can hinder them, unless you will let them plainly understand, that such proceedings as these will oblige the allies to break with them, and abandon the house of Austria to the mercy of France.

"What you say of Lord Galway is certainly right; and, considering the unjust impressions of the king of Spain in his prejudice, he cannot be of use there. But who can? Every body that is there desires to leave the service, and come home; and I know nobody to send but Lord Rivers, who, perhaps, will not care to go neither, without troops from hence; and we neither have them; nor, if we had them, would it be of any use to send them, as you will see by the enclosed from M. Montandre.

"There is nothing thought so essential here as to preserve Catalonia

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† This letter is printed in Lediard, tom. ii. p. 105., and contains an exhortation to the king of Sweden to conclude an accommodation with the emperor.

this winter, if it be any way possible; and it having been fully considered this night at the cabinet council, Mr. Secretary Harley has orders to write to you by the messenger, to see if you can, either by Count Wratislaw or Zinzendorf, bring this to be agreed with at the court of Vienna, which is at this time so unpopular here, that our two dukes\*, last Sunday night, would have been contented, I think, to have broke with them; and the least unreasonable of the two would be satisfied with nothing less than a joint complaint and representation from England and Holland together, at their unaccountable conduct. But if they will be easy in sending troops to Spain, that matter will be set right again.

"I find by the letters from Turin that Lord Peterborough is returned thither again, though he had formally taken his leave of the duke of Savoy. He has written a very angry letter to my Lord Sunderland, in which he says he is coming very soon to your camp; and you seem to be so much more in his favour than any body else, that I cannot but impute it to my lady's good offices, for last winter's visits to her."

Fortunately for the interests of the Grand Alliance, the views of Marlborough were too enlarged to enter into the resentment of his friend. Though disapproving the perverse and selfish spirit which actuated the imperial cabinet, he contemplated their conduct with the eyes of a statesman, and would not consent to sacrifice the public welfare to the feelings of personal resentment, however justly founded. He therefore combated the opinions of Godolphin, by arguing that the emperor would not persist in pursuing a line of conduct which was so contrary to his own interest; and that it was necessary to connive at these selfish projects, for the sake of the common cause.

"*Meldert, June 9.* — By yours of the 17th, I see you are very apprehensive of the court of Vienna's making peace. I think them extremely to blame in every thought they have, but such a proceeding would be direct madness. I think they have many projects more at heart than that of Toulon; but till I am cheated I must rely upon what Prince Eugene promises, which is, that he will do his best; so that I do not apprehend a neutrality. But I very much fear that Count Wratislaw and the other ministers may persuade the emperor to such a behaviour as may force the king of Sweden into war, which I think would be destruction to themselves, as well as to their friends. I have said all that is possible for me to do to the court of Vienna, and have this morning sent your letter to Count Wratislaw.

"Yesterday the Count de la Motte joined the duke of Vendome's army, so that I think they have now all that is possible for them to have; and notwithstanding the noise they have made of being in the plains of Fleurus, they have always been in very strong camps. They may in

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\* The dukes of Somerset and Devonshire.

their next march, if they please, go into the plains of Fleurus, and then, if the deputies would allow of it, we might have a decisive action; but by what I can learn they are no ways inclined to it."

"*Meldert, June 13.* — I had yesterday yours of the 27th, with the enclosed letters that you had received from Alicante and Lisbon. I have also received a copy of a letter from General Erle to Lord Rivers, by which, and what the king of Spain says to me in his letter of the 3d of May from Barcelona, I find Lord Galway in very bad circumstances. For my own part, I think him incapable of being guilty; but if there be no confidence the consequences must be fatal. I send copies of my letters from Prince Eugene and the king of Spain to Lord Sunderland, it being in his province, as also my answers; so that if her majesty would have me write any thing more I might have her pleasure.

"The Count Maffei\*, who is now with me, presses very much that more powder might be sent to the fleet, assuring me that there is none to be bought in Italy; he also desired me, in his master's name, to let you know that all the money he had, or could borrow, he has employed for the project. He begs that the second 50,000*l.* might be sent, so that they might not fail for want of money; and if they should be so unfortunate as not to succeed, you might then stop it from his subsidy. As this is the most likely project to make this campaign end well, if possible, they should have no excuse.

"As to myself, I am sure you are so kind as to believe that I will be careful of taking the first opportunity of doing good, as far as in me lies, but you know I am not entirely master; however, I will not despair of doing service. By the express from Prince Eugene I received the enclosed from Lord Peterborough, and if he does not change his mind I am like to be happy in his company. Whatever his project may be, you shall be sure to know. I suppose the queen's intentions are that he should return for England, and not stay on this side the water. I shall not pretend to give him much advice, but shall govern myself by what you shall write me; for I believe I may have your answer before I shall see him."

"*Meldert, June 16.* — I had this morning yours of the 30th of the last month, with the order of battle, by which it appears that the enemies were very much stronger than Lord Galway, which makes it very strange that by choice they should go to attack them in a plain.

"I have sent the queen's letter to Mr. Robinson. I hope it may have a good effect; but I believe nothing can hinder the king of Sweden from mortifying the emperor by staying in some of his hereditary countries, and I am afraid it will fall upon Silesia; but though he is angry to the last degree, I dare say he will not declare war, since that cannot but turn to the advantage of France.

"You are very much in the right to make no answer to General Erle's letter till you hear from Lord Galway. I know his presence in England is wanted for the board of ordnance. However, I think him the properest

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\* Minister of the duke of Savoy. He afterwards came over to England, as envoy extraordinary from that prince. — *Ed.*

man you can leave in Spain, for he has never disoblged King Charles, and I think is of a temper to please him; and I confess I think there is the same reason that the king of Spain and his general should command in Spain as there was for the king of Portugal and his general in Portugal. This is my opinion only to you and her majesty, and if this should be thought reasonable, then Erle will be proper to be left, for I take it for granted that my Lord Galway neither can nor will stay.

"You will see by the letters I send Mr. Secretary Harley that the Saxon troops are desired for the Rhine, and that the emperor would give the command of the army on the Rhine to the elector of Hanover. I believe he will refuse it; so that army will be without any commander for at least one month longer."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

*Windsor, Sunday, June 15-26.* — One letter of last post from the Hague tells us the Count de Noyelles has written a letter to the States, in which he is pleased to take great liberties with my Lord Galway. We think it pretty hard here, at the same time, that he who has been the visible occasion of our misfortunes in Spain, for two years successively, should have the confidence to lay the blame at the doors of others, who have suffered so much, and at so great an expense. And as most people are forward to think and say that nothing can succeed while Lord Galway is with the king of Spain, so here we shall enter into no expense, with much satisfaction, as long as we find the king continues under the same ill influence against us.

"As yet nothing has gone right for us, nor do I much like Mr. Robinson's last letter from Leipsic; but whatever uneasiness happens to the court of Vienna, they deserve it richly, who would not, in all this time, send a general to the Rhine, though they have been pressed to do it, to my knowledge, ever since last Christmas.

"I reckon the duchess of Nemours's death engages us to assist the king of Prussia, as far as we can, in his pretensions to Neufchatel; but I am sorry it comes to bear at this time, for fear it may put him upon recalling his troops from Italy to take possession. I hope you will endeavour to prevent this consequence of it."

*From Lord Sunderland.*

"*Whitehall, June 10-21.* — \* \* \* \* What you say in relation to Lord Galway is very right, that nothing should be done hastily in a matter of that consequence; but the account that Colonel Wrede has brought sets that matter in quite another light, and I am afraid there is too much partiality in Lieutenant-general Erle to lay much weight upon what he writes to Lord Rivers. As for King Charles, it is plain Lord Galway is very ill with him; but I am afraid that will be the case, in a month's time, of any body else that may be sent, if they do their duty. When I have said this, I don't pretend to say, or judge, what is right or proper to be done with such a court as that of Barcelona."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Meldert, June 20.* — I have had the happiness of your kind letter of the first of this month from St. Alban's. From my soul I wish I were

with you, but every day gives me less prospect of that happiness. Your reasoning for not venturing at this time agrees exactly with that of the Dutch; for my own part, I beseech God Almighty to put into my heart what is right. I am very apprehensive of the consequences on both sides, so that I am resolved not to let slip any favourable occasion, but will not undertake, unless others be of the same opinion.

"I have received a letter from General Erle, by which, and by every thing that comes from that country, I find there is such a contempt and anger against Lord Galway, that it will be impossible for him to continue with any satisfaction to himself, or advantage to the public; but if this be not the opinion of your friends\*, I desire what I say may go for nothing. The being too much in the sun this day has made my head ache, so that I must end with assuring you, with the truth of my heart, of being entirely yours."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Friday, June 13-24. — Not having any thing from you since my last, nor likely to have before this post, I shall only trouble you with some farther reflections on the affairs of King Charles.

"I find Lord Halifax, Lord Somers, and their friends are pretty indifferent as to Lord Rivers, and unconcerned whether he is to return or not. But they are very uneasy to think of recalling Lord Galway, though sensible he must be useless; for they carry that matter so much farther as to think all these misunderstandings are industriously fomented by Count de Noyelles, whom they take to be the principal occasion and contriver of Lord Galway's misfortunes; for which reason they seem to think, unless he be called home either before or at the same time, with Lord Galway, it will look as if he had been in the right, in all he had suggested to the king of Spain, and all the reflections which belong to that matter must light upon Lord Galway and England.

"Now I know no remedy so probable for these difficulties as that, if any troops go to Spain from Italy, the emperor might order some proper person to take the command of the whole, and Count Noyelles and Galway be both recalled."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Meldert, June 23. — I received yesterday yours of the 1st and 3d by the messenger. What you write of the court of Vienna is certainly right; but by the abstract I sent you by the last post, as well as by other letters, I am convinced they have no intelligence with France. Notwithstanding that, I have writ very plainly to them already, that if, upon any account whatsoever, the project concerted for the entry of France should miscarry, they must expect that all the fatal consequences would, with justice, be laid at their door. However, I shall obey your commands in writing, and at the same time propose to them the sending the greatest part of their detachment of Naples to the relief of King Charles in Catalonia. I hope you have not as yet told the Count de Gallas that the queen would be contented to pay them. If you have not, I beg you will

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\* The Whigs.

not let him nor Sir Philip Meadows\* know any more than that the queen, as a mark of her zeal for the public good, and the particular concern she has for the person of King Charles, would be contented to allow a subsidy, towards the support of such troops as the emperor should send from that detachment of Naples. I am particular as to that detachment, so that they may not pretend to send any of their troops which are to enter France; for when that expedition is over I should be in hopes that we might be able to spare the king from that army the 7000 palatines, which are paid by England and Holland. That expense would not fall upon the queen alone, as I am afraid any other would do. For the Dutch have so much mind to peace, and so just a pretence to poverty, that it was with great difficulty I was able to persuade them to come into one half of the expense of the regiment of Bothmar. That regiment, and the Saxons, make together 5400 men. The money that is saved by the regiments of foot will more than pay the queen's part."

"Meldert, June 23. — Believing it might be reasonable for you to show my long letter to some that may have a much better opinion of Lord Rivers than I have, I send you my opinion as to the command in Spain, apart, so that it may be known to none but yourself and her majesty. As I have already told you that it is impracticable for Lord Galway to continue in that service, and as you approve of the reasoning in Montandre's letter, the number of the queen's subjects in Spain will be too few for the command of Lord Rivers; so that the best for the service would be to give the command to General Erle, and leave no other officers with him, but what may be suitable to the number of men. And as the troops of necessity that go from Italy must be all foreigners, I think the chief command should be left to the king and his generals, and that General Erle should have directions to concern himself only with the queen's subjects, and be obedient to whatever the king should command. At the same time I think he should be encouraged by having the commission of general of the foot. The train of artillery might be very much lessened, so that you might be the better able to give subsidies for German troops that shall go thither. I should think that you might in confidence tell Lord Rivers that it is impossible to send from England such supplies as are necessary for the support of King Charles but by the consent and assistance of the parliament; so that if they shall in the winter resolve on such a supply as shall enable the queen she will then desire him to take the command."

*Lord Godolphin to the Duke.*

"Windsor, June 16-27. — \* \* \* \* I never did once imagine that the emperor had a thought of making separate terms with France; but yet all his behaviour has been so unaccountable, as to put the rest of the allies under the same difficulties as if he had acted by directions from Versailles.

"For what relates to Spain, my own opinion agrees exactly with what you write in your private letter to myself; and in that matter

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\* British minister at Vienna.

there will be no difficulty with the queen. But, as I have told you in my former letter, some of our friends here will be unwilling to bring home Lord Galway, while Count de Noyelles stays with the king of Spain; so the true way of making all this easy will be, for the emperor to send a good general with the troops from Italy. The very best would be the Count de Thaur\*, who went to Naples with the detachment.

"The queen will be very careful not to let the duke of Newcastle, or any body else, make you uneasy about governments. That of Tinmouth waits your orders; that of New York will be made vacant, whenever you propose a proper man; that of New England is also like to be vacant very soon, there being great clamours depending this time against Colonel Dudley, the present governor."

#### CHAP. LVIII. — RISE OF MRS. MASHAM.—1707.

WHILE Marlborough was employed in superintending the operations of foreign policy, and the details of the camp, the intrigues in the court and cabinet no less seriously engaged his attention, and furnished still greater cause of perplexity.

Notwithstanding the success which attended the perseverance of the Whigs, in procuring the appointment of Sunderland, their victory was not complete. It was of the highest consequence to favour their party, in the disposition of church preferment, not only as the means of increasing their interest in Parliament, but of securing the influence attached to the clerical character in public opinion. On this point, however, the queen was still more tenacious than on questions of state policy. Zealously attached to the doctrines of the high church, she was anxious to fill the ecclesiastical dignities with persons of congenial sentiments, and to exclude those of contrary principles, whom she regarded as little better than infidels. Jealous of the favour which the two ministers had recently shown towards the Whigs, she withdrew from them that confidence which she had

\* He is more commonly known by the name of Daun; an able officer of Austria, who, it will be seen in Chap. lix. distinguished himself greatly by reducing Capua and Gaeta, and taking possession of the whole kingdom of Naples. He was the father of the celebrated Count Daun, who commanded against Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War.—ED.

evinced on former occasions, and consulted only her own partialities, or the recommendations of her secret advisers, in the disposition of ecclesiastical preferment.

Two instances of this kind form a prominent feature in the correspondence of the year. The first was her refusal to nominate Dr. Potter to the Regius Professorship of Divinity, in the University of Oxford. Although this learned divine had been warmly recommended by Marlborough himself, yet his attachment to the doctrines of the revolution was a sufficient demerit with the sovereign; and she designated for the appointment Dr. Smalridge, who to equal talents and learning, added the merit of a zealous devotion to the tenets of the high church, and to the Tory maxims of policy.

The second and most prominent instance was in the designation to the two sees of Exeter and Chester, which became vacant at the close of the preceding year. Without waiting the recommendation of the ministers, or rather to prevent their interference, she promised these two dignities to Sir William Dawes and Dr. Blackall, who were no less distinguished for their Tory zeal than for their merit and learning; and to evade the remonstrances of Marlborough, she concealed her intentions until he had taken his departure from England.

Such striking proofs of favour to the opposite party awakened the indignation of the Whigs; and, at their instigation, Marlborough and Godolphin were involved in a new contention with the queen, which lasted during the whole year. The effects even recoiled on the two ministers themselves; for when their remonstrances failed in inducing her to desist from her purpose, the junta relapsed into the same suspicions of their good faith, as they had manifested on former occasions, and recurred, as before, to importunities, complaints, and threats.

This political discordance with the Whigs in general gave rise to a misunderstanding between Halifax and Marlborough in particular. We have already adverted to the increasing importunities of the Whig chief for some post, which he could hold with the situation of auditor of the exchequer. He had indeed been gratified with the appointment of ambassador to the court of Hanover, in the preceding year, and was

afterwards engaged in negotiating the treaty of barrier. But this employment being temporary, only increased his anxiety to move in a diplomatic sphere, and he aspired to the situation of joint plenipotentiary for the conclusion of peace. Marlborough, however, disliking his temper, endeavoured to elude his demand, by offering the appointment to Lord Somers; and on his refusal, he recommended Lord Townshend, hoping by this choice at once to conciliate the Whigs, and to prevent the nomination of a colleague with whom he could not cordially act. Halifax was grievously mortified at this slight, and expresses his chagrin in a letter to the duchess.

“ *March 28.* — Madam; I am extremely concerned that the contrary winds keep my Lord Marlborough on this side of the water; but I am at present under so great a mortification, that I think nobody but myself would trouble themselves about the public. Your grace has been so obliging to me, that I cannot forbear any longer from unburdening my heart to you.

“ I was the last man in England to think myself qualified for any foreign business, when last year I was put upon going to Hanover, as a service particularly acceptable to the queen. I knew how ungrateful and difficult a task I undertook; yet at the desire of Lord Marlborough and lord treasurer, I submitted, and went uneasily, but successfully, through it. It happened while I was in Holland, that a treaty for securing our succession, and a barrier for the States, was set on foot; and, by Lord Marlborough's orders, I was employed in that, and had many conferences with the ministers upon it, and letters from them since, which, by the directions of lord treasurer and Lord Marlborough, I answered; and by their commands, against my own inclinations, entered into that negotiation, and took upon me the ungrateful part of opposing the unreasonable pretensions of the Dutch. Afterwards, Lord Marlborough desired me to persuade Lord Somers to join with him in treating of peace, when the time should come. I did it very zealously, as Lord Sunderland can witness, but could not prevail. And after that, when perhaps your grace will think I might have expected, at least, to be asked the question, I heard, in a very extraordinary manner, that Lord Townshend was named.

“ I have told your grace, a short, but melancholy story, by which I think it appears, I have been treated with great contempt or unkindness, as will be judged both at home and abroad, at a time that I am not conscious myself of having deserved either from Lord Marlborough.

“ Madam, I will make no other reflections, and forbear saying any more upon a subject so afflicting to me. I beg your grace will not imagine me so vain, as to be much disturbed for missing the most expensive, most troublesome, and most dangerous commission in the world; but I own I am almost<sup>d</sup> distracted to find I can no way get any share of

Lord Marlborough's esteem and friendship. I have done all I could to merit them, and for that intention I hope your grace will pity me and forgive me."\*

The offended peer soon found an opportunity, of which he did not fail to profit, to show his resentment for this slight. We have already alluded to the Tory principles of Admiral Churchill, and the zeal with which he was supposed to have inflamed the queen and prince of Denmark against the Whigs. His conduct naturally excited their resentment, and they expressed their resolution of directing an accusation against him in parliament. The complaints which had arisen on the mismanagement of the navy, afforded an opportunity of selecting him as the person who possessed the highest influence in the council of the lord high admiral, and to whom many of the recent losses, sustained by the trading part of the community, were attributed. The duke was naturally anxious to spare the feelings and character of a brother, and not only appealed to the Whigs in general, but particularly addressed himself to Lord Halifax, who was one of the principal movers of the accusation. Although he wrote in a style of unusual humility and condescension, the offended peer disdained to give any reply. This contemptuous treatment weighed on the mind of the duke, and drew from him the strongest expressions of regret and indignation, in his letters, both to the duchess and Godolphin.

The duchess, who had invariably censured the conduct and principles of her brother-in-law, espoused the cause of the Whigs, and, by her reproaches and interference, aggravated the disquietude of her husband.

Admiral Churchill, at the same time, imprudently increased the odium against him, by imitating the example of the Tories, in stigmatising the conduct of the war in Spain, and the character of Lord Galway. He was even accused of joining at a public dinner in a sarcastic toast, which was then current, reflecting on the military talents of the unfortunate commander. Another act of imprudence was, his

\* As this letter is without the date of the year, I first considered it as written in March 1708, when the appointment of Lord Townshend took place. But the detention of the Duke of Marlborough at Harwich by contrary winds, and the mention of the embassy to Hanover in the preceding year, combine to fix the date of the letter in March, 1707.

demur in taking the usual oaths, which were rendered necessary, by the appointment of a new board of admiralty, into which Walpole and other zealous Whigs were introduced. This hesitation was construed, and perhaps not unjustly, into a proof of his attachment to the exiled family.\*

At the same time, a private cabal was forming in the household of the queen, which no less embarrassed, and still more deeply affected the duke, both in his public and private capacity.

From the account of the domestic transactions in the preceding year, it appears that the great credit which the Duchess of Marlborough had at first attained with the queen had continued to decline. The external appearances of friendship and confidence were still preserved; because the queen was a perfect mistress of dissimulation, and because the spirit of the duchess was too lofty, even to suspect that the empire which she possessed over her royal mistress could be undermined. In this she resembled most favourites, who neglect to maintain their power, by the means employed to acquire it, and overlook appearances which seem trifling only to themselves. Nothing, in fact, could perhaps have shaken her interest, but an inferior agent, in whom she placed the most implicit confidence, and on whose situation and abilities she looked down with indifference, if not contempt.

Averse to the restraint of constant attendance, the duchess had endeavoured to lighten the fatigues of her envied, but not enviable, situation, by placing about the person of her royal mistress, as one of the bed-chamber women, Mrs. Abigail Hill †, an humble relation, whom she had rescued

\* The influence of his brother was very considerable, which made his conduct and politics of great importance to the duke. Admiral Churchill for a long period was at the head of the British navy, as he performed the duties of the queen's husband, Prince George of Denmark, who was lord high admiral, and much attached to Churchill.—ED.

† Mr. Hill was an eminent Turkey merchant; but, becoming a bankrupt, his numerous family was reduced to the greatest straits. Some letters from Mrs. Hill, the mother of Mrs. Masham, are preserved in the Marlborough Papers, which convey the warmest expressions of gratitude for the favours of the duchess, and show that she obtained places and establishments for all the children. Abigail was so reduced, as to enter into the service of Lady Rivers, wife of Sir John Rivers, bart., of Chaf-

from penury, and whose family she had maintained and patronised. Considering this dependant as too lowly in

ford, in Kent, as I was informed by the late James Rivers, Esq. She was raised from her humble situation by the duchess.

[This notice by Coxe appears rather too brief, and we shall subjoin a few additional particulars of the primitive relations between the Hills and Churchills. The Duchess of Marlborough has left a succinct account (*Conduct*, p. 176.) of the degree of kindred in which her rival stood to her, and of the manner in which she became acquainted with her destitute condition. It would be impossible to alter the duchess's narrative into more expressive language than her own; and it is so interesting, that we shall append it to the note of Mr. Coxe. After referring to the paternity of Mrs. Hill, she says,—

“Our grandfather, Sir John Jenyns, had two-and-twenty children, by which means the estate of the family, which was reputed to be about 4000*l.* a year, came to be divided into small parcels. Mrs. Hill had only 500*l.* to her fortune. Her husband lived very well for many years, as I have been told, until, turning projector, he brought ruin upon himself and family. But as this was long before I was born, I never knew there were such people in the world till after the Princess Anne was married, and when she lived at the Cockpit; at which time she came to me, and said, she believed ‘that I did not know that I had relations in want,’ and she gave me an account of them. When she had finished her story, I answered, ‘that, indeed, I had never heard before of any such relations,’ and immediately gave her out of my purse ten guineas for their present relief. Afterwards I sent Mrs. Hill more money, and saw her. She told me that her husband was the same relation to Mr. Harley as she was to me, but that he had never done any thing for her. I think Mrs. Masham's father and mother did not live long after this. They left four children, two sons and two daughters. The elder daughter (afterwards Mrs. Masham) was a grown woman. I took her to St. Alban's, where she lived with me and my children, and I treated her with as great kindness as if she had been my sister.”

The duchess then relates how she obtained for Mrs. Abigail Hill her first appointment as bed-chamber woman to the Princess Anne, and how she prevailed upon Lord Marlborough to procure the situation of laundress to the duke of Gloucester's family for her younger sister. Not contented with conferring these benefits, the duchess, it appears, resolved to provide for the whole family. The eldest son she got into the Custom-house:—

“Her brother (whom the bottle-men afterwards called honest Jack Hill) was a tall boy, whom I clothed (for he was all in rags), and put to school at St. Alban's, to one Mr. James, who had been an usher under Dr. Busby, of Westminster; and whenever I went to St. Alban's I sent for him, and was as kind to him as if he had been my own child. After he had learned what he could there, a vacancy happening of page of honour to the Prince of Denmark, his highness was pleased, at my request, to take him. I afterwards got my Lord Marlborough to make

situation, and too confined in abilities to create jealousy, she little imagined that a person whose post. was held only by her protection, and who was bound to her by the ties both of gratitude and affinity, would attempt to form an interest against her benefactress. For a time, her cousin answered all her expectations, and seemed a faithful and vigilant observer of the transactions at court, and the feelings and conduct of the queen. The duchess, therefore, relaxed still more in her attendance; and, proud of her husband's splendid services, she gradually became more presumptuous and domineering.

Mrs. Hill had not, however, long filled her confidential office, before she likewise aspired to a higher degree of consideration; and the state of the cabinet and parties offered a temptation which overcame her sense of gratitude. The violent bickerings which continually arose between the queen and the duchess did not escape the vigilant eye of a daily attendant. By the confidential complaints which frequently burst from the queen, Mrs. Hill found herself growing into consequence; and her rising influence was perceived by the candidates for court favour, almost before it was known to herself.

Besides that suppleness of temper natural to dependants rising into favour, which formed so advantageous a contrast with the overbearing and provoking conduct of her patroness, the political principles of Mrs. Hill were in unison with those of the queen. She was deeply imbued with the maxims of the high church party, and was classed among those who were adverse to the house of Hanover, if not partisans of the Stuarts. Such a congeniality of character

him groom of the bed-chamber to the duke of Gloucester. And though my lord always said that Jack Hill was *good for nothing*, yet, to oblige me, he made him his aide-de-camp, and afterwards gave him a regiment. But it was his sister's interest that raised him to be a *general*, and to command in that ever-memorable expedition to Quebec. I had no share in doing him the honours. To finish what I have to say on this subject, when Mr. Harley thought it useful to attack the Duke of Marlborough in parliament, this Quebec general, the honest Jack Hill, this once *ragged boy whom I clothed*, happening to be sick in bed, was nevertheless persuaded by his sister, to get up, wrap himself in warmer clothes than those I gave him, and go to the house to vote against the duke."

— Ed.]

and sentiment, joined to the most flattering humility of demeanour, and a watchful observance of her royal mistress's wishes, made a rapid progress in the affections of Anne, whose character was turned to the familiar and romantic friendship which her station forbade, and who, at this period, peculiarly felt the want of an adviser and confidant.

The bed-chamber woman found a skilful counsellor and abettor in Secretary Harley, to whom she was related in the same degree by her father as to the duchess by her mother; and by whom she and her family had been likewise assisted. Their relationship produced intimacy; and in the secret intrigues which Harley was equally meditating against his patrons, he naturally courted the aid of so useful an auxiliary. Mrs. Hill, therefore, was easily estranged from her benefactress, and became the channel of a constant communication between the queen and the secretary, more dangerous, as it was less suspected.

Harley was, perhaps, of all men, the best calculated to win his way through the crooked paths of political intrigue. He had hitherto figured as a Whig or Tory as it suited his interests; and under the guise of moderation, had gradually acquired a considerable body of adherents, to whom his parliamentary talents gave strength and consistency. He was supple, plausible, and insinuating, adroit in flattery, and profuse in his professions of duty and attachment. To these qualities he joined uncommon discernment of character, a cool and calculating head, a spirit of profound dissimulation, and an exterior of familiarity, courtesy, and candour, which deceived the most suspicious.

Owing his political consideration principally to the countenance of Marlborough, he loaded him with declarations of respect, zeal, and duty, and professed to emulate his principles of moderation and independence. By this affectation of attachment, he won on his open and unsuspecting temper; and we find from the correspondence, that at the very moment when he was accused of duplicity, Marlborough himself became a pledge for his sincerity, and even advised the treasurer to employ his interposition with the queen. Knowing the Tory partialities of his royal mistress, her growing aversion to the duchess, and her anxiety for peace, to free herself from the power of the Whigs, Harley skilfully

formed his attacks against the chiefs of the ministry. By the intercourse with the queen, which he enjoyed in virtue of his office, and still more through the channel of Mrs. Hill, he found means to inflame her indignation against the duchess, to work on that high sense of prerogative, which she had imbibed from her father, and to represent the treasurer and general, as favouring the efforts of the Whigs for engrossing all the offices of state, and reducing her to a degree of dependance unworthy of a sovereign.\* These insinuations were too much in unison with her feelings to fail of the desired effect, and the secret cabals of Harley in the preceding year, had encouraged her to resist the attempts of that party for the appointment of Sunderland. At the same time, the artful secretary fomented the discontent of the Whigs against Marlborough and Godolphin, by insinuating that the two ministers were lukewarm in their cause, and the only obstacles to their admission into power.

The confidential friends of the duchess, among whom was Mr. Maynwaring, had made repeated representations on the rising influence and secret views of Mrs. Hill. But for a considerable time, they remonstrated without effect; for the duchess was rejoiced at the relief which she had gained from restraint, and could not be convinced of the danger arising from the machinations of her own dependant. At length, the conduct of the queen, combined with the evident favour of Harley and Mrs. Hill, dissipated the cloud which had hitherto obscured her judgment, and she communicated her apprehensions to Godolphin and the duke.

It is, indeed, singular, that the intrigue had escaped the matured sagacity of Godolphin, until it was become notorious; and that Marlborough, to whom the secrets of all the courts in Europe were known, should have been ignorant of a cabal in his own in which he was himself so deeply in-

\* These facts are usually considered as depending on the authority of the duchess alone, and, therefore, have been often questioned; but we find them also stated in a letter from Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, dated Feb. 10. 1708, and even avowed and justified by the Tory advocates of Harley. His insinuations and charges against the Marlborough family, and the measures which he adopted to promote a negotiation for peace, are stated no less strongly by the author of "The other Side of the Question," than by the duchess herself, p. 324.

terested. It is still more extraordinary, that after he was acquainted with the influence of the rising favourite, he should think so lightly of its consequences, as to suppose that it might be checked by a mere remonstrance. In reply to the first communication from the duchess, he says, "I should think you might speak to her with some caution, which might do good; for she certainly is grateful, and will mind what you say."\*

In conformity with this advice, the duchess not only remonstrated with Mrs. Hill, but assailed the queen with reproaches, and accused her of suffering her political antipathies to be inflamed by the insinuations of a dependant, who conversed only with Jacobites and disaffected Tories. To these accusations, which were urged both in conversation and writing, the queen replied in a style of affected humility and real sarcasm, denying, with the utmost solemnity, the charge advanced against Mrs. Hill.

"*Friday, Five o'clock, July 18.* — I give my dear Mrs. Freeman many thanks for her letter, which I received this morning, as I must always do for every thing that comes from her, not doubting but what you say is sincerely meant in kindness to me. But I have so often been unfortunate in what I have said to you, that I think the less I say to your last letter the better; therefore, I shall only, in the first place, beg your pardon once more for what I said the other day, which I find you take ill, and say something in answer to your explanation of the suspicions you seemed to have concerning your cousin Hill, who is very far from being an occasion of feeding Mrs. Morley in her passion, as you are pleased to call it; she never meddling with any thing.

"I believe others that have been in her station in former times have been tattling and very impertinent, but she is not at all of that temper; and as for the company she keeps, it is with her as with most other people. I fancy that their lot in the world makes them move with some out of civility rather than choice; and I really believe, for one that is so much in the way of company, she has less acquaintance than any one upon earth. I hope, since in some part of your letter you seem to give credit to a thing, because I said it was so, you will be as just in what I have said now about Hill; for I would not have any one hardly thought of by my dear Mrs. Freeman for your poor unfortunate, but ever faithful Morley's notions or actions."

The concealed sarcasm conveyed in this epistle wounded the feelings of the duchess. She applied to herself the reflection on those who, in a similar situation, "had been guilty

\* Meldert, June 2. 1707.

of tattling and impertinence," and gave utterance to her resentment in a style still more acrimonious than before.

The doubts of all parties were, however, soon turned into certainty by the discovery that Mrs. Hill had secretly contracted a marriage with Mr. Masham, whom the duchess had likewise protected and placed in the royal household. This match, concluded without her privity, and, as she soon afterwards discovered, solemnised in the presence of the queen and Dr. Arbuthnott, was a thunderstroke of evidence. It proved, not only that Mrs. Masham had forgotten her obligations, but that she possessed the highest degree of confidence. At the moment when this fact transpired, Godolphin also obtained unequivocal proof of Harley's machinations with both Whigs and Tories, and of his private intercourse with Mrs. Masham.\*

In this crisis, the duchess, instead of attempting to conciliate her royal mistress, and to regain her favour by renewing her former attentions, assailed her with bitter reproaches, which were the more provoking because partly just. On the first intelligence of the marriage she burst into the royal presence, and expostulated with the queen for concealing a secret which nearly regarded her as a relation. The mortifying replies of the queen, who warmly vindicated the silence of her favourite, by imputing it to fear of offending, rather inflamed than soothed her resentment; and from this period their correspondence exhibits a tone of dissembled humility on the one hand, and, on the other, of acrimonious reproach. By the interposition of Godolphin†, however, Mrs. Masham was

\* No reason has been assigned for Mrs. Masham's concealing her marriage, except that her husband was a relation of Mr. Harley. The match was suitable in point of rank and circumstances. Mr. Masham was the eighth son of a baronet, and from the office of page had risen to that of groom of the bedchamber in the Prince of Denmark's household. The duchess, as she herself states, had assisted in his promotion; for, in fact, no one at that period could obtain it unless agreeable to the Marlboroughs. In 1710 Mr. Masham obtained a regiment and was advanced to the rank of brigadier-general. At the famous peerage creation of 1711 he was raised to the upper house. By his lady, who died in 1734, he had three sons and two daughters. His eldest married Henry Hoare, grandson of a former lord mayor of London. The peerage title became extinct on the death of his son. — *En.*

† In the account of her Conduct, p. 245., the duchess does not allude

induced at length to make an overture of reconciliation; though the interview which ensued showed that the breach was irreparable.

Marlborough and Godolphin acted with dignity, but without that decision and address which the emergency required. They neither resolved to join cordially with the Whigs, and, by their assistance, to crush the rising cabal; nor did they yield to the prevailing passion of the queen, and coalesce with the Tories. They continued to maintain their moderate, but imprudent, principle to be swayed by neither party; and endeavoured to alarm the queen with threats of resignation, which had been too often repeated to produce the desired effect. The progress of their feelings and opinion will best appear from the correspondence.

*To the Duchess.*

“*Meldert, June 23.* — I have had the pleasure of receiving yours of the 3d from St. Alban's, and that of the 6th from St. James's, by which I find something is doing, by way of promotions in the church, that makes the Whigs uneasy. I do assure you I am very sorry for it, but you know I have very little to say in those matters. You know how often I spoke about Dr. Potter, and I do not hear that it is as yet done; though the consequence is, that if he has not the professor's place, I will never more meddle with any thing that may concern Oxford.”

“*Meldert, June 26.* — Though the post is not to go till to-morrow, and I hope to have the happiness of hearing from you before that time, yet I would not lose this hour, which I have to myself, of assuring you that you are always in my thoughts; and if it were not for the happiness I propose to myself, of living some part of the remainder of my life quietly with you, I could not bear with patience the trouble I struggle with at this time. The weather is so very hot, and the dust so very great, that I have this hour to myself, the officers not caring to be abroad till the hour

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to the interference of Godolphin; but in a letter to Mr. Hutchinson, which was written soon after the accession of George I., she expressly mentions the apology of Mrs. Masham as produced by his representations to the queen. “Lord Godolphin,” she says, “also took an opportunity of speaking to the queen on this matter, and when he gave me an account of all that had passed betwixt them in relation to it, I remember he told me that he had convinced the queen, indeed, that Mrs. Masham was in the wrong, but that she showed she was very desirous to have had her in the right. The effect of this was that Mrs. Masham condescended at last to write to me, to desire me to appoint a time when she might wait upon me, which accordingly I did,” &c.—From the narrative of the duchess to Mr. Hutchinson, copied from her original draught, and corrected with her own hand.

of orders obliges them to it. It is most certain that when I was in Spain\*, in the month of August, I was not more sensible of the heat than I am at this minute. If you have the same weather, it must make all sorts of fruit very good; and as this is the third year of the trees at Woodstock, if possible, I should wish that you might, or somebody you can rely on, taste the fruit of every tree, so that what is not good might be changed. On this matter you must advise with Mr. Wise, as also what plan may be proper for the ice-house; for that should be built this summer, so that it might have time to dry. The hot weather makes me think of these things, for the most agreeable of all presents is that of ice."

*To Lord Sunderland.*

"*Meldert, June 27.* — Nobody can have a better opinion than I have of Lord Galway; but when I consider the court and king of Spain, I think it would be the most barbarous thing in the world to impose upon Lord Galway to stay; for I am very confident he had rather beg his bread — I am sure I would. About ten days hence I hope we may hear something good from the duke of Savoy; for as to the affairs of Germany, I expect nothing but confusion. However, I have sent the order to the Saxons to march to the Rhine, as you will have seen by my letter to the elector of Mayence. As to our affairs here, we begin to think ourselves as strong as the enemy, which most certainly we are, and our foot infinitely better than theirs; so that I hope in a little time every body will consent to venture, and that God will bless us with success. I might be trusted with full powers, for I protest to you that I would not venture unless the probability were on our side; for the inclinations in Holland are so strong for peace, that should we have the least disadvantage, they would act very extravagantly. I must own to you that every country we have to do with, in my opinion acts so very contrary to the public good, that it makes me quite weary of serving. However, till the end of this war, I see the necessity of my serving; after which I hope for yours and our friends' leave of living the little remainder of my life in quiet. I am, with all my heart," &c.

"*June 27.* — You may assure 255 that no man living is more desirous of a good peace than I am. The emperor is in the wrong in almost every thing he does; but what she writes concerning his having correspondence with France, is certainly not so. The people in Holland, which seem to be favourable to Peterborough, are of all the worst in that country. I hear by my last letters from Italy that he is gone to Vienna, to solicit troops for King Charles; but his mind changes so often, that there is not much weight to be laid upon his motions, nor have I answered any of his letters, not knowing where to send them. I am glad to hear that the duke of Shrewsbury is easier than the last year. I do not think he can ever be of much use, but it is much better to have mankind pleased than angry; for a great many that can do no good have it always in their power to do hurt. What you say concerning the uneasiness be-

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\* This must allude to his journey to or from Tangier, where he served as a volunteer. See p. 8. vol. I. — Ed.

tween the queen and the lord treasurer—if that continues, destruction must be the consequence, as the circumstances of our affairs are abroad, as well as at home. I am sure, to the best of my understanding, and with the hazard of my life, I will always endeavour to serve the queen. But if she inclines more to be governed by the notions of Mr. Harley than those of Mr. Montgomery, I would sooner lose my life than persuade him to continue, in such circumstances, in the service of the queen. This is only to yourself; but you may depend upon it that if ever I be advised with, this will be my opinion. All that I know concerning Lord Peterborough is that he would do any thing to get the payment of an arrear of about 3000*l*."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, June 27.* — I have, since my last, had the favour of yours of the 8th and 10th, and am very glad to find you are so near an end of your Scotch business; for what you are obliged to leave to the British parliament I am not in much pain; for I think there must happen so many things on this side of the water, that of consequence I think will make the sessions either easy or uneasy; and as I can't but hope that God will bless the project of entering France, as well as this army, with some success this campaign, I will flatter myself that her majesty will have a very easy sessions. That which gives me the greatest trouble is, what you say concerning the queen; for if Mrs. Morley's prejudice to some people is so unalterable, and that she will be disposing of the preferments now vacant to such as will tear to pieces her friends and servants, that must create distraction. But you know my opinion was, and is yet, *that you ought to take with you Mr. Secretary Harley*, and to let the queen see, with all the freedom and plainness imaginable, her true interest; and when she is sensible of that, there will be no more difficulty; if there should, you will have performed your duty, and God's will be done. For my own part, I see in almost every country, they act so extremely against their own interest, that I fear we have deserved to be punished. I will endeavour to serve to the best of my understanding, and then shall submit with much resignation to the pleasure of God, whose mercies and protection I am very sensible of. And as I do freely venture my life in gratitude for the favours I have received from the queen, so I do hope and beg that you will take a proper time of letting the queen know my heart and firm resolution, with her leave, that as soon as the war is at an end I might be master of myself, by which I might have both time and quietness to reconcile myself to God, which ought to be the end of every honest man."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Meldert, July 4.* — By yours of the 13th I find 162\* is gone into the country in great delight, which I am very sorry for; for it is most certain, that whatever pleases him can't be for the service of the queen. If I were ever capable of giving advice, it would be rashness to do it at this distance; but I believe nothing can cure this matter, if I guess right, but

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\* Probably the archbishop of York.

lord treasurer's giving himself the trouble of writing very plainly what he thinks is wrong, and send it to the queen, without offering to quit, or expecting any answer; but, as in duty-bound, to leave it to her consideration. I should hope this would do it; but if it should not, the last and only thing must be, that the solicitor-general speak very freely to Mr. Harley. \* \* \* \*

"And as to what Lord Sunderland says concerning the king of Spain, that nobody will please him that does their duty, I am of his mind, and I have also as good an opinion of Lord Galway as any body can have; but that is no argument for Lord Galway's stay; for as it is, it will be impossible for those two\* to serve together; but as I am resolved to meddle as little as possible, pray say nothing of this."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Meldert, July 4. — Since my last I have had the favour of yours of the 13th, old style, with the enclosed letters of Mr. Methuen and Montandre. I agree with you, that the alliance with Portugal should be maintained, if possible; but by Mr. Methuen's letter I fear it will be very difficult. However, there ought to be care taken that the fault should not be on our side. I own to you, that I am a good deal of the mind of Montandre, by which I am confirmed in the opinion, that the war in Catalonia must be carried on by troops from Italy, and not by the queen's subjects, by which you may save money, and the service be better done; and by that the king and his generals will naturally have the command, which is itself very reasonable. I hear the court of Vienna has had a copy of my letter to Count Piper, and that they dislike two expressions†; the one where I mention the court of Vienna, and the other the treaty of Italy. If I hear any thing from them of it I shall let them know the truth, that I meant the letter for their service. If they take it ill after that, it will not give me much trouble.

"I have received letters from Turin of the 15th of the last month, by which I see they will not begin their operations till about the 25th. I shall not be at ease till I hear they are in France; for the fear of the king of Sweden is so great at Vienna that God knows what orders may go from thence. I send to Mr. Secretary Harley a letter from the elector of Hanover's minister at the Hague, and my answer. You will see by it that the elector desires that M. Bothmar's regiment of dragoons, which is

\* The Count de Noyelles and Lord Galway.

† The two passages which displeased the court of Vienna, in the duke's letter to Count Piper, were these: "All this you will easily conceive gives us a great deal of uneasiness; but may I frankly own to you, that the new instances of dissatisfaction which the court of Vienna has so lately given the king is a greater trouble to me than the latter of these accidents." And second: "We caused the army to be assembled immediately, as did likewise the enemy on their side; for taking advantage of the treaty of Italy, they have drawn so many troops from those posts, that they are come out of their lines with a pretty large superiority." — *Lediard*, vol. ii. p. 196.

paid by the queen and Holland, might go with him into Germany. It was by no means proper for me to give him the answer; but I should think if it serves with him in Germany it would be very unreasonable for the queen and Holland to pay it. I have writ the same thing to the pensioner, but have desired him not to make use of my name. Besides, if we allow of this, we may be sure, either this campaign or the next, he will press to have more of his troops.

"I have had letters of the 22d of the last month from Vienna this morning, by which I see they have resolved to send Count Wratislaw once more to the king of Sweden, and if possible to give him satisfaction. If they had done this sooner it would have been better, but I am glad he goes. I have this morning received your two letters from Windsor, of the 15th and 16th of the last month. As to what you say concerning Neufchatel, I have said so much to the king of the positive orders her majesty has given to her ministers, for their acting in whatever way he shall think proper, that I am sure he is satisfied; so that you need apprehend no ill consequences by the death of the duchess of Nemours. The king of Prussia is so zealous for the entering France, that he has already desired that some of his troops may take possession of the principality of Orange.

"Tho' my letter is already too long, yet I must answer your desire of knowing how long the enemy and we may continue in our camps. I believe, with some difficulty, we might stay in ours till the end of this month; but I have been some time endeavouring to persuade the Dutch deputies that I might take the camp of Genappe; when I can prevail, you will hear of my being there. The reason of their backwardness is, that they apprehend that might engage the two armies to some action, which they are willing to avoid till we hear some good news from Italy."

*To Lord Sunderland.*

"Meldert, July 7. — My lord, I have but too many reasons to think that the Dutch would be glad of pretences to excuse the earnest desire they have of a peace. I now send a letter to Mr. Secretary Harley, which I have received from the States-general, in order to have her majesty's commands. There can be no question of the great advantage it would be to the allies if the emperor could put an end to the war in Hungary. But I do very much fear the advantages the French have had in the beginning of this campaign, as also the king of Sweden's being still in the empire, has heartened the Hungarians to that degree, that whatever inclinations the emperor may be brought to for peace, it would be of little use in this conjuncture; so that, in my opinion, I can see no use in taking such measures as this letter seems to desire, but that of using the emperor very harshly, and by it showing to France that the continuance of the war must be with great difficulty. For it is not possible that England and Holland can speak to the emperor, as is desired, but that it must be known in France.

"I have not acquainted any body, either in England or Holland, what my thoughts are of this matter, which makes me beg you will communicate them to nobody but Lord Halifax and Lord Somers; and pray

assure them that I shall govern myself agreeably to their opinions, so that you must take care of the directions I must receive from Mr. Harley. The Dutch deputies will not own to me that they have any other orders or directions, but that of being cautious not to venture any thing till they hear what is done in Provence. But I have reason to believe that they have more positive orders from the States; and let the success be good or bad in Provence, I believe they will continue of the mind they are now in; since it is the daily discourse in this army, as well as in Holland, why should they venture, since they have already in their hands what will be a sufficient security to them? If an occasion offer, I no ways doubt but God will both incline us to make use of it, and bless us with success, which will not only be the endeavours, but daily prayers of," &c.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Windsor, June 24–July 5. — I am sorry to find you have your doubts on the affair of Toulon. I confess I have had mine a good while, and the more, because I see them upon all occasions so pressing for money beforehand. But I knew no remedy; they were not to be refused, and we must trust them, if we are deceived. Upon that, and many other accounts, I am like to pass my time but indifferently next winter; especially since the queen's proceedings in some things will give the Whigs a handle to be uneasy, and to tear every thing to pieces, if they cannot have their own terms. And Mr. Harley does so hate and fear Lord Somers, Lord Sunderland, and Lord Wharton, that he omits no occasion of filling the queen's head with their projects and designs; and if Mr. Montgomery should take him with him upon any occasion of that kind, he would either say nothing, or would argue against what the other says, as he did upon some subjects, some months since, when Mr. Freeman himself was present.

"Lady Marlborough went to Woodstock very early this morning.

"Since I had written thus far, I have seen the queen, who desired me to tell you that she would write to you in a post or two, as soon as her hand was a little stronger. I suppose the occasion of her letter will be upon my having read to her some expressions in your letter of the 27th, which she calls splenetic. However, I think this use may be made of it, to say in your answer what you think proper upon the state of the queen's affairs."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Meldert, July 11. — \* \* \* \* Since you think it will be of no use to take Mr. Harley with you to the queen, you must find some way of speaking plainly to him; for if he continues in doing ill offices upon all occasions to Lord Somers, Lord Sunderland, and Lord Wharton, it will at last have so much effect upon the queen, whose inclinations are already that way, it must occasion that no measures will be followed. If Mrs. Morley writes to me, I shall be sure to send you a copy of my answer.

"You have so much business, that I am afraid you have forgot to

settle with Mr. Bridges the allowance out of the poundage, which I desired for Mr. St. John.\* I beg the favour of your doing it."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Meldert, July 11.* — As I believe I shall stay in this camp the greatest part of this month, and if we can find forage, longer, I shall make use of this time in beginning to take the waters of Spa next Wednesday; and as I am obliged to be abroad every day, I shall content myself with one bottle. I wish you could take them with me, for besides the satisfaction I should have, I am very confident they are better here than they can be in England. I cannot express to you the joy I have when your letters are kind, as that of the 23d of the last month was: I received it last night. And as I find you intend to return from Woodstock in a week, I shall be impatient to hear you approve of what has been done. Your expression of the ice-house, that it can't be of use this three years, is a very melancholy prospect to me, who am turned on the ill side of fifty-seven.

"I am very sorry that you think you have reason to believe that Mr. Harley takes all occasions of doing hurt to England. If lord treasurer can't find a remedy, and that before the next winter, I should think his wisest and honestest way would be, to tell the queen very plainly which way he thinks her business may be carried on; and if that be not agreeable, that she would lose no time in knowing of Mr. Harley what his scheme is, and follow that; so that lord treasurer might not be answerable for what might happen. If this were said plainly to the queen and Mr. Harley, I am very confident the latter would not dare undertake the business, and then every thing might go quietly.

"Mr. Montgomery writes me word, that upon reading some part of my letter of the 27th of the last month to Mrs. Morley, she thought what I said proceeded from the spleen; but, if I may be believed, my resolution is taken, though, at the same time, if I could see that my life could do her any good, I would venture it a thousand times for her service; but when a peace is made, I can't but think it very reasonable for me to dispose of the little time I may have to live."

*Lord Godolphin to the Duke.*

"*Windsor, June 27.—July 8.* — Not having any letters from you since my last, nor from Lisbon, this serves chiefly to cover the enclosed letter from the queen. My next will be from London, her majesty going thither for two days in the beginning of the week, to accompany the prince, who is to qualify himself as well as myself, for renewing our offices of admiral and treasurer of Great Britain. This will necessitate some other renewals, as in the prince's council, and the officers of the exchequer, which may occasion brangles and disputes next winter, of which there will be no need; for I never saw more preparation for uneasiness in my life.

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\* The Duke of Marlborough had requested Lord Godolphin to increase the emoluments of Mr. St. John, as secretary at war, by augmenting the poundage, and did not desist from his instances till he succeeded.

"The queen has indulged her own inclination in the choice of some persons to succeed the bishops, which gives the greatest offence to the Whigs that can be; and though the Whigs were, from other things, in a disposition to lay more weight upon it than in truth the thing itself ought to bear, yet it must be allowed, taking all circumstances together, to be a very great *contre-temps*. And, indeed, Mr. Montgomery is particularly sensible of the load it gives him; but at the same time, he sees plainly, that the queen has gone so far in this matter, even against his warning, as really to be no more able than willing to retract this wrong step.

"One of the measures, which I fear is laid down by the Whigs, is, to disturb your brother George, as soon as ever they have an opportunity. He is sensible of this, and seemed to have thoughts of preventing any thing of this nature, by not *renewing* upon the occasion I hinted before. He spoke to me; and though I am of opinion it would be right for himself, and every body else, I entered no farther into it, than to say that was an affair in which I thought nobody could advise so well as one's self. I am sorry to have nothing but such disagreeable subjects to entertain you with. Lady M. is at Woodstock, but I hope she will be here again next week."

"*Windsor, June 30.—July 11.*—There being now two posts wanting from you, and no other foreign letters since my last, in which was one enclosed from the queen, I shall therefore only trouble you now with what relates to England, though that be a very disagreeable subject. By all the conversation I have had since my last, I have a good deal of reason to be confirmed in the great uneasiness of the Whigs, as well as of the consequences of it; and though I will not neglect any thing that is possible to prevent the inconveniences that threaten, yet the difficulties one meets with are such, and particularly in the unwillingness of the queen to do any thing that is good and necessary for Mrs. Morley, that unless I may hope for Mr. Freeman's assistance, even before the winter, there must be the greatest confusion imaginable in all the affairs of the parliament."

"*Sunday, July 8-19.*—By the bishop of Norwich's being made bishop of Ely, there are now three bishoprics vacant; and I have so little hopes of there being well filled, that I am resolved to use all my endeavours to keep them vacant, till I can have Mr. Freeman's assistance, in those spiritual affairs, which seem to grow worse and worse, ever since I saw you last, with the queen and me, and another person, who, I doubt not, has not much changed his mind in those matters, though he won't own any thing like that to Mr. Montgomery."

"*July 10-21.*—After I had written thus far, I received the favour of two letters from you, of the 13th and 16th of June, in one of which is enclosed a copy of a letter from my Lord Peterborough. You seem to desire my advice what you may answer to his proposal. I cannot imagine first, what he will propose, or, indeed, that he can propose any thing practicable; but I observe, he laments the emperor's persisting in sending the detachment to Naples, when you cannot but remember it was his own proposal, last winter, to the duke of Savoy and to Prince Eugene; and

perhaps the expectation he gave them of the queen's concurrence in that project was the ground of their engaging in that unfortunate design. As to his coming into England, I must own myself to have been of a different opinion from my friends on that point. I always thought that when his power was taken from him, and all his commissions recalled, he would do less hurt abroad than at home, and so I think still it will be found; but I don't at all wonder you should like him better any where than with you.

"I think what you say of Erle's staying, and the king of Spain's commanding, are both very right; and, I believe, as soon as our next Lisbon letters arrive, the queen will take the resolution of allowing Lord Galway to return; but if Erle be to stay there, I doubt it will be necessary for you yourself to write to him on that subject, for I don't think any body else has credit enough with him to make him do it willingly, as we must do to serve well."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, July 18.*— Having this safe opportunity by brigadier Macartney, I shall write with more freedom than I durst do by the post. I am very sorry to tell you, but it is most certainly true, that if the king of France would offer the same conditions as he did the last winter they would be thought by the Dutch sufficient for the beginning of a treaty; but the king of France seems positively resolved that the duke of Anjou must have Spain and the Indies. It is as certain that the Dutch will never more this war venture any thing that may be decisive, being of opinion that they have already enough in their possession for their security, and that France will assist them in disposing of this possession as they shall think best for their security; and you may be assured that every step they make for engaging the queen in joining with them, to show the world that the emperor is in the wrong, is for no other end but to excuse themselves when they appear for peace.

"The queen's letter from the king of Sweden is very discouraging; however, I am persuaded he does not make these wrong steps, intending to favour France, so that I can see no inconveniency in my writing, when you have corrected it, such a sort of letter as I have sent you; for if we can engage him we may yet have a good peace.

"As to the elector of Hanover, I think in the offer that has been made him he acts more like a merchant than a generous man: so that I am apt to think we shall get very little advantage by it.

"When my brother spoke to you about his *renewing*, I could wish you had encouraged him in his resolution of being quit; for it would be very disagreeable to me to have him receive a mortification; for I can't be unconcerned in that matter, after the contempt of Lord Halifax, not answering my letter I meant with all the kindness imaginable. I shall not be surprised at the hard usage any for whom I am concerned shall meet with. I can't, on this occasion, hinder saying so much to you, whose quiet I wish as much as my own; but I fear neither of us can have any, till we are at Woodstock, so that I could wish some practicable scheme could be made, by which her majesty might be well served, and we both out of the ministry.

"The enclosed is a copy of my letter to the queen\*, I writ by Macartney; if it gives you any ease, I am happy; but I own to you I am very desponding. I am afraid there is too much conversation between the queen and Mr. Harley. You on the place can best judge what may be proper to be done in it, but methinks one or both should be spoke to."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Meldert, July 21.* — I received yesterday yours of the 28th, from Woodstock, as also that of the 30th and 3d, from Windsor. My head is so full of things that are displeasing that I am at this time a very improper judge of what would be best for the work at Woodstock; for really I begin to despair of having any quietness there or any where else. What you say of Mr. Prior† has given me uneasiness; but when you shall know the reason why any consideration was had for him, you will rather pity than reproach me; but as I am taking my measures so as to be out of the power of being censured and troubled, I am resolved to be ill-used for a little time longer. I see by yours of the 30th that I am to be mortified by the prosecution of my brother George. I have deserved better from the Whigs; but since they are grown so indifferent as not to care what mortifications the court may receive this winter, I shall not expect favour. My greatest concern is for the queen, and for the lord treasurer. England will take care of itself, and not be ruined because a few men are not pleased. They will see their error when it is too late. I should be glad you would let me know the conversation‡ that has been between you and the queen, and if it were before or after the letter sent me by Mr. Montgomery, which I answered by Macartney. The union you mention between the lord treasurer, yourself, and me, for the good of the queen and England; can there be a difficulty in that union? But I will own to you my apprehensions are, that somebody or other, I know not who, has got so much credit with the queen, that they will be able to persuade her to do more hurt to herself than we can do good. Till I hear again from you, I shall say no more on this subject."

"*Meldert, July 11-22.* — \* \* \* \* I have sent to lord treasurer a copy of my letter to the queen, tho' I own to you I am desponding as to the good it may do; however, I have done my duty, and God's will be done. By my letter you will see that I have endeavoured to do the Whigs the best office I can; but I shall think it a very ill return if they fall upon my brother George. I do with all my heart wish he would be so wise as to quit his place; but I hope nobody that I have a concern for will appear against him. After the usage I had from Lord Halifax I am concerned but for very few; therefore, if there should be occasion, pray say, as from yourself, two words to Lord Sunderland; for it would be very uneasy to me to have reason to take any thing ill of him, and it

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\* This letter is missing.

† This passage will show the violence of party spirit, when it is considered, that some petty favour shown by the duke to Prior, independent of political considerations, was sufficient to provoke displeasure.

‡ Alluding probably to one of her violent altercations with the queen.

is impossible for me to be unconcerned in this matter. I expect no more than what I would do if he had a brother attacked. This, and many other things, shows there is no happiness but in retirement."

CH. LIX. — DISUNION IN THE GRAND ALLIANCE. — 1707.

IN the camp of Meldert, Marlborough was acquainted with the result of the enterprise against Naples. General Daun, the brave defender of Turin, in the middle of May led a body of 9000 men across the Appenines, traversed the papal dominions, and reaching the Neapolitan frontier on the 24th, was welcomed by the acclamations of the people, who cordially expressed their abhorrence of the Bourbon government. On the approach of the imperialists to the capital, the duke of Escalona, the Spanish viceroy, withdrew, to escape the popular fury; while the magistrates advanced to Aversa, and, delivering the keys of the city, pledged their allegiance to King Charles. The new government was generally acknowledged; and Gaïeta being taken by storm on the 30th of September, the conquest of the whole kingdom was completed before the close of the year, by the reduction of the petty, though strong holds in the mountainous district of Calabria.

This enterprise being happily accomplished, Marlborough flattered himself that the emperor would detach reinforcements from Naples, for the succour of Charles in Spain. In this hope he was not wholly disappointed; for although some contention arose between the two imperial brothers, relative to the government of Naples, the emperor seemed as if disposed to make amends for his past errors by a zealous support of the common cause. The correspondence between Wratislaw and Marlborough, which had been suspended, was resumed; and in the letters both of the general and the treasurer, we trace symptoms of returning cordiality.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Meldert, July 25. — I have had the favour of yours of the 6th, from Windsor, but have not time to give an answer by the next post.

"The enclosed letter from Count Wratislaw I received this morning;

I think it a more reasonable letter than I have seen from that court a great while. I shall not give my answer till I have yours, Lord Somers's, Lord Halifax's, and Lord Sunderland's thoughts, of what may be proper to answer.

"I hope to-morrow we may have the good news confirmed of the duke of Savoy's being in Provence. You will, by this post, have an account in print of the reception of the Germans at Naples. Pray make my excuse to Lord Sunderland, that I can't answer his of the 8th by this post. I send Sir J. Norris's letter, that you may see what he desires concerning the bills of exchange."

*Count Wratislaw to the Duke of Marlborough.*

[Enclosed in the preceding letter.]

"July 13. — Count Lescheraine delivered to me, the day before yesterday, your highness's letter of the 18th past, by which I see your obliging complaints on my silence; and which induce me to hope that I am not quite so ill with you as I have been made to believe. It is true, that at the time of the new misfortune in Germany, and of the battle in Spain, I kept silence for some posts. For with regard to the first, I could not resolve to make my apology, by charging my master, and accusing his first minister; and for the second, I wished to avoid charging your generals, and blaming the orders of England; since these kinds of complaints are always useless, and for the most part injurious. However, in process of time, I have done both one and the other; and I flatter myself that you have assented to my opinion.

"At present the invasion of Provence is much advanced, or has failed, and you will now be convinced that this court has no concealed views, but concurs in every thing in its power to please the allies. I think, however, that we shall pass the mountains, but I much doubt that we can maintain ourselves in France during the winter. In addition to the excessive expense for the transport of provisions, we risk our army in the sole view of pleasing England, and endeavouring to ruin the French marine. This is the only reasonable object to be hoped for from this expedition, of which I also know the importance, if England would avail herself of it, for the continuation of the war.

"I wished much to converse with you a couple of days, and would have met you in Saxony, had you not declined an interview, under the plea that it would have given umbrage to the king of Sweden; and yet, perhaps, our conversation would not have been entirely useless; for certainly the allies must understand each other better than they have hitherto done. They ought to adopt resolutions which are practicable, and not such as are merely agreeable to their wishes; for the inclination which the Maritime Powers have shown to abridge the war by extraordinary expedients, has in general retarded the peace which we all desire.

"First, it is necessary to consider whether the war in Spain is to be regarded as a diversion, or as a principal object. According to my scanty knowledge, I am entirely for making it a diversion, because it is too difficult and chargeable to be rendered offensive: whereas, if we wished, we might subjugate all the Italian islands with the greatest

facility. I do not mean by this to say that Spain ought not to be the principal object of the war itself; but that in obtaining what we may obtain, namely, Italy, we may the more easily acquire the rest at the conclusion of peace; particularly if we press France on her own ground.

"For my part, I would send all the Portuguese in Catalonia into their own country; and, joining with them 6000 auxiliaries, would leave them to make war according to their own good pleasure. In Catalonia I would not have more than 12,000 infantry and 4000 allied horse, who, being in a central position, may alarm Valencia and Aragon; and in case of necessity, may even make an irruption into Roussillon. I have said 12,000 infantry and 4000 allied horse, for the troops of king Charles would suffice for the garrisons, and this body ought to be under the orders of the king, and at his entire disposition. Neither his Catholic majesty nor we know what remains of the allied troops since the battle of Almanza, so that I can make no calculation on that subject.

"On the affairs of Italy I cannot yet speak, for that depends on the progress of this campaign. If we can maintain ourselves during the winter in Provence and the neighbourhood of Toulon, it will, in my opinion, be necessary to reinforce that army with as many troops as we can draw from all sides. But if we are obliged to retire from France into Piedmont, then we must put ourselves on the defensive in Italy. A squadron in the Mediterranean is always necessary and very useful; and the fleet on the coasts of England, having troops for a descent, will secure the interior, and at the same time alarm the coasts of France and Andalusia.

"It is pretended in England that the troops which the emperor may send into Spain ought to be maintained by us. You know what I have said on that subject in my preceding letters; and if these disputes be continued we shall never do any thing. It ought to be remembered, that when the archduke was demanded of us, we were reproached in the same manner, for making a difficulty to send him, because nothing was then asked for this war but his person only."\*

The latter part of this letter relates to the negotiation with Sweden, and displays the facilities which the emperor had shown to the demands of the king, and his hopes of a satisfactory result, mixed with expressions of regret, that the maritime powers had been restrained, by the advice of the elector of Hanover, from taking a decisive part against a monarch who had insulted the head of the empire and suspended the progress of the war.

*The Duke of Marlborough to Lord Godolphin.*

"Mildert, July 27.—Being obliged to be abroad almost the whole day of the last post, I could not answer yours of the 6th as I ought.

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\* Translated from the original, in the French tongue.

“ You may be assured that I shall not send the letter to the king of Sweden, but as corrected and approved by yourself and friends; but by what I have from thence, I am in hopes there will be no occasion of writing. If there should, I believe we must do it without acquainting the pensioner, because it is certain that the Dutch will never agree to have the preliminaries sent; for I am afraid they are of opinion they will never be obtained from France. However, I am of your opinion, that England must never depart from them. You will see by my last letter to Mr. Secretary Harley, that I shall delay the answer to the States; for by what is writ from Vienna of the behaviour of the Hungarians, I think even the Dutch will be of opinion, that this is not a proper time for pressing the emperor.

“ You have done very well in sending the memorial of Portugal to Holland; for by it you will gain time, and at last you will be answered with the impossibility of their helping, and their hopes of the queen's generosity in helping the king of Portugal. Would it not be a good expedient to gain more time, as soon as you have the States' answer to the memorial, to send Lord Galway to Portugal, by which you may amuse that court? for whatever expense you make in that country, I look upon it as money flung into the sea, for they have neither officers nor good inclinations; but by this method you may keep them in hopes till the next spring.

“ I cannot but think it extremely for the queen's service, that you continue firm in the resolution of paying no more regiments in Catalonia than there may be English soldiers to complete; and whatever Spaniards or other foreign troops, England would be at the expense of, that ought to be by subsidy, and not regular pay; and there ought to be care taken that the clothing which is there, upon account of private regiments, should not be given to other people; for that expense at last will fall upon the queen.

“ The copy of Count Wratislaw's letter, which I sent you by the last post, agrees extremely with the notion I have for the scheme of the next campaign; for should Toulon not be taken, the war must be continued; but if that should succeed, I should then hope France would be forced to give such conditions as England should think reasonable. I do assure you I am so weary of all this matter, that nothing can make me happy but being in quiet at Woodstock.

“ I received last night the enclosed letters from Prince Eugene and Sir Cloudesley Shovel. I am extremely glad to find they have resolved to attack Toulon in the first place. If they succeed, it will be the greatest misfortune could have happened to France. The last two lines in Prince Eugene's letter should not be seen but by few. You must not be too much alarmed at his expression; for it is his way to think every thing difficult, till he comes to put it in execution, but then he acts with so much vigour, that he makes amends for all his despondency. Though he writes in this manner to me, I am sure to the officers of the army his discourse is the contrary. I would not stay for the post, but send this by Colonel Britton, so that her majesty might have this good news as soon

as possible. With my humble duty, I beg you will assure her of my hearty congratulation and prayers that she may ever be happy." \* \* \*

Amidst the awful suspense in which all parties were held respecting the fate of the expedition against Toulon, the Dutch appear to have manifested more strongly than usual those inclinations for peace which they had repeatedly expressed. Deeming themselves secure of a barrier by the conquests of the preceding year, they felt less interest for the success of the war in other quarters than anxiety for such an arrangement with France as might enable them to attain their darling object. Their conduct excited great displeasure in England, and gave additional strength to the reviving confidence between the British and imperial courts. In fact, this selfish and limited policy turned against the republic those feelings of resentment which Godolphin and the Whigs had conceived against the emperor; and we find the treasurer proposing a separate union with the rest of the allies, to deter the States from tampering with France. He even conveyed a hint that the queen would assist in procuring a general declaration for continuing the war till the monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria. In these sentiments the Whigs expressed their concurrence.

The Duke of Marlborough, however, contemplated the conduct of the Dutch with more indulgent eyes, and firmly, though delicately, opposed suggestions which tended to create a breach with the republic. But the meditated defection of the States, and the new zeal manifested by the court of Vienna, induced him to give a more vigorous tone than he had hitherto assumed to his negotiations with the king of Sweden; and he encouraged the disposition of his colleagues to conciliate the court of Vienna. The views and projects to which these sentiments gave birth will be fully developed in the correspondence.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Windsor, July 13-24.* — I am to acknowledge the favour of yours of the 18th, with M. Zinzendorf's letter, and the answer the queen is to have from Vienna, concerning the transporting to Spain some of the troops from Naples. I take the substance of that answer to be, that if Naples be reduced, the emperor will not only send, but maintain them while they are in Spain; and if not, he will still send them, if the allies will maintain them there. I wish either of these ways may be taken; since it is now neither reasonable, nor hardly possible, to send troops to

Catalonia from hence; nor is Mr. Methuen of opinion, as, perhaps, he may tell you himself in the enclosed, that it is like to be of much use to send any more troops to Portugal itself. He says, nothing will prevail with them to enter Spain again; and the most that can be expected from those people is a frontier war. This being the case, all that seems necessary for us is to support them, so as to keep them firm to our alliance; by which means we shall continue to have the convenience of their ports, which we cannot well do without, while the war against Spain subsists, and can be supported by the allies from Italy, which I hope it may, and cheaper than hitherto from hence.

"All this shows the necessity of getting as many troops as we can, and as soon as we can, from that side; for I am so far from being of opinion with the States, that the queen's advantages in this year ought to incline the allies to accept the proposals of the king of France in the last, that to this moment I think he is every day more and more pressed; and that if the States will stand firm, they will yet find the effects of it before the end of the year. But in case they do not, or will not see their own interest in this point, it is my humble opinion, with submission to better judgments, that the queen must speak very plainly to them, and let them see that if ever they make any step towards France, but with the participation and consent of England, they must expect the last resentment from her majesty upon such a proceeding.

"This is, at present, but my own private opinion upon what you have written in yours of the 18th; but as soon as I have an opportunity of doing it, I will send you the thoughts of our friends, as well as my own, upon this subject, which I take to be extremely nice, and of the greatest consequence.

"In the mean time, give me leave to add from myself, that, in case we succeed at Toulon, I believe we may have reason from the Dutch; and in case we do not succeed, we shall stand more in need of it than before. I submit it to your thoughts, whether we should not endeavour, without loss of time, to make farther and stricter alliances with the emperor, the king of Prussia, the elector of Hanover, and the rest of the allies, for going on with the war, and not hearing of peace but by general consent. The greatest obstruction I can foresee to this is, the king of Sweden, because of his antipathy to the emperor. But if those differences were capable of being accommodated, and that king satisfied, that objection would not be so strong. And when, as you say, the Dutch are satisfied with the possession of what they have now, and the assistance of France to secure them in that possession, I leave you to judge what the Whigs will say to that, and how they will be persuaded, either to go on with the war, only for the advantage of the Dutch, or, indeed, to submit to those advantages by the means of peace, without expressing the last resentment at these proceedings of the States.

"I am glad Britton is with you, for several reasons; because he can give you a full account of all that has passed in Spain, and most exactly of all that relates to Lord Peterborough and his proceedings, which may be of use to you to be informed of, before he comes to you.

"Mr. Freeman's letter to the queen was as right and as full as is possible, and was no more than is extremely necessary; and it will be as

necessary to continue in the same style upon all occasions, both before and after you return."

"*Windsor, July 17-28.*—Since my last we have no foreign letters; two posts will be due to-morrow, but we cannot expect them, as the winds have been. In the mean time I continue to hope for good news from Italy, being more persuaded in my mind than you seem to be, that they will act in earnest on that side; and, indeed, if they do not, it is next to impossible for the allies to continue together as they do, this winter. But if the affair of Toulon succeed, I should think we are in a better way than ever to have reason from France; and, therefore, our chief concern at present ought, in my opinion, to be, what measures to take, and how to deal with the Dutch, in case the affair of Toulon should not turn as we wish it. By the picture which you have lately made of them, and which I must be so just to myself as to say I always suspected and expected, it seems to me, that no time ought to be lost in the queen's endeavouring to make use of the influence of England, to strengthen and augment the alliance, to receive as many into the fraternity as can possibly be procured, and that the foundation of the whole should be, never to admit the inclinations of the States to peace, but in general to declare against it, except as in the letter to the king of Sweden, corrected and altered, as it was sent back from thence. Perhaps it may be thought and said, that this is visionary and impossible; but what will parliament say? Parliament nor England will not lie down and die, because the Dutch find their account in peace, but rather inclined to think, so strengthened, as I have been wishing, that they may yet get the better of both France and Holland together. And if the latter be once convinced, as I think they ought to be, and, perhaps, the sooner the better, that the queen and England are capable of coming to this resolution, I cannot help being of opinion, they will think more than once before they give them a just provocation to do it."

"*Windsor, July 21.-Aug. 1.*—The wind continuing contrary, we have now three posts due, so your trouble will be short at this time, since I have nothing to add to my last letters, but that since I sent them I find that Lord Halifax, Lord Somers, and Lord Sunderland, are certainly of my opinion, as to the measures which England ought to take with the Dutch; and that the sooner this is explained to them the better. They agree that this ought not to depend upon the event of Toulon; for as good success there will make the affair less difficult, so disappointment will make it yet more necessary, and consequently that we ought to try it in all events. There may be some niceties to be observed in the method of doing this, but I forbear troubling you with any of my thoughts as to the method of doing it, till I have yours as to the thing itself."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, Aug. 1.*—I am very impatient to hear from Count Wratislaw; for Mr. Robinson's letter of the 19th, from Leipsic, speaks very doubtfully of the reception that count may have. If it be possible the king of Sweden should use the emperor hardly after the advances the latter has made, I agree entirely with you, that we must take such

vigorous measures as may put a stop to his proceedings; but it must not be sooner than the end of this campaign. But I own to you, that I can't persuade myself that he will make such a step as must necessarily give so great an advantage to the king of France, for I am sure he earnestly desires the continuance of the war.

"This bearer is a member of parliament; he comes from Spain, and seems to be a very modest man; but as much as he cares to speak, he is of the same opinion with all that I have seen, which, in short, is, that Lord Galway is neither an officer nor zealous. They all say that he has also grown very proud and passionate, which, you know, is very different from the temper he formerly had. I will not pretend to judge how right it may be, to let the friendship and opinion of the Whigs govern in this matter; but I am very certain the opinion King Charles and all the officers have of him (though unjust) will make it impracticable for him to do any thing that is great or good.

"I have sent Brigadier Palmes to the duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene, with orders to stay there till they can judge how the campaign will end on that side, and then to have their thoughts on a project for the next campaign. I have acquainted them with my opinion. I expect him back about the middle of September, so that I may have yours and our friends' thoughts, before I settle any part of it with the court of Vienna and the States-general.

"I have had the favour of yours of the 13th, which is in answer to mine of the 18th, *n. s.* I am glad, for the sake of the queen and England, that you are of opinion that the war in Spain ought to be carried on by subsidies, which may get foreign troops; for her majesty's subjects can never come in time, nor, indeed, be kept in good order in that country, for want of recruits. If we succeed at Toulon, when that place is in the hands of the allies, besides the ruin it must be to his naval stores, it will make it very difficult for the king of France to support the next campaign, which I hope will encourage the Dutch to have no thoughts but of war.

"I allow all your reasonings to be very right concerning England, Holland, and parliament, and that war must be continued; but no reasoning or success can prevail with the States to think any thing reasonable, but what tends to their own particular interest. However, during war it would be dangerous to make any alliances in which the Dutch were not concerned.

"I have this morning received a letter from the pensioner, who is very much alarmed at the proceedings of the king of Sweden. Whatever does happen, I am very confident we shall hurt ourselves, if we make a noise till the end of this campaign.

"You will have received the considerations of the court of Vienna, as to sending troops for the support of the king of Spain. I have received a copy from Count Zinzendorf, but shall make no other answer, but that we must see the success of the expedition into Provence, before we can judge what may be *feasible* for the relief of King Charles; by this I shall gain time for the return of Brigadier Palmes. I intend to write to the pensioner, that the Dutch may give the same answer."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

" *Windsor, July 25. — Aug. 5.* — The queen approves of your thoughts of sending Brigadier Palmes to the duke of Savoy for the reasons you give, and at his return it will certainly be the most proper time to speak to the States and the pensionary; for you will please to consider, that sooner or later there seems to be an absolute necessity of doing something of this kind. England had entirely swallowed the advantages hoped for against France this summer; and since it is now likely to pass over without any endeavours or attempts of that kind, the parliament will certainly enter into the reasons and causes of this proceeding, and will not probably be very well satisfied, unless they find there has been some expostulation upon it with the States, and some better regulations made. And if this should have been wholly neglected, or but too long delayed, it would certainly give the greatest handle imaginable against the war.

" I thank you for the copy of Count Wratislaw's letter, which I cannot think so reasonable throughout as you seem to do. All that he says of what is past is entirely unreasonable, and particularly his doubts whether England would make the right use of success at Toulon, by continuing the war. And when he talks of their having ventured and exposed their army only to gratify England, had they ever had Italy or an army, but for the extraordinary efforts and expense of England? and is it now thought too much to do what is really the most solid advantage to themselves, only because it is particularly grateful to England? I confess this is a little harsh to my ear.

" As to the future views, I approve them very much, and shall endeavour, as far as I can, to make them practicable; but I see by your last letter from Sir Philip Meadows, the court of Vienna affects still to have the palatine troops sent to the king of Spain from the duke of Savoy's army, which cannot be done by any means, if the enterprise succeeds at Toulon; for, in that case, even by Count Wratislaw's own scheme, the duke of Savoy's army ought to be strengthened and augmented, so as that they may winter in France. It is true, indeed, if we should be baffled there, and be obliged to retire, so great an army on that side would not be necessary, and then the palatines might go to Spain; but, at present, I think we ought to insist still upon having some of the troops from Naples, as most at hand, and because of the remoteness of the place, very difficult to be made use of this year, any other way than by transporting them to Catalonia by sea.

" Count Wratislaw touches on one thing in his letter, against which I beg leave to precaution you in time; and that is, the thought of sending for Prince Eugene to the Rhine the latter end of this campaign. Now the affairs of the Rhine for this year seem to be at an end, by the troops detached from Villars's army, and I believe the elector of Hanover would like to have that command another year. Besides, I do really not think him sincere in dropping that expression to you; for if they had Prince Eugene at Vienna, they would not think of sending him to the Rhine, but rather make use of him to bridle the king of Sweden. Upon the whole, I think it might be right to answer him, that, in general, his views are likely to be approved; and that if the emperor has any doubt

whether England would make use of the success we hope for at Toulon, not to continue the war, his imperial majesty has but to make it his request to all the allies not to make peace till the monarchy of Spain be restored to the house of Austria, and he will soon see if England will not be ready to join with him in procuring such a declaration from them. And perhaps this would not give a very improper rise for what will be necessary to be said to the States upon the subject of the former part of this letter.

"If Count Zinzendorf comes to you, as I hear, he may be of great use in concerting all these things against the return of Brigadier Palmes, which I wish might be sooner than the middle of September; both because before that time the siege of Toulon must be over one way or other, and also, because after that time, to speak very plainly, it will be no more than absolutely necessary that you should make haste into England, to look after our affairs at home.

"I agree with all you say concerning Spain and Portugal, but if they are likely to be pressed in autumn, as the French brag, we must be at some extraordinary expense to keep them firm to our alliance. At present I think we are on very good terms with them.

"Mr. Robinson's last letters give us but a very doubtful account of the matters depending between the emperor and the king of Sweden, notwithstanding all the advances made by the former. I hear that my Lord Peterborough has been with him, and don't doubt but from thence he will go to Berlin and Hanover, before he comes to you, by which time he will be furnished with sufficient matter for a whole week's conversation.

"Since I had finished this letter, I have shown it to the queen for her approbation. She commanded me to remember her very kindly to you, but did not say the least word of her having received a letter from you.

"I had almost forgot to observe one thing to you upon what you write, that subsidies would be better than a regular pay for the troops to be sent from Naples to Spain. This is certainly true, if any honesty remained in the world, but as the case now stands, if that method be taken, the subsidies will be sent to Vienna, and the troops, I doubt, will starve in Spain.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, Aug. 4.* — By the last post I had not time for copying the enclosed from Lord Peterborough.\* His motions have been so uncertain, that I have writ but one letter in answer to four of his, which I sent to Sir Philip Meadows, who writes me word, that it came after the earl was gone; but that he should send it to Hanover, believing it might meet him there. By one expression in his letter, I believe his justification is meant to be printed. I should think it for his service, as well as the quiet of the queen's business, that nothing of this kind should be printed. If he gives me occasion, I shall put him in mind of the English saying, '*little said is soon mended*;' but I know he will govern himself, and I had

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\* This is the letter which is already printed in Chapter lvii. — Ed.

much rather it should be so, than your humble servant have any thing to do in it.

"I do not hear the elector of Hanover has yet declared any time for his going to the army on the Rhine; so that for this campaign we must not, I am afraid, expect any other thing but obliging M. Villars to keep on the other side of the Rhine, so that they may detach the greatest part of their army for Provence. I hope to-morrow we may have the good news of the duke of Savoy's being at Toulon the 23d of last month.

"Having wrote thus far, I have the favour of yours of the 17th, by which I see you want two mails from Holland, in which letters you will find us full of hopes of success of the project of Toulon; but if that should not succeed, you will find no hearts left in Holland. You must see this month of August pass, before you will be well able to judge what measures may be proper to be taken.

"I am sorry for the uneasiness your cold gives you, and so with all my heart wish you might never have any other uneasiness, but what of necessity you must undergo for the good of the public. I have been uneasy in my head ever since I left off the Spa waters; but if the siege of Toulon goes prosperously, I shall be cured of all diseases but old age."

*To the Duchess.*

"Meldert, Aug. 4. — Since my last we have had so much rain, that I can hardly stir out of my quarter, the dirt being up to the horses' bellies, which is very extraordinary in this month. However, I think we must stay here till we hear what success the duke of Savoy has at Toulon. By a letter I have received from Lord Peterborough, he should be at this time at Hanover, where, no doubt, he will be a great favourite with the electress Sophia; I do not think his humour will be agreeable to the elector. I send a copy of his letter to Mr. Montgomery.

"I did last winter desire the queen's favour in giving her picture to Comte Wratislaw, which she was pleased to promise, so that I thought it had been at Vienna. But by the last post I received a letter from the emperor's resident, that Sir Godfrey Kneller says he can't begin the picture till he has a warrant from lord chamberlain. Pray give my duty to the queen, and that I desire she would be pleased to give Lord Kent her orders; for Wratislaw has set his heart on the honour of her picture, and Sir Godfrey might order it so that her majesty need not have the trouble of sitting but once. But the next year I must beg the favour of the queen that she will allow Sir Godfrey to come three or four times to draw hers and the prince's pictures for Blenheim; if I am ever to enjoy quietness, it must be there, so that I would have nothing in my sight but my friends.

"Having writ thus far, I have received yours of the 18th, by which I find there were two Dutch posts due. What 73 tells you is a melancholy prospect; but when thoughts are carried any where else, they are dangerous; so that of two evils you must choose the least. I am more concerned at what you say of the queen, since that is what may hurt immediately the elector of Hanover. But as to 50, I hope it is at a great distance; and I will own to you, that the little gratitude or sense the

English have of their peculiar happiness, makes me less concerned ; but I would venture a good deal to make the queen happy, for I am persuaded she means very honestly."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

" *Genappe, Aug. 11.* — I had not time by the last post to answer that part of your letters of the 17th and 21st of the last month, in which you say that it is not only your own opinion, but also that of Lord Halifax, Lord Somers, and Lord Sunderland, that there should be no time lost in taking measures ; and at the same time, letting the Dutch know the firm resolution of the queen and England, never to think of peace till they can bring France to those preliminaries agreed to last winter. I think this is very rightly judged, but the execution will be very difficult ; for as the preliminaries were never in form brought to the States, so you may be sure they will pretend to know nothing of them.

" By what I hear from Leipsic, I believe the fate of Toulon will be decided before the negotiation of Count Wratislaw will be finished. When I told you that I approved of the greatest part of Count Wratislaw's letter, I did not mean his reasoning upon what was passed ; for my humour is to look forward, so that I meant as to the managing of the war for the next campaign. You may be in the right to wish Prince Eugene to continue where he is ; but if himself and the emperor shall think fit to have him in Germany, it would be very harsh in the allies to oppose it. But I shall be better able to speak on this subject after the return of Palmes, which cannot be till the middle of September.

" By the last post I sent you the last resolution of the States, by which you will see their great caution. I cannot forbear giving you my opinion as to what you say of the parliament settling the management of the war with the States. It is a matter I think 31 and all his friends would be extremely glad of, and, therefore, I think it should be avoided ; for it is certain that there can be no good end of such an inquiry, and although I cannot prevail with them to do what is good for themselves, yet they will trust me with much more power than they will ever be brought to do by treaty."

In many of the letters between Marlborough and Godolphin, as well as in those from the duchess to the queen, we find frequent allusions to the court of Hanover and to the discordant views and sentiments of the electoral family. The electress Sophia was highly anxious to accept the invitation to England, which had already formed the subject of a discussion in parliament ; and notwithstanding her repeated disavowals, both public and private, she always contemplated the prospect of visiting a country where she was regarded as the presumptive heiress to the crown, with a degree of eagerness which increased with age. She even frequently declared that she should die content if she could only live to have in-

scribed on her tomb, "Sophia, Queen of Great Britain." At all events, she considered herself as entitled to a pension sufficiently ample to give consequence to her rank and pretensions. She, therefore, readily listened to all who flattered her ruling passion, and, at this moment, was secretly caballing with the Tories, who, to embarrass the government, proposed to bring the subject of the invitation again into discussion. She was at the same time displeased with the Whigs, and, in her resentment for their opposition to her wishes, forgot the services which they had rendered at the Revolution and the zeal which they had manifested in promoting the Protestant succession.

The elector was too prudent and high-minded to countenance these petty cabals; but from aversion to parade and a love of economy, he contributed to the coldness which reigned between the two courts, by declining the formalities which custom had introduced in the intercourse of princes. Thus, when it was thought proper to invest the electoral prince with the order of the Garter, to raise him to the English peerage, under the title of Duke of Cambridge, and to compliment him by the mission of a regular ambassador on the birth of his son—the elector received these marks of distinction with a degree of coldness which bore the appearance of aversion, and did not hesitate to express his contempt for what he called baubles and trifles. The dissatisfaction arising from this source was increased by the reports and complaints of Mrs. Howe, the lady of the British minister, who, in her correspondence with the duchess of Marlborough, expatiated on the froward and mysterious conduct of the electoral court, and represented every trifling omission of ceremony as a deliberate insult and a proof of indifference to the succession.

The electoral prince partook neither of the eagerness of his grandmother to anticipate her expected honours, nor of the stern contempt with which his father regarded the established forms of princely intercourse. On the contrary, he seized every occasion to manifest his respect to the queen and his regard to the nation over whom he was destined to reign; but he was too confined, both in means and influence, to be an object of attention to any of the parties who were striving to ingratiate themselves with the future sovereign.

The Tories did not fail to profit by the situation of the electoral family and the dissatisfaction which reigned between the two courts. At first they employed the agency of Sir Rowland Gwynn, an English gentleman who resided at Hanover; and when he was dismissed for his intrigues, by order of the elector, they recurred to Mr. Scott, a dependant of the electoral family, who visited England under the plea of domestic business. By his channel they conveyed assurances of their attachment, accused the Whigs of treachery to the Protestant cause, and wrought on the passion which the electress felt to visit the British dominions.

By the agency of Robethon the Duke of Marlborough was speedily acquainted with these machinations, as well as with the sentiment of displeasure which they exerted in the mind of the elector.

*Robethon to Cardonel.†*

"*Hanover, Aug. 2.* — \* \* \* \* My Lord Peterborough has been here three days; he was indulged with a court carriage and six horses to convey him to Herenhausen, where he dined and supped every day. He has warmly declaimed against Lord Galway. He appears to be extravagantly Swedish, and an enemy of the emperor.

"Our Mr. Scott, who has demanded permission of his electoral highness to go to London for his domestic affairs, has been intriguing there with the high Tories; and he has written to the elector a letter of ten pages, which I have read, tending to advise him to give his assent to the invitation of the electress, and assuring him that if he will permit him to forward it, he will take care that the business shall pass in the next session. He pretends that the great body of the nation desire it; that the Tories, who have proposed it, are the true friends of this house; that the Whigs are devoted to the court, and for this reason oppose the invitation of the successor; and that these same people, among whom he reckons Lord Halifax, would engage his electoral highness to take the command on the Rhine, in order to expose his reputation, and to receive an affront. But he has been told that his highness would not go, unless my lord

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† Mr. Cardonel was the able secretary of the duke. M. Robethon was the minister of the elector of Hanover, and busily employed in maintaining a correspondence with the British statesmen friendly to the Hanoverian succession. He had been private secretary to King William until he died; and was a very active, intelligent, and trust-worthy correspondent. He wrote all the letters which George I., George II., and Queen Caroline sent to this country, from the time he entered their service till the death of Queen Anne. Robethon was not an Hanoverian; nor is it certain of what country he was a native. He is called by some a French Protestant refugee, and by others a Dutchman or Fleming. — Ed.

duke would give him a good detachment, which he could do without risk. He has written four letters to the elector, full of invectives against my lord duke. His highness was so irritated at this proceeding, that he wrote to him, with his own hand, forbidding him to meddle in any business, on pain of being dismissed from his service.\* His highness ordered M. de Schutz to communicate the copy of this letter to Lords Godolphin, Sunderland, and Halifax, in order to make this fellow known to them. I am directed to acquaint you with all this, and to beg you to apprise my lord duke of it. Hitherto I have been the dupe of this man, and therefore it is just that I should labour to prevent others from being so too."

On this occasion Marlborough acted with his usual candour and frankness, by acquainting the elector with the reports circulated by Mrs. Howe, and experienced a similar return. From the correspondence we find that this explanation prevented an open breach between the two courts, and restrained the intrigues of those who laboured to set them at variance.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, Aug. 8.* — I find by yours of the 21st that you want four packets from Holland; and as the wind is, I fear they are still on this side. The news we have this morning from Paris is much better than what we received by the last post. The duke of Vendome has detached 12 battalions and 9 squadrons, but continues still in his camp. I hope this detachment will encourage the deputies, so as that I may make the march I have been proposing to them for these last six weeks. If they allow of it, my next will be from another camp. You will, by Mr. Walpole's† letter, have an account of all our affairs in Catalonia; however, I trouble you with a copy of the letter from Lieut.-general Erle. The other two papers, I have not had time to have them copied; they should not be shown to many; by that from Hanover the queen may see the obligations she has to some of her subjects. Tho' the elector has behaved himself in this business as I always thought he would, you may depend on it that Mr. Scott does nothing but by the direction of the electress, and I dare say you will see this matter attempted in the winter. The other is from Besenval, the French minister, to Torcy. By a letter Mr. Cardonel has received from Lord Peterborough, he should be here this evening or to-morrow.

"I here enclose the resolution of the States, given me this day by the deputies of the army. It is an answer to my having pressed them to get fuller powers. It would do them hurt with the States, if they should know they have shown me the whole resolution, so that I beg it may be

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\* A translation of the elector's letter is printed in Macpherson, v. ii. p. 93.

† Horace, afterwards Lord Walpole, brother of Sir Robert, who was secretary to General Stanhope in Spain.

communicated only to Lord Halifax, Lord Somers, and Lord Sunderland. You will see, by the reasoning of this resolution, the humour they are in. I should be glad to know what your opinions are of the use I ought to make of this."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Windsor, Aug. 4-15.*—I received yesterday the favour of yours of the 4th and 8th of August, with the several papers enclosed. The copy of my Lord Peterborough's letter is a perfect picture of himself, and some paragraphs of it are very well explained by the letter intercepted from Besenval. But you having by this time had enough of the original, I shall say no more of it now, but that I hope you have advised him not to be so troublesome as his own temper and inclination would naturally lead him to.

"I think it very probable that he may have entered into all the views of the elector of Hanover, and join with these people in that and in other things when he comes hither, unless your lessons have power enough to hinder him from it.

"I thank you for the letter you sent me from Hanover, because I hope it will do some good with the queen; I am sure it ought to do so. Mr. Secretary Harley will have orders from the queen to let the elector of Hanover's minister know that the person\* mentioned in that letter ought to be recalled immediately.

"I have communicated to Lord Halifax and to Lord Sunderland the resolution of the States, enclosed in yours of the 8th from Meldert. Their construction of it is, that you are more at liberty than you have been; and your letters received to-day, of the 11th from Genappe, seem to confirm that construction. We agree that this month of August must pass, and the fate of Toulon be over, before any just measures can properly be taken, as to what ought to be said to the States."

"*August 5-16.*—\* \* \* \* I am much afraid our affairs grow every day worse and worse with the king of Sweden, not that I really think he is in any engagement with France; but his own natural unreasonableness, and his uncertainty is like to have the same effect. And I doubt Lord Peterborough has done all he could to make mischief there, as well as in other places where he has passed; and unless he be gone from you before this comes to your hands, a little good advice from you will have more weight than from any body to hinder him from hurting himself, and being very troublesome to others."

The disavowal of Scott, and the communications made to the queen, contributed to soften her prejudices against the elector; and before the close of the year, Mr. Howe was commissioned to convey assurances which announced the restoration of harmony between the two courts.

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\* Mr. Scott.

*From Mr. Howe.*

"*Hanover, Dec. 26. N. S.* — The morning after my arrival I had an audience of the elector, and when I had made the queen's compliments to him, I came upon the business of England, which he entered into with me, in the openest and fairest manner that could be expected. He bid me assure the queen, that he should never think of any other interest in England but hers, and that whatever interest he had there, he thought very secure in her majesty's; nor would he hearken to, or give any encouragement to the projects of those who have only their own private views. His electoral highness told me, that as to Scott, he was wholly ignorant of his behaviour in England, and that as soon as he was acquainted with it, which was indeed by Scott's own letters, he sent for him away, and ordered M. Schutz to let him know how much he was displeased at his proceedings. M. de Bernsdorf has assured me since, that the elector had once resolved to turn him out of his service, but that he thought the fellow would then go into England, and still carry on his intrigues, which might have occasioned a jealousy that his electoral highness had done it with that design.

"I have seen Scott at court, who has been to see me at my house, and I think I have not seen a greater alteration in any body's countenance; for, from that height of insolence he used to carry himself, he looks quite dashed, like a guilty knave that is discovered in all his vice. I hope this has set the elector himself very right in every thing, and that it will make him put a stop to the proceedings of the electress."

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#### CHAP. LX. — CHANGE OF CAMP. — 1707.

IN the camp of Meldert Marlborough had been detained six weeks, by the caution of the Dutch deputies, who opposed his design of marching on Genappe, which must have forced the enemy to risk a battle, or retire from their strong position at Gemblours. At length, on the intelligence that Vendome had detached thirteen battalions and twelve squadrons to Provence, he obtained their consent to the projected movement. The heavy baggage was sent to the rear; the troops at Brussels were ordered to Waterloo, to cover the march; and those at Louvain, to the abbey of Florival, where four bridges had been thrown across the Dyle. On the 10th, in the afternoon, the passage of the river was effected, the duke of Wirtemberg being detached with fourteen squadrons towards Pieterbois, to observe the enemy,

and afterwards to form the rear guard. The troops reached the heights of Wavre on the dawn of the 11th. Having made a short halt, they again proceeded, and, after a forced march of seven leagues, encamped with their right at Promelle, and their left on the Dyle, the head-quarters being established at Genappe. During this movement two letters occur.

*To Secretary Harley.*

"Genappe, Aug. 11. — Yesterday I decamped from Meldert. At nine I gave orders for some heavy baggage to march towards Brussels, and the artillery to pass the Dyle at St. Joris-Wert. At three the army struck their tents, and began their march at four towards Florival, where we likewise passed the Dyle, and continued our march all night to this camp, from whence we might, with less disadvantage, have attacked the enemy in their camp at Gemblours, had they continued there. But, having notice about eight at night of our march, they immediately gave orders for decamping, and marched about midnight towards Gosseliers, and are supposed to have taken the camp at Pieton.

"You will receive a large volume from Mr. Robinson of my negotiation with the Swedish ministers, who consent that her majesty and the States should procure the consent of the several princes pretending to the territory of Hadelen, that the emperor transfer the sequestration to the king of Sweden, which may bring these princes to demand an equivalent, as in the affair of Eutin; but the article about the Protestant religion in Silesia will admit greater difficulties. There is little appearance of bringing the Swedes to any reasonable terms."

*To Lord Godolphin.\**

"Genappe, Aug. 4-15. — \* \* \* \* I had writ thus far in our old camp. The march I made last night and this day has had the effect I always assured the deputies it would have. As soon as the duke of Vendome had the assurance of my being marched, he immediately gave orders for decamping, and accordingly began to march at twelve o'clock last night, knowing very well, that if he had stayed till I had been in this camp, he could not have marched without an action. I hope this will convince our friends in Holland, as it has done our deputies, that if they had consented to my making this march six weeks ago, as I pressed to do, the French would have then made, as they now have, a shameful march, by which both armies see very plainly that they will not venture to fight. We have nothing since my last from Provence; and I am so very sleepy, not having shut my eyes last night, that I shall give you no farther trouble."

On the retreat of the enemy, Marlborough moved directly to Nivelle, where he arrived on the same evening; and learning that Vendome was advancing to Seneff, he prepared

\* The former part of this letter is printed in the preceding chapter.

with alacrity for an engagement the ensuing day. Count Tilly was detached at the head of forty squadrons and 5000 grenadiers, with orders to post himself between the two camps, and harass their rear guard, in case they should attempt to march before the main army could arrive. But the French commanders were not anxious to risk the event of a battle. The approach of the confederates to Nivelle became again the signal for retreat, and they effected their purpose with such rapidity, that they gained the inclosures which skirt the plain of Mariemont, without any effectual obstruction from the allied detachment. They then continued their progress to the position of St. Denis, behind the rivulet which falls into the Hainé, in the vicinity of Mons.

Uncertain of their design, Marlborough detached parties to watch their movements, and an aide-de-camp of Overkirk ascending the height of Great Roeux, descried them in full march towards the Haine. Calculating that they intended to occupy the strong camp of Cambron, Marlborough reluctantly allowed his troops to halt a day, for the sake of recovering from their fatigue. On the 14th, at six in the morning, he directed his march to Soignies; but his progress being retarded by a heavy rain, the heads of his columns did not reach the intended camp till late in the evening, and the rear was unable to join before the ensuing morning. The French, meanwhile, evinced the same caution as on the former occasion. After passing the night under arms, they broke up from St. Denis, and continued their retreat by Cambron to Chievres, from whence a single march would place them within the protection of their lines.

As the hasty retreat of the enemy precluded all hope of an action, so a succession of heavy rains detained the two armies above a fortnight in their respective camps, greatly to the mortification of the British general, who confidently expected to retrieve the time which he had been compelled to waste since the commencement of the campaign. But although the caution of the enemy, and the opposition of the deputies, had frustrated his views, his skill and activity called forth the admiration of all competent judges, and of none more than Eugene, who sincerely sympathised in his disappointment.

"*Turin, Aug. 19.* — What your highness has done since your had the power of marching against the enemy, evidently proves that this campaign would have been as glorious as the last, if you had not been restrained by the great circumspection of the Dutch deputies, who, ignorant of our profession, follow the opinion of their generals, who know nothing but defensive warfare."

In a letter to Godolphin, Marlborough recapitulates the incidents of his march.

"*Soignies, Aug. 15.*—I was in hopes this might have given you an account of some action; for on Friday we marched to Nivelles, and camped about half a league from Seneff, where the French army was encamped. We came too late for attacking them that evening. As soon as it was dark they began to make their retreat, without making the least noise, not touching either drum or trumpet; so that the Count de Tilly, whom I had detached with 40 squadrons and 5000 grenadiers, to attack their rear guard, in case they should march, knew nothing of their marching till daylight; so that their rear guard was got into the inclosures before he could join them, so that there was very little done. Our loss was three officers and some few soldiers. I believe theirs was also very inconsiderable; but by these four days' march they have lost very considerably by desertion; for we gave them no rest, so that they were two days without bread. They were in one continued march from Friday night, from Seneff, till Sunday twelve o'clock, to Cambron; so that they may now have their bread from Mons. This army is also very much fatigued, so that I shall be obliged to take three or four days' rest in this camp, and then I shall march towards Ath.

"M. Vendome's avoiding twice to fight within these four days, I hope will convince our friends, as well as enemies, that his orders are not to venture. The consternation that has been amongst their common soldiers ought to assure us of victory, if we can ever engage them; but as they will not venture, they are now in a country where they may march from one strong camp to another, and so end the campaign, which I fear they will do.

"I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 27th, by which I see you think this may be a proper time to attempt on the coast of France. The season is very much advanced; but if you have any fixed project settled with the officer that is to command, if you would let me know it, you may depend upon having three or four battalions as you desire; for though the Dutch should not be willing, I would take upon myself for so inconsiderable a number. But should you not be almost sure of success, I should not think it advisable for you to run into such an expense as unavoidably this must be. But if you are sure that the people will join with you, and that they can be supported this winter, it ought not to be neglected. If I could have persuaded, the elector of Hanover had been at the army before now.

"Count Dohna\* has been some days with me, and his account dif-

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\* Count Dohna was the principal officer taken prisoner at the battle of Almanza.

fers very much from that of the English officers concerning Lord Galway.

"My Lord Peterborough has been here ever since Friday, and I believe thinks of staying some days longer. He assures me that he shall be able to convince yourself and Lord Sunderland that many stories have been made of him, in which there is no truth, and that he hopes to justify himself in every particular to the queen's satisfaction; that his intentions are to be employed by the queen, as she shall judge best; and that if she does not make use of him, that he may have her leave to serve elsewhere.

"He has very obliging letters from the king of Spain, and the duke of Savoy has a kindness for him."

During the visit of Lord Peterborough, which Marlborough here announces, the justifications and complaints with which he had filled his letters while absent, were repeated even to satiety. After a stay of ten days he took his departure, apparently gratified with the polite and hospitable reception which he had experienced, and soothed by the judicious advice of his former patron. At his request Marlborough gave him a letter of recommendation to Godolphin, but cautiously abstained from a general approbation of his conduct, and referred him to the queen and ministry, to whom he transmitted his written justification. The correspondence will spare the necessity of entering farther into the particulars of this visit.\*

*To the Duchess.*

"*Soignies, Aug. 15.* — Since my last we have had one continued rain, so that neither the enemy nor we can stir out of our camps. I have at this time my winter clothes and a fire in my chamber; but, what is worse, the ill weather hinders me from going abroad, so that Lord Peter-

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\* The following is the ostensible letter of recommendation, of which Peterborough was the bearer, from Marlborough to Godolphin: —

"*Soignies, Aug. 20.* — My lord, as I have had the favour of Lord Peterborough's company ten days, he has not only shown me, but left with me the copies of several letters, and resolutions of councils of war, to demonstrate the falsity of several facts maliciously reported of him. He has given me the enclosed paper of what he hears is reported against him. My having been so constantly abroad makes me ignorant, not only as to this paper, but also what other facts may be laid to his charge; but as he is resolved to acquaint you and Lord Sunderland with every thing, in order the queen may have a true information, I shall say no more, but that, as far as I am capable of judging, I verily think he has acted with great zeal.

"I am ever, my lord, your most obedient humble servant,

"MARLBOROUGH."

borough has the opportunity of very long conversations; what is said one day the next destroys, so that I have desired him to put his thoughts in writing. My Lord Peterborough has shown me several obliging letters of the king of Spain to himself, which I can't but wonder at, after what he has writ against him. He does also assure me that he is some thousand pounds the worse for the service, having lost two equipages upon the whole, he swears. And I believe his estate is very much in debt."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Soignies, Aug. 18.* — I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 31st and 1st of last month. I think your thought of the Venetians is very good, but I very much question your bringing it to bear in any reasonable time; for that of landing in France, I gave you the trouble of my thoughts by the last post. I should have sent you the enclosed copies of the king of Spain's letters some time since, but by a mistake they were forgot. I also send you a copy of what I have received this morning from Count Wratislaw, it giving more hopes of an accommodation than his last. But I am afraid at last he will find that the Swedes presume so much on the favourable conjuncture, that they will be very unreasonable. It is not to be expressed the rains we have had, and that continue still, so that if the safety of the common cause depended upon our marching, neither the enemy nor we could stir out of our camps; for it is with the greatest difficulty that the generals get to my quarters for orders. All the comfort we have is, that the enemy do at least suffer as much as we.

"Sinnerling has acquainted me this day with the assurances he has had from her majesty, of her assisting the king his master; and pressed me at the same time that troops might be immediately sent. I have endeavoured to let him see that till we have more certainty of the expedition of Provence, nothing could be done; but, in the mean time, he ought to press the court of Vienna to have those troops in Naples ready to be transported, if that should be for the service.

"Lord Peterborough has said all that is possible to me, but says nothing of leaving the army. By what he tells me, he thinks he has demonstration to convince you that he has been injured in every thing that has been reported to his disadvantage."

"*Soignies, Aug. 22.* — If we had had any tolerable weather we had stayed but one night in this camp, but as the rains continue, God only knows when we shall be able to get out of it.

"Lord Peterborough left us on Saturday. I have endeavoured to let him see, that for his own sake, he ought to clear up the objections against him, in order to which, I have given him a letter for yourself; and he has promised me that he will acquaint you and Lord Sunderland with all he has to say. At the same time I must acquaint you, that by what I am told of his discourses, he will not be governed; but I have said so much to him, that I hope you will have it in your power to make him easy, which may prevent much mischief, as he will most certainly run into the notion of Hanover, and all other things that may be cross. The opinion of the elector of Hanover should be made as public as possible;

for I very much fear that this very next winter the queen may receive mortification on that subject.

"I see by yours of the 5th, which I received last night, that you are of the opinion that the chief command should be left to the king of Spain and his generals. I think the best argument that can be given in Portugal is, that her majesty, being resolved to leave only a lieutenant-general in Spain, they ought to do the same, by which that matter would be settled. But as for the number of troops that should go from Italy, I can know no certainty till the return of Brigadier Palmes.

"I believe it is very true that the king of Sweden has no engagement with France; but his unaccountable obstinacy, and the little knowledge he has of the affairs of Christendom, may make him take engagements this winter; especially if it be true what is writ from Paris, of the duke of Savoy's having attacked the intrenchment, and being repulsed with considerable loss. The enclosed from Count Wratislaw is what I have received since my last, and is the only one which gives me some hopes of an accommodation. My trumpet is this minute returned from the French army, and says they have no news from Toulon since the 9th, so that the duke of Savoy's being repulsed is false."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Soignies, Aug. 22.* — I do assure you I did not mean the Whigs when I spoke of ingratitude, but I meant it in general to England; and if you will do me justice, you must believe that I have done all the good offices that are possible at this distance. I do not say this to make my court to the Whigs, but that I am persuaded it was good for my country, and for the service of the queen; for I do really believe that the Tories will do all they can to mortify the queen and England; for I am now both at an age and humour, that I would not be bound to make my court to either party, for all that this world could give me. Besides, I am so disheartened, that when I shall have done my duty, I shall submit to Providence; but, as a friend, I will foretel you the unavoidable consequence, if the Whigs mortify the lord treasurer, that he will be disheartened, and Mr. Harley have the power and credit of doing what he pleases. This I know will hurt both the queen and England, but I see no remedy."

"*Soignies, Aug. 25.* — Since yours, in which you desire I should look on the seals, I have done it for two or three posts, and I am very confident they have not been touched. As long as you are careful to send them to Mr. Secretary Harley, you may be sure they will come safe. The continued ill weather we have had, which keeps us in this camp, gives me the spleen, for it is not in this place I would stay.

"If Lord Peterborough should, when he comes to England, at any time write to you, pray be careful what answer you make, for sooner or later it will be in print.

"Most of your letters being full of fears for this winter, I can't forbear assuring you, that I would not only wish prosperity and quietness to the queen, but I would take pains and venture any hazard to make her business go well; so that, for God's sake, if you think I can contri-

bute, let me know it. For I can assure you, that if we have not success at Toulon, there will be this winter a great deal of uneasiness in most of the foreign courts; so that should we, at the same time, have divisions in England, how could the war be carried on with vigour this next campaign, which must be done to bring France to reason?"

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Soignies, Aug. 25.* — I send you enclosed a copy of the pensioner's letter, with my answer, that on the descent, and the oaths to be given this country, as well as the barrier. I should be glad to be directed what I might say farther on those points. It is near six weeks since I have had any thing directly from Provence; and what we have by the way of Paris can't be relied on. If we should not succeed at Toulon, I find by all my letters from Holland that they shall be very much disheartened; so that our friends fear they will not be able to make them act with vigour. But I hope the contrary, if the king of Sweden gives no disturbance; so that I could wish your thoughts might be employed to see if you can find some proposition that might be made to him, to bring him more into the interest of the allies.

"Having writ thus far, I this minute received yours of the 8th. What you say of Prince Eugene, we can have no just thoughts of, till the return of Mr. Palmes. I have this morning received letters of the 20th, 24th, and 29th of the last month, from Mr. Chetwynd and others from the army in Provence; and I am sorry to tell you that I observe by all of them, that there is not that friendship and reliance between the duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene as should be wished, for making so great a design succeed. I beg this may be known to nobody but yourself and the queen, hoping God may reconcile them, and make them act for the best.

"By my letter I received this morning of the 17th from Mr. Robinson, he thinks the king of Sweden is resolved not to be reconciled to the emperor. I do not send his letter, not doubting but he writes the same thing to Mr. Secretary Harley. The desire you have that the States should enter into stricter measures with the czar may be right, if the emperor and king of Sweden should not agree; but the enclosed I send of Count Wratislaw, of the 17th, from Leipsic, gives great hopes. I have also a letter from Count Rechteren, of the 10th, from Vienna, that assures me the emperor has agreed as to the point of religion, desired in favour of the Silesians by the king of Sweden.

"I have received another letter from General Erle; he presses very much to come home. He should either be made easy in that service or have leave to return. If you shall see it practicable, and for the service, to make a descent this year, I would recommend Withers rather than Ingolsby; for the first is very brave and diligent, and will make no other demands than what are absolutely necessary; the other will be desiring a train of artillery, and such expenses as you will not be able to comply with; but, upon the whole, if we do not succeed in Provence, it will not be reasonable to attempt the landing of men this year. A very little time will clear this matter; for I reckon Brigadier Palmes was with the

duke of Savoy about ten days ago, so that I may hear from him in a week."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Soignies, Aug. 29.* — I have had yours of the 10th, and your note of the 12th, with Vanbrugh's letter, by which I see the hall and saloon must be left for next year. As our business of this year goes, I am afraid it will be time enough, especially if the news we have from France be true, which says that the French made a sally on the duke of Savoy, on the 15th, by which we suffered very much.

"If you have good reason for what you write, of the kindness and esteem the queen has for Mrs. Masham and Mr. Harley, my opinion should be, that the lord treasurer and I should tell her majesty what is good for herself; and if that will not prevail, to be quiet, and let Mr. Harley and Mrs. Masham do what they please; for I own I am quite tired, and if the queen can be safe, I shall be glad. I hope lord treasurer will be of my mind, and then we shall be much happier than by being in a perpetual struggle; for if lord treasurer and I have lost the confidence of the queen, it would be the greatest folly in the world in us, to act so as the world may think, as they now do, that it is in our power to do every thing, by which we shall not only be made uneasy, but lose our reputation both at home and abroad. I shall always be ready to sacrifice my life for the quiet and safety of the queen, but I will not be imposed upon by any body that has power with her; for as I have served her with all my heart, and all the sincerity imaginable, I think I deserve the indulgence of being quiet in my old age."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Soignies, Aug. 24.* — \* \* \* \* The weather, beginning to be good\*, I intend to make the cannon and baggage march to-morrow, and the army the next day. I believe the French will march from Cambron before I pass the Dender; for it is very plain they will avoid the coming to action. I shall take care as soon as I can for the exchange of Macartney; but I beg that none of the prisoners in England may have any encouragement, for the French do not use us well, pretending to govern absolutely in the exchange of prisoners, by making their choice; for at this minute they act as if they were our masters."

The treasurer, who had looked with anxiety to the military operations of his friend, in the hope that a successful engagement would allay the domestic feuds, participated in his mortification. To make amends for the disappointment, he recurred to his favourite scheme of a descent on the French coast; and suggested a subsidiary alliance with the Venetians, for the purpose of increasing the disposable force in Italy. The close of the letter (Aug. 15.), in which he imparts

\* The former part of the letter, being political, is inserted in Chapter lxii.

these plans, merits particular attention ; because it conveys his opinion on a proposal made by Harley, to arrest Lord Peterborough, and bring him to a public trial for his conduct.

*" Windsor, Aug. 15-26. — I am to acknowledge the favour of your letters from Soignies, of the 15th and of the 18th, with the several letters and papers enclosed, which I shall be sure to keep very carefully, according to your directions.*

*" By yours of the 15th, the French seem to have very narrowly escaped your hand, and I doubt the very ill weather, and the country in which they now are, will secure them from falling any more this year into the same dangers. This, I reckon, will put you in a condition of more easily sparing three or four regiments for our descent, in case the season of the year and other circumstances will admit of our putting it in execution.*

*" It is impossible to be sure that any attempt of this kind shall succeed, but all the assurances from those parts are very encouraging to it ; besides that, we know all the force of France is at this time moving towards Provence, and their people, on this side, left both unguarded, and also in many places organised, for fear of revolts. With your assistance, I see we might be able to have about 6000 foot and about 1000 horse and dragoons, which, if they were well on the other side, I should think might be sufficient, with a good man at their head, to make themselves masters of Rochfort and Xaintes, which opens to them the provinces of Xaintonges and Angoumois, where the Protestants are the most numerous, and the people said to be the best disposed of any. But all this will turn upon having a proper person at the head, and in a great measure also upon the success at Toulon, which I hope is in a good way, though all the French accounts endeavour to fright us very much with their good posture there, and the great preparations they are making to dis-appoint the duke of Savoy's design upon that place.*

*" I am glad you have no other objection to the Venetian troops, but your doubt of their not coming in time ; for they are certainly nearer at hand than any others whatever, except those which the emperor has in Italy already. I am very glad to find by Sir Philip Meadows's last letters, that he is in hopes the imperial court will be early in letting us have some of the troops from Naples, for strengthening the duke of Savoy's army, which I take to be equally useful to us, as if they let us have them for Catalonia.*

*" I doubt the elector of Hanover will not be willing to let the Saxon troops, now upon the Rhine, advance towards Italy, because he is so pressing to have others from you ; but I think it is very plain there will be no farther occasion for them this year where they now are, unless the elector would show more diligence and vigour than his motions hitherto seem to promise, or indeed, than the season of the year seems now to admit of.*

*" I enclose to you a letter I had lately from Mr. Secretary Harley, which I desire you not to lose, that you may see his thoughts concerning Lord Peterborough. I must own to you, at the same time, that if one*

could imagine there were the least truth in what Lord Peterborough has taken so much pains to profess to you, my own opinion would be, not to make him desperate, till he had first given clear demonstration. It was impossible for him not to be troublesome; but in this, as in all other things, I can submit to better judgments, and I incline to think that the opinion of lords Halifax, Somers, and Sunderland, would, in *this particular*, be the same that Mr. Secretary Harley seems to have.

"I have written to my Lord Manchester by this post, in my Lord Sunderland's absence, that he would lose no time in proposing to the Venetians to come into the great alliance, upon promising subsidies for ten or twelve thousand men, to join the duke of Savoy, and giving them assurances of taking care of their interests at the general peace; and that no peace shall be made without their participation."

The letter from Secretary Harley to Lord Godolphin, to which allusion is here made, is too singular to be omitted, particularly when we consider the situation of the secretary, and his subsequent approbation of Peterborough's conduct.

"*Wednesday, Aug. 13.* — Your lordship will see what Mr. Robinson writes to me apart, in answer to my queries about Lord Peterborough. I confess it is none of my business, and therefore I beg your lordship's pardon, if my zeal run before my discretion, when I offer to your lordship's consideration what should be done with Lord Peterborough as soon as he arrives. Should he not give an account in writing of his proceedings, and that being represented to the committee, if not to the council, and if it appears he has acted contrary to his instructions, ought he not to be committed? It is true he will be admitted to bail, but he may be tried by a common jury for a misdemeanor. I need not specify the reasons for it, they seem to be obvious. It is better to find him work to clear himself, than leave him leisure to do mischief. I must again beg pardon for offering my thoughts, to which I have no motive but the honour of the queen, and the service of her ministers."

In the next letter we find Godolphin reverting to the feuds in the cabinet, and the embarrassments arising from the influence of Mrs. Masham and Harley.

"*Windsor, Aug. 16-27.* — Mr. Hare came hither yesterday, and finding he resolved to return to you by the very next packet boat, I have a mind to mention some particular things to you, by a safe hand, which I should not care to venture by the post.

"I reckon one great occasion of Mrs. Morley's obstinacy, and of the uneasiness she gives herself and others, especially about the clergy, proceeds from an inclination of talking more freely than usual to Mrs. Masham; and this is laid hold of and improved by Mr. Secretary Harley, upon all such matters, if not upon others, to insinuate his notions, which, in these affairs, you know by your own experience, from the conversation we had together before you left England, are as wrong as possible.

I am apt also to think he makes use of the same person to improve all the ill offices to the Whigs, which both he and that person are as naturally inclined to, as the queen is to receive the impressions of them."

"Now this must needs do a great deal of mischief, and I am afraid we shall find the effects of it in the winter, if a timely remedy be not put to it, which I think cannot be done, but by you and me, speaking very plainly at the same time to Mrs. Morley, both of Mr. Harley and a great many things, and settling a rule for preventing, before it is too late, all the uneasiness for the future. But how this will be done in time I cannot see, unless your affairs on that side will allow of your being here some time before the meeting of the parliament; and to satisfy you of how great importance it is that you should be here before that time, is the chief reason of my giving you this trouble."

"*Windsor, Aug. 22.—Sept. 2.*—I have the favour of yours of the 22d and 25th, and am very sorry you have had so much bad weather: we have had our share of that, and therefore I hope you have yours of the fine weather we have here at this time.

"I have not yet heard of Lord Peterborough, though our letters from the Hague tell us he was to come over in the last packet boat; but whatever he shall say it cannot be relied on. He will be governed by his animosities or his interest. I cannot answer which of them will prevail."

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## CHAP. LXI.—FAILURES OF THE ALLIES.—1707.

THE rains having at length ceased, Marlborough quitted Soignies on the 1st of September, and, directing his march upon Ath, passed the Dender, with the view of turning the hostile position at Chievres. But the enemy, instead of awaiting his approach, fell back to the Scheldt, in order to avail themselves of the protection afforded by their great fortresses. The fatigues of this arduous march did not prevent the duke from transmitting the detail of his movements, nor from giving his opinion on the suggestions contained in the letter from Godolphin, dated August 15-26.

"*Ath, Sept. 1.*—You will know by the letters of this day, upon our marching hither, the enemy decamped in great haste, and I believe our march to-morrow will oblige them to pass the Scheldt. The deputies are convinced that if we had made the march to Genappe two months ago, when I pressed for it, the duke of Vendome would have been obliged to retire as he now does.

"I know nothing of the duke of Savoy's quitting the siege of Toulon

but what I am told by the duke of Vendome's trumpet, who says it was on the 22d. I believe this will naturally put a stop to the descent you intended; and if you have good reason for a descent, as yours of the 15th seems to think, it is most certain that early in the year, when they have the whole summer before them, is a much properer time.

"What Mr. Secretary Harley says in his letter concerning Lord Peterborough may be right; but I think as you do, that you must take no step in that matter but in conjunction with Lord Somers, Lord Halifax, and Lord Sunderland, and, if possible, with Lord Wharton also, or he will play you tricks. By what I have heard Lord Peterborough say, I believe he thinks he can justify himself in every particular; but I should think it is impossible to justify the application of the money; for whenever you have those accounts I believe you will find the greatest confusion imaginable, so that I think Mr. Bridges should make himself master of that account as soon as possible.

"Upon this ill news from Provence, I am already pressed by M. de Quiros that immediate orders might be given for sending troops to King Charles. Till I know what the duke of Savoy's and Prince Eugene's projects may be, by Mr. Palmes, who, I believe, might leave them as soon as they marched from Toulon, I shall not be able to give any answer. In the mean time I should be glad to know what your thoughts in England are as to that point. The enclosed from Count Wratislaw\* I received this morning; you will see it gives more reason for hopes than Mr. Robinson's letters."

Resuming his march on the 5th, Marlborough crossed the Scheldt above Oudenard, and encamped at Petteghem, from which place he thus announces his movements.

"*Sept. 5.*—Since my last we have made three marches in order to pass the Scheldt, which we have done this morning. We shall stay in this camp to-morrow, and the next day march to Helchin, by which we shall oblige the enemy to eat up their own country, which I am afraid is all the hurt we are likely to do them; for I am very confident they will be careful not to give occasion for action."

Advancing on the 7th along the tongue of land bounded by the Scheldt and the Lys, Marlborough established his left at Helchin, where he took up his head-quarters, and extended his right to Belleghem. This bold and decisive movement alarmed the enemy, and, as he had foreseen, they immediately crossed the Scheldt and withdrew to the strong post of Pont à Tressin, which was covered by a series of new lines, formed behind the Marque, and protected by the cannon of Lille.

\* Alluding to the successful progress of the negotiation with the king of Sweden.

During his continuance in the stationary camp at Helchin, Marlborough received the first intelligence of the unfortunate failure before Toulon, and the retreat of the combined forces into Piedmont.

To the success of this momentous enterprise, which had held all Europe in anxious suspense, the British ministry had confidently looked, as a compensation for the misfortune in Spain, and as the means of extorting from France a peace no less honourable than secure. Their exertions were commensurate with the magnitude of the object. The cares of Marlborough were long called forth in providing ample means of aggression; and no resource was omitted to stimulate the zeal of the two powers employed in the execution. But it was beyond human foresight to calculate on the effects of jarring interests and passions, or to devise expedients for combining contradictory elements in one uniform and consistent plan. By importunities, threats, and largesses, the concurrence of the courts of Vienna and Turin had indeed been extorted; but no efforts could soothe their jealousies or obviate their contentions. The first and most prominent obstacle arose from the suspicion fostered by the imperial court against that of England, and the fears they entertained, lest the destruction of the French marine in the Mediterranean would be the prelude to a separate peace between France and the maritime powers. Similar jealousies existed between the courts of Turin and Vienna, and the interest which the duke of Savoy appeared to manifest in the enterprise was a sufficient reason for the aversion with which it was regarded by the emperor. The rivalry which reigned in the cabinet extended its influence to the field, and created the same disunion between the duke of Savoy and Eugene, in their capacity of generals, as between the duke and the emperor, in their capacity of sovereigns. As early as June we find the duke of Savoy expressing his indignation at the obstacles and mortifications which he endured, and declaring, that were it not from respect for the queen of England, he would instantly quit the alliance. On the other hand, the imperial court were not sparing of their censures and insinuations. They expatiated on his selfish and encroaching policy, and ascribed his opposition to the enterprise against Naples to a secret wish of preserving that

crown for his son-in-law, the duke of Anjou. Eugene also not only re-echoed the accusations of his court, and incessantly dwelt on the danger and difficulties of the design in which he was unwillingly engaged; but treated the complaints of the duke of Savoy with regard to his want of authority, as proofs of an intention to avert from himself the blame of a failure, which he considered as inevitable.

The effects of these disputes were felt at every step of this ill-fated enterprise. In addition to the diminution of force, occasioned by the detachment for the invasion of Naples, no recruits appeared to fill up the vacancies in the Austrian ranks, and day after day was spent in combating objections and obviating delays. An enterprise commenced under such auspices afforded but a faint prospect of success.

The 25,000 auxiliaries in the pay of the maritime powers were united with the troops of Savoy and Austria, and a fleet of forty sail, under the command of Admiral Shovel, hovered on the coast to maintain the communications by sea, and to co-operate in the intended attack. It was not till towards the latter end of June that the army was in a condition to move, and after the necessary garrisons were drafted for the protection of Italy, the whole collective force did not exceed 35,000 men. They scaled the Col di Tende, forced the passage of the Var, and traversing the rugged country bordering the Mediterranean, reached the camp of La Vallette, in the vicinity of Toulon, on the 26th of July, the fleet at the same time appearing before the mouth of the harbour.

The garrison of Toulon scarcely exceeded 8000 men, the works were in ill condition, and the new defences, which had been projected to resist the peril of the moment, were yet incomplete. The troops, elated at the sight of the goal which appeared to bound their enterprise, anxiously expected the orders for an immediate assault, and such an effort would doubtless have been crowned with success. The expectation of all was raised to the highest pitch, when the two commanders ascended the heights, to survey the town and works, and the presence of the admiral indicated the ready co-operation of the fleet. But a sudden damp seized the spirits of the soldiery when orders were given, which announced the abandonment of an assault, and the preparations for

regular approaches. As the infantry did not exceed 23,000, it was obviously impossible to invest the town, and cut off the communication with the interior; but the confederate commanders were too far engaged to retreat with honour. Orders were issued to bring the heavy cannon from the fleet, and on the 30th of July General Rehbinder, with 3000 men, occupied the commanding heights of St. Catherine. But the time which had been wasted in deliberations and disputes, enabled the French court to mature their measures of resistance. Marshal Tessé, to whom the command in Provence was intrusted, was hourly joined by reinforcements from the most distant quarters, whose advance was facilitated by all the means which the country afforded; and the efforts of the government were seconded by the sacrifices and exertions of the nobility and people. Before the allies were prepared to commence a siege, he approached with twenty fresh battalions, and occupied an intrenched camp on the opposite side of the town, while a second force was collecting of troops drawn from Catalonia and Roussillon; and detachments from the Netherlands and the Rhine successively arrived to swell the numbers engaged in the defence. On the 18th of August, the force of the enemy amounted to no less than seventy battalions.

In these circumstances the enterprise became hopeless. After some successful attacks of posts, the allies were embarrassed by the want of supplies, and menaced by the force gathering around them. Having no alternative but to abandon their design, they relinquished their posts, re-embarked the cannon and stores, and on the 22d commenced their retreat. After a toilsome march of ten days they arrived at the Var, unmolested by the enemy; and on the 14th of September, again traversing the Col di Tende, reached the point from which they had commenced their expedition, with a force diminished to half the number. Eugene himself announced this disgraceful retreat to Marlborough in a style and tone which showed how little interest the imperial court had taken in the success of the enterprise.

*“La Valette, Aug. 20. — The siege of Toulon is every day more and more impossible, on account of the enemy's force and situation and the strength of their artillery. By the enclosed plan, your highness will see their camp flanked on the right by the town, with more than 130 pieces*

of artillery, exclusive of the fire from the two ships moved into the harbour, and on the left covered by inaccessible rocks, while the cannon-shot of the place reaches even to the mountains.

"They had originally 40\* battalions and a regiment of dragoons. They have been since reinforced by 72 or 73 battalions and about 40 squadrons, which threaten our flanks under Medavi. I know not from whence troops from all quarters daily join them. The contrary winds prevent our receiving any intelligence from the fleet and hinder the galliots and boats from advancing, although they have only a hundred paces to traverse; and although since the capture of Fort Louis they might have bombarded the harbour and town without risk. For three days we have bombarded the town by land with a few mortars. Marshal Tessé declares that the dukes of Burgundy and Berry are speedily expected, that the duke of Berwick will be here to-morrow, and that, by the 24th, their force will be increased to 164 battalions and a considerable corps of cavalry. It is certain that a reinforcement of foot is marching from Roussillon, under M. d'Arene. We are embarking the sick, wounded, and artillery, that we may march without encumbrance. Medavi threatens to occupy the posts in our rear; but I believe he will think twice before he risks an action. I have to-day concerted measures with the admiral, and we have agreed to finish our arrangements at the Var, with the hope that Brigadier Palmes will be there, and that I shall know your highness's intention, and what has been projected in England and Holland. This country needs a speedy remedy, and it is necessary that the allies should take just measures, without throwing the burden from one to the other. I hope also to receive news from Vienna; for, to form a project, one must be acquainted with every thing. If I could speak with your highness, it would perhaps be more advantageous for the public good, and I should have the pleasure of assuring you," &c. †

It is needless to make any farther comments on this unfortunate expedition; because the facts speak for themselves. The misunderstanding which had manifested itself between the two courts, and two commanders, in the course of the enterprise, broke forth with redoubled violence on its failure. Complaints and recriminations re-echoed on every side; and the result not only frustrated the sanguine hopes of Marlborough, but convinced him that the two courts could never be again brought to unite, for the attainment of a common object, nor the two generals be associated in any future command.

\* This estimate is exaggerated by Prihce Eugene to extenuate the failure; for we learn from the Prince of Hesse, that on their arrival before Toulon, this French force consisted of only twenty battalions, and that Tessé did not join with twenty more till three days after.

† Translated from the original in French.

The only fruit of a campaign which occasioned such sacrifices, and created such expectations, was the capture of Susa, which was reduced at the instigation of the duke of Savoy, who was anxious to close the avenues into Piedmont, and open a way into Dauphiné. After this exploit, in the beginning of October, the imperialists retired into Lombardy, the palatines marched to embark for Catalonia, and the Hessians took the route towards Germany. These movements sufficiently indicated the abandonment of offensive operations on the side of Italy.\*

The failure of this enterprise created equal alarm and embarrassment both in England and abroad. The whole attention of the British cabinet was employed to counteract the dangerous consequences which it was expected to produce; and under the first impulse of disappointment, we find several interesting letters from Godolphin, conveying suggestions for the plan of the ensuing campaign. From the experience of the preceding year, he argued that no effort could be expected from the Dutch and Germans; and pressed the necessity of maintaining the defensive in Italy, Germany, and even in the Netherlands, while the principal efforts were made in Spain, and on the coast of France. For this purpose, he proposed to collect troops from all quarters, particularly from the Venetians, and princes of the empire; and even urged that an attempt should be made to obtain subsidiary forces from the king of Sweden, whose army he conceived would become burdensome to his finances, in consequence of his accommodation with the emperor. Above all, he exhorted Marlborough to obtain from the court of Vienna considerable detachments from the army in Naples, and to send them with such succours as could be drawn from Italy, under the command of Eugene, to give a new impulse to the affairs of the allies in Spain. This measure, he contended, would be extremely popular in England, and consequently receive the cordial support of parliament; and he suggested every argument of gratitude or policy, which he conceived likely to weigh with the court of Vienna.

\* Letters from Mr. Chetwynd, the British envoy, to the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Sunderland; from the duke of Savoy, Prince Eugene, the prince of Hesse, General Rehender, and Count Wratislaw to the duke; and from the Journal of the Baron de St. Hippolite.

Collaterally with these suggestions, he recommended the speedy return of Marlborough to England, and desired him to solicit the mission of Zinzendorf or Wratislaw from Vienna, that he might arrange the projects for the ensuing campaign at the Hague, without prolonging his stay on the continent.\* His views were, however, turned to more practicable schemes; and his opinion on these and other subjects is sufficiently manifested in his letters, intermingled with reflections on the domestic policy of England.

*To the Duchess.*

*Helchin, Sept. 8.*—By the last post I was so tired, and received yours so late, that I had neither time nor force to answer it. I am sorry for what you write concerning my brother George. It is certain he is a very indiscreet Tory, and has so little judgment that he is capable of any indiscretion; but I am very sure he would not say or do any thing that he thought might prejudice the queen or her government. I am very glad to find by yours that the queen has it in her thoughts to give the white staff to the duke of Devonshire †; for I think him a very honest man, and that he will prove a very useful one."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

*Helchin, Sept. 8.*—Your two last letters of the 16th and 19th, by the post and Mr. Hare, I have received. By both I see you had not received the ill news from Toulon. What you write concerning the queen, Mr. Harley, and Mrs. Masham is of that consequence that I think no time should be lost in putting a stop to that management, or else to let them have it entirely in their own hands. I did mention this to you in a former letter, but have had no answer. I do not see any thing to the contrary but that the campaign in this country might be finished by the end of October; and I believe the elector of Hanover will be desirous to have a meeting for settling the operations of the next campaign. As yet I have heard nothing from himself, but his general here has told me that he believed it would be desired.

"The danger Mr. Stepney is in gives me a good deal of trouble, for I am afraid it will be very difficult to find a proper person to fill his place; for it must be one that is capable of the business of Flanders as well as that of Holland; but whilst there are any hopes of his life I beg nobody may be spoke to. If I knew any body proper for this station, I would take the liberty of naming him; but as I know none, I hope you will think of somebody that has dexterity and no pride. For if the queen be

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\* Letters from Lord Godolphin, July 28., August 8., July 31., August 7–18, and August 12–23.

† William Cavendish, first duke of Devonshire, who took so active a part in the Revolution, died on the 18th of August, 1707, and his place of lord high steward was given to his son, who inherited both his estates and patriotic principles.

not very well served in this country, she will quickly feel the ill effects; for not only the people in this country, but the Dutch also, must be pleased, which is a pretty hard task.

"The weather is so very fine that I have begged of Lady Marlborough to make a visit to Woodstock; and if your business will permit of it, I should be glad you would see it, though but for one day. If I could fly, I would be there; but my fate is to row in this galley. If I can ever be so happy as to be free, I shall then endeavour to end my days in quiet, which is much more longed for than I can express.

"I open my letter to send you the enclosed, which I have received this minute. Prince Eugene's letter should not be seen by any body but the queen."

The first of these enclosures was from Count Wratislaw, announcing the conclusion of the treaty with the king of Sweden, and attributing the success principally to the support of England and Holland. He launched also into bitter invectives against the duke of Savoy.

"Your highness," he concludes, "sees how the duke acts, and if our allies will let him go on, and will continue their confidence in him, to our exclusion, they will repent of it another day. You see also the sentiments of Prince Eugene, with regard to next year. By the first post I will send you a paper in cipher, and beg that some person of fidelity may be intrusted with deciphering it, for the secret is of much importance."

The letter from Prince Eugene was written to Count Wratislaw, during the siege of Toulon, and is interesting, because it displays the interminable misunderstanding with the duke of Savoy, and announces the failure which soon afterwards took place.

"*La Vallette, Aug. 4.*—\* \* \* \* I believe this will find you returned from your journey; I wish it happy. It is very cruel that conjunctures should oblige one to commit such meannesses, but there is no remedy. What you write to the Duke of Marlborough is just. With regard to myself, I will go wherever they wish me, if I have an army; and I declare that I will no longer be a subaltern, except to my masters, unless conjunctures should oblige me to pass the winter in this country, of which I am very doubtful.

"The duke of Savoy, with his usual policy, seeing the great difficulties, not to say impossibilities, of this operation, throws it entirely on me, in order not to disgust England and Holland, who press him extremely, without listening to any reason. He does it with the more cunning, because he praises me on my capacity, and says I can do what I will. He answers them on every thing that they must address themselves to me, that he is much inclined to this operation, that he knows the consequence of it, but that he can do nothing which I do not deem proper.

"They are all enraged with me, and think that I wish not to risk the troops. I answer clearly that I am accustomed to act according to the rules and reasons of war, every one knowing that I readily hazard when I have the least appearance of succeeding; and that, from complaisance for England, and for a little envoy\* who is here, I shall not advise a thing if I see it impossible; but that, if in spite of all, the allies and the duke will have it so, the troops of the emperor will not abandon them, and that I will omit nothing to succeed.

"This is the state in which we are. By the journal and my relation, you will see the detail. It is the most difficult operation I have seen in my life. We are working at batteries; we will see the effect of them before we decide on a bombardment or a siege, at least this is my sentiment.

"I do not doubt that strong detachments will arrive on all sides, the enemy having repassed the Rhine in Germany, being retired into quarters of refreshment in Spain, and the armies of Flanders inactive."

*The Duke of Marlborough to Lord Godolphin.*

"*Helchin, Sept. 12.*—I find by yours of the 22d, which I received last Friday, that you had not then received the ill news from Toulon. By the letter I have received from Mr. Secretary Harley, as well as by what you say of Lord Peterborough, I find that he had not been with the queen, nor any body in her service, which I wonder at; for he told me he would in the first place wait upon you and Lord Sunderland. He is very capable of pushing his animosities so far as to hurt himself and give a good deal of trouble to others, which were to be wished might have been avoided, especially this winter.

"What you say of the oaths of fidelity† is very reasonable; but by the pensioner's letters they are of another opinion, so that I believe they will not allow the oaths to be given. God knows what is best to be done in that matter; but I am afraid the business of the barrier, which is next to impossible to be settled, will occasion very great uneasiness between England and Holland. I can very easily keep it off till my return to the Hague, but then I must be instructed.

"Don Quiros and M. Sinzerling have been with me. I have wrote by Sinzerling to the elector palatine, to know what number of his troops, paid by England and Holland, he will consent should go for Spain. As soon as I have an answer you shall have it. I believe Holland will consent that those troops should be sent to Catalonia, and the truth is, we have no others that can go. By what we hear from France, they are sending back the duke of Berwick with the troops that came from Spain, and 4000 men more; and, as they say, orders for attacking Gerona.

"Now that the agreement is signed between the emperor and king

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\* Mr. Chetwynd, late secretary to Mr. Hill, the British envoy at Turin. After Mr. Hill's recall he remained a short time at that court as our minister. He was afterwards second Viscount Chetwynd.—Ed.

† Alluding to the oaths of fidelity which were proposed to be administered to the inhabitants of the conquered provinces.

of Sweden, I beg you will be careful of making any step with the Muscovite ambassador that may give offence to the Swedes; for should they return into the empire during the war, it would oblige us to make an ill peace with France.

"You will see by the copy of the letter I sent you by the last, of Prince Eugene, that he and the duke of Savoy cannot serve any more in the same army; and the elector of Hanover, being in possession of the command in the empire, I see no place where he can serve but in Spain, in which place I am afraid we cannot succeed. I long for the coming of Palmes, that I might know what the duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene intend for the remainder of this campaign, and their thoughts for the next. It is now very plain that the French, having no troops in Italy, enables them to be strong in all other places; so that we must think of strengthening the army on the Rhine and in this country, or the next year we shall be beaten in one, if not in both places. God knows how we shall be able to do this; but if we cannot, we shall run great hazard, notwithstanding the Catalan regiments which Lord Galway has raised, and which I hope your orders will put an end to.

"I could wish, for the queen's service and the good of the common cause, that you would do all that is in your power for the raising those regiments of foot which were taken at Almanza, by which you may have in the spring a body of foot to employ in a descent, if practicable. I should think the raising of these regiments very difficult, but that I am persuaded that the greatest part of the officers are at liberty or vacant. When you shall resolve to take this method I thall then press the States to do the same thing."

"*Helchin, Sept. 15.*— Since my last I have had the favour of your two letters of the 25th and 29th. I think your thoughts for the affairs of Spain, and retrieving our misfortune at Toulon by strengthening the army in Italy by the Venetians, if possible, are very right; but I am afraid you will find those people more backward. You will see by the enclosed, that the king of France promises the elector, that he shall have, the next campaign, an army strong enough for regaining Brabant.

"I am not concerned for what may happen here the next campaign, in comparison of the apprehensions I have for the queen's business this winter in England. If that goes well, I hope we may be able to struggle with the French in this country.

"I am sorry to see you are of opinion that Lord Galway will not care to go to Portugal; for there he might do service, and where he is, I think it is impossible.

"I think it might be for the queen's service and the public good, to endeavour to persuade the States to make an augmentation for carrying on the war with more vigour, or we shall never come to a good peace. Whatever you say to Vriberg, must at the same time be said at the Hague.

"The French intending this day to forage at Templeuve, I marched thither with 20,000 foot, and 5000 horse. Upon their having notice, they did not suffer their foragers nor escort to leave their camp; but suffered me to forage the whole country, though I was three leagues

from my own camp, and not a league from theirs; but they will venture nothing this year.

"You will see a letter I sent Lady Marlborough, which I received by the last post from Lord Peterborough. By that you will see that he intends to be in good temper; but I confess I cannot understand the meaning of his not waiting upon the queen, and that there is no notice taken of it. In my poor opinion, you should resolve to be pleased, or to be very angry."

"*Helchin*, Sept. 19. — The enclosed is a copy of a letter I have received from Count Wratislaw, and all in cipher. I am afraid his characters are very just. However, his project, in my opinion, is very dangerous at this time; but I have not, nor shall give any answer to it, till I hear from you.

"As to your desire of Prince Eugene's going to Spain, I think he can serve nowhere else; for I dare say he will not serve under the elector of Hanover, nor can he serve with the duke of Savoy. I shall incline to think, as Sir Edward Seymour said in the House of Commons, that he never knew admiral or general that had ships or troops enough.

"I am of opinion that the war will be decided in this country by a battle early in the next campaign, for they see that no success in any other part of the world can get them peace; so that I am persuaded they will have a very great struggle here at the opening of the field. However, I shall endeavour to govern myself agreeably to what you think will please in England. If you have any particular place in which you think great service might be done by a descent, that ought to be known to none but England and Holland, and I think might very easily be accommodated with the service of this country, for a descent can't be put in practice till the beginning of July, and before that time I dare say we shall have decided the business here; for if we have not a battle before that time we may ship the troops to Ostend, which will not give so much notice to France as if they were shipped from England."

The letter from Count Wratislaw, which accompanied the preceding, conveyed an additional proof of the perverse-ness of the imperial court, in continuing their endeavours to alienate the maritime powers from the duke of Savoy.

"The last post I gave your highness notice of my arrival at Vienna, and that the ratification of the treaty was in the hands of the king of Sweden; so that I flatter myself his army will pass thro' Silesia without stopping, altho' his march, in consequence of the excesses which the officers encourage the soldiers to commit, will cost us immense sums, and will diminish our finances to such a degree, as to shackle the efforts of the ensuing campaign.

"Your highness may be persuaded that this court will faithfully execute the treaty recently concluded. Nevertheless, we cannot flatter ourselves that Sweden will leave us in repose; and I beg leave to recal to your recollection, what I had the honour of representing to you in my last letter from Leipsic, of the 3d of August, being always of opinion,

that we ought to arm Denmark during the winter, that we may be able to dispose of her troops in the spring as we think best. The maritime powers ought not to spare some hundred thousand crowns, which will be well expended, if we should be delivered from the embarrassing apprehensions, which have so much disquieted us during this campaign.

"I conjure you then to finish the treaty before you return to England, for which the States seem well inclined; and the English ministers will be responsible to the public, should they continue to persuade themselves of the good dispositions of the king of Sweden towards the common cause.

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"The retreat of our army from Toulon justifies the court of Vienna, and proves it to have been more correct in its predictions than that of England, which was so urgent for the invasion of Provence, an enterprise shown by experience to have been impracticable. I have long entreated your highness that such approbation and facility should not have been given in England to the projects of the duke of Savoy. What is past sufficiently shows his intentions. You see, at present, that all his views are directed to create misunderstandings between the court of Vienna and the maritime powers, in order to render himself master of your opinions, and ruin the credit of the emperor. He insinuates, through the means of Lord Peterborough and others, that it is the interest of the maritime powers to procure for him the Milanese, for the purpose of establishing a third power in Italy, which being more attentive to economy than to the house of Austria, would prove a balance to France in that quarter. This poison, however subtle and insinuating, is too apparent to deceive persons so enlightened as you, and who reflect on the conduct of the duke of Savoy in all times. For doubtless, he will make the same insinuations to France, under the pretext of limiting the power of the house of Austria, and thus render the interests of both parties subservient to his own views, which are only for his own aggrandisement. Whatsoever may be said to the contrary, you will never have an ally more sure and more necessary than the house of Austria; while the duke of Savoy, whatever accession of power he may obtain, will always be a mercenary, and will never act against France, except under new and advantageous conditions. Whereas, if he is retained in a situation less considerable than that to which he aspires, he will always be necessitated to join the allies, or see his territory become the theatre of war. I do not affirm that we ought not to conciliate the duke of Savoy, and must grant what we have promised; but, at the same time, distrust his personal conduct and advice, and not be the dupes of his suggestions, as we have been this year. Far from placing the same confidence in him as we have lately done, we ought to place our confidence in each other, and mutually communicate what insinuations may be made on his part."

After expatiating on the necessity of forming a plan for the next campaign, he hints at the conquest of Sicily, and adds, that it should be promptly undertaken, lest France should have time to repair its shattered marine, and render

the enterprise more difficult. The English fleet, he observes, might winter, either at Palermo or Messina, and thus at once cover Naples, and deliver Barcelona from the danger of a siege, as well as open the Mediterranean for the passage of succours to Spain. He complained that this design had not been sufficiently promoted in England; that no attention had been paid to form a regular plan for conducting the military operations in Spain, or for sending immediate succours; and that even no answer had been given to their proposals, except that nothing could be settled, till the result of the expedition against Toulon was known. And as the news of its ill success had not then reached England, and the fleet had returned to Lisbon, there could, he urged, be no time for subsidiary treaties with the German princes, and no troops could be despatched to Spain.

"I have long," he adds, "declared that the emperor is incapable of sending his troops into Spain, and defraying the expenses of the war; for how can it be supposed possible that his imperial majesty can do so, when the rebels ravage on one side his hereditary countries, and the Swedes ruin Silesia? It is quite chimerical to dictate to us terms of peace with the rebels, which can never be carried into effect; for experience evidently proves that Ragotski has rejected all conditions, even the most advantageous, which were proposed to him last year; and I entreat you, prince, to consider this as a certain truth, and not suffer yourself to be amused on that subject by any person whatever.

"In the present state of our affairs we cannot cede Transylvania to him, without placing ourselves in a much worse situation, since the loss of Transylvania will inevitably draw us into a war with the Turks, and without that cession Ragotski will never enter into an accommodation.

"To prove, however, the anxiety of the emperor to assist his brother, he is willing to exceed his powers, and has ordered Prince Eugene to send to Barcelona 2000 foot and 1000 horse, provided Admiral Shovel will engage for the expense of the transport, and the maritime powers will provide for their future subsistence. In a word, this is all which the allies have a right to expect from the court of Vienna, for the assistance of Spain. For we are not in a situation to charge ourselves with more expenses; and the business of Sweden, besides a thousand reasons, will not permit us to spare more of our own troops."

After touching on the difficulties in regard to the appointment of a commander for the imperial troops in Spain, the inactivity of the Low Countries, and the progress which the French had made on the Rhine, he continues, "These considerations induce me to apprehend that the parliament will be more agitated than ever, and that our enemies in England

will use their best efforts to gain the superiority to our detriment. It is, therefore, more than ever necessary, in so alarming a crisis, that the conduct of both sides should be extremely prudent. On our part, we must not impute the ill success of this campaign to the counsels of the English ministry, in order not to discredit them with the nation; while on your part you ought not to render us odious to a people, from whom we must draw the means of continuing the war."

He concluded with proposing that Prince Eugene, or some other minister from the court of Vienna, should have a personal interview with Marlborough, to arrange the plan of future operations.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Windsor, Sept. 9. — I am very much afraid the miscarriage of Toulon is owing to the little good understanding betwixt those two princes, or rather, in truth, betwixt the imperial court and the duke of Savoy; for which reason I think little or nothing can be hoped from them in this year, nor I doubt in the next neither, unless measures are taken this winter, to remove and cure the jealousies between the emperor and the duke of Savoy. This makes me repeat once more to you the necessity of Count Wratislaw's meeting you at the Hague, at the end of the campaign, that both this thing, which is extremely essential, and also Prince Eugene's going into Spain, may be there concerted and settled. The latter of these will be a very popular thing in England, and very much contribute to obtain the necessary subsidies in parliament.

"I am the more particular upon what relates to Spain and Italy, because those places being most remote, the necessary measures for carrying on the war there ought to be adjusted, in the first place; because else there will want time to put them in execution. Spain cannot be supported this winter without Prince Eugene and some troops from Italy; and Italy cannot be made useful next year to the common cause, but by putting the duke of Savoy at the head of an army to act offensively against France, and by giving him the view and assurance of it immediately."

After proposing to procure from the king of Sweden a body of troops to serve under the elector of Hanover, he adds,

"As to Flanders, I am sorry to find you think there will be a necessity of augmenting that army. I doubt it will prove no small difficulty here to keep it upon the foot it now stands, considering how little fruit the Dutch have suffered it to yield us this summer. Nor how they are like to be persuaded to any augmentation on their part, can I see much ground to hope. What you say of their aversion to let King Charles's own subjects take the oath of fidelity to their sovereign, and of their renewing at this time their instances about settling their barrier, seem to

me as if they sought rather for a handle to be cross than really to join heartily with us in prosecuting the war. If they had, as they have not, any just pretension to the sovereignty of any part of Flanders hereafter, upon a peace, the taking the oath of fidelity to King Charles in the mean time, till such stipulation be made, does not interfere with that pretension; and as to their barrier, I continue of opinion that England never will nor can, admit that Ostend should be in their possession, but in the possession of King Charles. That being granted, I think we might agree with them in the other desires they make as to their barrier, provided they will agree with us in an augmentation of their forces and a vigorous prosecution of the war the next year. But for all these things poor Mr. Stepney will be extremely much wanted, for his condition is thought desperate by most people here; and if it were possible for him to recover, it would be impossible for him to assist in these things, which come to bear immediately and will continue all this winter to require a man in that station of the best sense and integrity. If you can spare Cadoogan till spring, I believe he is the most sufficient for this service. But you are the best judge of the whole, as well as of this particular.

"I doubt the season is too far spent for you to think of any siege, otherwise Ypres or Nieuport would open a way to Dunkirk next year, and, consequently, give a pleasing prospect to our people.

"By our letters from Lisbon of the 3d, I find they will expect more regiments from us for the defence of their frontier, or take a handle from the want of them to make up with France and Spain. I think, therefore we must send them two or three regiments more by this convoy.

"By the next post the queen tells me she will give me an answer to your letter."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Helchin, Sept. 22.* — The winds have been so contrary that I believe this may come at the same time with what I wrote by Mr. Hill. Since that, I have received the enclosed letters concerning the march of the palatines for Catalonia. I have sent copies of them also to the pensioner, desiring him to lose no time in returning an answer, and that I should take upon me, in the queen's name, so that the troops might be immediately sent; but I fear the States will not willingly promise what is desired by the elector.

"I have not yet seen Brigadier Palmes, but expect him daily. I hope he will bring Prince Eugene's consent to serve in Spain, since you say it is what is desired in England. If there be need of it, I shall be sure to press him. Besides, as the commands are now settled, he can serve nowhere but in Spain or Hungary.

"The king of Sweden will certainly not come into the grand alliance, since that would put him out of all hopes of his mediatorship, with which we must continue to flatter him. For the troops of King Augustus, it is just that they should be entertained by the emperor and empire, but I fear they are not able to comply with the expense; however, they ought to be pressed by England and Holland.

"It were to be wished that we could please the Portuguese, without sending any more troops, since they must be useless."

## CHAP. LXII.—DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.—1707.

WHILE the perplexing state of affairs abroad, and the embarrassments arising from the failure of the enterprise against Toulon, called forth all the exertions of Marlborough, he experienced additional disquietude from the continued feuds in the cabinet, and the increasing jealousy of the Whigs. He was now fully sensible of the secret cabals of Harley and Mrs. Masham, and their rapid advances in the favour of the queen; but he was convinced that the influence of Harley was too powerful to be eradicated, and either from the remains of former confidence, or from a reliance on his asseverations, he still flattered himself that he might venture to employ, as heretofore, his interest and services.

This apparent indecision, and the inflexible determination of the queen to persevere in the appointment of the two bishops, inflamed the resentment of the Whigs; and they recurred, as before, to threats of a separation of interests, and parliamentary hostility. Their determination was announced by Lord Sunderland, in a letter, which is now lost, but of which the substance may be collected from the reply of the duke.

*To Lord Sunderland.*

"Meldert, July 27.-Aug. 7. — I had not by the last post time to acknowledge the favour of yours of the 8th. As to the affairs of the church, I have done what in me is, so God's will be done. I am very much obliged to you for your friendly and sincere manner of letting me know what must happen next winter, if the queen is not governed by her friends in the matter of the bishops. I do with all my heart wish every thing may be as you desire, for the sake of the queen and England; but I am very sensible there is no content except in a quiet life.

"The enclosed is from Sir Cloudesley Shovel, which will give you an account of the duke of Savoy's passing the Var. I have sent lord treasurer a copy of my letter to Prince Eugene, by which you will see they intend the siege of Toulon as the first place, which is certainly right; for the other sieges would have lost time. If this expedition succeeds, we may live to see happy days, or, as the Dutch are so weary of war, we must have an ill peace. The business of Hungary is as wrong as possible; but I cannot but hope the king of Sweden will at last do well, for he is certainly no friend to France. May you and yours be happy, is the hearty wish and prayer of," &c.

The perplexity which these threats created, and the disappointment which Marlborough himself felt, in the failure of his efforts to vanquish the opposition of the queen, may be traced in the subsequent letters.

*To the Duchess.*

"July 27. — I have a letter from lord Sunderland, in which he lets me see the ill consequences that must happen, if the queen cannot be prevailed with in the affairs of the church. It is pretty hard to me to give him an honest answer, since it would lay too great a weight upon the queen. If other things go well, that will be done as they wish; but I am rather despairing than otherwise. I have done what I can, and let what will happen, I hope to have nothing to reproach myself with, and then God's will be done."

*From Lord Sunderland.*

"Whitehall, Aug. 5-16. — I give you many thanks for your kind letter of the 27th of July, and assure you what I wrote to you last, concerning the affair of the church, was sincerely meant for the service of the queen, your grace, and lord treasurer. I will only say one thing more on this occasion; that there are so many uneasy things preparing by the common enemy against next sessions, and by the management of the court, so little confidence between them and the only people that either will or can support them, that I own I have terrible apprehensions of the consequences.

"I can't help taking notice, upon this occasion, of the letter from Hanover\*, which you sent enclosed to the lord treasurer. That letter does really set that matter in so true a light, that one would be astonished at the blindness of the queen, or any about her, considering how much they apprehend that foolish thing. But really if the queen does go on a little longer in the way she is at present, mankind will be quite uneasy, and will think of Sir Miles Wharton's old saying, "not to anger two courts at once." I only mention these things, as what are sincerely my apprehensions, but hope you and lord treasurer will be able to prevent the mischief which seems hanging over us all.

"I am very well pleased with the resolution of the States, which you sent to the lord treasurer, for I think it leaves it entirely in the power of the deputies; and the march your grace has lately made shows it is so.

"I send enclosed a letter, writ by lord treasurer's direction, to Lord Galway. I think it essentially agrees with your thoughts of that matter; and, indeed, as Lord Rivers has ordered it, it is impossible the poor man should venture there with any satisfaction to himself, or so as to be of any use.

"I am very much afraid of the king of Sweden, by the accounts the last letters give us, though one can hardly bring oneself to think he is in measures with France."

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\* Alluding to the invitation.

*To Lord Sunderland, in reply.*

"*Soignies, Aug. 22.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 5th, and am sorry for the apprehensions you have for the next winter. As for myself, I have done what I can at this distance. I do not say this to make my court, for really I am weary of struggling, but to do myself justice to you; for I writ\* the very next post after I received yours, and sent the copy of my letter to my lord treasurer; but I am as yet ignorant of the effect it has had. I think what you say as to Lord Galway is so very right, that I hope he will approve of it, for his own sake and that of the public. I intended to have stayed but one night in this camp, but the continual rains are such, that God knows when I shall be able to march."

*From Lord Sunderland.*

"*Althorpe, Aug. 30.—Sept. 10.* — I have the honour of yours of the 22d, since which we have the melancholy news of our disappointment at Toulon. The greatest apprehension I have from it is, the effect it may have upon Holland; that makes it the more necessary for England to show a spirit upon this occasion, if there should be that humour amongst them in Holland. For I am confident that people will be of the side of England in this, whenever they are spoken plainly to, notwithstanding Buys and his friends, who I take to be the Harley of Holland.

"I should be very sorry your grace should be weary of struggling, as you say you are; but if so, what must the Whigs be, at least of struggling upon the foot they have hitherto done?"

*Reply of the Duke.*

"*Helchin, Sept. 19.* — I received yesterday the favour of yours of the 30th of the last month, from Althorpe. I agree entirely with you, that the success the French have had, is very discouraging; and if care be not taken, in the manner you mention, the consequences may be dangerous with Holland; for I have received very desponding letters from those parts. Either we were in the wrong in the beginning of the war, or we have reason to continue it with vigour, or content ourselves with losing our liberties; for the French are very insolent in success, notwithstanding their great desire of peace. If the allies continue firm this winter, I am of opinion the enemy will, at the entrance of the next campaign, venture a battle in this country, since they see that success in any other part of the world cannot give them peace.

"You may be sure that I long extremely for quietness; but, at the same time, I am very sensible that during this war I must continue in the galley. My greatest uneasiness is, what I hear from England; and my concern for the lord treasurer is such, that, as a friend, I could wish he would take the resolution of retiring; for, by the letters I receive, he will unavoidably be mortified, and consequently, not be able to serve England with the success he has done hitherto. I do, with all my heart,

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\* To the Queen.

wish England prosperity ; but if that cannot be, it would be some ease that it was not in the hands of lord treasurer. If you are of my opinion, I shall ever acknowledge it as a mark of your kindness to me, if you advise him to make this step ; for I am much more concerned for him than for myself."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

" *Soignies, Aug. 29.* — I am a good deal concerned at a letter I received by the last post from Lady Marlborough, in which she tells me that Mr. Harley has the entire confidence of the queen. If she has good reason for this opinion, I can't but think there should be no time lost in speaking plainly to her majesty, in letting her know what you and I think is her interest. If she be of another opinion, I think you and I should honestly let her know, that we shall not be able to carry her business on with success ; so that she might have time to take her measures with such as will be able to serve her. I shall always be ready to sacrifice myself for the prosperity of the queen ; but I will not be thought to have credit, when her business is managed in a way which, in my opinion, must be her ruin. I beg you will let me know your thoughts on this matter, and what you think may be proper to be done ; for though I am weary of all sorts of business, I know her meaning is so sincerely honest, that I would undergo any trouble or hazard, that you think may do good. On the other side, if I can't do good, nothing can make me so happy as a quiet life."

By the reply of Godolphin, we find that this letter was shown to the queen, and instead of producing the expected effect, drew from her a justification of her conduct, and a vehement exculpation of Harley, in the same manner as she had exculpated Mrs. Masham to the duchess.

" *Windsor, Aug. 25.—Sept. 5.* — I have the favour of yours of the 29th, with the papers enclosed. I keep them all by me, and if at any time you want any of the papers you send me, I can readily find them.

" Though I have written fully to you by Mr. Hare about the queen, and though I am not very willing at any time to say much upon that subject by the post, yet desiring in yours of the 29th to know my thoughts upon what Lady Marlborough had written to you, I am under a necessity of endeavouring to make you comprehend as well as I can, that both Mr. Montgomery and Mrs. Freeman have thought it best to read to Mrs. Morley your last letter to me, all except one word, which was the name of a person not fit to be mentioned. They did very well foresee this would certainly have the consequence of making yet more uneasiness in Mrs. Morley towards Mrs. Freeman, but did hope it might be of so much use another way as to overbalance that. Whether their thoughts will prove right in the latter of these, I cannot tell ; but in the former, I am very sure they have not been mistaken, and I believe you will soon be of the same mind in that matter, by a letter I am told you will have from the queen as soon as this. And I cannot but think it is of so much consequence, that the queen should not be countenanced and encouraged

in complaints of Lady Marlborough, that you will take great care, in your answer, of that particular. I will only add, that when you write yourself any thing to me, which you would not have the queen know, it ought to be in a letter apart. I am so much distracted with doubt and apprehensions concerning Toulon, that I cannot say any thing to the purpose, about that matter, or the consequences of it. But as the wind is, I believe we shall have another post to-morrow.

"I have not seen Lord Peterborough, nor has he yet waited upon the queen. In my Lord Sunderland's absence, he made his application to Mr. Secretary Harley, who is rather worse disposed towards him, if possible, than his colleague. Several letters and answers have passed between them, which all tend, I think, rather to increase the misunderstandings, than to lessen them. He has sent me your letter, with his answer to some objections he states in it. I must own I think his answers to those objections, stated by himself, are frivolous enough. I believe I shall see him to-morrow or next day at Quainton Place, where I am told he is to be."

*From the Queen to the Duke.*

"I had the satisfaction of receiving yours of the 25th last Wednesday, for which I give you many thanks, and for your kindness in telling me your mind so freely; and I beg you would continue to do so upon all occasions. But as to what you say, that I must put my business into Mr. Harley's hands, or follow the lord treasurer's measures, I should be glad you would explain yourself a little more on that. For I know no measures the lord treasurer has, but what were laid down when you were here, and I do not know I have broken any of them; for I cannot think my having nominated Sir William Dawes and Dr. Blackhall to be bishops is any breach, they being worthy men; and all the clamour that is raised against them proceeds only from the malice of the Whigs, which you would see very plainly, if you were here. I know this is otherwise represented to you, and I believe you have been told, as I have, that these two persons were recommended to me by Mr. Harley, which is so far from being true, that he knew nothing of it, till it was the talk of the town: I do assure you these men were my own choice. They are certainly very fit for the station I design them; and, indeed, I think myself obliged to fill the bishop's bench with those that will be a credit to it, and to the church, and not always to take the recommendations of 29\*, who, all the world knows, is governed by 26†; and now that I have said all this, in answer to yours of the 25th, I must give some answer to a long letter the lord treasurer read to me, which he received by the last post from you. In that I find Lady Marlborough has said, that I had an entire confidence in Mr. Harley. I know so much of my own inclination, that I am sure I have a very good opinion of Mr. Harley, and will never change it without I see cause; but I wonder how Lady Marlborough could say such a thing, when she has been so often assured from

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\* Probably the archbishop of Canterbury.

† The Junta, or one of the Whig chiefs.

me, that I relied entirely on none but Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery. You seem much concerned at this thing that Lady Marlborough said, and upon that, tell the lord treasurer that Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery should tell their miuds freely to me. It is what I desire of all things, for I can't see any other measures to be taken, than what have been already laid down; and I am sure I have no thoughts of altering them. I can think but of one thing to be added, which is, a resolution to encourage all those, who have not been in opposition, that will concur in my service, whether they be Whigs or Tories, which is a thing I wish might be put in practice, believing it might do a great deal of good, and I am sure it is not for my service to disoblige any body.

"I cannot end this without begging you will once more be so kind as to tell me your mind freely in every thing. I will desire the same favour of Mr. Montgomery, and when I know both your thoughts, I will give you my poor opinion. In the mean time continue your justice to me, and be assured I will be to my last moment, most sincerely your humble servant."

The appeal of the queen produced a reply from Marlborough, in a tone of more than usual earnestness, corroborating his former sentiments.

"Madam,

"Sept. 15

"I have had the honour of your majesty's of the 25th of the last month, by which I find mine of the 29th to lord treasurer was read to you. I beg the justice of you to believe, that I am no ways concerned for the power that the Whigs may have with you, but the great concern that I must always have for your quiet and safety; for if you are served to your satisfaction and security, I am very indifferent who the persons are. And as you desire that I would speak freely, I do protest in the presence of God Almighty, that I am persuaded that if you continue in the mind that I think you now are, and will not suffer those that have the honour to serve you, to manage your affairs agreeably to the circumstances of the times, your business must inevitably run into confusion; and, consequently, make it impossible for my lord treasurer to serve; for if he is thought to have the power, when he has not, both parties will be angry with him; though both would admire him and be his friends if he were out of the service. If I were with your majesty, I believe I could let you see the trouble and distraction you are like to be in this winter, which you must prevent before the meeting of parliament, or it will be too late.

"I find the duke of Savoy, Prince Eugene, the elector of Hanover, and the emperor, are all desirous that you would be pleased to allow me to continue so long on this side the water, as might be necessary for concerting the operations of the next campaign. This will make it impossible for me to be in England before the meeting of the parliament; and should I come at this time, it might create jealousies on this side the water. But as I prefer your quiet and service above all other considerations, if your majesty thinks my being with you, for one day or two, may

be of any use, I am ready to obey. If I come in a yacht, one man of war should be ordered to Ostend, and not be told what it is for; for I would endeavour to be back with the army before the French should know I am gone for England. What I now propose will make so much noise, that I beg you will be pleased to advise with my lord treasurer, before you send me your commands.

"It is impossible for me to finish this letter without assuring your majesty of what I know of Lady Marlborough, that nobody could serve you with more zeal and true affection than she has done for many years; and I must do her judgment that right, as to say, that she has foreseen some things which I thought would never have happened; I mean concerning the behaviour of some in your service.\* I pray God to direct you in all things for your own good, and that of all Europe, that your own affairs may prosper and be glorious, as they have been for some years, and I shall then enjoy all the happiness and quiet that this world can give me."

The subsequent letters refer to the same subject, and are filled with complaints on the unpleasant situation of the two ministers; being without influence with the sovereign, and yet exposed to the jealousy of those whom they were labouring to serve.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Sept. 15. — I enclose a copy of my letter to the queen, and I leave it to your discretion to deliver it or burn it; and I think I am obliged, let the consequence be never so fatal to the friendship and love I have for you, to tell you my opinion freely, that if the Whigs continue in that unreasonable humour of being angry with you, whenever the queen does not do what they like†; for the truth is, they are jealous that you and I have inclination to try once more the Tories. You and I know how false this is. However, if the queen will be governed by Mr. Harley, they will have just reason given them to be angry; and if you and I continue in business, all England will believe what is done is by our advice, which will give power to the Whigs to mortify whom they please; so that I think you must speak very freely to the Whigs and the queen, and if they will not approve your measures, have nothing to do with either; and if we were well out of this war we should then be happy."

*To the Duchess.*

"Helchin, Sept. 15. — I have received yours of the 25th and 26th of the last month, and by the enclosed letter you sent of the queen's, I am afraid that nothing can go well this winter. I am confirmed in this thought, by what Lady Sunderland writes, as from her lord. I will make no reflections, but I own to you that I think the expressions are very hard, when I consider what pains lord treasurer and I take.

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\* Alluding to Mrs. Masham.

† Something omitted in the original, though the sense may be supplied from the context.

"I have sent a letter to lord treasurer for the queen, and a copy of my letter, and have left it to his discretion of burning or delivering it. For my own part, I am out of heart, and wonder at the courage of lord treasurer; for were I used, as I do not doubt but I shall, as he is by the Whigs, who threaten to abandon him, whenever the queen displeases, I would not continue in business for all this world could give me; and I believe they would be the first that would have reason to repent. I do not send you a copy of my letter, being sure lord treasurer will show it you. I did desire your opinion as to his quitting, but you have never made me any answer; for, as I would serve the queen with the hazard of my life, so my friendship to him obliges me to wish that he would venture nothing, since every body pretends to be angry.

"I send you back Lady Sunderland's letter, that you may read it once more; for I think it is plain they believe that lord treasurer and I have a mind to bring in the Tories, which is *very obliging*."

"*Helchin, Sept. 19.* — I have received yours of the 30th and 2d. I have received no letter from 267\* since that you sent me; and you may be sure I shall never mention Mrs. Masham either in letter or discourse. I am so weary of all this sort of management, that I think it is the greatest folly in the world to think any struggling can do good, when both sides have a mind to be angry. When I say this, I know I must go on in the command I have here, as long as the war lasts, but I would have nothing to do any where else; for really what I hear from England gives me great disturbance, and sometimes vexes me so that I am not the same man. If you, the lord treasurer, and I, were out of business, I should be more capable of doing my duty here.

"I find by some of your letters that you think I may have credit with the queen; but I do assure you I have not, and I will give you one instance, — that Smalridge has been able to hinder the disposing of the professorship. I see this, but that must not alter my doing the best service I can; I would be esteemed, but I am not ambitious of having power."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Windsor, Sept. 12-21.* — My last acknowledged the favour of yours of the 12th and 15th from Helchin, and there is now but one post due this day, and we shall not have that before these letters go.

"I believe you will have an answer by this post from the queen: whether it will be enclosed in this I cannot tell. By a long conversation between Mrs. Morley and Mr. Montgomery, of which I have had some account, I find they both agree that for you and England to see one † another before the natural time, might be liable to many great inconveniences; and those, in the nature of them so uncertain, that no human precaution is sufficient to prevent the ill consequences that may happen from those uncertainties. Besides that, to say the plain truth, in case one should run that venture, one cannot at this time depend upon the

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\* Probably the queen.

† These expressions are used to conceal the cipher.

fruit of it with any certainty, I having lately spoken very fully upon all those subjects, of which Mrs. Freeman's head and heart seem to be so full. And though there has yet appeared but very little encouragement to think the arguments used upon that occasion are like to prevail, yet one may conclude in this case, as the Scripture does, in the very words of our Saviour, '*If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.*' Mr. Hare can explain this sentence to you, if there be need of it.

"I have troubled you so much in my three or four last letters upon the subject of our affairs abroad, that I shall not repeat any thing, but that it seems indispensable to have a congress of the ministers of all the allies, at your return to the Hague, for a thorough concert of all that is to be done next year. The time will not allow you to give yourself the trouble of going to the elector of Hanover, or any body else. The sooner this concert can be made the better; for we shall never be able to get our parliament to enter upon the particulars of the war, next year, till we are able to communicate some scheme for it, from abroad, which will be encouraging and agreeable to them. I am very sensible that in other years the encouragement to our allies has often proceeded from their votes, in the first week of the parliament; but our misfortunes and disappointments in this year will make that very difficult at present, even though we could obtain those things to be done, which are necessary to put them in good humour."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* — Tho' I have wrote a long letter this day by the post, I would not lose this safe opportunity by Mr. Lumley. I am so extremely concerned for the quiet and safety of lord treasurer that I can't be at ease till I know what resolution he has taken. If he stays in this place, and does not entirely govern the queen, he will be duped by Mr. Harley; and if he does, what is certainly best for himself, quit, he will do great hurt both to the business at home and abroad. However, there is nothing else left to make the queen sensible of the danger she is running into; and if that will not do, we must leave it to Providence. I do with all my heart pity the queen, being very sure she does not know the fatal step she is going to make."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 12th; I have also received the letter you mentioned from the queen. I am sure Lady Marlborough must have acquainted you with it. You being on the place must judge infinitely better than I can; but by what I hear from England I think every thing must go ill, and therefore I continue of the opinion, that unless the queen will be pleased to be guided by you, or that Lord Somers, Halifax, and Sunderland will make it their business to persuade you to have patience some time longer: if neither of these two things happen, I hope you will take such measures that it may appear very plainly to England that you do not approve of the measures now taken. The words in your letter I think I understand, so that I shall not speak to Dr. Hare; but since one from the dead can't gain belief,

pray be careful of the living, for I am convinced that the queen will not be guided till she see that the advice she now follows has brought her affairs into confusion. Nothing shall dishearten me from endeavouring to do all the good I can here abroad. Our prospect is by no means good; but I think in the beginning of the next week to go for two days to the Hague, in order to hearten and take measures with them, so that I might not be obliged to stay long at the Hague when the campaign is done, tho' I am persuaded my being in England this winter will be of very little use to the public. But I shall have the satisfaction of being with you and Lady Marlborough notwithstanding."

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* — The uneasiness of the Whigs, and the obstinacy of the queen, must unavoidably give an opportunity to the Tories of showing their malice. I am a good deal concerned for the mischief this must do, both at home and abroad; but I am satisfied it will be impossible for you and me to influence the queen to any thing that is right, till she has tried this scheme of Mr. Secretary Harley and his friends. What it is, God knows, but that there is one I am sure. If there is any thing in the world can hinder her from running this hazard, it must be her knowing you will quit. For myself, I would not, for any thing this world could give me, act otherwise than to show that I have no concern left but the wishing you may do right. If you stay in your place, though you are no ways consenting, yet all that shall be amiss you must be answerable for; and on the other side, I am very sensible that if you do quit, the business both at home and abroad must very much suffer. For whatever the queen and these new schemers may think, the allies will expect nothing good from England, when they shall see that you and I have lost our credit, after having served with so great success. I hope your answer to this will let me know your positive resolution, so that I might govern myself; for whilst you are in I shall send my opinion."

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#### CHAP. LXIII. — CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN. — 1707.

As the campaign was now drawing to a close, and as both the queen and treasurer disapproved Marlborough's temporary journey to England, it became necessary to accelerate the arrangements for the ensuing year, that his departure from the continent might not be retarded.

For this purpose he first visited the Hague to confer with the ministers of the States; and, after a short stay at the camp on his return, repaired to Frankfort to settle the necessary plans with the elector of Hanover and with Count Wratislaw, who was deputed thither on the part of the emperor.

During this interval his correspondence displays the same character, and the domestic broils occupied more of his attention than the foreign transactions.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Helchin, Oct. 3.* — I shall go to-morrow towards the Hague, where I intend to stay but two days at most, being resolved to return to this camp. I have thought, as well as I can, how to leave the business of this country, at my return to England, and I think it must be to Cado-gan; so that if the queen pleases I shall acquaint the States-general, and the council of state of this country, that in the absence of Mr. Stepney, he is charged with the care of her majesty's business. My journey this time to the Hague will not only enable me to take measures for the operations on the Rhine, for the next campaign, but also make my stay much shorter at the end of the campaign.

"You will have known by the last letters from France that the king has given orders, as they write, for an augmentation of 30 regiments of foot and 20 of horse. This, added to the superiority they had the last campaign in Germany, Flanders, and Spain, as also the advantage they probably will have of having some of their troops from Spain, must give a very melancholy prospect for the next year's service, if we are not willing and able to make a considerable augmentation. I shall endeavour to make them sensible of this at the Hague, though I am aware their expense is already so great, that, tho' they should have the will, I fear they have not the power. You shall be sure to know by the next post from the Hague in what humour I find them; and if there should be a necessity of my going to Frankfort, I shall do it, so as not to delay my coming for England; for if I do go I will return to this army before they separate, so that I desire the yachts may be in Holland by the end of October, old style."

Marlbrough, leaving Helchin on the 4th of October, reached the Hague at nine in the morning, on the 6th, and without a moment's delay visited the pensionary and secretary to the council of state, with whom he deliberated on the objects of his journey. In the afternoon he held a conference with the deputies of the States, and communicated the orders which he had received from the queen, to repair to Frankfort, for the purpose of settling, with the elector of Hanover and Count Wratislaw, the operations of the next campaign. The same afternoon he held another conference with the deputies, and obtained the concurrence of the Dutch government in all the plans which he thought proper to submit to their consideration. During his short stay at the Hague, we find some interesting communications both on foreign and domestic affairs.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Hague, Oct. 7.* — Since coming here I have had two conferences with the deputies of the States: they are very desirous I should meet the elector of Hanover, for taking measures with him for the next year's campaign, and at the same time to press that the emperor, and empire, might take the 6000 Saxon horse into their service. I shall so order it, that my going to Mentz shall not delay my return to England; for I intend to return to the army before they separate. I leave this place this evening, and hope to be with the army on Sunday night, and stay with them till the Saturday following, when I shall leave them encamped, where they shall continue till my return, which I intend shall be by the 28th or 29th of this month. In two days after my return I intend to send them to their garrisons, after which I am afraid it will be necessary for me to be at Brussels for some few days. By what I have now done, I hope my stay at the Hague need not be above six days. I am the more particular, that you may know when to expect me in England, which I think may be about the 7th of November.

"Having this safe opportunity by Colonel Pendergrass, I must acquaint you, that I see very plainly that the Dutch will not only not augment their troops, but will act the next year as they have done this last, which is so disheartening, that I do wish with all my heart it were possible for me to be excused from being at the head of their troops. I am very impatient to hear the certainty of what you will do, for that shall govern me. I shall say no more, since you will see my mind by the enclosed copy of what I wrote to the queen.

"Brigadier Palmes came to me yesterday. He hopes to be in a condition to pass with the next packet boat. He will give you an account of all that the duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene have said to him."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Hague, Oct. 7.* — I thank you for yours of the 16th, as also the copy\* you sent me. God's will must be done. I have thought as well as I can, and have prepared myself for the worst.

"I return to-morrow for the army, and as it is thought necessary for me to go to Mentz or Frankfort, I shall begin that journey about ten days hence, and return again to the army before they go to their winter quarters; so that this journey will not delay my coming for England, as I intended, in the first week in November. I have had so little time to myself here, that I shall not trouble you with a longer letter, but refer you to what I wrote to lord treasurer. He will let you see what I wrote to the queen, in answer to two letters I have received."

*To Lord Sunderland.*

"*Hague, Oct. 7.* — My lord, I had the favour of yours of the 19th last night, and am very glad of this safe opportunity, by Colonel Pendergrass, to return you my thanks and thoughts. I believe the last year no argument could have prevailed with the queen to have had a thought of

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\* Probably a copy of one of her letters to the queen, or of one of the queen's replies.

parting with me and the lord treasurer; but I have good reason to think that is much altered. However, I believe when it is very plain that I and the lord treasurer are in earnest, I am a good deal of your opinion, that the queen will not part with us; so that I think there should be no time lost in trying this experiment. If it does not do, at least the lord treasurer and I shall have nothing to reproach ourselves with, and shall be blessed with a quiet life, which, in my opinion, is preferable to all this world can give. I do from my soul wish so well to the queen, that I hope those that shall succeed may be more lucky in giving content than we have been; but I am sure they can never be more sincere, though we could not cure jealousies."

*Reply of Lord Sunderland.*

"*Newmarket, Oct. 8-19.* — I must now return you my thanks for the favour of your kind letter by Mr. Pendergrass. I am fully convinced that things are not so well as they were last year between the queen and your grace, and the lord treasurer. But I must beg on this occasion to say that if you and the lord treasurer would have believed what some of your friends and servants have told you in relation to Mr. Secretary Harley, this had never happened. But be that as it will, without looking back to what is past, I am sure it is high time to try to retrieve them before they are past recovery; and I can't but believe, as you say, that when it is very plain that you and the lord treasurer are in earnest, the queen will not part with you; since what is insisted on is so reasonable in itself, as well as what has been promised over and over. I am ashamed to trouble you in so many letters with this over and over; and, indeed, I should not do it but for the apprehension I have of the inevitable confusion that must attend the queen, and all that have to do with her, if this obstinacy continues. For, as to myself, I am very easy, having resolved, as an honest man, whatever happens, to act upon the same principles and with the same people I have always acted."

In the afternoon of the 7th, Marlborough departed from the Hague and proceeded to Antwerp, from which place we find a letter to Godolphin.

"*Antwerp, Oct. 8.* — I received this afternoon yours of the 23d, by which I see you are desirous I should come for England. Your two letters of the 12th and 16th, as well as that of the queen, telling me that your opinions were that it would make too much noise, made me take the measures I now have done at the Hague, to meet the elector of Hanover, and one\* from the emperor at Mentz, the 20th of this month. Accordingly, I have wrote letters to all the courts of Germany; so that it will be impossible for me to put the journey off; but since the queen is desirous I should come, I will order it so as to be with you by the 1st of November, if the wind gives leave. I am afraid my presence will be but of very little use; but if the queen and you be of another opinion,

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\* Count Wratislaw.

the parliament ought then to be put off for a fortnight. And if the intelligence I have from England be true, their meeting is no ways to be wished till the queen is pleased to take a firm resolution of what she will do; for if the Whigs will not support, and the Tories will be malicious, what must be the consequence but ruin? But if any body has a good scheme which is like to succeed, the sooner they meet the better.

"I find my thoughts are very different from those of the queen. My comfort is that a little time will convince her I am much more concerned for her quiet and good than I am for my own life. Whilst I am thought to have a share in the ministry I must tell my mind freely, when I see destruction at hand. When I have nothing to do I shall not displease, and shall always be ready to help whenever I shall think my service can be of use."

On the 10th he reached the camp, and inspected the movements of the troops, preparatory to the arrangements of winter quarters. The same evening the intended garrisons for Menin, Courtray, and Oudenard commenced their march, and on the ensuing day the army moved to Pettighem, with an intention to traverse the Scheldt. The passage being, however, delayed by heavy rains till the 13th, they proceeded through Ghent to Westrem, and finally pitched their camp at Asch. Here they remained stationary a few days, and followed the example of the enemy in breaking up for their winter quarters, which were nearly the same as in the preceding year.

Before the separation took place, Marlborough had commenced his journey, and his correspondence with his friends in England shows the progress of his negotiations as well as the state of domestic affairs in England.

*To the Duchess.*

"*Helchin, Oct. 10.* — I have had opportunities of writing four letters to you this week; and my head aching, and none of yours to answer, will be an excuse for this short letter. I leave this camp to-morrow, and shall certainly have the spleen to see the poor soldiers march in dirt up to the knees, for we have had a very great deal of rain. I shall write to you once more before I leave the army, after which my letters will come irregularly till my return from Germany. I hope to make the journey in fourteen days."

"*Westrem, Oct. 13.* — I have had yours from Woodstock of the 25th. I wish you may find the building advanced as you are told; but by what is writ to me, I believe you will not. I have been a good deal out of order these four or five days; however, I intend to begin my journey on Saturday, so that I may be in England, since it is desired, by the 1st of November. I pray God I may be able to do any good when I shall be there. I have no heart nor spirits left; and would give a good deal to

avoid this troublesome journey. We have had, and have still, very ill weather, which will make the roads intolerable. I am very much afraid I shall not have the pleasure of receiving many of your letters till my return; however, I will take the best care I can to have them follow me, so that I beg you will be regular in writing, and I will take all opportunities of doing the same.

"I have often had the spleen, but never with so much reason as now, finding almost every body disheartened, I mean on this side the water; and if we have at the same time uneasiness in England, how is it possible to struggle? The English, I am afraid, do not know their happiness; I mean in comparison with other countries; but if they oblige the queen to a peace, as the circumstances of affairs are now abroad, they will be sensible in a very little time of their error. For my own part, it will give me ease and the pleasure of being with you, which is what I most earnestly desire."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Westrem, Oct. 13.*—If you have so ill weather as we have here, Newmarket must be very disagreeable. I was not well when we began our march on Tuesday, and these three ill days have made me more uneasy; however, I am resolved to begin my journey next Saturday, that I may return to the Hague, so as I may be in England by the 1st of November. You know that Mr. Craggs keeps company with the Tories, which makes me send you his enclosed letter\*, which I desire may be shown to the queen; for if the Whigs will not oppose these measures, I beg that parliament may be put off for some little time; but you and the queen can judge much better than I can. But my zeal is such that I can't forbear sending my opinion; for if the Tories succeed, it will not be in any body's power to do service. I found every body so desponding, that should parliament not begin with their usual vigour, it must give great advantage to France, especially should they show any inclination for peace. And should they succeed in their invitation, the Dutch would think themselves undone, for they put their trust entirely on the sincerity of the queen; for the news of the invitation was got to the Hague, so that I know the pensioner thinks it will disturb all business, which will

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\* This relates to the proposed invitation of the princess Sophia to England. Mr. Craggs was a noted official in this and the next reign. He had been much favoured by the Marlboroughs; but on the rise of Mrs. Masham, he secretly connected himself with her friends, Harley and Bolingbroke. He continued to thrive even after the ruin of his new Tory patrons and the death of Queen Anne. In 1718 he succeeded Mr. Addison as secretary of state. Craggs was in this office when the great South Sea bubble exploded. In this famous monetary infatuation he was suspected, with Sunderland and others, to be deeply and nefariously implicated. A sudden death, however, saved him from responsibilities. The minister was father to James Craggs, upon whom Pope wrote the well known epitaph, commencing,—

"Statesman, yet friend to truth," &c. — *Ed.*

encourage in their country the partisans of France. I intend to-morrow to make use of the queen's leave in making the enclosed promotions."

"*Frankfort, Oct. 27.* — I was resolved to have left this place on Monday last; but the two electors were so very pressing that I would stay for the arrival of Count Wratislaw, that I could not refuse. He is not yet come, but they say he will be here this night. I have taken my measures to begin my journey on Saturday, and hope to be at the Hague by the 3d of the next month; so that with a fair wind I may yet have the happiness of being with you by the 1st of November, old style. The two electors are very zealous that the emperor and the empire may entertain the 6000 Saxon horse, which would be a very necessary augmentation for this army. I have promised to press Count Wratislaw that the court of Vienna may do their part, which, it is said, ought to be one half of the expense. I believe I shall have good words, but I am afraid it may end there; however, I shall be very plain with him. The elector of Hanover tells me very positively that if the empire do not put their army in a better condition than it is at this time, he will not return to it the next campaign. I can be very sensible of the uneasiness he is like to meet with, by what I suffer in Flanders.

"What I am going to say does not proceed from the spleen, but really from the vexation I have in my mind, which makes me less capable of serving with success, as I have done hitherto; so that if I can't prevail to have Prince Eugene sent to Catalonia, I should think the next best thing for the service will be that he commands in chief in the empire, and that the elector of Hanover takes upon him the command I have in Flanders; for if things go as I think they will, both in England and Holland, nothing shall prevail with me to lose that reputation I have hazarded for this war. Till I have had an opportunity of acquainting the queen, and having her leave, I shall let nobody know of this intention of mine but the pensioner, who is an honest man, and so much my friend that he will say nothing of it till he has my leave.

"I send you the duke of Savoy's letter and project, as also my answer; so that in what I have been wanting, the lords of the cabinet may advise her majesty. The States having, by an express, given me power to assure the landgrave of Hesse that they will satisfy him for his arrears if he will consent to leave his troops one year longer in Italy, I shall this afternoon send an express to Cassel, and press him in the name of her majesty, as well as that of the States-general; but I fear he has already sent his orders from the Hague. You shall know what effect my letter to the landgrave has had."

Meanwhile, Godolphin, in conformity with the advice imparted in the preceding letters, in his own name, and in that of Marlborough, expostulated with Harley, and not only required from him a categorical answer whether he would continue to support the system on which they had hitherto acted, but specifically charged him with influencing the queen in the choice of the two bishops.

Harley received these accusations with an affectation of humility and surprise, and replied in the language of injured innocence. As to the first point he professed his sole and decided attachment to Godolphin and Marlborough, and after hinting at the malice of the Whigs, who delighted to wound in the dark, and to ruin, by misrepresentations, the characters of those whom they did not approve, he made a tender of his resignation whenever he should be deemed a burden to the service. His answer to the question, whether he would continue to concur in the measures of the treasurer and general, can only be given in his own singular words.

"It has always been my temper to go along with the company, and if they should say Harrow-on-the-Hill or Maidenhead was the nearest way to Windsor, I would go along with them and never dispute it, if that would give content; and that I might not be forced to swear it was so."

He then professes his sincerity and devotion to his two patrons, and continues:—

"I am satisfied to a demonstration there can be no other centre of union but the queen by the ministration of your lordship and the Duke of Marlborough, and there the bulk of the nation will fix themselves, if they be suffered. All other expedients are very wretched things, and will end but ill; and I dread the thoughts of running from the extreme of one faction to another, which is the natural consequence of party tyranny, and renders the government like a door, which turns both ways upon the hinges, to let in each party as it grows triumphant; and, in truth, it is the real parent and nurse of our factions here. It is time to relieve your lordship's patience and beg pardon for this tedious letter, and withal to desire leave to assure your lordship that you have not a more faithful servant, nor a truer or more zealous friend than myself, to the utmost of my capacity," &c.

He wrote in the same style to Marlborough.

"*September 16-27.*—I have desired my lord treasurer to ask leave for me to go into the country, which I hope to do this night se'nnight. I entreat your grace will permit me now, upon my taking leave, to assure you I never have writ any thing to you but what I really thought and intended. For near two years I have seen the storm coming upon me, and now I find I am to be sacrificed to sly insinuations, and groundless jealousies. I have the satisfaction, not only of my own mind, but my enemies and friends witness for me, that I have served your grace and my lord treasurer with the nicest honour, and by the strictest rules of friendship; that I have sacrificed every thing to this, the world knows; and that what credit I have with the clergy or laity has been all employed to no other end but the service of both your lordships.

"I have not interposed in, or contradicted directly or indirectly, by myself or any other, the putting in or putting out any person, or meddled

with any measures which are taken; for I have avoided knowing them. And yet I am now first charged in general, and when I desired that particulars might be told me, nothing is specified but the two nominated bishops. I must therefore say the same to your grace I did when it was mentioned to me yesterday, that I never knew those two persons, I never spoke of them, nor ever thought of them, or directly or indirectly ever recommended them to the queen, or to, or by any other person. And, my lord, I must do myself this justice, that I am above telling a solemn lie; that I scorn the baseness of it; and that if I had known or recommended those persons I would not have been so mean as to deny it, but would have owned it, and given my reasons for it. And now, my lord, since I am going into the country, and perhaps Sunday next may put an end to any farther opportunity of my troubling your grace with letters; I beg leave to assure your grace that I shall always preserve an entire duty and service for your grace. And I will add but this, that if there be any uneasiness in the queen to comply with any proposals, I heartily wish that the true reason of it may be found out; for as I have no hand in it, nor any friend or acquaintance of mine that I know of, so I believe that half the pains which are taken to accuse and asperse the innocent, would discover the true cause, and provide the remedy. I shall trouble your grace no more upon this subject. I humbly beseech you to forgive what is extorted by the undeserved misrepresentations made of him, who has neither in thought, word, or deed, contradicted the title of being, with the utmost sincerity, my lord,

“Your grace’s most humble, and most obedient servant,

“R. HARLEY.”\*

These asseverations, however solemn and plausible, did not dissipate the suspicions of the two ministers; although, from the correspondence, it appears that they continued in a state of doubt and hesitation, ignorant of his real schemes,

\* Contrary to my custom, I have inserted these extracts from the letters of Harley, which I discovered in the Hardwicke Collection, notwithstanding they are already printed in the Hardwicke State Papers, and Somerville’s *Queen Anne*, because they convey an indubitable proof of political duplicity which has seldom been paralleled. That I may not be accused of partiality to the great man whose life I have undertaken to write, I shall merely give the comment of the able historian of *Queen Anne*.

“The part which Mr. Harley was now acting exhibits a scene of dissimulation and duplicity, for which neither his sympathy with the sovereign, nor the unjustifiable conduct of the junta to her, nor the goodness of the end which he had in view, supposing that to be admitted, can afford any apology. He not only maintained the external profession of respect for the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Godolphin, but continued in his private correspondence to give them the most solemn assurances of his affectionate attachment to their persons, while he was using every art to undermine their influence with the queen.”—*Somerville’s Queen Anne*, p. 268. *note*.

and yet conscious that he was secretly caballing to their detriment.

Marlborough, in particular, seems to have been deeply affected by the ingratitude of a minister whom he had cherished and promoted, and so discouraged by the decline of that influence which he had hitherto enjoyed, that he determined to carry into effect the resolution he had already announced, of withdrawing from public life. But as the affair drew to a crisis, Godolphin relapsed into his former hesitation. He appears to have been vanquished by the earnest solicitations of the queen, and fascinated by the professions of Harley; and the last letter which he wrote to his friend is an attempt to weaken the impression which his complaints had previously made.

*“ Newmarket, Oct. 7-18. — I am to acknowledge from this place the favour of yours of the 8th from Antwerp, by an officer whom I don't know, with the enclosed to the queen, which I delivered to her last night; also that of the 10th from Helchin, and of the 13th from Westrem, with the letters and papers enclosed. I am extremely sorry to find by them that you complain of want of health, at the same time you are to take a great journey, in this ill weather, which is the same with us as with you, and makes the queen very apprehensive of a fit of the gout coming upon her here. I saw her very uneasy last night, but they send me word this morning she is a little better; and if she is able, she designs to go to London on the 10th.*

*“ I am very much troubled to find our letters of the 23d of September did not reach you before you left the Hague, and had settled with them your journey to the Rhine; for it is most certain that must have had a better effect, after you could have been able to have encouraged them from hence; and it is as certain that your coming over in time would have contributed to that encouragement more than any thing else can. It is very true, both the queen and my letters were against your coming for a day or two only, while the armies were in the field; for that could not but have made a great noise, and have exposed all things to great hazard, without allowing time enough here, for your coming to have been of any effect. But when the armies were, or might have been separated, when you had opportunity of giving, at the Hague, the reasons for your coming over, that must needs have been of the greatest use here; and if it had succeeded, would have enabled you to have adjusted every thing on that side, much more to the advantage of the common cause. But there is an end of that now, and it remains only to be considered, whether the parliament can be deferred a fortnight, without doing more hurt than good. I confess I think it puts us under a great deal of difficulty, and I doubt the parliament cannot be put off, without discouraging our friends, retarding all our preparations, and encouraging the opposing party, already grown insolent, from our ill success abroad this year.*

"On the other side, nothing is fixed here to make the parliament succeed, nor can I do any thing so shameful as to abandon the queen, but upon a joint measure with Mr. Freeman, who now cannot be here till after that thing comes to bear; and the resolution must be taken, one way or other, upon the whole matter. I can come to no other conclusion, but that it will still be best for you to hasten hither as soon as you can. Accidents may happen to delay the proceedings of the parliament, so that nothing very material may be decided finally before you come.

"In several of your letters to Mrs. Morley, I find you often repeat *that the rashness of some people's schemes may prove fatal*. But there is really no such thing as a scheme, or any thing like it from any body else; nor has the queen as yet any thought of taking a scheme, but from Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery. The misfortune is, that the queen happens to be entangled in a promise\* that is extremely inconvenient, and upon which so much weight is laid, and such inferences made, that to effect this promise would be destruction; and at the same time she is uneasy with every body that endeavours to show the consequences which attend it.

"10 at night. — This afternoon the queen told me she hoped to write to you herself by this post, but just now she sent me the enclosed †, which I send you, because it is less trouble to me than to write the substance of it by candle-light."

These cabals in the cabinet, and the declining favour of Godolphin and Marlborough, did not escape the penetration of the Dutch government, and increased that desire which the States had already manifested for peace. But no mortifications could damp the zeal of the two friends for the true interest of their country; for we find Godolphin engaged in a correspondence with the leading men in Holland, the object of which was to stimulate them to new exertions and to evince the necessity of prosecuting the war with unabated vigour, and on the same principles on which it was begun.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Newmarket, October 9-20. — I have but just time to acknowledge yours of the 11th. I did not want the letter you enclosed from Slingslandt, to know their humour in Holland for peace. I have letters almost every post from Buys. I send you the last, because I have not time to copy it. Pray keep it, and when you see him, if you ask him, I believe he will show you my answer, which is, in short, to repeat, that if they will proceed to settle their state of war they may have such terms as will satisfy and secure their allies; whereas, any other method will create

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\* About the two bishops.

† Unfortunately this and many other letters, between the queen and the duke, are lost.

jealousies and distinctions among the allies, and oblige all sides to continue their expenses. I need not, therefore, trouble you with any thing more, to guide you in your behaviour, when you come to the Hague, especially since Mr. Secretary Harley's letter to you upon that point is so plain and so full; I think it was dated 4-15. In a word, after the advantages with which God has blessed the arms of the allies, England will not be satisfied, nor think themselves safe, with less terms than those mentioned in the letter to Buys.

"I cannot say enough to you, nor have I time for your expressions of kindness to myself. I am apt to think that matter\* may remain as it is till your coming over, which I wish may be with the soonest, but not much longer."

"October 24.—Nov. 4.—The wind being westerly, I must still continue to write, though I long extremely to see you here; for till you come I doubt nothing will go right, whatever it does then. I labour as much as I can, and try every way that can be thought of, to prevent the queen's spoiling every thing. But I am much afraid it will be too late, unless Mr. Freeman helps to make a solemn treaty, from which there is to be no departure upon any terms whatsoever, without which it will be next to impossible for Mr. Montgomery to continue where he is; and the consequences of that I need not enlarge upon to you.

"Mr. Secretary Harley came to town the night before the parliament met. They chose the same speaker yesterday, without any obstruction, and he is to be presented to the queen the 30th, at which time I am afraid there will be a necessity for her to speak, though if it could be without too much murmuring, I would rather her speech were deferred till you come."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Hague, Nov. 4. — A little after my arrival here last night, I received five packets from England. The convoy is also come, and I am using all the diligence I can, to despatch what of necessity must be done before I leave this place. Count Wratislaw and Quiros being here, with powers from the emperor and the king of Spain, will create so much business, that should I stay a month I should not have one day to myself. I have declared to them, as well as to the States, that I shall be obliged to make use of the first fair wind after this next Tuesday. The wind being now very contrary, I may probably be with you as soon as this letter, which I beg with my duty you will let the queen know is the reason of my not doing myself the honour of answering hers of the 14th.

"I send you enclosed my letter to the landgrave of Hesse, his answer, and the States' letter to me on that subject. I also send you the letters I have received by two expresses from Turin. You will be pleased to acquaint her majesty with the contents, and such as may be proper, with her leave, may be communicated to the cabinet council. I shall do my utmost to persuade the landgrave's minister that his master's troops may continue one year longer in Italy. I do not see by Prince Eugene's

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\* Their resignation.

letter that he has any thoughts of going to Italy; and by what I find by Count Wratislaw, I am afraid the court of Vienna are desirous of keeping him in Germany.

"The pensioner has promised me to second my endeavours with Count Wratislaw, that the prince may be sent. He tells me that the king of France has given the necessary orders for an augmentation of threescore thousand men, which I believe is not in his power; however, it has a very ill effect here. I have many things to say, but shall give you no further trouble at this time, being resolved of being with you as soon as possible."

"*Hague, Nov. 8.* — I had ordered my business so that I might have sailed this day, having sent my servants on board yesterday, and ordered the yacht to Helvœt Sluys, where they are now, with the men of war, so that we might go to sea with the first opportunity. But the wind is not only contrary, but also blows very hard, so that God knows when I shall be able to be with you; but you may be assured that I will not lose one hour, when the wind will allow my going to sea.

"I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 24th, and am much troubled to see that the queen continues making you uneasy. I am afraid you do me too much honour in thinking that my presence is necessary; but you may depend that I shall be governed by you, in doing what you think may do good; but I must confess that by what I see abroad, as well as at home, it looks as if it were resolved by destiny that nothing should go well this winter. My last letter I hear is blown back; and as the wind is, it is impossible for this to go, so that I may be as soon with you as this."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Hague, Nov. 8.* — I was in hopes not to have writ, but to have been at sea this night, having sent my servants on board the yacht yesterday. But the wind being as contrary as possible, and blowing a storm, I have continued in this place, but shall not send for my servants back, being resolved to make use of the first wind that will allow of my going to sea, having finished what I was to do here, and very desirous of being with you. I am afraid my friends will then see that I am not of much use, but I shall be governed. I am sorry to tell you that the inclinations the Dutch have for peace will occasion their hurting themselves and their friends, as much as our unhappy differences in England. I am to thank you for yours of the 24th, which I received this morning. What you say of Mrs. Masham is very odd; and if you think she is a good weathercock, it is high time to leave off struggling; for believe me, nothing is worth rowing for against wind and tide, at least you will think so when you come to my age. I have been to wait upon Mrs. Burnett, and have ordered her a yacht."

"*Hague, Nov. 11.* — I find my lord treasurer very desirous of my being with him. I have no opinion of my being able to do any good; but uncertainty is the worst of all conditions, for death itself is easier than the fear of it. If you were truly sensible of the great desire I have of ending my days quietly with you, I flatter myself your good-nature would be contented to bear many inconveniences, and to let the rest of the world

govern itself after its own method. This is the third I have writ since my being here, and the postmaster tells me that not only those, but some of mine from Frankfort, are still on this side; so that I shall not make this longer than by assuring you of my being, with my heart and soul,

"Yours,"\*

#### CHAP. LXIV. — MINISTERIAL CHANGES. — 1707, 1708.

MARLBOROUGH arrived in England on the 7th of November, old style, and had the mortification to find the feuds in the cabinet more dangerous and violent than they had appeared, even in the representations of his friends.

The Whigs, indignant at the disappointment of their hopes, had realised their threats of a separation of interests, and had actually formed, if not a coalition, at least a secret

\* It is impossible to close this year of the duke's history without a remark on the paucity of stirring incidents, and the contrast it offers to the glittering throng of achievements that signalised the memorable 1704. It arose, however, from no fault of the duke, but he was mastered by adverse circumstances. France had rallied, as she is wont to do after great reverses, in an extraordinary manner, and presented on every side an undismayed front. One of her best generals she had pitted against Marlborough, and so ably did the Frenchman direct the movements of his troops that he could never be taken unprepared. Vendome was the most skilful in strategy of all the French generals, and managed the disposition of his brigades like a game on the chess-board. The cautious resolves of the Dutch deputies too were in his favour; they had obtained their chief object — a strong frontier against French aggression — and were determined to risk no more hazardous battles. Indeed, the Grand Alliance was in heart already dissolved; it was no longer united for a common object, and each member of the confederacy was (England excepted) intent on some separate and selfish scheme of interest or ambition. Under such altered conditions the reverses and short comings of the year may be easily accounted for, and of which the most signal were the failure of the enterprise against Toulon, and the entire defeat of the Anglo-Spanish army at Almanza. The domestic politics of the year had not been more auspicious to the duke's interests; the court of Queen Anne had been the scene of as signal defections and treacheries as the movements of the allies on the Continent, and the Marlborough influence was rapidly yielding to the wiles of the new favourites, Masham and Harley. — Ed.

understanding with the violent Tories. Godolphin stood alone, exposed to the obloquy of both parties, and loaded at the same time with the displeasure of the queen. The administration, which in the preceding session of parliament had appeared so united and prosperous, was become a disjointed and ill-assorted mass, and exhibited all the symptoms of approaching dissolution.

The inactivity of the campaign in the Netherlands, the fatal defeat at Almanza, the failure of the enterprise against Toulon, and the want of some brilliant exploit, to satisfy the eager expectations of the people, afforded ample scope to that party spirit, which is inherent in our constitution, and which, at this particular period, was the more inflamed, because it had been long repressed by an unusual series of military successes. Every operation of the war became the theme of malignant insinuation, or open invective; and the unfortunate events in Spain furnished a prominent subject of reproach.

With the disasters in Spain was connected a vehement controversy on the conduct and merits of the earl of Peterborough, which greatly aggravated the perplexities arising from the distracted situation of foreign and domestic affairs.

We have already traced the wanderings of this eccentric peer from court to court, and his incessant, though fruitless endeavours to regain his lost consequence. Having dissipated a considerable part of his fortune, in his short, though brilliant career, he laid before the ministry a strong claim for pecuniary remuneration. Instead, however, of the compliance which he expected, he was charged with a counter demand of much larger extent, on the part of government, for neglecting to furnish a regular account of the vast sums intrusted to his disposition, which he had distributed with his usual caprice, sometimes withholding from the court of Barcelona even the necessary supplies, and sometimes lavishing his largesses with an unsparing hand. Disgusted in temper, and impoverished in circumstances, he at length returned to England, to urge his pretensions in person, and to claim from the gratitude of his country that justice which he considered as withheld by a parsimonious and selfish administration. Consulting only the dictates of wounded pride, he at first declined waiting on the great officers of the crown; and even

deferred the customary testimony of respect towards the sovereign, until he found his conduct arraigned, and charges of mismanagement insinuated against him. He then demanded access to the royal presence; but received from Lord Sunderland, as secretary of state, a notification, that the queen could not grant him an audience, until he had given a satisfactory explanation on three points which were laid to his charge. First, why he did not, in the preceding campaign, march to Madrid, with the army under his command? Secondly, why he did not fulfil his instructions, in advancing to the king of Spain the supplies intrusted to his disposition? and thirdly, why he retired to Italy, without orders, and borrowed large sums of money on disadvantageous terms?

Still more incensed by this repulse, Peterborough openly joined the opposition; and appealed from the cabinet to the nation, by employing Dr. Freind, an eminent physician, to draw up a vindication of his conduct. In this publication, the most confidential documents and secret instructions were introduced, and he was exhibited as another Alexander or Cæsar, by whose chivalrous exploits kingdoms had been overrun; and to whose unmerited disgrace all the late misfortunes in the Peninsula were attributable. Public sympathy threw a lustre over his character, and aided the efforts of every party in opposition to bring him into notice. Indeed, no time was ever more favourable for the investigation which he courted, nor could any subject afford a wider scope to popular eloquence and popular obloquy.

In this temper and state of parties the parliament resumed its functions on the 30th of October, and the earliest discussions displayed that spirit of discord, which reigned alike in the cabinet and the nation.

In consequence of the Union, the same ceremonies took place as on the meeting of a new parliament. Mr. Smith, the sitting speaker, was rechosen, and the Scottish members were introduced, with the usual formalities of a new election.

On the 10th of November the queen addressed the two houses in a speech, extenuating the failures of the campaign, and recommending vigour and unanimity, as the best means for restoring the prosperity of the Grand Alliance, and obtaining a safe and honourable peace.

On the report of the speech, the Commons unanimously voted an address of thanks. After lamenting that the wise designs of the queen, for the advantage of the nation, and the good of the common cause, had not produced the desired effect, they assured her majesty, that no disappointment should discourage them from enabling her to reduce, in conjunction with her allies, the whole Spanish monarchy to the obedience of the lawful sovereign, King Charles.

But in the House of Lords, which had hitherto displayed less tendency to factious opposition, and more energy in support of the war, the strongest symptoms of discontent appeared. Before the usual motion for an address, Wharton made a violent speech on the decay of trade, and the scarcity of money. He was followed by Somers, who expatiated on the ill state and mismanagement of the navy, and the great losses of the merchants for want of convoys. The earl of Stamford endeavoured to repress these invectives, by recommending an address in the usual form; but this suggestion was strenuously resisted by the Whig lords, as well as by the Tory chiefs, Rochester and Nottingham; and the tide of opposition proving too powerful to be stemmed, the motion was suffered to drop.

These topics were resumed with increasing virulence on the 12th. On this occasion the Whigs repeated their accusations, and an order was unanimously passed for the whole house, in a committee, to inquire into the state of the nation, in regard to the fleet and trade. Such was the curiosity excited by this question, that the queen herself attended on the 19th, the day appointed for the discussion.

The attack was opened by a petition subscribed by two hundred merchants of London, detailing their losses by sea, and bitterly censuring the neglect and mismanagement of the navy. Wharton, who had presented the petition, commenced the debate, and set the example to his colleagues, by his open complaints against the Admiralty in general, and his indirect insinuations against Admiral Churchill in particular.

The leading Whig peers adopted the same strain of argument: but the Tories, instead of confining themselves to the original heads of accusation, laboured to direct the attack against the ministry collectively, and argued that the public

grievances were not to be removed by partial remedies, but by a radical change of administration.

The Whigs, who had calculated on the co-operation of the Tories, were displeased with their zeal, and hoped to divert the ferment which they had raised, by recurring to the original topics of discussion. Among other expedients, Lord Halifax moved for the appointment of a committee, to receive proposals for encouraging trade and privateering in the West Indies. In this suggestion the ministry concurred, from a similar motive, and the lord treasurer himself seconding the proposal, it was carried unanimously. A future day was then appointed for the prosecution of the inquiry.

Marlborough having taken the usual oaths, on the 10th of November, was present at both these debates, and witnessed with regret the hostile attack, which the Whigs had so long threatened against his brother. Although he cautiously avoided entering into the discussion, his feelings were deeply wounded by the severe reflections of the Whigs; and at the close of the debate, he warmly expostulated with Wharton, who had particularly distinguished himself by the bitterness of his invectives.\*

The scrutiny was afterwards continued; but on the 15th of December another topic was added, at the instigation of the Tories, by a motion for a committee, to inquire into the conduct of the war in Spain, and the cause of the failure in the expedition against Toulon.

Lord Peterborough was now brought forward, and Rochester, who took the lead, expressed his surprise that a commander who had been sent abroad, with so many commissions and characters, should have been divested of all, and yet no examination instituted into his conduct on his return. He was warmly seconded by Nottingham and Haversham. But the Whigs maintained a cautious reserve, and even Halifax contented himself with ambiguous expressions of approbation, by alluding to the printed account of Dr. Freind, and observing that the high achievements which it commemorated were only to be equalled by those related in Quintus Curtius.†

Peterborough spoke in more brief and modest terms than

\* Tindal, vol. xvi. p. 489.

† Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, Dec. 16. 1708.

usual, expressing a hope that he should be permitted to vindicate his character at some future time ; and asserting that he had declined pressing his justification, not to interrupt the public business. The result, however, was a motion for papers and documents, particularly for the orders and instructions sent to Lord Galway, Lord Peterborough, and Lord Rivers ; a statement of the sums of money, with the disposition of which they had been respectively intrusted ; and also of the number of troops at the battle of Almanza, and what account had been taken of Lord Peterborough's proceedings since his return. The ensuing days were chiefly occupied with motions for papers and reports, and other preparations for the grand inquiry.

During these dissensions the Commons had voted a considerable supply, and the queen repaired to the House of Lords, to thank the parliament for their promptitude and zeal. She concluded by requesting an augmentation of forces in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and announced her resolution to encourage and favour those only, who were willing and desirous to bring the war to a safe and honourable conclusion. A committee was accordingly appointed, to draw up an address of thanks for her majesty's most gracious speech, consisting principally of Whigs.

The ensuing day being fixed for the resumption of the important debate on the state of the nation, the public expectation was raised to so high a pitch, that the lobbies were crowded at an early hour, and even the queen herself again attended *incognita*. The new-drawn address being reported by the duke of Bolton, chairman of the committee, was unanimously approved. It commended the spirit and resolution manifested by the queen, for the vigorous prosecution of the war in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and for strengthening the duke of Savoy, who had deserved so well of the whole confederacy. After expressing their hopes that her example would incite all the allies to a noble imitation, they added, "Your majesty's favour will always be the highest encouragement to your subjects ; but the zeal we have for the preservation of your majesty's person and government, and the duty we owe to our country, always has, and ever will oblige us, to do all that lies in our power for supporting your

majesty in this just war, till it be brought to a safe and happy conclusion."

The lord treasurer and principal officers of the household were then, as usual, commissioned to receive the pleasure of the sovereign, with regard to the presentation of this address. On their departure the House was put into a committee, to resume the debate on the state of the nation, and the management of the war in Spain.

This was the opportunity which was taken to bring forward the question, so long threatened, on the conduct of Lord Peterborough. Rochester again opened the discussion, by applauding his courage and skill; and after enumerating his services, observed, that as it was the usual custom to thank or call to account, any person who had been employed abroad in so eminent a post, he suggested the necessity of a similar proceeding in the present case. Halifax supported Rochester, by enlarging on the justice of a general examination; and added, that such an inquiry was most anxiously desired by the noble earl himself. Several peers followed in the debate, some throwing out the severest reflections on Galway, and others stigmatising him as a foreigner. The policy of prosecuting the war in Spain, till the whole monarchy should be recovered, was strongly and repeatedly urged. Peterborough himself exclaimed, "We should give the queen nineteen shillings in the pound, rather than make peace on any other terms;" and added, with an affectation of disinterested zeal, "If necessary, I will return to Spain, and serve even under the earl of Galway!"

Rochester seized this opportunity to enforce the darling principle of his party against an offensive war in the Netherlands. He observed, "We seem to neglect the principal business, and to mind only accessories. I cannot forget the saying of a great general, the old duke of Schomberg, 'that to attack France in the Netherlands, is taking a bull by the horns.' I therefore propose, that we should remain on the defensive in that quarter, and send from our army fifteen or twenty thousand men into Catalonia."\* He was followed

\* We find some sensible remarks on this insidious motion, in a letter from Maynwaring to the duchess.

"There is nothing that one reflects upon mote naturally, after this glorious conquest, than the vile attempt that was made last winter to

by Nottingham, who bitterly complained that Spain, the principal object of the war, was almost abandoned.

These reflections on the conduct of Marlborough were too obvious to pass unnoticed. He rose, and with great warmth exposed the insidious proposition of Rochester, and represented the necessity of increasing, instead of lessening the forces in the Netherlands. "The first reason," he observed, "which induces me to object to this proposal is, that in Spain most of the enemy's strong places may be kept with one battalion in each; whereas, the strong fortresses in Brabant, which I have reduced, require twenty times that number for their preservation: secondly, if our army in the Netherlands be weakened, and the French gain any considerable advantage there, the discontented party in Holland, who are not a few, and who bear with impatience the great charges of the war, will not fail to cry aloud for peace."

Here he was tauntingly interrupted by Rochester, who expressed his wonder that the noble peer, who had ever been conspicuous for calmness and moderation, should now lose his natural temper. He insisted on the absolute necessity of succouring Spain, and requested his grace to oblige their lordships, by apprising them how they might obtain troops to send thither, for that purpose. "The obligation," he added, "will be the greater as Lord Peterborough has reported the opinion of Prince Eugene, that the Germans would rather be decimated than sent into Spain."

Marlborough repelled this sarcasm with becoming dignity. He acknowledged his warmth, but apologised, by observing

draw the forces out of Flanders, to which I remember your grace was a witness in the House of Lords. Of all the attempts that I have known to serve the king of France, that was the plainest, and yet the best laid, with respect to the fools among ourselves, who were sure to be caught with any thing that looked like carrying on the Spanish war. \* \* \* \*

"If one can wound an enemy at the heart, it is ridiculous to think of cutting his finger; and that I take to be the case with France now. We are going into its very vitals, and tearing up by the roots that trunk of power, that with its branches had almost overshadowed Europe. For which reason, the Duke of Marlborough never can forgive those men that would, by lessening his army, have taken from him the means of doing this great service to his country, but will certainly be as good a Whig as your grace next winter, which I wish, for many reasons, and for none more than that I am sure it will please you extremely."

that the subject was too important to be agitated without concern. He continued:—

“ Although it is improper to disclose secret projects in so numerous an assembly, because the enemy will not fail to be informed of them; yet I am authorised by the queen to gratify your lordships, by the assurance that measures have been already concerted with the emperor, for forming an army of 40,000 men, under the command of the duke of Savoy, and for sending succours to King Charles. It is also to be hoped that Prince Eugene may be induced to take the command in Spain, in which case the Germans will gladly follow him. The only difficulty which may be objected to this scheme is, the usual tardiness of the court of Vienna; and it must be admitted, that if the 7000 recruits, which the emperor promised for Piedmont, had arrived in time, the enterprise against Toulon would probably have been attended with success. But I dare engage my word, that for the future his imperial majesty will punctually perform his promises.”

This dignified reply was so explicit and satisfactory, that even Rochester could start no plausible objection; but with an affectation of candour, observed, “ Had we known sooner how well all things had been managed, this debate might have been spared.”

The secondary question on the conduct and merits of Peterborough was now completely superseded, and Marlborough had scarcely ceased speaking, before Lord Somers moved a resolution, in which he expressed his conviction, that all would agree; namely, “ that no peace could be reasonable or safe, either for her Majesty or her allies, if Spain and the West Indies were suffered to continue in the power of the house of Bourbon.”

No objection being expressed, Lord Wharton, after adverting to the communication made by the duke of Marlborough, proposed an address of thanks to the queen, for her care, as well as for her instances with the emperor to send a considerable force to Spain, under the command of Prince Eugene. Lastly, Lord Halifax moved a resolution, pressing “ that her Majesty would be pleased to continue her solicitations with the emperor, for this end, as well as for reinforcing the duke of Savoy, and strengthening the army on the Rhine.”

These several resolutions were sanctioned by the house, and to embody them in the usual form, a committee was appointed, in which the names of Marlborough, Godolphin, and Peterborough were introduced, and in which no Tory

was admitted, except the earl of Rochester. An address was accordingly presented to the house founded on these resolutions, and the concurrence of the Commons obtained.

This measure originated with the Whigs, was carried by their influence, and evidently intended as a disavowal of the objections, urged by Rochester, against an offensive war in the Netherlands. It is, however, singular, that these resolutions, which announced a principle, hitherto not so distinctly avowed, were carried in the absence of the lord treasurer. Whether the motion was made with the approbation of Marlborough and Godolphin cannot be discovered; but it is certain, that when passed, it obtained their sanction; for the queen returned an answer, expressing her perfect concurrence in the united opinion of the two houses, that no peace could be safe or honourable, unless the whole monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria. \*

The same questions were agitated in the lower house; but the management of the war in Spain, and the conduct of Peterborough, occupied less attention than the complaints against the Admiralty. Many of the members being themselves merchants, and affected by the losses at sea, it was imagined that the severest censures would be passed against Admiral Churchill, who was represented as the cause of the naval disasters, and accused not only of negligence, but even of fraud and malice.

After a long and attentive investigation of different petitions and reports, a motion was made, that the petitioners had proved all their allegations to the satisfaction of the

\* It is very singular that this sudden alteration of the address, and the manner in which it was proposed and carried, in the absence of the lord treasurer, should have escaped the notice of all our historians. I was fortunately enabled to discover the particulars of the transaction, from a curious letter written by Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, December 20th, and from a careful examination of the Lords' Journals for Dec. 19th, 1707.

The political cause of this sudden alteration in the address, without a single dissenting voice, is still mysterious, and not easy to be developed. Vernon seems to impute it to the reconciliation between the two ministers and the Whigs; and bishop Hare, in a letter to the duchess in 1710, attributes it solely to the Whigs, and states it to have been intended as a mortification to Godolphin.

After representing the fact as it occurred, we must leave the decision to those who may discover more distinct and positive information.

committee. Admiral Churchill strenuously opposed it, and ably justified his own conduct as well as that of the council. He contended, that though the petitioners had proved their losses, they had not substantiated their charges against the Admiralty; he enlarged on the injustice of deciding on so momentous a question, from partial evidence; and obtained a suspension of the vote, till the Admiralty could produce their justification, which they were actually preparing.\*

During this discussion, however, a material change took place in the temper and views of parties. The successful efforts of the Whigs convinced the ministers that they were formidable antagonists, and that their junction with the Tories might convulse the state, and dissolve the whole system of foreign and domestic policy. They therefore found it necessary to regain the confidence of their former supporters; and especially to convince them that the obstacles which they had experienced in the cabinet, and the partialities which had given them such disgust, were derived from other quarters. A sense of mutual interest seems, therefore, to have produced a new and temporary reconciliation.

The queen was not ignorant of this accommodation, and foreseeing that the accumulated strength of the Whigs and ministry would lead to a new attack against her Tory partialities, she submitted to some condescensions which mark her alarm. Assurances were given to the Whigs, that although she had too far engaged herself to recede from her promises in favour of the two Tory bishops, she would promote no more of that party in future to the higher offices of the church. This assurance she gave personally in the cabinet council; and the dukes of Devonshire and Somerset were authorised to communicate it to the Whig leaders in the House of Commons. She even so far conquered her natural bias, as to bestow the see of Norwich on Dr. Trenchard, the tutor and friend of Lord Sunderland, and to confer the office of Regius Professor, at Oxford, on Dr. Potter, who was recommended by Marlborough, to the exclusion of Dr. Smalridge, and to the great displeasure of the University.

The effects of this accommodation were speedily apparent in the House of Commons. The Whigs became lukewarm

\* Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, Dec. 9. and 13.

in their charges; and the Tories, suspecting that the attack against the Admiralty was merely to promote the advancement of Lord Orford to the management of the navy, would not give their aid in promoting the objects of their political rivals. Besides these motives, which actuated the great mass of both parties, many individuals were unwilling to offend the queen, by an attack against her husband; or Marlborough, by an accusation of his brother. Accordingly, the complaints and debates, which had so deeply agitated the nation at the commencement of the session, ended in a resolution, merely recommending the queen to appoint an additional number of cruisers, for the better security of trade.

The House of Lords, in which the Whig interest was predominant, did not so readily desist from their charges against the Admiralty board. In an address, which was drawn up on the 25th of February, they entered into a brief review of the whole examination; and amidst warm expressions of respect for the person and character of the prince, they directed the most acrimonious accusations against the influence of Admiral Churchill, though without mentioning his name. They represented him as making "the worst use imaginable" of the confidence reposed in him by the lord high admiral; of screening himself under his protection, and of insulting the legislature, by a vindication which conveyed not the slightest assurance of future amendment. They concluded with expressing a hope "that seamen would be encouraged, trade protected, discipline restored, and a new spirit and vigour put into the whole administration of the navy."\*

This ebullition of spleen was, however, confined to the affairs of the Admiralty; for the scrutiny into the conduct of the war in Spain terminated no less favourably.

In subsequent debates the earl of Peterborough was again brought forward, and a regular investigation made into his conduct. The letters from King Charles, and the complaints which had been advanced against him, were submitted to Parliament, and drew forth, on his part, volumes of memorials and justifications, with crowds of witnesses. This investigation having rendered the affairs of Spain and Por-

\* Journals of the Lords, Feb. 25.

tugal the subject of general interest, the opposition deserted the cause of Peterborough, to direct their invectives against the misconduct of the generals, and the deficiency of the British troops, in the battle of Almanza. The much-debated matter began at length to weary the public attention, and was finally regarded as a mere chicane of opposition. A statement was produced by government, to account for the deficiency of the troops; and though great, it appeared to be owing to the circumstances of the war, not to intentional neglect. After the usual proposals and amendments, an address was passed, thanking the queen for taking measures to retrieve the affairs of Spain, and providing foreign troops for that service. This decision terminated the inquiry, and relieved Marlborough and the ministry from embarrassments of no ordinary magnitude.\*

The reconciliation between the ministers and the Whigs was the prelude to the downfall of Harley; and no change in the course of a long political life was more deeply felt, or more reluctantly sanctioned, by the Duke of Marlborough.

Averse to party connexions, and always dreading the violent spirit of the Whigs, his fear of becoming the mere instrument of their projects overcame his sense of their influence, as well as his conviction of the imperious necessity, which compelled him to form a cordial union with those who alone concurred in his principles of foreign policy. He was also restrained by a profound respect and gratitude for the queen, and an unwillingness to wound her feelings, or shock her prejudices, even in cases where her own interest and honour were concerned. Lastly, with a high opinion of the integrity, as well as the abilities of Harley, it was not without an arduous struggle, that he could be induced wholly to withdraw his confidence from a minister, whom he had protected and trusted, and to whose professions he listened, even at the moment when repeated proofs occurred to justify a suspicion of his duplicity. Circumstances, however, rapidly accumulated, which furnished indirect, but convincing proofs of his secret intercourse with the queen by the agency of Mrs. Masham; and of his schemes to form a party and an administration of his own, either by restoring the preponder-

\* Journals of Lords and Commons; Chandler's Debates; Letters from Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury; Burnet; Tindal; Conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough; and Other Side of the Question.

ance of the Tories, or by creating a schism among those who supported the government.

Harley saw the indecision of the two ministers, and their dread of being domineered by the party with whom they were associated. Hoping thereby to take advantage of their embarrassment, he requested an interview with both, on the plea of clearing himself from the aspersions under which he laboured. The meeting accordingly took place\*, and produced, if any, but a temporary effect; for the dispute was brought to a crisis, by various incidents, which at once awakened the suspicions of the ministers, and diminished the credit of the secretary, in the House of Commons.

A clerk in his office, of the name of Gregg, whom he had employed in Scotland and elsewhere as a spy, had formed a secret correspondence with Chamillard, the French secretary of state, for the purpose of communicating the secrets of the English cabinet. This correspondence was carried on through the medium of Tallard's letters, which were sent to the secretary's office, to be read, before they were transmitted to France. Gregg had not long been engaged in this treasonable intercourse, before one of these packets was intercepted, and found to contain the copy of a letter, which the queen was to write to the emperor, requesting him to send Prince Eugene into Spain. So exact was his intelligence, that the additions made by Godolphin to the original draft of the secretary, were specifically distinguished.

In consequence of this discovery, Gregg was arrested on the 30th of December, and after an examination, in which he acknowledged his guilt, was brought to a public trial at the Old Bailey, and convicted on his own confession. The circumstances of the transaction, as well as his dependence on Harley, appear to have given some colour to the accusation previously advanced against the secretary, of a correspondence with the French court, which Marlborough had indignantly repelled.

Another circumstance, which occurred at the same time also contributed to affect the credit of Harley. Vallière and Bera, two smugglers, whom he had employed to procure intelligence between Calais and Boulogne, had profited by

\* Letters between Harley and Godolphin, Dec. 5. — Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 627.

his protection and confidence, to convey information to the enemy. They were likewise arrested; and although their treasonable practices were perhaps only the usual deceptions of such agents, yet, at the moment, the discovery made considerable impression on the public mind, and was not without its influence on Marlborough and Godolphin.

These discoveries gave weight to a variety of indirect hints, which the ministers had before overlooked, of Harley's machinations with the queen and their enemies; and, at the same time, the consciousness of the critical situation in which he stood, forced the secretary to become more active in his intrigues, and to employ his efforts in widening the breach between the ministers and the Whigs. In particular he seems to have resorted to the interposition of the Duke of Buckingham, to effect a coalition between the moderate of both parties, and instigated the queen to send messages to the leading Tories, exhorting them to vindicate her dignity against the encroachments of the Whigs. Mutual fears and jealousies brought the affair to a crisis. Before the close of January, Harley received, from the attorney-general, a formal notice that he had fallen under the displeasure of Godolphin. He instantly appealed to Marlborough, as to his patron and protector. In a confidential interview, Marlborough frankly acquainted him with the motives of the coldness which he had experienced, both from himself and the treasurer, and even descended to particulars. Harley, however, was not disconcerted, but again appealed to Godolphin, treated the charges against him as artful misrepresentations, and concluded with those professions of innocence and zeal for their service, which he had so often employed. The brief and indignant answer of Godolphin proved that his professions had now lost their weight, and cut off all hopes of a reconciliation.

"I have received your letter, and am very sorry for what has happened, to lose the good opinion I had so much inclination to have of you; but I cannot help seeing, nor believing my senses. I am very far from having deserved it of you. God forgive you."\*

Having at length taken their reluctant resolution, the two ministers found, in their attempts to remove their dangerous

\* *Hardwicke Papers* — *Somerville's Queen Anne*, p. 628., where this as well as the preceding letter is printed.

rival, a mortifying proof of his interest with their royal mistress. In vain they laid their complaints before the queen, and insisted on his dismissal. She appeared to have forgot their deserts; and however necessary their services were, at this period, to the safety and honour of the country, she evinced a determination not to abandon her confidential adviser.

At this juncture the Whigs became sensible of their injustice to the two ministers, and felt that the fate of their party, as well as that of the general and treasurer, depended on the disgrace of the obnoxious minister. The whole body conveyed to Marlborough an assurance of their unanimous and zealous support; and to prove their resolution of pushing their hostility against Harley, a committee of seven Whig lords was appointed to examine Gregg and the two smugglers, for their treacherous correspondence. For this purpose, Gregg received a respite, to give time for his examination, and to draw from him a farther confession, by the prospect of a pardon.

These circumstances discouraged neither the queen nor Harley. She persisted in her purpose, and reports of a plan for a new ministry were circulated, with a design of intimidation. A decisive step was therefore necessary; and no alternative remained, but to bend to the interest of Harley, or resign their posts. Accordingly both Marlborough and Godolphin joined in announcing their resolution, and stating that the queen should no longer consider them as her servants, if Harley was not dismissed. The letter of Godolphin is not extant, but that of Marlborough is still preserved.

“Madam: — Since all the faithful services I have endeavoured to do you, and the unwearied pains I have taken for these ten days, to satisfy and convince your majesty’s own mind, have not been able to give you any such impressions of the false and treacherous proceedings of Mr. Secretary Harley to lord treasurer and myself, but that your majesty is pleased to countenance and to support him, to the ruin of your own business at home; I am very much afraid it will be attended with the sorrow and amazement of all Europe, as soon as the noise of it gets abroad. And I find myself obliged to have so much regard to my own honour and reputation, as not to be every day made a sacrifice to falsehood and treachery, but most humbly to acquaint your majesty that no consideration can make me serve any longer with that man. And I beseech your majesty to look upon me, from this moment, as forced out of your service, as long as you think fit to continue him in it.

"No heart is fuller of duty to your majesty than mine; nobody has more sincere wishes for your prosperity, nor shall more constantly pray for your majesty's long life, and for your happiness both here and hereafter. I am always, with the greatest respect, and the truest zeal for your service," &c. \*

Still, however, the queen persisted in her resolution, and encouraged Harley to maintain his post. On the 9th of February, a meeting of the cabinet council was summoned, as usual, and the customary notice sent to the two ministers. Resolved not again to sit at the same board with the secretary, they waited on the queen, and respectfully repeated their determination. She appeared little concerned at the proposed resignation of the treasurer, but was much affected with the declaration of the general, and employed the most earnest entreaties to dissuade him from his purpose. The fate of England and of Europe hung on his decision; but he proved the warmth of his friendship, and the consistency of his character; he did not belie his repeated asseverations, that he would stand or fall with Godolphin. He firmly and manfully resisted her instances, and retired from her presence with firmness and respect.

This disappointment, however, did not intimidate the queen. The cabinet council assembled at the appointed time, and after she had taken her seat, Harley proceeded to open the business of the meeting, which related to the affairs of his department. The members at first appeared as if absorbed in reflection: half-smothered murmurs were then heard, and the secretary paused. A momentary silence ensuing, the members turned to each other, with looks of surprise and uneasiness, till the duke of Somerset arose, and, with warmth, exclaimed, "I do not see how we can deliberate, when the commander-in-chief and the lord treasurer are absent." On this unexpected observation, which plainly expressed the sense of the meeting, Harley was still more disconcerted, and the queen remained silent. The observation being repeated, the queen broke up the unfinished deli-

\* The draft of this letter is written in the hand of Marlborough, except a ~~trivial~~ alteration by Godolphin, which is introduced in the text. The original runs thus, "*That your majesty is pleased to countenance and support him, to the ruin of your own business, and of your faithful servants at home, which may be attended with the sorrow and amazement,*" &c.

beration, and withdrew with evident emotions of anger, alarm, and disappointment.\*

The result could not long be concealed, and the agitation of the public mind became extreme. Expressions of concern and dissatisfaction were heard in both houses of parliament; and the Commons, in particular, suffered a bill of supply to lie on their table, though ordered for that day. The prospect of the treasurer's resignation excited similar discontent among the monied men in the city, by whom his abilities and integrity were best appreciated.

Still, however, with her characteristic pertinacity, Anne did not abandon her purpose. But Harley was conscious, that with the load of suspicion under which he laboured, detested by the Whigs, and not cordially supported, even by the whole body of Tories, he could not conduct the government against the current of public opinion. He, therefore, entreated the queen to accept his resignation, and his instances were seconded by the prince of Denmark, who dreaded a convulsion in the state. Her resolution was swayed by these alarming symptoms, and the representation of her husband. The next day she summoned the Duke of Marlborough into her presence; and, after some bitter expostulations, which spoke her anger and mortification, she informed him that Mr. Harley should retire from her service.

Accordingly, on the 11th of February, Harley formally resigned the seals. His place was transferred to Mr. Boyle, a zealous Whig; and the office of chancellor of the exchequer was restored to Mr. Smith, who held it, with that of speaker, during the short remainder of the session. The resignation of Harley was followed by those of St. John, Mansell, and Harcourt; and the posts of comptroller of the household, and secretary at war, were transferred to Earl Cholmondeley, and Mr. Robert Walpole, who had gained the esteem and confidence of Marlborough, by his diligence and zeal in office. The queen, however, was too deeply mortified, to accept the recommendation of Godolphin in favour of Sir James Montague, brother of Lord Halifax, for the office of attorney-general; and this post, so necessary to the public

\* Conduct of the Duchess, p. 253. — Burnet, vol. v. p. 373.

administration of justice, continued vacant till the close of the year.

Meanwhile the examination of Gregg had proceeded, and though the criminal continued to acknowledge his own guilt, he repeatedly and solemnly declared that Harley was innocent of the slightest connivance in his treasonable practices. As his confession threw no new light on the transaction, he was deemed unworthy of the royal mercy, and preparations were made for his execution. The queen at first refused to consent, and appeared extremely agitated on the slightest allusion to the conduct of the criminal, as it affected Harley.\* But as a pardon would have fixed a stigma on the disgraced minister, and as the behaviour of the criminal was highly insolent, she at length gave her sanction; and a dying confession, published in his name and at his request, strongly asserted his own guilt and contrition, and at the same time vindicated the innocence of his principal.

On the 18th of March, a report from the committee of lords was published. Although the examination had produced no new fact, to disprove the asseverations of the criminal, yet as it showed that Harley had been guilty of culpable negligence, in suffering papers of the highest importance and secrecy to remain open to the inspection of the common clerks in his office, it left an unfavourable and indelible impression on his official character in the public mind, though it appeared to produce no change in the sentiments of the queen.

A letter from Mrs. Burnet to the duchess is here introduced, to show the opinion of the Whigs, and the burst of zeal and attachment which the crisis called forth from their party.

*“ Tuesday morning. — Had I not been prevented, I had yesterday wrote, to wish your grace joy of the late victory, which I hope, if it please God, will have as happy effects as any the Duke of Marlborough ever got. I should have done it before the success, since I was well satisfied the resolution was right, be the event what it would; for 'tis not to be expressed with what indignation it was generally received, that the lord treasurer and the Duke of Marlborough should be put one moment in the balance with Mr. Harley and his party, who in all respects have appeared so far inferior to what they were ever thought to be,*

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\* Letter from Godolphin to the Duke of Marlborough.

though I am confidently told that Mr. Harley would have undertook the weight, if the queen would have ventured.

"The danger the Duke of Marlborough was in of being taken once in Holland by the French, did not more plainly show the love and esteem that country had for him, than this accident has showed, that however displeased some may be, for particular matters, yet that they have an esteem and sense of the great obligations we are under, and the merit of the lord treasurer and the Duke of Marlborough. Had this affair hung longer in suspense, most, if not all the Whigs of consideration would have laid down their places; and not only the bishop of Salisbury, but most of the other bishops, would have come and offered lord treasurer and the Duke of Marlborough all the service in their power, and have been ready to join in any thing to show their regard to the duke and lord treasurer. And this I don't say now, when it may look like making a court after victory, but what was their thoughts when the worst was feared. With respect to things beyond sea, I am glad it came to so short an issue; and I ought to add, out of the regard I have to the queen's character, which cannot but suffer in this preposterous struggle, but also for the honour of lord treasurer and the Duke of Marlborough, it had been better it had lasted a few days longer, that people might have had opportunities to have showed their zeal for them, and to have more firmly united all honest men that mean well together, and discovered who were so. For I am told, that the most humoursome of the Whigs, in the House of Commons, were ready to offer their service, and all, in general, showed anger or contempt at the arrogance of Mr. Harley.

"I will add no more to this letter, but what I pray for, that the lord treasurer and the Duke of Marlborough may make the best use of the great advantages this has given them, and improve the good understanding and confidence this has laid the foundation of, with all wise honest men that love the queen; for I am sure they are the only friends that can be relied on. 'Tis presumption in me to give any advice; but some things are so plainly for their service, that whoever loves them cannot but see it, and consequently cannot but wish, at least, they may do them."

#### CHAP. LXV. — ASCENDENCY OF THE WHIGS. — 1708.

THE dismissal of Harley and his adherents was rendered popular by an invasion from France, which was preparing at the moment when the change was in agitation.

The court of St. Germain's had long endeavoured to persuade the king of France to invade England, for the purpose of establishing the young Pretender on the throne of his an-

cestors. But although they exaggerated the number of their adherents, and expatiated on the internal divisions of Great Britain, Louis had not hitherto listened to their applications; either because he found sufficient employment for his forces in other quarters, or because an unsuccessful attempt might ruin the interest of the Stuarts. At this period, however, circumstances seemed to favour the long-meditated project; while the humbled state of the French monarch induced him to make a desperate effort, in order to create, at least, a diversion in the country on which the fate of the war depended.

The recent disagreement between the ministers and the principal Whigs, the influence of the Tories among the country gentlemen and clergy, the number of those who were really devoted to the Stuart line, the clamours excited against the burdens of the war, and the cry of peace which began to be raised in every quarter, proved an increase of disaffection towards the government, which was readily mistaken by the exiled prince for a proof of attachment to his cause; this opinion was also corroborated by the number of every rank and station, who had carried on, or affected to carry on, a secret correspondence with his emissaries.

It was, however, in Scotland, where the principal leaven of disaffection existed. The warlike clans of the Highlands, secluded among their mountains, nurtured in their prejudices, inured to danger and hardship, and passively obedient to their feudal lords, fostered an ardent and zealous attachment to the descendants of their ancient kings; and this attachment derived new force from the events which had recently occurred. In the first part of the reign of Anne, the Scots had succeeded in extorting the Act of Security, which was calculated to render them a separate and independent nation on her death; and, therefore, they witnessed, with indignation and horror, the union of the two countries, which destroyed their darling hopes, by not only incorporating them with a people against whom they still felt all their ancient rivalry, but even by settling the eventual transfer of their crown on a foreign family. These prejudices were heightened by the alarms wilfully spread among them, that the union with England would be no less detrimental to their commerce and landed property, than to their freedom. Be-

sides, the nobility were degraded in their own opinion and in that of the public, by the dissolution of the Scottish parliament, and their partial exclusion from the British House of Lords. It was impossible, therefore, to satisfy all the great families; and while the dukes of Queensbury and Argyle, the earls of Scaford and Stair, and other nobles, supported the connexion with England, the disaffected found active and zealous chiefs in the dukes of Hamilton and Athol, and the lords Buchan, Errol, and Marischal. In consequence of these elements of disaffection, the opposition to the Union rose almost into open rebellion, and the articles were publicly burnt in several towns.

Calculating, therefore, on the timidity of the queen, and her known dislike of the Hanoverian line, on the former correspondence of Marlborough and Godolphin with the exiled family, on the promises held forth by many among the Tories, and on the zealous support of the English Jacobites, as well as the recent schism of the Whigs, the disaffected hoped to produce a new revolution, and to secure at least the reversion of the crown to the lineal descendant of their former sovereigns. Hence they importuned the court of St. Germans for a military force to call this latent spirit into action; and their applications were earnestly submitted to the French cabinet. Accordingly, agents were despatched into Scotland, and transmitted the most gratifying intelligence of the general spirit manifested by the bulk of the nation. They dwelt on the scanty force, which was employed to maintain the public tranquillity, both in Scotland and in the north of England, and described the facility of seizing the principal fortresses, and the public treasure. They represented the delay which must ensue before assistance could be obtained from abroad, without the previous consent of parliament; and argued that a prompt and decisive effort would be attended with certain success.

These representations produced the desired effect. The expedition was fitted out at Dunkirk, and consisted of 8 sail of the line, 24 frigates, and 66 long boats, with numerous transports, conveying 12 battalions, 13,000 stand of arms, and a store of military accoutrements. The command was intrusted to the Chevalier de Forbin, a distinguished naval officer; and the young Pretender, who had just at-

tained his twentieth year, accompanied the expedition, under the name of the Chevalier de St. George. He was furnished with services of gold plate, liveries, and uniforms, and with every requisite for a splendid court. Anticipating the functions of sovereignty, he created a master of the Scottish mint, and even issued orders for the regulation of a new coinage.\* He was loaded with the presents and contributions of the Roman court, and obtained the blessing of the Pope on his colours and standards, which were decorated with the royal motto, "Dieu et mon droit," and other appropriate inscriptions.

These preparations, however, did not escape the vigilance of the English government. Marlborough received early intelligence of the design, from his friends in Holland, as well as from his spies in France; and the active zeal which he evinced as commander-in-chief is proved by a confidential letter to General Cadogan, whom he had left as temporary agent with the Dutch government, and in whose diligence and fidelity he reposed implicit confidence.

"*St. James's, Feb. 17.* — Upon what you writ the last post to M. Cardonel, and the advice come from other parts, of the preparations making at Dunkirk, her majesty has thought fit, that upon receipt of this you forthwith repair to Flanders, and by all possible means inform yourself of the enemy's designs, giving notice of what you can learn, by every opportunity, and if you find it requisite, by frequent expresses, both by Ostend and the Brill. Her majesty does likewise think fit, in case there be any good grounds to believe the enemy have formed a design of landing in these parts, or in North Britain, that there be a proportionable number of her majesty's foot forces, not only kept in readiness to embark immediately, but does farther recommend it to your care, if the enemy should embark with an intention of landing in Great Britain, before you have any other orders from hence, that then you put her majesty's troops on ship-board with all possible speed, either at Ostend or in Zealand, and come yourself with them, to the first convenient port you can make. And you are, in what relates to the particular troops to be made choice of on this occasion, to concert with, and observe the directions of Lieutenant-general Lumley, to whom I likewise write on this subject, as I do to M. de Overkirk, desiring them withal, as I do to you, that it may be kept as secret as the service will allow. And if the States have any men of war in Zealand, or ready in their ports, you are to apply to them for their assistance herein."

In conformity with these instructions, Cadogan obtained

\* Lockhart's Memoirs.

from the Dutch government a promise of immediate assistance in troops and ships ; and repairing to Brussels, concerted with Overkirk the mode and means of transport, as well as of supplying the void left in the garrisons by the intended drafts. At Ghent he consulted the commander-in-chief, General Lumley, and obtained orders for the immediate march of ten battalions. Proceeding next to Ostend, he made every preparation for the transport of the troops to England, on the first notice that the French were actually embarked, on board the fleet prepared at Dunkirk, for the expedition.

In England the war department displayed the vigorous impulse of Marlborough. Drafts were made from the horse and foot guards, and several regiments of infantry were ordered to join the earl of Leven, commander-in-chief in Scotland, who had taken possession of the castle of Edinburgh. Others were collected on the north-east coast of Ireland, to be ready for immediate embarkation.

The Admiralty also exonerated themselves from the stigma under which they had recently laboured, by their vigour and promptitude. Without diminishing the convoy for the Lisbon fleet, which consisted of no less than twelve English and five Dutch men of war, they fitted out two squadrons of twenty-three British and three Dutch men of war, which sailed from Deal, under the command of Sir George Byng and Lord Darnley, and appeared off the coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk.

In the midst of these preparations the customary notice was submitted to parliament. On the 4th of March, Mr. Boyle, secretary of state, imparted to the House of Commons, by order of the queen, the intelligence received from General Cadogan, relative to the French preparations at Dunkirk. He stated that the pretended prince of Wales was arrived with 15 battalions, ready to embark, that the duke of Berwick was expected, and that the object of the expedition was Scotland, where they had many friends, and hoped to surprise the castle of Edinburgh. He at the same time announced the preparations at Ostend, and gave notice that the States-general were anxious and willing to assist the queen, with their whole disposable force, by land and sea.\*

\* Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, March 4.

These reports of a projected invasion, which had been hitherto slightly treated by the Tories, and represented as a mere political trick to excite alarm, were received with the deepest sensation by the Commons. All party distinctions seemed to be forgotten, in the general anxiety to rally round the throne. An address of thanks was instantly drawn up, and being approved, was conveyed to the Upper House by Lord Hertford, who returned with the unanimous sanction of the Peers.

After thanking the queen for her communications, and gratefully acknowledging the zeal of the Dutch, the two houses expressed their resolution to assist her majesty with their lives and fortunes, in the maintenance of her undoubted right to the crown, against the pretended prince of Wales, and all her enemies, both at home and abroad. They praised the zeal and activity which had been manifested, both in the naval and military departments, and requested her majesty, not only to execute the laws against papists and non-jurors, but to secure the arms and persons of those who were suspected. At the close of their address, they expressed sentiments worthy of the British nation:—

“As we doubt not, but by the blessing of God upon the continuance of your majesty’s care, your enemies will be put to confusion, so we readily embrace this opportunity to show to your majesty and the whole world that no attempts of this kind shall deter us from supporting your majesty in the vigorous prosecution of the present war against France, until the monarchy of Spain be restored to the house of Austria, and your majesty have the glory to complete the recovery of the liberties of Europe.”

The two houses proved that these loyal declarations were not empty professions. They passed a bill, requiring all persons to take the oath of abjuration, under pain of being treated as convicted recusants, suspended the Habeas Corpus Act, and proclaimed the pretender and his adherents, traitors, and rebels. They consented that the 5000 men, who were ready for embarkation at Ostend, should be immediately brought from the coast of Flanders, and voted supplies commensurate with the exigency of the moment.

The activity of government corresponded with the zeal of the legislature. Many avowed or suspected Jacobites were arrested, and after a short confinement in different places, conveyed to London. Among the most distinguished was

the duke of Hamilton\*, who had repaired to England, under the plea of domestic business, and was taken into custody by a state messenger, in his passage through Lancashire. He was permitted to remain some days at a seat in Staffordshire, and finally transferred to the Tower.

In the midst of the general suspense and anxiety, the troops from abroad landed at Tynemouth, and with the forces collected in the country, prepared to advance, by rapid marches, to the scene of danger. But long before they could reach their destination, the storm, which had menaced the British shores, was dissipated, by the vigilance and enterprise of the navy.

The unexpected apparition of a powerful squadron before Dunkirk confounded the French court, who had fondly imagined that the departure of the Lisbon fleet had left the coasts defenceless. Fear and indecision succeeded to hope and confidence, and after a considerable delay, occupied by orders and counter-orders, advantage was taken of a gale, which drove the English fleet off its station, to give the signal for sailing. Their destination was, however, suspected, and when they reached the Frith of Forth, they were astonished to find Sir George Byng,\* with his squadron, waiting their arrival. Discouraged by the appearance of this superior force, and disappointed of the expected co-operation from the rebels, they changed their plan, and beat round the north of Scotland, to land at Inverness, where they expected an insurrection in their favour among the Highland clans. But they were driven out to sea by tempestuous winds, and after becoming the sport of the elements for the space of a month, deemed themselves fortunate in effecting their return to Dunkirk, though with the loss of 4000 men, from hardship and sickness. One of the ships, the Salisbury, was captured, having on board Lord Griffin, the two sons of the earl of Middleton, and Colonel Warcope, who were committed to the Tower. The vigilance of government prevented the adherents of the pretender from exciting disturbances; and the only effect produced by the attempt was, a temporary run on the Bank of England, which was obviated by the prudence of the lord treasurer, and the liberal assistance of the nobility

\* The best account of this proceeding is found in Lockhart's *State Papers*, vol. i. p. 217.

and monied men, among whom we distinguish the names of Marlborough, Somerset, Newcastle, and Godolphin, as well as of the principal merchants in the city.\*

On the defeat of the intended invasion, the services of Marlborough and Godolphin received due praise from the nation at large; one for his judicious disposition of the military force, and the other for the vigour and wisdom of the internal government.

The spirited address presented by the Commons to the queen conveys full testimony to their merits, and a censure no less strong on "those persons, who, by endeavouring to create divisions and animosities, lessen the just esteem which your majesty entertains for those who have so eminently, and in so distinguished a manner, commanded your armies, and managed your treasure, to the honour and glory of your majesty abroad, and the entire satisfaction of your people at home."

The language of the peers, on the contrary, manifested the spirit of jealousy and suspicion, which the Whig chiefs still fostered against the general and treasurer, and proved that they were no less eager to recommend the merits of their own party to the royal notice, than to concur in the applause of the nation. After congratulating the queen on the disappointment of the enemy, and professing their zeal and loyalty, they held up to her detestation those who had recently endeavoured to misrepresent the actions of her best and most faithful subjects, and conjured her to exclude them in future from her presence. They concluded with expressing their opinion, that her majesty should principally depend upon, and encourage those who had been, ever since the Revolution, most steady and firm to the interest of the late king, and of her majesty, during her happy reign.

The reply of the queen is conveyed in language which she had never before employed, and was ill in unison with her private sentiments. Instead of the cautious silence which she had hitherto maintained respecting the Revolution, or its abettors, she now adopted the style in which she had been addressed. After deprecating party distinctions, she de-

\* Tindal and the other historians: History of Europe for 1708; Lockhart's Papers, vol. i. which contain much interesting information on this subject; Journals of the Lords and Commons.

clared her obligation "to place her chief dependence on those who had given such repeated proofs of the greatest warmth and concern, for the support of the Revolution, the security of her own person, and the Protestant succession."

In the speech with which she closed the session, she assumed a still more decisive tone. After thanking the parliament for their liberal and timely supplies, she observed, "I take these to be such undeniable proofs of your zeal and affection to my service as must convince every body of your doing me the justice to believe, that all which is dear to you is perfectly safe under my government, and must be irrecoverably lost, if ever the designs of *a Popish pretender, bred up in the principles of the most arbitrary government, should take place.*" \*

Such expressions sufficiently display the fear which the queen conceived of the Whigs, as well as the necessity she felt of yielding to the impulse of public opinion, and may serve as a proof of the change which recent events had produced in the character of the administration. This memorable answer closed the business of the session; for the parliament was prorogued the same day, and on the 15th of April dissolved, a short time before it would have expired, by the lapse of three years.

We cannot close our narrative of these transactions without adverting to an incident which seems to have arisen out of the struggle for the dismissal of Harley, and which, though of minor importance in itself, materially affected the feelings and interest of the Duke of Marlborough.

Mortified at the increasing influence which Mrs. Masham appeared to enjoy, the duchess continually persecuted the queen with reproaches and remonstrances, both in person and by letter.† Finding that her ill-judged efforts, instead of lessening, increased the affection of the queen for the new favourite, she adopted the resolution of withdrawing from court. She waited on her royal mistress, a few days before the dismissal of Harley, and after a preamble, which was frequently interrupted by the violence of her emotions, she added, "As Lord Marlborough is now about to be forced

\* Journals.

† One of these indecorous altercations is recorded by the duchess in her Conduct, p. 244.

from your majesty's service, I cannot, in honour, remain any longer at court." She then expatiated, as usual, on her own services, and on the friendship which the queen had condescended to entertain for her; and as a recompence, concluded with requesting permission to resign her offices in favour of her two elder daughters, who from their rank, alliance, and character, were well calculated to merit such a favour.

After listening with seeming embarrassment to this long appeal, the queen evaded compliance, by affecting much kindness, and repeating, "You and I must never part." The duchess, however, was not diverted from her purpose, and renewed her solicitations, that if circumstances should render her retreat necessary, her majesty would comply with this request. The queen, pressed by her importunities, and intimidated by the presence of a person whom she equally feared and disliked, renewed the declaration, "that they should never part." But added, should that even be the case, she would transfer the offices to two of her daughters; and did not hesitate to bind that promise by a solemn asseveration. The duchess took her leave, kissing the queen's hand; and after the duke and Godolphin had succeeded in extorting the dismission of Harley, the queen yielded to her continued applications, by confirming in writing the promise which had been verbally given. Still, however, the duchess had reason to feel that her attendance was unwelcome; and on the departure of her husband to the Continent, she wrote a letter, expressing her resolution not to incommode the queen by her presence, but artfully recalled to recollection the promise which she had before extorted.\*

"*Murch* 31. — Madam; upon Lord Marlborough's going into Holland, I believe your majesty will neither be surprised nor displeased, to hear I am gone into the country, since by your very hard and uncommon usage of me, you have convinced all sorts of people, as well as myself, that nothing would be so uneasy to you as my near attendance. Upon this account, I thought it might not be improper, at my going into the country, to acquaint your majesty, that even while Lord Marlborough continues in your service, as well as when he finds himself obliged to leave it, if your majesty thinks fit to dispose of my employments, according to the solemn assurances you have been pleased to give me, you shall meet with all the submission and acknowledgments imaginable." †

\* From a narrative manuscript of the duchess, beginning — "Some days before my Lord Marlborough," &c. — *Conduct*, p. 254.

† From a copy in the handwriting of the duchess.

It is needless to expatiate on the disgust which this ill-timed application and imprudent importunity produced. The queen and the duchess never met without sullen silence or bitter reproaches ; and never wrote without ironical apologies or contemptuous taunts. The effects of these female jars, arising from offended dignity on one hand, and disappointed ambition on the other, may be traced throughout the series of correspondence, and produced the most sinister effects on the administration of public affairs, by the perplexities into which they perpetually threw both the treasurer and general.

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#### CHAP. LXVI.—PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.—1708.

HOWEVER anxious to mature the preparations for the ensuing campaign, and to join Eugene, who was impatiently expecting him at the Hague, Marlborough could not quit England, until the danger of invasion had ceased. He, therefore, took his departure on the 29th of March, o.s., before the close of the session, and after a speedy passage, reached the coast of Holland. He proceeded without delay, in an open boat, to the Brill, and on the morning of the second of April, appeared at the Hague, whence he wrote Secretary Boyle.

##### *To Secretary Boyle.*

“You will have heard by last post how well I was in making my passage hither, the next night after I left London. Since my arrival, my time has been wholly taken up in concerting with the prince of Savoy, and the generals and ministers. Yesterday we had a conference with the States-general, when the prince communicated to us two projects, for the operations on the Rhine, and Moselle. The latter seems to be most relished ; but to put it in execution, the prince requires 80,000 men for the army in the Low Countries, which you may believe the states are not inclined to give. I must own, that according to the present juncture, we should be in a situation to act offensively on this side, that we may have an eye at the same time to our affairs in England, to deter the enemy from the thoughts of another invasion, which they might be inclined to, if we should weaken ourselves too much in Flanders. But the states are of opinion that the best way of hindering it, would be to keep a good squadron constantly before Dunkirk. The prince has insinuated to me, that he should be glad if I could accompany him to

Hanover, to concert with the elector; but I shall excuse myself, that I may get five or six days to come over, and inform the queen fully of the measures that shall have been taken, to which end I keep the yacht and convoy on this side."

With Eugene, Marlborough entered into a confidential communication on the state of foreign affairs, and the views of his sovereign. In these preliminary discussions, two points, in particular, occupied his attention, namely, the demands of the emperor, for the levy-money of the troops whom he had engaged to furnish; and the claims of the duke of Savoy on the Austrian court.

On the first head, Marlborough referred the discussion to the treasurer and the British cabinet, from a reluctance to acquiesce in demands which he deemed exorbitant, and an unwillingness to offend the emperor by a direct refusal.

The adjustment of the second point was still more delicate; for the duke of Savoy, on the one hand, demanded the immediate fulfilment of the treaty concluded in 1703, by which he was to receive part of the Montferrat, forfeited by the duke of Mantua, while the emperor delayed the investiture, under the pretence that the cession of the said territory would infringe the rights of the house of Lorraine. Marlborough was particularly anxious to effect an accommodation, because the success of the campaign in Italy depended on the union of the two courts; and because his friends in England, especially the treasurer, made the conduct of the emperor the theme of perpetual invective, and censured him for continuing to rely on a prince, whose engagements had been so seldom fulfilled. With this view, Marlborough despatched General Palmes to Vienna and Turin; but his principal hopes of success rested on the mediation and influence of Eugene.

The result of their amicable negotiation was highly satisfactory. From Eugene he received assurances, that the emperor was gratified by the resolution of parliament to continue the war till the whole monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria, and would faithfully redeem the pledges he had repeatedly given, in exerting his whole strength to promote the objects of the Grand Alliance. That the army on the Rhine should be increased to the amount of 20,000 men, with every requisite for action, by the

middle of May ; and that a succour of 12,000 men should be furnished for the service of Italy, to be placed under the sole direction of the duke of Savoy. That although he could not comply with the desires of the queen and parliament, by sending Eugene into Spain, he would despatch a considerable body of his troops to Catalonia, and consign the command to Count Staremberg, one of his most able generals. Finally that he would assist in the formation of an army on the Moselle, which, under the direction of Eugene, should act in any quarter, where it could be employed with the best effect. The prince also pledged himself for the compliance of his imperial master with the demands of the duke of Savoy.

After accomplishing these arrangements, Marlborough and Eugene proceeded to mature the plan for the campaign, of which they had previously concerted the outlines, as appears from a letter of Eugene to the duke, dated St. Laurent, August 31. 1707.

“ I have received your highness's letter of July 30th, by Brigadier Palmes. He departs informed of the state of affairs here, and of my opinion respecting the war in this country, and in other parts. But should it be resolved to remain here on the defensive, we ought to have a body, which may be withdrawn to form a second army on the Moselle, with some detachments from our other armies, and to act in Germany or Flanders, according as circumstances require. Above all things, magazines and artillery must be provided, without which the troops will be useless. In this case, the army in Spain must be put in a condition to want no succours, and to support itself. I entreat you to take care that none may discover these designs. In the project for this country, I only speak of the valleys of Barcelonetta and Aosta ; but if we could take Susa before winter, an army might act by Mont Cenis, or perhaps by Mont Genevre, which is the only passage practicable for artillery.

“ This project appears vast ; but if two armies were ready in May, it would not be impossible, particularly if those who were charged with the execution were not obliged to govern themselves according to the ridiculous judgments of the ignorant, as in such enterprises we attempt all that is possible ; and yet the success is always uncertain. Those who have commanded armies know this by fatal experience.

“ I end with the affairs of Spain. The king presses me continually for succours from Vienna, of which he is in want. I am overwhelmed with projects, which are referred to Holland and England, and of which General Palmes has no knowledge. It is now September. Neither fleet nor troops have any orders ; for what Lescheraine has communicated amounts to nothing. I wish, therefore, to know what is intended, that I

may apprise the king; and what measures are to be taken, for on those depend also the dispositions for the ensuing campaign." \*

In arranging this extensive design, the two generals admitted to their deliberations Pensionary Heinsius, of whose secrecy and zeal they were well assured. With him they settled two projects; one real, the other ostensible. The purport of the ostensible project was, to form two armies, one in the Netherlands, under Marlborough, the other on the Moselle, under Eugene, as if they intended to resume the design of penetrating through Loraine, which had been baffled in 1705. The real project was, to unite these two armies by a rapid march, and give battle to the French in the Netherlands, before they could be joined by reinforcements drawn from distant quarters. The army on the Moselle was to be principally formed of imperialists, palatines, Saxons, and Hessians, who had before served on the Upper Rhine; and, consequently, the German army, which had hitherto acted with little effect, was to be reduced to the defensive.

The ostensible project was communicated to the deputies of the states on the 12th of April, and the two generals earnestly recommended the preparatory measures, requisite for the execution of their secret plan. Several other conferences were successively held, to mature their arrangements, and the acquiescence of the Dutch government was at length obtained.

This disposition of force was more necessary, in consequence of the intentions manifested by the French to recover their losses in the Netherlands. For this purpose they had drawn troops from the most distant parts, even from Spain and Italy; and the choice of the generals indicated the quarter which was to be the prominent theatre of action. For the command in Dauphiné was given to Marshal Villars; that on the Upper Rhine to the elector of Bavaria and Marshal Berwick; and the direction of the war in the Netherlands was intrusted to the duke of Burgundy, who was expected to reap the laurels of victory under the skilful guidance of Vendome.

While Marlborough was employed in arranging military operations, the increasing feuds in the British court called

\* Translation from the original French.

forth his serious attention; for he had scarcely reached the Hague before the disputes, which had raged in the preceding year, broke out with redoubled fury. It was evident that the forced accommodation, which had recently taken place with the Whigs, would only prove the germ of new contentions.

The appointments of Cowper and Sunderland, and the nomination of Boyle in the room of Harley, had not sufficiently gratified the ambition of the rising party; and they now endeavoured to force the rest of their chiefs into the royal service. They first brought forward Lord Somers, whose mildness of character and steady attachment to the principles of the Revolution, had won the respect even of his rivals, and who was personally esteemed both by Marlborough and Godolphin.

Somers had hitherto announced a resolution never to accept any office of state while Harley continued in the administration; and that objection being now removed, the preceding changes were considered as propitious to his promotion, which was made by the Whigs an indispensable condition of their support. They hoped this object would encounter the less obstruction, from the general estimation in which Somers was held, as well as from the particular regard entertained for him by the two ministers. Before the departure of Marlborough, the lord treasurer, with his usual delicacy, was endeavouring to render the change palatable to the queen; and Somers was designated for the office of president of the council, which was held by the earl of Pembroke, in conjunction with the viceroyalty of Ireland. The treasurer found, however, so much repugnance on her part, and so much impatience on the side of the Whigs, that he wrote, in the most pressing terms, to hasten the temporary return of Marlborough to England, as soon as his military occupations would permit, for the sake of settling this political dispute.

*"Newmarket, April 5-16. — I had the satisfaction to receive here last night the favour of yours of the 31st of March, from the Hague, and of Prince Eugene having been there before you. I hope your affairs on that side will soon be despatched, because it is plain those on this side will not be so without your assistance; and yet I am not in despair, but your being one fortnight here would obtain what is reasonable to be done, and set things upon a tolerable foot, which otherwise are like to*

come to great extremities next winter, in the opinion of your humble servant."

The duchess was equally pressing for the return of her husband, and the Whigs, through their organ, Lord Sunderland, expressed their hopes that his presence would extort the consent of the queen to their just demands.

*Lord Sunderland to the Duchess of Marlborough.*

"*Whitehall, April 6-17.* — A Dutch mail came in this morning, by which we had reason to hope that Lord Marlborough is determined to return for some days. I can't but rejoice extremely at it, because I think it is of the last consequence to every thing here; and, besides, will bring you back to us again, which I heartily wish, not only for the satisfaction it would be to all friends, but because I am more and more convinced of what I took the liberty of saying to you before you went out of town, that I am sure your absentsing yourself for any long time, is just doing what yours and all our enemies desire, and proclaiming to the whole world what they, by all arts, endeavour to make people believe. Whereas, till every thing breaks to pieces, which I hope will not be yet, sure it would be right to endeavour to deceive the world, at least in this point. I beg pardon for touching on this subject, which I know is not agreeable to you; but I think it is of so much consequence, that I could not help doing it.

"The letters of to-day tell us the prince of Wales is gone back to St. Germain, so that there is an end of that danger, at least for this year; and it is not to be imagined the consternation they are in at Paris upon this disappointment. It does really look as if they put their whole hopes upon this single expedition; and it has raised as much the spirits of all our friends in Holland.

"As to our elections here at home, by the nicest calculation that can be made, they will be very considerably better in this parliament; so that if all this will not keep you from the spleen, I don't know what will. I am sure nothing can keep us from it, but your coming back again among your friends."

Marlborough promised to comply with their solicitations, and made preparations for his immediate departure, as soon as he had completed his military dispositions. He had scarcely, however, adopted his resolution, before he was assailed by remonstrances from the States, who were apprehensive lest he might be detained in England by contrary winds, and expatiated on the injury which would arise from his absence; to the interest of the confederacy. They even applied to the queen, repeating their instances against his departure.

The timidity of the republic would not, however, have

prevailed, had he not been swayed by difficulties of another kind. To execute the plan which he had concerted with Eugene, it was necessary to obtain the co-operation of the German princes, who manifested the utmost reluctance in sending their troops into the field.

The elector palatine refused to supply his contingent, unless the emperor would restore the territorial possessions and honours which had been wrested from his family at the peace of Westphalia, and conferred on the Bavarian line. Similar difficulties were raised by the landgrave of Hesse, and King Augustus, as elector of Saxony; but the greatest arose from the elector of Hanover, who evinced unusual eagerness to command a powerful army, and expressed the utmost indignation at the slightest hint of a diminution of his forces.

Eugene engaged to negotiate with the palatine and Saxon electors, and the landgrave; but knowing that he was himself obnoxious to the elector of Hanover, he earnestly entreated Marlborough to join him at that court, in the full confidence that his influence could alone prevail. The necessity of the case was so urgent, that Marlborough, though reluctantly, yielded to the arguments of his friend, and relinquished his design of returning to England. He announced this change in a letter to Secretary Boyle.

"*April 20., n. s.* — Prince Eugene, who is gone to Dusseldorp, to concert with the elector palatine, being very pressing with me to meet him again at Hanover, to persuade the elector to come into the measures for the operations of the campaign, and the States having written by this post to pray the queen to dispense with my return to England; I hope her majesty will not disapprove my setting out the beginning of next week for Hanover, where I purpose to continue only forty-eight hours, and to be here again in twelve days."\*

He did not linger at the Hague after the departure of Eugene, but proceeded to Hanover, where he arrived on the 26th. His first letter to Secretary Boyle contains a brief account of his journey and proceedings.

"*Hanover, April 27.* — After I writ to you on Monday, I made such diligence, that I arrived here yesterday in the evening. I took up the Count de Rechteren† at his house on the road, and Prince Eugene joined

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\* State Paper Office.

† Envoy from the States-general, formerly Baron d'Almelo.

us at the last stage. We had at night an audience of the elector, electress, and electoral prince. To-day we have begun our conferences with the ministers: what the result may be, will appear from the next, which it is likely will be from the Hague, intending to leave this place Sunday or Monday."

On reaching Hanover, the two generals were equally concerned and surprised to find that the elector had conceived a jealousy of the plans in agitation, and was determined not to resume the command on the Rhine. He in particular did not conceal his aversion to Eugene, whom he considered as sent to usurp those laurels which he himself had hoped to acquire. During their stay of two days at Hanover, they soothed his jealousy, or at least overcame his repugnance; and obtained his consent for the formation of a separate army on the Moselle. But he was not acquainted with the real project, and was left to suppose that Eugene might either act on the Moselle, or repair to the Rhine, as circumstances required. He was also gratified with 2000 imperial horse, intended for Eugene, and was promised a further reinforcement of 5000 men from the Netherlands. A pledge was given on the part of the emperor, to obviate the objections which had hitherto prevented the formal establishment of the new electorate in the house of Hanover.

Here the two great commanders separated. Having already gratified the elector palatine, and the landgrave of Hesse, by announcing the acquiescence of the emperor in their demands, Eugene proceeded to Dresden, where he was equally successful with King Augustus. From thence he took the route to Vienna, to accelerate the preparations for the ensuing campaign, and to effect an accommodation with the court of Turin.

Marlborough returned to the Hague, which place he reached on the 2d of May. After communicating to the States the result of his negotiations, and concerting the measures for opening the campaign, he proceeded to join the army, which was assembling in the vicinity of Brussels.

At the Hague he found letters from Godolphin and the duchess, filled with reproaches for his refusal to repair to England.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Newmarket, April 8-19.* — I have the favour of yours of the 13th, and am very sorry you have so little time to yourself, while I am so idle as to

be here. One of my best reasons for it was, the hopes I have to meet you at London at my return thither. But I must own your letter leaves that matter very uncertain, since you seem to think that the enemy's forming a small camp near Ypres will oblige you to go to Flanders. For my part, I cannot see much ground to apprehend the French preparations there, or any where, since their disappointment in Scotland, which seems to have very much disordered all their measures.

"I entirely dislike all Prince Eugene's projects, even if they should succeed; for considering how the court of Vienna used us as soon as they were masters in Italy, it would surely be very unadvised to put it into their power to do the same again, by making them masters again upon the Rhine and Moselle, and neglecting the opportunity of our own advantages nearer home, of which our people will be much more sensible. I wish, therefore, most earnestly, that your notion may prevail with Prince Eugene, but not at the price of those two electors\*; because that could not fail of being called here a *pretext* not to return into England, our world not being much better natured than when you left it."

"*Sunday night. April 11-22.* — The wind had been so fair all the while I was at Newmarket, that at my return from thence on Sunday, I was not out of hopes to have found you here; but instead of that you don't think of coming, which I must own is a great mortification to me; for I had much set my heart upon the hopes of seeing you, and endeavouring once more to have set Mrs. Morley's affairs upon a right foot; and I really think it would be very hard for her to have resisted the plain necessity with which our arguments might have been enforced at this time. I say this chiefly because I really believe one of your chief reasons for your not making use of the fair wind that presented, was, your apprehension that your being here would not be able to do any good; for you must give me leave to say, that I cannot think you will go to Hanover, or that you will think yourself there is any occasion at present for your going to Flanders.

"I am very sorry for what Prince Eugene tells you of the little to be expected from the duke of Savoy. I confess I had great hopes that something might be done with effect on that side, where there seems to be the least preparation for any resistance. \* \* \* \*

"A good many people seem to be uneasy here, at your sending for three regiments; but I hope it will soon be over, if the diligence of Lieutenant-general Erle, joined to the great allowances which I have made at the treasury, for restoring the Almanza regiments, can be sufficient to have them completed by Midsummer, the time assigned for that purpose. He goes to-morrow to Northampton, to review such of the troops as are upon their return from the frontiers of Scotland."

"*April, 13-24.* — Since my former letter of the 12th, the letters of the 20th are arrived from Holland, and to my great surprise I have none from you, nor had Lady Marlborough received hers when I sent this morning; so I conclude some accident must have happened to her letters and mine. By yours to Mr. Boyle, I am very sorry to find you resolve

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\* Palatine and Hanover.

to go to Hanover. It will be looked upon here as a very full conviction, that any place is more agreeable than England; and I am afraid the pains that you take in going thither can have no other effect, than to increase the elector of Hanover's jealousy of Prince Eugene, and render him still fuller of difficulties and irresolution."

"April 16-27. — In my last I acknowledged yours of the 20th with the account from Prince Eugene of King Augustus's proposals to the emperor, in which matter the queen does fully agree with your opinions at the Hague.

"As to what is said to you by those of Amsterdam, concerning their *barrier*, we in England shall be easy I believe in giving them any satisfaction about that matter with these two conditions: — 1st, that Ostend remain in the hands of Spain; and, 2dly, that Dunkirk be demolished. I think we are undone whenever we consent to any peace, without these two articles.

"I wish your next letters from Hanover may give us a good account of your having had success there, but I must own it is more than I expect."

The replies of Marlborough show how deeply his feelings were wounded by these querulous reproaches.

*To the Duchess.*

"Hague, May 3. — At my return last night at this place I had the pleasure of receiving yours of the 5th and 6th. I am very sorry, and do assure you that it was never my intention that any letter of mine should give uneasiness to you; but the contrary, for I can have no content, if I must live without your esteem and love. The letter writ by the States\* proceeded from my positively refusing of them, and not from any desire of not returning. I must own to you, that I have never been one day since I left England without very dismal thoughts; for I am very much of your opinion, that the queen's inclinations are such, that the Whigs must be angry, and, consequently, the lord treasurer and I not only uneasy, but unsafe. All this I could bear if I could be so happy as to gain your love and esteem; for however unhappy my passion and temper may make you, when I have time to recollect, I never have any thought but what is full of kindness for you.

"The hope you have of the good instructions that have been given to the duke of Devonshire †, in order to persuade the queen, is what I am afraid will signify very little, since the power and inclinations of Mrs. Masham will be opposite. For my own part, I shall this campaign do my utmost for the good of the common cause, and the queen's service,

\* Alluding to the letter written by the States to the queen, against his return to England.

† He here alludes to the proposal for admitting Lord Somers into the council without an office. See the next chapter.

after which, I should, from my soul, be glad of being excused from any farther service. I shall leave this place in two or three days, and shall take care to have your letters follow me to Brussels.

"The enclosed paper you sent me, I should think would do good."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Hague, May 3.* — At my return here last night, I had the happiness of your three letters of the 3d, 5th, and 8th, by which I am sensible of your kind desires for my return. I am now thoroughly convinced, if I had avoided being at Hanover, at the same time with Prince Eugene, not only the project made at the Hague had miscarried, but also these people would have laid the fault at my door.

"After a very great deal of uneasiness, the elector has consented to the project for three armies; but we have been obliged to leave on the Rhine two imperial regiments more than we designed, so that Prince Eugene will have 2000 horse less on the Moselle; and as for the joining the two armies, we thought it best not to acquaint the elector with it, so that I expect when that is put in execution, he will be very angry; but since the good of the campaign depends upon it, I know no remedy but patience.

"The burgomasters of Amsterdam were above two hours with me this morning, to convince me of the necessity of a sudden peace. I need not repeat you their reasons, the greatest part of them were such as you have heard formerly from Mr. Buys. That which gave me the greatest surprise was, that they hoped the queen would come into measures with them for the proposing peace to France, in case France should make none to them by the month of July. This, from the most zealous part of the Dutch, has very much alarmed me. The next thing they desired was, that the queen would be pleased to lose no time in giving her orders for beginning a treaty for their barrier; and that they on their side were willing to take any measure her majesty should propose to take, for the security of the Union and the Protestant succession. They insist on the same barrier they formerly proposed, with what they call an expedient, which is, that half the garrison of Ostend might be Spaniards. They make difficulty of giving me this in writing, but at last, I believe, they will do it. In the mean time, I beg you will acquaint the queen, that I may know her pleasure. Though they pressed me very much to acquaint you by this post, at the same time they were very earnest that you should let nobody know it but her majesty.

"Not only in this conversation, but in that in which I had with them before I went to Hanover, I find they think the Tories are in the interest of 54, and that the court is divided. This opinion may prove very fatal to the queen's interest. Every thing has so ill a prospect, that I should despair, were it not for the hopes that God will give me, this campaign, an opportunity of serving the queen and common cause.

"Before I left England, I did speak to the queen, that in this promotion the earl of Rivers might have a commission of general of the horse, he being the only lieutenant-general of the last war. If her majesty

pleases, I think it reasonable that his commission should be dated from the time he was sent for Portugal.

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"I own to you that I expect no good nature from my dear countrymen; but I beg that justice and friendship of you to believe, that I could no ways avoid my journey to Hanover, without hazarding the project we have made for this campaign."

*To Lord Sunderland.*

"*Hague, May 4.* — My lord, at my arrival here last night, I had the favour of yours of the 6th. I am of your opinion, that the proposal from the court of Vienna for levy money, is very unreasonable. I also agree with you that it will be impossible for those that are thought to have the credit, to be able to do her majesty or their country any service. For my own part, I shall endeavour to do my duty this campaign, after which I should be glad to see my place well filled, and that for the remaining part of my life I might have a little quiet, and be sometimes with my children. You will see by Mr. Secretary Boyle's letter what we have done at Hanover. I shall leave this place on Monday, in order to take the field, as soon as there is any grass, the spring being very backward. My kind love to Lady Sunderland, and be assured that I am tenderly yours," &c.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*May 6.* — \* \* \* \* \* The pensioner's sickness hinders me from seeing him, but I have pressed M. Fagel, the greffier, that their ships might be hastened to you. Yesterday's letters from Paris assure us, that the duke of Burgundy is to command in Flanders, and that they are to have a superiority of 30,000 men, which I think is impossible. But if they send him, they think themselves strong enough to act offensively, by which we may have an action. Those who are angry at the coming over of the three battalions, do not know that they are part of our 20,000 men, as also the regiment of Raby. But I am so sensible of some people's being glad to find fault, that I am quite weary of serving; for though I give myself no rest, and ruin my constitution, I cannot please without doing impossibilities.

"I shall write to my brother George, as you desire.

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"I go from hence to-morrow morning, but shall not be at Brussels till Thursday, being resolved to go by Ghent, to give the necessary orders for the English. The recruit horses not being come, will make it very difficult for the English horse to take the field at the same time with the rest of the army."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Hague, May 6.* — \* \* \* \* \* I am of your mind, and not that of Mr. Bertie's, for Mrs. Masham will not have that preferment, since it must prove her ruin; but I am afraid she will have the power of doing all the mischief that is possible to the queen. There is care taken, by letters writ from England, to persuade these people that the queen has no kindness for you, the lord treasurer, and me. I take this to be the

politics of Mr. Harley, for the inducing of these people to a peace, to which, God knows, they are but too much inclined.

"I am to thank you for three of yours, which I received this morning. I should be glad to have your second letter of the queen, that I might be the better able to judge of that fatal correspondence with Mr. Harley, which will prove her ruin. I must own to you that I am of the same mind with your friends, that you cannot oblige Mrs. Masham more than by being at a distance from the queen. However, I value your quiet and happiness so much, and being almost persuaded that it is next to impossible to change the inclinations of the queen, I would not have you constrain yourself in any thing. I find by yours, that some friends of mine are angry at my not returning. It is most certain if I had not gone to Hanover we should have begun this campaign without any project. God knows how this will succeed, which we have agreed on; but this pleasure we have, that it gives uneasiness in France. Besides this, I own to you, that if I had come, I should not have been able to have done any good with the queen; for till she suffers by the unreasonable advice of Mrs. Masham and Mr. Harley, it will be not in my power to do her any service; so that unless you will have it otherwise, it is my intention to use my endeavours of making it necessary for my staying abroad this next winter. The account of the behaviour of my brother George is unaccountable. I shall be sure to write to him my mind very freely."

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#### CHAP. LXVII.—DOMESTIC CABALS.—1708.

THE state of parties and of the cabinet fully justified the concern which the friends of Marlborough expressed at his unexpected journey to Hanover. The antipathy of the queen to the Whigs in general returning with redoubled force, she withheld her countenance even from those who had rendered her the most essential services. Notwithstanding the merits of Sir George Byng, in defeating the recent invasion, her aversion to his party principles so far overcame her gratitude, that she scarcely deigned to treat him with the attentions due to his rank.

"Sir George Byng," observes Godolphin, in a letter dated April 29d to Marlborough, "is come to town, but has not yet had that countenance shown him which either his past diligence, or the hopes of his future behaviour in this summer's service, might naturally lead him to expect. Those who have most credit with Mrs. Morley [the queen] do him all the ill offices imaginable. Mr. Montgomery [Godolphin] has taken some pains to change this temper, and to reconcile them; but I am not

certain what will be the effect of it. This I am sure of, that if these prejudices are not to be cured, the advices they occasion will ruin the service, and those that give them. In a word, we must hope you will do miracles abroad, and, afterwards that those may produce yet greater miracles at home."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"April 19-30. — \* \* \* \* Mrs. Morley continues so very difficult to do any thing that is for herself, that it puts us into all the distraction and uneasiness imaginable. I really believe this humour proceeds more from her husband than from herself, and in him it is very much kept up by your brother George, who seemed to me as wrong as possible when I spoke to him the other day. I spoke so freely and so fully to him of what we must all expect next winter, and himself in particular, if things were to go on at this rate, that he appeared to be much less resolute after I had talked awhile to him, and thanked me for speaking so freely. If he did not do this out of cunning, I believe your taking notice to him that Mr. Montgomery seemed to fear he put Mrs. Morley upon wrong measures, might possibly have no ill effect; but you are the best judge of this. The vacancies in the prince's council will not be very well filled, and the difficulty of filling the attorney-general's place is as great as that in which you left us, and which still remains as when you left us. I have been to-day, with the queen's leave, to see the duke of Hamilton. Mortifications are of use to some tempers. I found him less unreasonable than I expected, but very desirous, however, to be set at liberty, and to be distinguished from the rest of his countrymen."

The Whigs, on the other hand, discovering that Godolphin was either unwilling or unable to vanquish the repugnance of the queen; and finding that their endeavours to force their chiefs into the principal offices of state were offensive to the moderate of all parties, adroitly changed their mode of attack, and confined their demands to a seat for Lord Somers in the cabinet council, without any official employment. In this pretension they expected the queen would readily acquiesce, to evade their farther importunities. They accordingly endeavoured to surprise her into compliance. The dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire, lord privy seal and lord steward, waited on her without any preparatory communication, respectfully but strongly urged the pretensions of Lord Somers, and concluded by proposing the modified demand, which, it was hoped, would obviate all objections. The queen, though surprised, was but too clear-sighted not to perceive that this expedient was adopted only the more easily to attain the ulterior purpose, and firmly resisted their importunities. Appealing to the treasurer, she was cha-

grined to find him an advocate for the proposal, and as a last resource addressed herself to Marlborough. The letters which passed on this occasion will furnish the secret history of the transaction.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*April 22.—May 3.* — Having this safe way of writing to you by Mr. Durell. I am desirous to tell you that last night the dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire were with Mrs. Morley, again to press her upon the subject of Lord Somers. After she had long defended herself upon the old argument, of not doing a hardship to Lord Pembroke, they proposed to her to call him, for the present, to the cabinet council, without any post at all, which being new to her, and unexpected, she was much at a loss what to say. At last she said she thought it was very unusual, upon which they offered some instances of its being done; and then she said she thought the cabinet council was full enough already, so they took their leave in much discontent; and she was also very uneasy, being sensible of the disadvantage she should be exposed to by this refusal, since her main argument, upon which she had hitherto insisted, was taken away by it.

"This morning she sent for Mr. Montgomery, to give him an account of this visit, and to complain that she saw there was to be no end of her troubles. He told her that the matter was much changed by this proposal, and that he could not but think it entirely for her service to accept of it; that it was a very small condescension, if they would be satisfied with it; that it gained her point absolutely, with regard to Lord Pembroke; that it would make all her affairs easy at once; and that if Mr. Freeman [Marlborough] were in town, he was sure it would be his mind as much as it was Mr. Montgomery's [Godolphin]. She seemed still very uneasy and very unwilling; but she said she would write to Mr. Freeman about it to-night or to-morrow. I hope, therefore, you will make such an answer to her, as this thing may be no longer delayed; for as it stands now, you will give me leave to say the refusal is of much worse consequence, and exposes her much more than as it stood before.

"If Mr. Freeman has no mind to enter into particulars, why might not he answer in general that he begs her to comply with Mr. Montgomery's desires in this affair, who, he is sure, will never propose any thing to her but what shall be as much for her honour as for her advantage? I shall write to you to-morrow by the post if there be any occasion."

At the same time the queen's letter reached the duke.

"*Kensington, April 22.—May 3.* — The occasion of my writing to you at this time, is to give you an account of a visit I had yesterday from lord privy seal and lord steward, in which they proposed my taking Lord Somers into the cabinet council, without giving him any employment, since I could not be prevailed upon to make him president, laying a great stress on its being necessary for my service. Their arguments did not at all convince me of the reasonableness nor the propriety of the thing. But all the answer I made was that the proposition was a very new thing, and

that I thought there were enough of the cabinet council already ; that I depended upon their assistance in carrying on my business, and had no thoughts of employing any but those that served me well in the parliament, and *had no leaning to any others*, and would countenance all that served me faithfully. This is the sense of what I said to them ; and this morning I gave this account to lord treasurer, who had heard nothing of this matter before, but joined in the two dukes' proposal, using a great many arguments to persuade me to comply with it, and, I must own to you, did not convince me any more than what I had heard before on the same subject ; though I have a much greater respect for him than for either of the others, looking upon it to be utter destruction to me to bring Lord Somers into my service. And I hope you will not join in soliciting me in this thing, though lord treasurer tells me you will ; for it is what I can never consent to.

" You are very happy to be out of the disagreeable and vexatious things that I am more or less continually made uneasy with, which makes me not wonder at your not coming back as you promised. I pray God bless and direct you in every thing, and never let it be in any body's power to do me ill offices with you, but be assured that I am, and will be ever, your faithful servant."

The duke was equally embarrassed and chagrined by this appeal to his arbitration, and communicates his sentiments to Godolphin previous to his reply to the queen.

" *May 8.* — I have just now received on the road yours of the 22d, by Durell, and 23d, by the post. I have but time to assure you that by the next post I shall follow your directions to Mrs. Morley ; for if she be obstinate, I think it is a plain declaration to all the world that you and I have no credit, and that all is governed underhand by Mr. Harley and Mrs. Masham."

" *Ghent, May 9.* — Having been obliged with my own hand to copy my letter to Mrs. Morley, I have but just time to tell you that I beg that nobody may see the original letter of Mrs. Morley, but Mrs. Freeman, and that you would keep it for me.

" I have enclosed my letter to Mrs. Morley to Mr. Secretary Boyle, so that if she takes no notice, you may let her know that I had writ you word that I had done myself the honour to answer her letter ; but I think it would be best not to own the having received a copy. I shall stay here to-morrow, and go the next day to Brussels."

Marlborough to the queen, in reply to her letter of May 3d : —

" Madam,

*Ghent, May 9.*

" I had this day, on the road, the honour of your majesty's letter, by Durell ; and though I have but very little time this post, being obliged to go this evening, I would not defer writing, and begging leave, in a few words, to acquaint you with my thoughts of your affairs abroad, as well as in England.

“ I must begin in observing to your majesty that the town of Amsterdam, which has always been the most zealous for the carrying on of this war with vigour, has, as your majesty may have seen by my former letters to lord treasurer, pressed me in two conferences, by their burgo-master and pensioner, for the making steps towards a peace, which I think not for the honour or interest of your character. I have reason to believe this change of theirs does not proceed from the apprehensions they have of France, but from what passed in England last winter, and from the continued intelligences they have of your majesty's being resolved to change hands and parties. They being sensible of the fatal consequences this may have in the next parliament, is the true reason of their being earnest to have propositions of peace made this campaign.

“ As for England, I do not doubt but care is taken to incline your majesty to believe that the Tories will have this next parliament a majority in the House of Commons. But I beg your majesty to consider, before it is too late, how that is possible, after the attempt that has been made by France for the Pretender; and that the greatest part of that party is suspected either to have known, or, at least, to have wished success to the attempt. Besides, their continual endeavours to incline the people to a peace, which, in the circumstances we are in, can only tend to the lessening your majesty, and, consequently, the advancement of the Pretender's interest.

“ This being the truth, how is it possible, madam, that the honest people of England, who wish well to you, and the carrying on of the war, can be prevailed upon to choose such men as they believe would ruin all that is dear to them? If what I have the honour to write to your majesty be the truth, for God's sake consider what may be the consequences of refusing the request of the dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire; since it will be a demonstration not only to them, but to every body, that lord treasurer and I have no credit with your majesty, but that you are guided by the insinuation of Mr. Harley.

“ We are assured that the duke of Burgundy is coming to the head of this army, with the king of France's leave, and orders to venture a battle. I shall be so far from avoiding it, that I shall seek it, thinking it absolutely necessary for your service; so that God only knows whether this may not be the last I may have the honour to write to you, which makes me beg with the same earnestness as if I were sure it were to be my last, that your majesty will let no influence or persuasion hinder you, not only in this, but in all your worldly affairs, to follow the advice and good counsel of lord treasurer, who will never have any thought but what is for your honour and true interest.”

*To the Duchess.*

“ *Ghent, May 9.*—I have sent to the lord treasurer the queen's original letter, which I have desired nobody but yourself may see. In it you will see her positive resolution. Mr. Montgomery will show you what I have writ to her. I wish it may do good, but I fear all is undone; for our affairs here abroad go every day worse. I stay here to-morrow, and the next day go for Brussels, from whence you shall be sure to hear from

me. The writing and copying Mrs. Morley's letter has so tired me, that I can say no more."

"*Brussels, May 14.* — Since my arrival here, I have had yours of the 27th of the last month, and am very sensible of the indiscreet behaviour of my brother. I know not what effect it may have; I have writ my mind freely to him.

"As to what you say of the Garter, I think it should not be given till the queen is sensible of the shame it would be to let so worthless a creature as 40 so much as expect it. Not only this, but every thing I hear, puts me very much out of heart, that I expect nothing but confusion. If my letter to the queen has no effect, I hope both the lord treasurer and you will be convinced that I have no credit, and will accordingly take your measures.

"We are in so great want of rain, that I shall be forced to delay the meeting of the army four or five days; besides, the French seem to change their resolutions every day, so that I believe their taking the field will depend on our motions. I went yesterday to wait upon Lady Tyrconnel, who I think is grown very old, and her hoarseness much worse than when I saw her last.

"I have been to see the hangings for your apartment and mine; as much as are done of them I think are very fine. I shall not send them over until the winter, unless you desire them. I should be glad, at your leisure, you would be providing every thing that may be necessary for furnishing these two apartments, and that you would direct Vanbrugh to finish the breaks between the windows, in the great cabinet, with looking-glass; for I am resolved to furnish the rooms with the finest pictures I can get. I shall be impatient for Dr. Hare, since you have written by him."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*April 29. — May 10.* — In my last I told you I would write by Mr. Hare some things more particular than those I would do by the post. By yours of the 5th of May, which I have received this day, it is very plain what mischief the divisions of the Whigs do even among the people of Holland; and yet the queen is still extremely obstinate, not only in refusing hitherto the proposal about Lord Somers, of which I sent you an account by Mr. Durell, but in the matter relating to Lord Halifax's brother\*, is as inflexible to all that can be said upon that subject, by all those who have access to her, and are concerned that the Whigs should not be divided; for it is most certain, nothing is like to be so ruinous to the queen's interests as those divisions, and it is as certain the queen might yet easily prevent it, by a very little compliance with Mr. Montgomery's advice in the matter of Lord Somers. But this will not be long in the queen's power, and nothing else in the world can keep the Whigs from being divided. I hope, therefore, your answer to the letters that went by Mr. Durell will be very full to that point. But I am afraid we shall

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\* Sir James Montague, who was candidate for the vacant post of attorney-general.

not have it so soon as I hoped, since by your letters of this day, I find you designed to leave the Hague last Monday, and I doubt Durell will not have been able to remit it before your going to Flanders.

“ But in all your letters pray remember that nothing is like to have better effect with the queen, than to show the ruin that must unavoidably follow from the divisions among the Whigs, which, in my opinion, can only be prevented by the assistance of Lord Somers.”

[In reply to the 9th.]

“ *May 15.* — I have received this morning the favour of yours of the 9th from Ghent, with the papers enclosed, in which I shall be sure to obey your commands very exactly.

“ Mr. Secretary Boyle being obliged to attend the poll to-day for the Westminster election, he sent me the letter you enclosed to him for the queen, to deliver, which I did. But she laid it down upon her table, and would not open it while I stayed in the room, by which I am afraid it is not like to have any more effect than some other representations of the same kind have had from your humble servant, who has endeavoured to lay the consequences of this sort of proceeding so fully before Mrs. Morley, that it is astonishing to find how little they prevail. The original letter which you send me seems to take it for granted, that what has been desired of Mrs. Morley is no less than *destruction*, without giving one reason why it is thought so; and when, in truth, the contrary is really that *destruction*, and this the only way to avoid it. A time is coming, when I doubt this will be plainly demonstrated, but it will be too late then to think of a remedy; and when it is known to be so, then I expect to be called upon to try it. I ask your pardon for dwelling so long upon a subject so disagreeable; but if you were in my place, I fancy you would scarce forbear venting yourself sometimes to your friends.”

“ *Thursday night, May 17.* — As the wind is now, I expect letters from you to-morrow, after which I shall write again by the post. In the mean time I cannot resist this safe opportunity by Mr. Withers, of telling you that though Mr. Montgomery has had two conversations with Mrs. Morley, of two hours apiece, upon the subject of Mr. Freeman's letter, she continues hitherto inflexible on that point, and resists all the plainest reasons and arguments that ever were used in any case whatsoever. At the same time, she renounces and disclaims any talk, or the least commerce with Mr. Harley, at first or second hand; and is positive that she never speaks with any body but the prince, upon any things of that kind. From whence the prince's notions come is not hard to conjecture. Upon the whole, Mr. Montgomery's life is a burden to him, and like to be so more and more every day. After I have said all this, I know nothing to be done, but to persist upon all occasions in the same language, and hope that time and accidents may open people's eyes, as the danger comes nearer. But as often as you have any occasion to write, I think you should still continue to represent, that the longer that matter is deferred, the less good effects must certainly attend it.”

*Marlborough to the Duchess.*

"May 14. — I have had the pleasure of your very kind letter of the 4th, and it has been a pleasure to me that you approve of my letter to the queen. If it has the effect I wish, it would encourage me to hope that her business might go gently this next winter, without which we can never get out of this war with honour and safety.

"You are so good as to say you will never write of politics that may be disagreeable to me, if I desire it. You know in friendship and love there must be no constraint; so that I am desirous of knowing what your heart thinks, and must beg of you the justice to believe, that I am very much concerned when you are uneasy.

"When I took leave of Lady Tyrconnel, she told me that her jointure in Ireland was in such disorder, that there was an absolute necessity for her going for two or three months, for the better settling of it; and as the climate of Ireland will not permit of her being there the winter, she should begin her journey about ten days hence, and that she did not intend to go to London, but hoped she might have the pleasure of seeing you at St. Alban's. I have offered her all that might be in my power, to make her journey to Holland or England easy, as also that if she cared to stay at St. Alban's, either at her going or return, you would offer it her with good heart. You will find her face a good deal changed; but in the discourse I have had with her, she seems to be very reasonable and kind.

"I have this morning received yours by Lieut. G. Withers, as also that of the 7th by the post. The copies of the several letters you have sent me, I shall not have time to read them till to-morrow, that I go to the army; for in this place I have very little time to myself.

"You will see by the two enclosed letters from Mrs. Morley, both which were writ since she received mine.\* I desire that nobody may see them but Mr. Montgomery, for I believe that you and lord treasurer are of opinion with me, that the queen should not know that her letters are sent to any body. If I receive any others, you shall be sure to have them, and you will keep them till my return. You may assure lord treasurer, that on all occasions I have to write to the queen, I shall follow the directions he has given, in his letter by Lieut. G. Withers, though I must own to you, that I am thoroughly convinced, that until the queen has suffered for the obstinate opinion she is now in, neither lord treasurer, you, nor I, will be able to prevail, though never so reasonable; but when she shall be sensible of her having been ill advised, she will then readily agree to all that may be advised by us. I pray God it may not be then too late. Whatever happens, if you are kind, I will flatter myself with enjoying some happy years at Blenheim. I am sorry for the death of Mr. Botter, and glad you are going thither, so that the finishing of the inside may be to your *mind*."

From this letter it appears that the treasurer gave credit to the solemn disavowal made by the queen of any inter-

\* Something omitted in the original.

course with Mr. Harley ; and at the same time, we find the duchess herself asserting that the queen did not consult Mrs. Masham. They therefore joined with the Whigs in ascribing her obstinacy to the insinuations of Admiral Churchill, through the prince of Denmark, and wounded the feelings of the duke by the heaviest accusations against the conduct of his brother. The duchess, as we have already seen, did not fail to re-echo and exaggerate these complaints. Their suspicions were, however, ill-founded ; for the counsels of Harley were still heard with the same complacency, and followed with the same confidence ; and Mrs. Masham was also still the agent of his private intercourse with the queen.

The person who was charged with the preceding letter from Godolphin, carried also a reply from the queen, to the remonstrance which Marlborough had written from Ghent, evincing a decided perseverance in her former resolutions.

" *Kensington, May 17.* — I writ to you on Tuesday by the post, by which letter I believe you will expect a longer from me now ; but I have been so tired to-day with importunities that come from the Whigs, that I have not spirits left to open my afflicted heart so freely and so fully as I intended ; and, therefore, should not have troubled you till to-morrow, by the post, but that having told Lieut.-general Withers I would write by him, I thought he might wonder if I did not do it.

" I can now only tell you, that as to what you mention, and what the lord treasurer told me some time ago, of your being pressed in two conferences for the making steps towards a peace, I am entirely of your opinion, thinking it neither for my honour nor interest ; and do assure you, that whatever insinuations my enemies may make to the contrary, I shall never, at any time, give my consent to a peace, but upon safe and honourable terms. Excuse my answering nothing more of your letter at this time, and be so just to me as not to let any misrepresentations that may be made of me have any weight with you ; for that would be a greater trouble to me than can be expressed. I cannot end without begging you to be very careful of yourself, there being nobody, I am sure, that prays more heartily for your preservation, than her that will live and die most sincerely your humble servant.

" The prince desires his service to you." \* .

The determination which her obdurate silence, on the great point at issue evinced, is still more fully proved by the communications of the treasurer.

\* This letter, as well as the preceding, is printed from copies preserved by the duchess.

"May 11.—\*\*\* I am now to acknowledge the favour of yours of the 5th, 6th, and 8th of May, by which last you refer me to the next post, for your answer to mine by Mr. Durell; but you take no notice of your having received Mrs. Morley's letter, which Mr. Durell also carried to you. I hope your answer to both will be such as may bring that matter to a good end at last, which has hung unreasonably long, considering either what is past, or how much all things to come depend upon a right decision of that affair."

"May 22. — Every body here is busy at present about elections and the talk of them. The generality of them are as good, I think, as can be desired, and there is little reason to doubt but the next parliament will be very well inclined to support the war, and, I hope, to do every thing else that is reasonable, if they can have but reasonable encouragement. All seems to turn upon that. Mrs. Morley continues to be very inflexible. I still think that must alter; my only fear is, that it will be too late."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"May 24. — I have had the favour of yours by Lieutenant-general Withers, as also that by the post of the 7th. I am so extremely sensible of the difficulties you meet with, that were it in my power, I should despise any danger to make your life easier; but we must venture both life and quiet for the service of the queen, or all is undone.

"I beg you will read the enclosed letter to the queen. She may depend upon the truth of it; for the author of the enclosed drew the answer to Lord Peterborough by the elector of Hanover's orders. What the answer of the electress was, I do not know."

We here insert a translation of the letter from Robethon, to which reference is here made; and which will serve to show how zealously the discontented parties exerted themselves in promoting the invitation.

"Hanover, May 18. — My lord; I have received Mr. Cardonel's letter from Ghent, but do not answer him, because I prefer addressing myself directly to your highness, in order to inform you, in confidence, that Lord Peterborough has written letters, dated April 3-14. to the elector and electress, for the purpose of representing to them the absolute necessity there is, that some member of their house should go and reside in England, since 5000 French troops have thrown every thing into the utmost consternation, and have been prevented from effecting a descent in Scotland by a mere chance. He speaks much against the ministry of the queen. He says he will come hither this summer, to tell the electress many things, which he cannot venture to write, and will afterwards serve the campaign with the elector. This prince answered him in a manner calculated to prevent him. But as I know what embarrassment this master firebrand would occasion, when seconded by Mr. Scott, I thought proper to communicate the intelligence to your highness, who may, perhaps, find some means to frustrate this hopeful journey. M. Plessin is going

to England, and, in passing, will see M. Bernstorff and myself, and we will endeavour to give him proper ideas of the business of that country."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"May 28. — I have had an opportunity to read yours of the 24th. to the queen, with the letter from Hanover. She was not much surprised at it, and seems prepared to expect a great deal of trouble upon that matter, in the winter, but cannot be prevailed with, upon that or any other account, to do what can only, in my opinion, prevent it.

"Lord Halifax tells me that he heard there is a letter in this town (I believe it must be from Scott) which pretends to say, that when Mr. Freeman was lately at the elector of Hanover's, he told the elector that there would be a necessity that something of that kind should be done next winter, because of the extreme perverseness and imbecility of the queen. As ridiculous and preposterous as this story seems, yet I intend to acquaint Mrs. Morley with it; because I think it not unlikely to be an invention of Mr. Harley, who, perhaps, intends to make his use of it."

"June 12. — \* \* \* I am now going to give you an account of a conversation this morning, betwixt Mr. Montgomery and Mrs. Morley, which ended with the greatest dissatisfaction possible to both. They have had of late many great contests upon the subject of Lord Halifax's brother, but without any ground gained on either side. This day it held longer than ever. The particulars are both too tedious, and unnecessary to trouble you with them. In short, the obstinacy was unaccountable; and the battle might have lasted till now, if, after the clock had struck three, the prince of Denmark had not thought fit to come in, and look as if he thought it were dinner-time.

"I hope your next will acquaint us with Prince Eugene's arrival, which will be very welcome news to me."

"June 6. — I have had a letter from Lord Coningsby, whose judgment and experience, in all the affairs of the parliament, I value very much. He tells me he has had sore eyes, which makes it uneasy to him to write; but in a little time he will send me his thoughts very fully, as to the measures which ought to be taken about parliament; and he adds, that a little more delay will go near to make every thing that is good impossible to be effected. I am entirely in the same mind, but find the queen so perverse and so obstinate, without the least foundation, that nothing in the world is, in my opinion, so unaccountable, nor more dreadful in the consequences of it. I can only say in this case, as I have heard my Lord Croft say a great while ago, in things of this kind, 'Well, sirs, God's above.'"

"June 22. — Having no letters from you since my last, nor any thing either from Spain or Portugal, I shall have very little to trouble you with by this post, unless I would give you an account of Mr. Montgomery's complaints, which, indeed, would be endless; and if I can judge rightly of him, I think he would rather choose to sink under the burden of them himself, than to give you the trouble of them to no purpose, who have so many things of greater consequence to take care of."

Wearied with fruitless representations to the queen, and chagrined by the importunities, and even threats, of the Whigs, the treasurer made a tender of his resignation, and announced his resolution in a letter, dated June 24.

"There will be three posts due from you to-morrow; and Colonel Sutton, telling me he designs to go over in the packet-boat of the 18th, I beg to write this letter beforehand, without consequence to those I shall continue to write to you every post; because, by so safe a hand, I may venture to write more freely than I am willing to do by the ordinary post.

"The queen continues so averse to every thing Mr. Montgomery can propose, for the support of Mrs. Morley's affairs, that he is tired out of his life at present, and has so little prospect of any tolerable ease in the winter, that he has been obliged once or twice to beg of the queen, either to follow his notions or to dismiss him, and not let him bear the burden of other people's follies. But all this hitherto has been to no purpose, and seems to make no manner of impression.

"The case with the prince is little better. He is sometimes uneasy at the apprehensions of what he shall meet with, but unadvisable in what is proper to prevent it; whether from his own temper, or made so by your brother, I cannot judge. But your brother is not, at least seems not to be, without his own uneasiness too, in which I always confirm him when we talk together; and he appears to be upon those occasions very much of my mind; but, however, he has great animosities and partialities, and he either cannot, or will not, prevail with the prince to do any good.

"This being the case here at present, and not very likely to mend before the parliament, I had a mind, by so safe a hand as Colonel Sutton, to prepare you to expect that it will not be possible for me to continue as I am till the meeting of parliament, unless it may consist with Mr. Freeman's affairs to see England, and settle measures both with me and the queen before the meeting of parliament, for at least fifteen days."

*Marlborough to the Duchess.*

"June 25. — \* \* \* \* I have had the happiness of yours of the 8th. The declaration made by the queen to 148 is very surprising. What you write of the duke of Devonshire is, I believe, very true; for I had a letter from him, by which I could see he was dissatisfied with the queen. He is a very honest man, and has had opportunities to know the pains the lord treasurer and I have often taken with the queen, to no purpose, so that I dare say he will do justice to us upon all occasions; for, as much as I can observe, he governs himself by reason. I wish I could say so of all our acquaintance." You are so kind to be in pain at what may happen when Prince Eugene comes. Put your trust in

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\* Alluding to Lord Sunderland.

God, as I do, and be assured that I think I can't be unhappy as long as you are kind."

"*July 1.* — Though we are in the month of July, I am now writing by a fire, the weather being very wet and cold, which I am very sorry for, since it must be very inconvenient to Prince Eugene's army, who are now on their march. God knows what we shall be able to do when we join! I am sure of nothing so much, as that I earnestly long for doing something that may put an end to this war, so that I might have the happiness of being in quiet with you; for were this war ended, nothing should persuade me to torment myself with business and absence.

"I have received yours, which should have been dated the 15th, by which I see the intentions of the Whigs. I need make no other answer, than what I have already assured you, that I shall be glad to strengthen them, but never to divide them."

Indignant at the failure of their attempt to introduce Somers into office, or even to procure his admission into the cabinet council, the Junta proceeded to still farther extremities, and again hoped to extort by force, what they could not obtain either by persuasion or importunity. The crisis of the new elections offering a favourable occasion to increase the strength of their party, they did not hesitate to carry into effect a plan which they had already formed, for the establishment of an interest in parliament independent of the crown.

In England, where the Whig party predominated, their efforts were less marked, and more successful; but in Scotland, where the Union had created such a struggle of contending passions, they joined with the Tories, and even with the Jacobites, to obtain partisans. Sunderland, though minister of the queen, so far forgot the respect due to the sovereign, as to assume the principal management of the cabal; and though he did not venture to use the royal name, yet by the influence attached to his official situation, he essentially furthered the views of his party.

The Whigs combined their influence to obtain the liberation of the suspected Jacobites, and particularly of the duke of Hamilton, who was intimately connected by marriage with Lord Sunderland.\* Newcastle, Wharton, and Halifax became bail for this nobleman, though he was arrested on the strongest presumption of treason. With this tie on his gratitude, strengthened by his jealousy of those who were

\* His first wife was Lady Anne Spencer, sister of Lord Sunderland.

employed in the administration of Scotland, they sent him back to his native country, on the eve of the new election, and found in him a faithful and active agent, whose connections and influence extended to every rank in society. By his assistance they hoped to secure the majority in the choice of the sixteen peers; and, indeed, gained the aid of the leading Jacobites. He was supported by all the interest of the dukes of Roxburgh and Montrose, and other Scottish peers, who participated in the sentiments of the Whig chiefs. On the other hand, the influence of government was intrusted to the duke of Queensborough, secretary of state for Scotland, who had been recently raised to the English peerage, by the title of the duke of Dover. With him were joined the earls of Mar and Leven, and other persons of note.

For some time the utmost secrecy was observed on both sides, and the Duke of Marlborough was unacquainted with the political manœuvres of the contending parties, till the crisis of the election approached. In a letter to the duchess, dated May 31, he imparts the first hints which he had received of the intrigue with the duke of Hamilton, and requests her to ask an explanation of Lord Sunderland. "I desire," he says, "you would know of Lord Sunderland, as from me, if the duke of Hamilton pretends to be chosen, and from what party; for I am sometimes told such extravagancies as are very hard to believe."

Even at the time when the mystery was developed, Lord Godolphin, from delicacy, maintained a cautious reserve, and referred him to the information which he might readily draw from the Scottish officers in the army.

"June 29. — The letters we have to-day from Scotland are full of the feuds and animosities of that country, about the election of peers. I have no mind to trouble you with the particulars, for they would be endless. Besides, since you must needs see very often both the duke of Argyle, Lord Stair, and Lieutenant-general Ross, you cannot easily avoid hearing what passes on this troublesome occasion."

Marlborough was no sooner acquainted with the unwelcome truth, than he hastened to give a proof of his public sentiments, and attachment to the cause of government, by sending his proxy as Baron Aymouth, to the earl of Mar. This authorisation was immediately announced, and pro-

duced a considerable impression, as we find from the letters of the Scottish Jacobites and Whigs to Lord Sunderland.

Inflamed by mutual rivalry, both parties proceeded to the contest; and the struggle was marked by all the fury of contending passions. But the hopes of the Whigs were baffled by the predominant weight of the crown, and the unexpected defection of the Presbyterians, who were alienated by the coalition which the Junta had formed with the Jacobites. Of the sixteen peers, only six of the Whig candidates were chosen\*; and of the commons, a considerable majority was returned in favour of government, although many of the officers of the army were gained by the Whig party; and Lord Orkney, in particular, declared for the list of his brother, the duke of Hamilton, though he owed his election solely to the influence of the commander-in-chief.†

Such political hostility from a party who had affected to identify themselves with government, created unusual concern in the minds of Marlborough and Godolphin; and their chagrin was augmented by the consideration, that the principal

\* It is singular that the Duchess, in her *Vindication*, takes no notice of the violent struggle in Scotland, nor of the schism between the Whigs and the government. Burnet mentions it only incidentally, and as a thing of trifling importance; whereas it threatened the total ruin of the administration. Tindal uses the very words of Burnet — “The queen supported Godolphin against the Whigs, from a principle of resentment and jealousy, disliking him less than the Whigs.” The author of *The Other Side of the Question* is the only political writer who seems to have understood the intrigue, and we find him reprobating the violent and imprudent conduct of Sunderland, with all the vehemence of political rivalry. He quotes a singular letter from that nobleman to the duke of Roxburgh, in which is the following expression: “I would not have you bullied by the court party, for the queen herself cannot support that *faction* long.” — P. 380.

It is, however, little wonder that a transaction of such moment should not have attracted due attention from historians, when we find De Foe, who was not only a contemporary, but engaged by Godolphin to promote the views of government, expressing to Lord Sunderland, with whom he was also in correspondence, his extreme surprise and embarrassment, at the mutual hostility which he witnessed in the two parties, whom he supposed to be both united in the interest of government. — *Letters from De Foe to Lord Sunderland, May 20th, and 25th, 1707.*

† Letters from the duke of Queensbury to the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Godolphin. Also from the dukes of Roxburgh, Hamilton, and Montrose to Lord Sunderland.

agents of the cabal were Sunderland, who was connected with them by the ties of marriage, and Somers, whose interest they were sincerely labouring to promote. They smothered, indeed, their indignation, from delicacy to that connexion, and from their fear of offending the Whig leaders; but in their private correspondence they gave full scope to their feelings; and in the letters from Marlborough to the duchess, we find him lamenting the perverseness of his son-in-law, and the ingratitude which he had himself experienced from those he had endeavoured to serve.

However great their disapprobation, it was surpassed by the resentment of the queen, who was highly indignant that one of her own ministers should presume to set up an independent interest; and she accused the secretary of state of employing her name and authority, to secure the election of his own partisans. She was still more deeply offended by the disrespectful remonstrances which he personally made against her partiality to the Tories. Indeed, she even threatened to dismiss from her service a minister who was not only personally disagreeable to her, but whom she considered as having abused the trust she reposed in him.

Marlborough, though disapproving the conduct of his son-in-law, was sensible that his disgrace at this juncture would prove a fatal blow to the public interests, as well as to his own consideration abroad. He therefore laboured to soothe the resentment of the queen, and with difficulty induced her to credit the solemn asseverations of Sunderland, that he had exerted no ministerial influence in favour of his party. He likewise urged the duchess to reprove the forward spirit of her son-in-law, and persuade him to behave with more respect towards the queen. By his intercession the fatal blow was suspended, and Sunderland was suffered to remain, though no argument could eradicate the displeasure and indignation which still rankled against him in the mind of the sovereign.

Notwithstanding the conciliatory part which Marlborough and Godolphin had acted, this ill-timed struggle created additional dissatisfaction and embarrassment. The Whigs resorted to still more violent means both against the queen and ministers. They even threatened to revive the long-agitated question for the invitation of a member of the

electoral family; but instead of the Electress Sophia, they purposed to bring over the electoral prince, whose youth and enterprising spirit were likely to render him a more dangerous visitor to the queen, than a princess in the decline of life. They gained the duchess of Marlborough to their views, and she was so indiscreet as to recommend the unwelcome proposal, not only to her husband, but to the queen.

Nor was this the only instance in which the duke was implicated, by the imprudence or officiousness of others. The duke of Somerset, who to the advantage of high birth and extensive property united a perfect acquaintance with the cabals of courts, had attained considerable influence with the queen, by means of the access which his post as master of the horse gave him to the royal presence. Having taken an active share in obtaining the dismissal of Harley, he was so elated by success, that he aspired to become head of a separate party. Though hitherto classed with the zealous Whigs, he suddenly assumed the tone of moderation, and flattered the queen by condemning the violence and overbearing pretensions of the Junta. He even conceived the design of dividing the Whigs, and tampered with those whom he hoped to sway by his promises, or influence by his arguments. He thus acquired such interest, that even the duchess, through her agent, Mr. Maynwaring, condescended to solicit his support, in the struggle for the introduction of Somers into the privy council.\*

\* In one of his letters Mr. Maynwaring gives a curious account of one of his conversations with the duke of Somerset. The letter is without date, but was evidently written in March or April.

"I had the honour to be with his grace this morning, who expressed a great liking of the proposal to bring Lord Somers into the cabinet, without an employment, which, he said, showed that he and his friends were at last come to their reason, and looked as if there would be an end of their extravagant demands; and that for his part, there was nothing that he would not do to bring it about. But yet I am not sure that he does not think that this would in some measure eclipse his present lustre in the court; for 'tis certain never man had such a thirst for power, not without some ingredients of vanity; but yet he is, without doubt, as honest as it is possible for *so great a statesman* to be; and, therefore, since your grace thinks it will be sometimes in his power at least to do hurt, it shall be my care to discharge my duty to him with more diligence than I have done, to see if my poor endeavours may be of any use to make him do what you wish."

The Whig chiefs were too vigilant and zealous to overlook these intrigues. Aware of the intercourse between him and the duchess, and conceiving that he would not have shown sufficient courage to set up a separate interest of his own accord, they suspected that he was actuated by the secret instigation of Marlborough, and unjustly accused the duke of resorting to so indirect and dishonourable a method of dividing their party.

These cabals and accusations form a prominent subject in the correspondence, which will be submitted to the reader, when we again resume the subject.\*

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#### CH. LXVIII. — COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN.—1708.

WE have carried down the narrative of these political feuds till after the commencement of the campaign, that we may present a more connected account of the military operations.

Marlborough reached Ghent on the 9th of May, and after reviewing the British forces, gave orders for the movement of the different corps towards the place of rendezvous, in the vicinity of Brussels. Collaterally with the plan of offensive operation, the French commanders had formed the design of recovering the principal fortresses of the Netherlands by treachery, and had readily found agents for the purpose, among a people who were highly dissatisfied with the change of government. A correspondence of this kind for the surprise of Antwerp was detected while Marlborough remained at Ghent, as appears from a letter to Count Rechteren, dated May 30.

"The first hint," he observes, "which we received of this conspiracy was, by a letter intercepted at Brussels, while I was at Ghent. Several others have been since taken, all addressed to the count of Bergueick, to whom they have been suffered to pass. But as they were not subscribed we could not discover the author. Lastly, six days ago we seized a woman, who put one of these letters into the post-office. She acknow-

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\* See Chapter lxxi.

ledged the writer to be her son-in-law, who was heretofore a shop-keeper at Antwerp. He has escaped, and we are endeavouring to discover his accomplices. As we have taken measures for the security of the place, we find, by several letters since intercepted, that the enemy are much disconcerted.”\*

Having completed his arrangements at Ghent, the British commander proceeded to Brussels, where he held a conference with the veteran General Overkirk, to complete the dispositions for taking the field.

From Brussels he wrote to Godolphin : —

“ *May 14.* — The great want of rain will oblige me to put off the assembling of the army till the 21st of this month. The French continue to threaten us with the duke of Burgundy and a vast army. I hope the duke of Burgundy will come; and for their army, I cannot see how it is possible for them to be stronger than they were the last campaign.

“ I send you the enclosed, that you may be the better able to judge of their tempers at the Hague, as to the duke of Savoy. It is certain that the French leave fewer troops in Dauphiné than was expected. I hope they may be the dupes in that matter, for I think it impossible that the duke of Savoy can rely on any promises of the king of France.” \* \* \*

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *May 11.* — Last night, by Mr. Hare, I writ to you upon a particular matter. Whether you will receive that letter so soon as this, is uncertain. I rather think Mr. Hare will not travel as fast as the post.

“ I think all you have done with the elector and Prince Eugene is entirely right, and will, I hope, have a very good effect, if they come timely enough into the field. But the general backwardness of the Germans is extremely discouraging. The duke of Savoy makes heavy complaints by this post, that General Visconti has refused to send him 6000 men for a particular expedition, which he had designed. I hope he lets you know the same things by Count Maffei, for there will be no remedy of this from Vienna, but by your means; and it would be a great pity the duke of Savoy should be stopped by his friends; for I don't see that our enemies are likely to be, on that side, in any condition of stopping him. I am very well pleased with their changing their generals in France; and I think it is no good sign for them. The elector of Bavaria's going to the Rhine will make all Flanders uneasy, and jealous that the French design to give them up to the States, as I really believe they intend to do, in case of any check or considerable disadvantage. For that reason they are willing to have him out of the way, though they endeavour to make him like it, by telling him he will be much nearer the opportunity of getting into his own country.

“ I am of opinion that the duke of Burgundy and the rest of the French princes that accompany him will be rather a hindrance and a perplexity

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\* Translation from the French draught.

to M. de Vendome, and not any advantage; but I agree with you, that it may very soon be the occasion of some action, not so much from the superiority the French pretend to have, as from the impetuous temper of that prince, who is full of ambition and desire to get a reputation in the world. I should think this consideration ought to make you act with the greater caution in the beginning of the year, till the Germans come into the field, and oblige the enemy to weaken their army. And I hope you will allow me to put you in mind of one thing more, which is, that even after the Germans shall be in the field, the communication from the French armies to one another is quicker than it can be between Prince Eugene's army and yours. Consequently you may be full as liable to be surprised by any sudden motion of theirs as they by yours.

"What you write about Portugal, and of our annoying the coast of France, is extremely right, and shall be followed here as far as we are able to do it. But I have always told you we cannot do it without the assistance of the Dutch ships to lie before Dunkirk; and as yet, I see no assurance of them."

*To Lord Godolphin, in reply.*

"*Brussels, May 17.* — I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 30th, and in a day or two expect yours by Dr. Hare. I do intend, if the enemy will give me leave, to follow your advice, by gaining time; so that the elector of Hanover and Prince Eugene may have time to act. As yet, the French have sent no troops to the Moselle.

"I have writ very pressingly to Vienna in favour of the duke of Savoy. Palmes writes me, that the prince of Salms endeavours to mortify that duke in every thing, which I fear at last may prove very fatal. It is most certain the French have drawn great part of their troops from that country. Mr. Howe says that the elector of Hanover appears very much out of humour, and no ways fond of his journey, not beginning by eight days so soon as he promised. I pray God bless me with success, for I expect none from the elector of Hanover."

"*May 24.* — \* \* \* \* To-morrow I shall march towards Hall, where we shall join the English and the rest of the troops which came from Flanders. You know already my intention of gaining time, till Prince Eugene can act with his army, which I am afraid cannot be till about the middle of next month.

"I have and shall continue to write to Vienna, as I am commanded. I enclose a letter of Count Maffei's, which I received last night. By that and some others I have received, I very much fear we must not expect any great things from the duke of Savoy this campaign; so that my only dependence is upon the junction of Prince Eugene with me; for if we should not be able to do something considerable our affairs in all parts will be in a bad condition.

"The discovery we have made of the design the French had for seizing the citadel of Antwerp will oblige, I believe, M. Vendome to change his measures. Next Saturday is appointed for their general review. After that, we shall have their order of battle, by which we shall know their number of battalions and squadrons. You will see by the letter from

Hanover that the prince electoral is to serve with his father's troops in this army. It would have been more natural for him to have served with his father; but I suppose they have a mind he should make acquaintance with the English officers."

On the 23d of May, the German troops, composing part of the allied army, began to assemble at Anderlecht; and while Marlborough was waiting for the arrival of the British and Dutch, he received intelligence that Vendome had collected his forces behind the Haïne, in the vicinity of Mons, and was preparing to advance. This information induced him to make a counter-movement, and the troops immediately marched to Hall, where Overkirk established his head-quarters, while those of Marlborough were fixed in the abbey of Belleghem. Here he was joined by the British and Dutch. The field deputies also made their appearance, not as before, to control his operations, but with private instructions to submit implicitly to his orders. The army amounted to 112 battalions and 180 squadrons, and was furnished with a train of 113 pieces of artillery.

As Marlborough had foreseen, the French commander moved at the same time to the vicinity of Soignies, where he was joined by the dukes of Burgundy and Berry, and the young pretender, who were all animated with the hopes of signalising their first career in arms. The force under their command amounted, at the lowest computation, to 124 battalions, and 197 squadrons; and the vicinity of the two armies, with the superiority of the enemy, and the presence of the French princes, seemed to portend a battle, which would perhaps again decide the fate of Brabant.

Not daunted by the imposing attitude of his antagonists, Marlborough took measures for receiving the expected attack, by establishing his camp on the 29th, between Tubise and Herfelingen, and fixing his head-quarters at St. Renelle. Here he prepared to execute the plan which had been previously formed for the junction of the army assembled on the Moselle, by writing to Count Rechteren, who commanded in the absence of Eugene, enjoining him to advance with all speed, and without waiting even for the arrival of the 10,000 palatines. He previously despatched an ostensible letter to the prince, the object of which was to reconcile the elector of Hanover to the design.

"*Camp of St. Renelle, May 30.* — I write this with the hope that it will find you in the vicinity of Coblentz, to explain to you our situation. The 21st we began to encamp near Brussels. The 25th all the troops were within reach, and on the 26th they joined in the camp at Hall, the right at Kester and the left at Hall. From thence we made a forward movement to this camp. On the 26th the enemy encamped at Soignies, three leagues from us; and as it rained, almost without interruption, for the two next days, they were prevented from moving, so that we cannot yet penetrate their design. Some say that they intend to march directly to us, in which case I shall wait to receive them. According to other advices, they meditate an attack on Ath, which we shall find it difficult to prevent, in consequence of the situation of the ground, and of the two armies; and so much the more, because they have not yet turned the least attention to the Moselle, where they are much superior. So that if affairs do not change, I see, to my regret, no appearance of doing any great matter here the whole campaign, since we shall be obliged to remain on the defensive.

"All this induces me to think, that if your highness has no hope of pushing your designs on the Moselle, and if the preparations for that purpose are not ready, it would be much more useful to the common cause, if, instead of remaining inactive with your army, you would make a sudden march with all the troops towards this side, advancing in diligence with the cavalry, while the infantry follows in the same manner. This measure might give us an opportunity of gaining a battle, which would decide the fate of the war. The elector of Hanover might at the same time obtain a great advantage, since the enemy would have no means of parrying this blow, except by drawing a strong detachment from the Rhine.

"If your highness agrees with me, and will commence your march as soon as possible, I beg you to impart this letter to his electoral highness, as I have not yet communicated with any living soul. But if you are of another opinion, and think you can quickly oblige the enemy to draw detachments from hence, then you will please to commit it to the flames, that no man may know the least of it. Above all, I entreat you to let me hear from you as soon as possible, by express, that I may take my measures for the event; for every thing depends on expedition, since it is certain that your highness might be here a fortnight before any troops which the enemy may draw from the Upper Rhine."\*

From the same place we find two letters addressed to Godolphin.

"*May 28.* — Having this opportunity by Colonel Hammond, I may venture to write freer than by the post. The motions the French have made make me begin to be of your opinion, that they are in the mind at this time to venture; and by their having sent no troops to the Moselle,

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\* This and the other letters which we find to Prince Eugene and Count Rechteren are translated either from the French draughts or originals.

they are certainly a good deal stronger than we are. If we should come to action in this part of the country, it must be decided in a great degree by the foot, which is what we ought to wish for. But what I fear is, if they have a sufficient strength, that they may post themselves so as to attack Ath, and take it before Prince Eugene can join. But this I beg you will say nothing of to any body. I hope they will not venture it; but as they are now camped, it is in their power. I believe you judge very rightly of the reason of sending the elector of Bavaria away; for the king of France does know that one way or other the Dutch will have peace, which must make the queen's business more difficult in England. Besides, I have some reason to believe, that several will be of the opinion of Lord Peterborough for the invitation, which must be very mortifying. I am very glad to find by yours of the 11th, that you have hopes that Mrs. Morley, though late, will do what you desire. Nothing else can make us happy in serving her well, for though I should have success, that might give safety abroad, but could not hinder disagreeable things at home. You may see that I have very melancholy thoughts, but be assured that I shall use my utmost endeavours that this campaign may be glorious to the queen and nation."

"May 31. — I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 14th, with Lord Galway's letters, by which I have the pleasure to see that we may fear nothing on that side.

"Count Zinzendorf writes me by the last post, that Palmes has so well succeeded in his negotiations, that the duke of Savoy will have reason to be satisfied that the elector palatine's affairs are settled to his mind, and that the emperor consents to the sending the 4000 foot for Catalonia, which, by this time, I hope Sir J. Lake is taking care of their embarkation. I am sorry to see in some of your former letters the difficulty there is in leaving a squadron in the winter in the Mediterranean; for I am very much persuaded that till a squadron stays the whole winter you will not succeed in Spain."

The duke had scarcely despatched these letters, before his situation became highly critical. The French, instead of hazarding a battle, as was expected, broke up their camp, and moved on his flank, through Bois Seigneur Isaac, to Brain l'Allieu, as if with an intention of advancing against Louvain, a design which had been ineffectually attempted in the preceding year. Marlborough was at first doubtful of their object, and fell back to Anderlecht, with the intention of covering Brussels; but finding that the enemy continued their march towards the Dyle, he penetrated their real design, and pressed forward during the night, amidst a deluge of rain. After a forced march of twenty-four hours, the heads of his columns reached the strong camp of Parc. The rest of the army arriving in the course of the afternoon, the head-quarters of Marlborough were fixed in the

abbey of Terbank, and those of Overkirk in the suburbs of Louvain.

He communicates the account of these movements to his friends in England.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

*" Terbank, June 4. —* I have this morning received the favour of yours of the 16th by Captain Coot, and that of the 17th by the post, by which I see you have had the pleasure of Newmarket. You will see by my letter to Mr. Secretary, that the French having marched all Friday night and Saturday, with the intention, as I was assured, to continue their march for Louvain, I thought it for the service not to camp at Brussels, but continue the march to this place, where the head of the army arrived yesterday, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the morning. If the French would have ventured, they might have been here at the same time; but finding I continued my march, I believe occasioned their staying at Brain l'Allieu, where they are now encamped, which makes me think, notwithstanding their bragging, that they will not venture a battle.

*" You have an expression in your letter of the 17th which is very melancholy,—that success cannot secure quietness next winter. By the last letters from Vienna, you might see that the business of the Upper Palatinate was settled to the elector's content; upon which, he sent orders for his troops to march; but two days after, an express arrived at Dusseldorf from Vienna, upon which he has sent positive orders to his troops not to march. I do not know what the difficulties are; but I fear we shall not have the use of those troops a good while, which may, in a great degree, break our measures, they being 10,000 men. You may, by this, see the great advantage the king of France has over the allies, since we depend upon the humours of several princes, and he has nothing but his own will and pleasure. The elector should have been on the Rhine by the 20th of the last month; but my letters from Hanover say, that he did not intend to leave that place till the 30th, notwithstanding that they knew the elector of Bavaria would be at Strasburgh the 21st. I know not what to make of this, but I am afraid we must expect no good news from thence this summer. I would not willingly blame Prince Eugene, but his arrival at the Moselle will be ten days after his promise. I believe his stay at Vienna is occasioned by the difficulties of the Palatinate. I am so tired, and am to be up so early to-morrow, that I cannot read my letters, so that you will excuse any errors."*

*" Terbank, June 7. —* I had the favour yesterday of yours of the 20th from Newmarket, where I should have been glad to have been with you; for besides the pleasure of your company, I should have enjoyed quietness, which is what I long extremely after; but God knows when I shall have it. You will know by this post, that the elector of Bavaria has been obliged to make a detachment to the Moselle, which will give an opportunity to the elector of Hanover to cross the Rhine. You will have seen by my last, that we are like to lose the 10,000 palatines at

least for some time. I have writ to Prince Eugene: I think time so precious that he ought not to stay for the palatines.

"The enemy continues in their camp at Brain l'Allieu; and I shall not march till they do, or that I hear from Prince Eugene; so that I have begun this day to pass in review the right wing of horse of the first line, and to-morrow shall see half the foot of the same line, and so continue every day till I have seen the whole army. I shall by the next post do myself the honour of sending the prince\* an order of battle of the enemy's, as well as of our own army. If you have curiosity, the prince may let you have a copy of them."

*To the Duchess.*

"June 11. — Whenever I have any reason, and my mind a little at ease, I make use of that time to write to my dear soul. The post does not go till to-morrow; but as I am that morning to see the left wing of horse, I make use of this time to tell you, that I am in my health, I thank God, as well as one of my age, and that has not his mind very much at ease, can be; for what I concerted with Prince Eugene will not be executed by fifteen days so soon as was resolved, which will be an advantage to the duke of Vendome, by giving him time. But the slowness of the Germans is such, that we must be always disappointed.

"Our news from Spain is as favourable as we could expect, and by Lord Galway's letters we have nothing to fear on the side of Portugal.

"The elector of Bavaria, having been obliged to make a considerable detachment from his army for the Moselle, will, we hope, enable the elector of Hanover to do something on the Rhine. By this time we flatter ourselves that the duke of Savoy is taking the field; the greatest difficulty he will meet with is, the mountains he must pass before he can get into France. As for us in this country, we have a very good army, but the French think themselves more numerous; however, I hope, with the blessing of God, that this campaign will not pass without some good success on our side. You easily believe me, when I tell you that I do from my heart wish that the favourable account I now give you of the posture of our armies may meet with no disappointment, and that this campaign may be so successful, that I may have the happiness of being with you in quiet this next summer, and for the remaining part of my life. I have this afternoon the favour of yours of the 23d and 25th, but am returned so late to my quarters, that I must answer them by the next post."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Terbank, June 11. — Since my last I have none of yours to answer, and I have been busy every day in reviewing the troops. The greatest part are in extreme good order. I shall continue in this camp, unless the enemy march, till I hear from Prince Eugene, that he is in motion; for as yet I have no account of his being gone from Vienna. The news we have from Spain is more favourable than we could reasonably expect, and I find by Lord Galway's letters, that we have nothing to fear on the

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\* The prince of Denmark.

Portugal side. We do flatter ourselves, that the detachment the elector of Bavaria has been obliged to make, may give an opportunity to the elector of Hanover of doing something on the Rhine. The continual complaints of the duke of Savoy are, I am afraid, forerunners for our not expecting much on that side. The disappointment of the palatine troops, and Eugene not being able to put in execution, by at least a fortnight, what was agreed between him and me, gives great disadvantage. However, I have taken my measures, that nothing may be wanting at his arrival, being persuaded that our greatest hopes must be in what we shall be able to do in the first four or five days; for their foot will be able to join them as soon, if not sooner than ours. But if Prince Eugene uses that diligence he has promised, he may, with his horse, join me some days before they can, by stealing a march, which time we must make use of. I have this afternoon received yours of the 25th, but have not time to do more than to thank you, till the next post."

"*Terbank, June 14.* — By the letters of Lord Galway, as well as what you write me in yours of the 25th and 26th, I cannot but observe that his project, that he now makes, does no way agree with the project he sent by Mr. Stanhope. That would have been expensive, but this is likely to be much more. There can be no doubt but Cadiz would be of great use. But I beg you to consider how impossible it will be to have success, unless it be done by surprise; and how impossible that will be, when the much greatest part of the troops are to march by land, and that you are to deceive the Portuguese, as well as the French and Spaniards. But if it be practicable, it must be this year and not the next, for when you shall the next winter put your troops into such quarters as may be proper for that expedition, you may be assured that they will take such precaution as will put that place out of danger.

"You know that by the treaty, England and Holland are obliged to give every year to the king of Portugal upwards of 4000 barrels of powder, which is more than is expended by France and all the allies in their armies; so that I beg you will be cautious of giving any encouragement of having an English train established in Portugal; for if the attempt at Cadiz goes on, the cannon and every thing for that expedition must be furnished by the fleet. As for the refugee officers, I think he sets a much greater value on them than they deserve. If he can make any use of them, I should think they would be better there than in Ireland!

"I am very sorry you have so much occasion to put you in mind of Lord Croft's saying, but as *God is above*, so I trust in him, or else our prospect is very dreadful.

"The enclosed is what came to me by express from Count Rechteren. You will see by it how uncertain all measures taken with the Germans are; for the army on the Moselle was to be formed, at farthest, by the 27th of May, and by this letter we must not expect it till the beginning of July. Patience is a virtue absolutely necessary, when one is obliged to keep measures with such people. I beg you will inform her majesty and the prince, that they may not think me negligent; and if the queen approves of it, I think Count Rechteren's letter might be read to the

cabinet council, so that they might see the reason of my staying in this camp. What you mention of Toulon is not now to be thought on. I own to you that I fear we must not expect, this campaign, much from the duke of Savoy ; but the best thing we can do is, to make him believe, that we flatter ourselves with great success on his side, and that we rely entirely on him, not doubting but he will take the best measures."

In the interval, Marlborough had again written to Count Rechteren, apprising him of the measures for facilitating the march of the troops, and desiring him to make such movements as might draw the attention of the enemy towards the Moselle. He also despatched one of his aides-de-camp, Captain Armstrong, who, besides regulating the details of the intended march with Count Rechteren, advanced as far as Frankfort, to meet Eugene on his return from Vienna.

On the 11th of June he again wrote to Eugene.

"I am glad that Count Rechteren sent Captain Armstrong with my letters to meet your highness at Frankfort, since that will have given you an opportunity of concerting the necessary measures with the elector of Hanover, without loss of time. You will have learnt on your arrival that the elector of Bavaria has sent a strong detachment towards the Moselle, which will doubtless march forward, in proportion as your troops advance, so you will easily judge that for a beginning we can rely only on the cavalry, with which I request you to hasten in all diligence ; for we can only reckon on a surprise, which will depend on the little time you may take for your march between the Moselle and the Meuse. If the palatines are not arrived, you will please not to wait for them ; and as soon as I know the day you will be at Maestricht, I will send some one to meet you, and acquaint you with my projects.

"If you can gain only forty-eight hours, I will make my dispositions for the moment of your arrival ; and with the blessing of Heaven, we may profit so well by those two days, as to feel the good effects of it the rest of the campaign. You will order the infantry to hasten as much as possible to Maestricht, where they will receive directions for their further march.

"The two armies have remained eight days in their present camps, and there is no appearance of a change, till I have the news which I expect from your highness. I have employed this time in making an exact review of the troops, which are in so good a condition, that it would gratify your highness to see them."

By a letter from Eugene, dated June 14., the British commander had at last the satisfaction to hear that the discussion with the elector palatine was terminated, and that he might daily expect intelligence of the intended march.

"*Frankfort, June 14.* — I have continued here some days since I received your highness's letter. The count of Rechteren, who has kent

yours of the 30th, will come to-morrow to Rheinfels to meet me. I press forward the march of the troops, and make all the necessary arrangements. Some difficulty has arisen for the palatines, the elector having persisted in not letting them march until the investiture had taken place, which, however, depends on certain formalities, not arising from the emperor. But from letters which I have just received from Cardinal Lamberg, at Ratisbon, the affair seems to be done. Your highness may be convinced, that I will omit nothing to press on my march from Rheinfels. I will give you due notice by a courier, being myself extremely impatient to assure you in person, of my respect," &c.

*Reply of Marlborough.*

"June 23. — I was much rejoiced at what your highness did me the honour to write to me in yours of the 15th, that the affair of the palatinate was finished; so that I hope the palatine troops are ready to join. I send your highness another letter, in conformity with the project concerted with Count Rechteren, to be communicated to the elector of Hanover. Your highness will also do well to write a few words to the elector palatine, and the landgrave of Hesse, that they may not be offended with the secrecy which we have observed."

The second letter to the elector, here referred to, was conformable to that of May 30., which Eugene, from prudential considerations, had deferred delivering. At this anxious crisis, the difficulties of the British general were increased, by the alarm and despondency which reigned in Holland, and the consequent eagerness manifested by some of the members of government for a peace. On this subject, as well as on the military movements, we find two interesting letters to Lord Godolphin.

"Terbank, June 18. — Since my last I have had the favour of yours of the 31st and 1st of this month. I am not surprised at the conversation you have had with the duke of Savoy's minister, though I am very confident he has no thoughts of that expedition for this campaign; but he knows very well how fond every honest Englishman is of that project."\*

"My opinion is, that the duke of Savoy knows too well that if he shall be able to do nothing considerable this campaign, the allies may grow weary of leaving so many troops with him the next year, unless he can, by some plausible offer, engage England.

"By what I have received this morning from Prince Eugene, the difficulty of the palatine troops continues, and he is not certain when the 4000 imperial horse can be at their rendezvous. In the meantime, you will see, by the enclosed paper, the diligence and care taken by the elector of Bavaria. It is most certain that the few troops which the French

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\* Alluding to some proposal for a renewal of the design on Toulon.

have on the Rhine give a great occasion to the elector of Hanover, and I should think a good opportunity for that of Franche Comté.\*

"I shall follow your advice in letting the elector know what my thoughts are; but I must own frankly to you, that I take the humour of the elector to be such, that the sure way of not being disappointed is, to expect nothing from thence.

"I send you the letter I have received this morning from M. Buys, with the answer I have made to it. You will see by it that they are not changed in their opinion, so that it will be necessary for you to think well of what answer I shall give; for it will be communicated to the four burgomasters. I am afraid that Amsterdam is very much determined for peace, and if that should be once known by the States, it might be of very dangerous consequence this winter. When M. Buys and his companion spoke of this matter to me, they assured me they had acquainted nobody but myself, being very sensible of the consequence. Your letter by Molesworth is not yet come to me."

"June 28.— \* \* \* \* By letters I received last night from Prince Eugene, he gives me hopes of being in a condition of beginning his march either to-morrow or the day following, and that he will, the night before his march, send a copy of my letter of the 24th to the elector of Hanover. The enclosed is a copy of my letter. Prince Eugene thinks the elector will not approve of his march, which is the reason of his not acquainting him sooner with my letter, so that he might not have it in his power to hinder the march, which he thinks otherwise he would do. That which gives me the greatest uneasiness is, that I find Prince Eugene thinks that their horse cannot join me in less than ten days, and that their foot must have fourteen or fifteen days. If they cannot make greater expedition, I fear the horse of the duke of Berwick will get before them, which I have writ to the prince, by express, this morning. According to the answer I shall have from him, I shall give the necessary orders for eight days' bread, which I shall take with me when I leave this camp, my design being to engage their army, if possible, or to oblige them to retire to such a post, as that I may have it in my power to make the siege of Charleroy; but if they take such a camp as will cover Charleroy, I shall then be obliged to stay for the foot, before I begin my march for Flanders. Since the disappointments Prince Eugene has met with have lost us above a month, and that the enemy know too much of our design, the best thing we can hope for is, that we may be able to oblige them to come to some action; for it is the opinion of Prince Eugene, as well as mine, that we must not expect any ease from the elector, which is a misfortune, but such a one as I know not how to remedy. We were in hopes to have heard that the elector of Hanover's army had passed the Rhine, the French being at this time very weak on that side. The letters from that army do not come till to-morrow, but our letters from

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\* This alludes to a plan, which at this time was formed by La Braconnière, a refugee officer, to excite an insurrection in Franche Comté.

Frankfort say, that they will not pass that river till Prince Eugene's army begins to act."

"*Terbank, July 2.* — Since my last I have had the favour of yours of the 11th and 15th. By the first I see the uneasy circumstances you labour under; and I do assure myself that you do me the justice to believe, that for your sake, as well as for the queen, I would cheerfully venture my life to make you two of one mind; for unless that can be, it were quieter and better to be under ground. I beg you to believe that my love and zeal for you is so much, that I should not value the difficulties I meet with here abroad. I have by this night's post sent yours of the 15th to M. Buys; what answer he makes you shall be sure to have. I am told that he is so possessed with the thoughts of peace, that he could not forbear saying lately to an honest man, who was not of his opinion, that if we had not good success this campaign, they must have peace."

*To Lord Sunderland.*

"*Terbank, July 2.* — My lord; I thank you for your letter of the 15th past, and shall expect yours and my lord treasurer's thoughts relating to the marquis of Guiscard\*, as you promise me. You will now hear that the investiture is actually given to the elector palatine, and I hope our next letters will tell us the same of the Montferrat to the duke of Savoy. Prince Eugene began his march with his army on Friday last, in order to join us, and I hope will make so much diligence as to prevent the enemy, upon which the whole depends; for though we have no account yet of their motions, 'tis not to be doubted but they are likewise hastening this way. I expect the prince himself here on Thursday or Friday, to concert matters with me, and reckon his horse will not be above two or three days behind him. As soon as they are at hand, we shall begin to move towards the enemy, in hopes to bring them to a battle, which I fear they will avoid. I wish I could flatter myself, but I have no hopes, that Toulon will be attempted; for of all projects that were the best for England. I am, with truth," &c.

Having made all these arrangements, and taken precautions to act offensively against the French army in the Netherlands, Marlborough deemed it expedient no longer to withhold the information from the States. He, therefore, despatched a letter announcing his design, by a courier from Terbank, on the 2d of July.

"High and mighty lords: having reflected on the situation of our affairs in this country, and considered those on the Moselle, and observing the little probability of supplying the army of Prince Eugene with all the requisites, so as to act offensively and with vigour; and being

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\* We find among the Marlborough Papers innumerable letters and projects, furnished by Guiscard, for the invasion of France, which were never carried into execution.

confirmed in my opinion by a resolution of your high mightinesses, communicated to me by the deputies, I have imparted to Prince Eugene and to Count Rechteren my opinion, that it will be more advantageous to the interests of the common cause, for the army on the Moselle to join us in Brabant, without delay, and entreated them, should they be of my opinion, to communicate the same to the elector of Hanover, and to begin their march as soon as possible. These measures being taken in conformity with the approbation of the field deputies, I doubt not but they will give notice to your high mightinesses. Nevertheless, I would not fail to inform you, that I have just received, from Prince Eugene, intelligence that his army commenced their march last Friday, the cavalry advancing by long forced marches, while the infantry rapidly followed; and that it was his intention to arrive in our camp on the 5th or 6th, to concert with me the operations, according to our arrangement, that as soon as the cavalry shall approach, we shall move directly upon the enemy, and bring on a battle, trusting in God to bless our designs, and hoping that I shall soon have an opportunity of sending you good news."\*

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#### CHAP. LXIX. — BATTLE OF OUDENARD. — 1708.

WHILE Marlborough remained at Terbank, eagerly looking to the movements of Eugene, and anxiously expecting the junction of his forces, new dangers arose in other quarters. Unwilling again to measure their strength with the British general in the field, the French commanders formed a plan, no less bold than judicious, to rob him of all his recent conquests, and reduce him to the same situation as when he commenced his glorious career. This design was grounded on the general discontent which pervaded the Netherlands under the oppressive government of the Dutch, and which had already manifested itself in the plot for the surrender of Antwerp. They meditated the surprise of Ghent, which commanded the course of the Lys and the Scheldt; and of Bruges, the centre of the principal water communications. They calculated that the acquisition of these important fortresses would lead to the capture of the smaller places; and, finally, their plan embraced the reduction of Oudenard, a point of the highest consequence in a military view.

Situated on the Scheldt, and at the verge of the frontier, Oudenard was the connecting link for the alternate defence

\* Translated from the French draught.

of Flanders and Brabant; and although incapable of a protracted resistance, was yet the most convenient place of arms for the operations on either side. While it was occupied by the allies, they could penetrate towards Lille, raise the sieges of Menin or Courtray, interpose between the borders of France and Ghent, and cut off the communications of a hostile army. If Brabant were threatened, they might pass the Scheldt, and occupying the strong camps of Lessines or Leuse, present a front, or hang on the flank, of a corps attempting to push towards Brussels. The banks of the Scheldt being elevated, present many defensive positions on either side; but such positions were useful only to the army which held the fortress. If Oudenard was thus important in a general view, it was still more valuable in the actual circumstances of the allies. It was the chief avenue to their other fortresses in Flanders, as well as the only channel of their direct communications with England, and its fall would have ensured the loss of all their conquests in that quarter; while the enemy, seated in the most fertile and opulent district of Europe, and holding the fortresses on the Scheldt, would have easily baffled every attempt for their expulsion, flanked all direct attacks on French Hainault, and stripped of their value the advantages of the two preceding campaigns.

The first part of the design conceived by the French commanders, was no less successfully executed than judiciously planned. Having diverted the attention of Marlborough by their feints on the side of Louvain, they suddenly decamped from Brain l'Allieu on the evening of the 4th of July, and rapidly advanced towards Hall and Tubise, where they intended to cross the Senne. In their march, they detached several corps to the different places of Flanders, where they had established a secret correspondence with the disaffected. At the dawn of the 5th of July, one of these parties, commanded by Brigadier La Faille and Pasteur, appeared before Ghent. By the negligence or treachery of the watch, a small number of soldiers were suffered to gain admission as deserters, and found means to amuse the guard, till the main body arrived and secured the gate. The other gates being seized with the same facility, the whole detachment advanced into the market place. La Faille, who had been high-bailiff

of Bruges, and was well known to the inhabitants, assembled the magistrates and burghers in the town-house. Producing a pardon, signed by the elector of Bavaria, for their defection to the allies, he readily obtained their submission, and invested a small garrison of 300 men, who held the citadel.

Six hours after the surprise of Ghent, Count de la Motte appeared before Bruges, which likewise surrendered on the first summons. He next endeavoured to surprise Damme, but failing in his attempts to intimidate the governor, he marched to Plassendael, a small but important fort on the canal of Bruges, and took it by storm.

Major-general Murray, who had been posted with a detachment at Mariekirk, was no sooner apprised of these movements, than he hastened towards Ghent, and arrived in time to save the place, had he not been refused admission by the burghers. He had, therefore, no resource but to retire to Sas van Ghent, and leave the small garrison in the castle to their fate. Here he was joined by deputies from the Hague, who on the first alarm were despatched to concert with him the requisite measures for the defence of the forts and posts which covered this part of the frontier.

Receiving prompt intelligence of the sudden movement made by his antagonists towards the Dender, Marlborough broke up from Terbank, on the morning of the 5th, and crossing the Senne and the canal of Brussels, encamped with his left at Anderlecht, and his right at the mill of Tombeck. Here he learnt the march of the hostile detachments against Ghent and Bruges, and pushed forward a body of cavalry, under General Bothmar, with orders to cross the Scheldt, near Termond, and, if possible, to obviate the danger.

During this march, the French were traversing the Senne, at Tubise and Hall, within a short distance of the camp which Marlborough had chosen. He arrived too late in the evening to arrest their progress, but he hoped to bring them to an engagement before they could reach the Dender. He therefore sent out a strong detachment to harass their rear, and at one in the morning, riding to the right of his lines, he ordered the troops to form, and hold themselves in readiness for battle, on the first appearance of the dawn.

The alertness of the enemy, however, baffled his design. Continuing their march during the night, they crossed the

Dender in several columns, near Ninove, and the allied detachment arrived in time only to seize a part of their baggage, and to make three hundred prisoners. In their haste they sunk their bridges, and the panic which reigned among them, was proved by the crowds of deserters who flocked to the confederate camp. Having accomplished the passage of the Dender, they descended the stream, and took post between Alost and Oerdegem, with a view to cover the attack against the citadel of Ghent, and at the same time to threaten Brussels. The consternation, indeed, was so great among the inhabitants of that large and opulent capital, that Marlborough advanced to Asch, within a league of Alost, where he encamped on the evening of the 6th. Here the melancholy forebodings, which the movements of the enemy called forth, were realised, by the intelligence which arrived of the surprise of Bruges and Ghent, and the investment of the citadel. The alarm was at its height both in Brussels and in the army.

In this trying moment, he was cheered by the arrival of Eugene, who, finding that he could not effect a junction in time, left his cavalry at Maestricht, and hastened to take a personal share in the expected conflict. The appearance of the illustrious chief restored joy and alacrity; and Marlborough welcomed him by observing, "I am not without hopes of congratulating your highness on a great victory; for my troops will be animated by the presence of so distinguished a commander."

Eugene warmly approved the resolution, which his friend had adopted, of engaging the enemy; and the proposal being sanctioned by a council of war, held the ensuing day, pioneers were instantly detached in every direction, to clear the roads for the passage of the troops. As Oudenard was known to be the next object of attack, General Chanclos, who commanded at Ath, was directed to collect reinforcements from his own and the neighbouring garrisons, and with these troops, and a corps of Waleff's dragoons, to throw himself into the place. This he happily accomplished without the slightest obstruction.

On the eve of so awful a crisis, which he might not survive, Eugene took the opportunity to visit his aged mother, the countess of Soissons, who resided at Brussels. Soon after

his departure, Marlborough was seized with a fever, the result of fatigue, anxiety, and watchfulness, and was earnestly recommended by his physicians to quit the camp. The peril of the moment, however, raised his active mind above the sense of bodily suffering: he matured his arrangements for the approaching conflict, though on account of his indisposition, he continued in his tent, and the regular orders were issued from the quarters of Marshal Overkirk. His disorder abating the ensuing day, he was enabled to resume the arduous duties of his station.

The enemy having received intelligence that the citadel of Ghent had surrendered, after a defence of two days, prepared to execute the rest of their design. Detachments were sent against Oudenard, which was invested on the morning of the 9th; and a train of heavy artillery was ordered from Tournay. To cover the siege, they prepared to occupy the strong camp of Lessines, on the Dender.

But they were opposed to a general, whose promptitude and activity have been seldom paralleled, and whose resources were called forth by the magnitude of the stake for which he was contending. Although the distance he had to traverse was twice that of the enemy, no obstacle could divert him from his object. To quiet the alarm which reigned in Brussels, the garrison was reinforced with four battalions of infantry. The roads having been cleared, the army broke up from Asch at two in the morning of the 9th, and moved towards Herfelingen, by the left, in four columns, the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the flanks. The whole body of grenadiers, and thirty squadrons of horse, under Lord Albemarle, covered the rear, and prepared to check any attempt of the enemy on Brussels. In consequence of this precaution, the movement was so rapid, firm, and connected, that before mid-day the heads of the columns reached Herfelingen, five leagues from Asch. Here the duke halted, and the troops encamped in their order of march, with the village in the rear, and the front towards the Dender.

Four hours afterwards, Cadogan was detached, with eight battalions, and as many squadrons, to throw bridges over the Dender, and post himself at Lessines. At this moment Eugene returned, and participated in the exultation which

the prospect of a battle inspired. The evening tattoo was the signal for the army to resume the march, which was continued during the night. Towards morning, Marlborough had the satisfaction to find that Cadogan had reached Lessines at midnight, and leaving 800 men to occupy the place, had taken post beyond the Dender, over which he had thrown bridges. He therefore crossed with exulting confidence, and encamped with his right to the Dender, and the front covered by a stream which falls into that river.

At this moment he descried the heads of the hostile columns on the distant heights, and perceived that his promptitude had disconcerted the plans of his antagonists. Indeed, the French generals had so little calculated on the rapidity of his movement, that they delayed detaching a corps for the occupation of Lessines until it was too late. Disappointed and discouraged, they now turned to the right, and hastened towards Gavre, with a view to shelter themselves behind the line of the Scheldt.\*

From Herfelingen and Lessines, Marlborough announced the progress and event of his march to the treasurer.

"*July 9.* — I should answer two of your letters, but the treachery of Ghent, continual marching, and some letters † I have received from England, have so vexed me, that I was yesterday in so great a fever, that the doctor would have persuaded me to have gone to Brussels; but I thank God I am now better, and by the next post I hope to answer your letters. The States have used this country so ill, that I no ways doubt but all the towns in this country will play us the same trick as Ghent has done, whenever they have it in their power. I have been desired by the deputies to write, that her majesty would be pleased to let the troops, now in the Isle of Wight, be sent for their relief to Ostend; so that it is likely you will be desired the same thing by M. Vriberg; but I hope the queen will continue in the resolution of employing those troops as she first designed; for I think that will be much more for hers and the nation's honour; but Vriberg must not know my opinion.

"I beg, with my humble duty, you will make my excuses to the queen, for my not acknowledging the honour of hers till the next post. I am so extremely troubled at what has been writ me concerning my brother George and Mr. Walpole, that I beg you will acquaint me with what you know of that matter.

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\* Circulars from Herfelingen and Lessines; Letters from Marlborough to Mr. Boyle and Lord Godolphin; Gazette; Complete History of Europe; Lediard; Histoire de Marlborough.

† From the queen and the duchess.

“ Having made a halt of five hours, I am continuing my march, as I intend to do all the night, in hopes of getting to the camp of Lessines before the enemy, who made yesterday a detachment of 16,000 men, for the investing of Oudenard. If I get the camp of Lessines before them, I hope to be able to hinder the siege, being resolved to venture every thing, rather than lose that place.”

“ *Lessines, the 10th.* — Mr. Cardonel telling me that by a mistake the letters were not gone, I have opened mine, to let you know that the head of the army is got hither. I have received advice this morning from the governor of Oudenard, that he was invested on both sides of his town yesterday morning. I should think myself happy, since I am got into this camp, if they continue their resolution of carrying on that siege.”

As the ensuing march from Lessines produced the decisive engagement at Oudenard, we shall here pause, to take a survey of the surrounding country and field of action, that we may more distinctly exhibit the movements and details of this memorable conflict.

From the frontier of France to the confluence of the Scheldt and Lys, the surface consists of low hills and bold undulations, which contract the valley of the Scheldt in various places, till they gradually subside in the vicinity of Ghent. Human industry here exerts unremitting efforts, and the eye nowhere rests on a patch of heath, or even on a single acre in repose. On the bolder swells of the upland, which are generally denominated *couters*, corn predominates; on the lower, flax, clover, pease, and buck-wheat. Woods or coppices are found only on the steep acclivities, where the plough cannot act, or in patches of plantations, except towards France, where the country is shaded by forests. Numerous villages and hamlets enliven this rich and varied surface; small farms and cottages are scattered in every direction; and at intervals appear the turrets of a castellated mansion, a convent or abbey. Of the roads, which form the communications between these countless dwellings, those across the *couters* are usually bare, and the others are mostly fringed with underwood, or bordered with avenues. Towards the Scheldt, which winds along a valley comparatively low, are ranges of meadows, intersected with numerous drains and watercourses.

At the distance of a mile north of Oudenard, is the village of Eyne. Here the ground rises into a species of low, but capacious amphitheatre. It sweeps along a moderately sized

plain, southward, to near the glaciis of Oudenard, where it is crowned by the village of Bevere, and numerous windmills. Turning westward, it then rises into another broad hill, under the name of the Boser Couter, and the highest point is near a tilleul or lime-tree and a windmill overlooking the village of Oycke. From thence the ground curves towards Marolen; and the eye glancing over the narrow valley watered by the Norken, is arrested by another upland plain, which trends by Huyse, gradually sinking till it terminates near Asper. A line representing the chord of this semicircle would commence about a league above the confluence of the Norken with the Scheldt, and traverse the plain of Heurne, which is nearly as high as the amphitheatre itself. Within this space two scanty rivulets, gushing from the base of the hill of Oycke, at a small distance asunder, embrace a low tongue of land, the middle of which rises into a gentle elevation. The borders of these rivulets, and a part of the intervening surface, are intersected with enclosures, surrounding the farms and hamlets of Barwaen, Chobon, and Diepenbeck. At the source of one is the castellated mansion of Bevere or Brian, at that of the other, the hamlet of Retelhoeck, situated in a woody and steep recess. These streams uniting near a public house, called Schaerken, proceed partly in a double channel along a marshy bed to the Scheldt, near Eyne. The Norken rising near Morlehem, beyond Oycke, runs for some distance almost parallel to the Scheldt; then passing by Ledge, Mullem, and Asper, it meets another streamlet from the west, and terminates in a species of canal, skirting the Scheldt to a considerable distance below Gavre. The borders of the Norken, like those of the other rivulets, are fringed with underwood, coppices, and thickets; and from Mullem to Herlehem the roads are skirted with avenues. Behind, are enclosures surrounding a small plain, which terminates beyond the mill of Royegem. Between these is a hollow road, which leads up to the hill of Oycke.

After this cursory view of the scene of action, we proceed to trace the movements of the contending hosts.

During the night of the 10th, the allied commanders prepared for an engagement, although they had a space of no less than fifteen miles to traverse, and a broad and rapid stream to cross, and although they were yet in doubt what

course their antagonists would pursue, or what position they intended to occupy.

The state of the hostile army was, however, highly favourable to their views. The French commanders, relying on the apparent anxiety of Marlborough to cover the great towns in his rear, little suspected that he would have made so bold and rapid a movement as the march to Lessines, which placed him between them and their own frontier. This disappointment inflamed the contention which already reigned between the duke of Burgundy and Vendome; and the discord which it produced in their counsels was not unknown to the confederate chiefs. Foiled, therefore, in their design on Lessines, the French commanders relinquished the investment of Oudenard, and directed their march to Gavre, where they had prepared bridges for crossing the Scheldt.

On this occasion Marlborough and Eugene evinced the same promptitude, decision, and spirit, which had marked their operations on the Danube; and they were ably seconded by their veteran colleague Overkirk. Aware that an army which is attacked in retreat, or in crossing a river, loses all the advantage of order and discipline, they pushed forward to the Scheldt, to come in contact with the enemy at the moment of their passage.

Preparatory to this movement, Cadogan and Rantzau were detached with a strong advanced guard of 16 battalions, consisting of the brigades of Sabine, Plettenberg, and Evans; and eight squadrons of the dragoons of Bulau, Leibregement, and Schulemburg, with the quarter colours, and 32 pieces of artillery. They were directed to clear the roads, and throw bridges over the Scheldt, in the vicinity of Oudenard. Departing at the dawn of the 11th, they were followed at eight in the morning by the whole army. The order of march was again in four columns, by the left, each line forming two columns, the cavalry leading the way, and the artillery in the rear.

At half-past ten in the morning Cadogan reached the right bank of the Scheldt, between the town and abbey of Bename, and immediately commenced the construction of the bridges. About the same time the hostile columns drew towards Gavre, two leagues below. Their bridges being

already prepared; the French advanced guard, led on by the Marquis de Biron, passed leisurely over, without suspecting the approach of the allies; and some of the soldiers were even detached to collect forage. The bridges were completed about mid-day. As the heads of the columns of cavalry were drawing near, Rantzau passed the Scheldt with the horse and quarter colours, and was followed by Cadogan, with twelve battalions; the other four being left to guard the pontoons. They advanced to the top of the high ground, between Eyne and Beverc, and formed at the extremity of the amphitheatre, the infantry opposite Eyne, and the cavalry extending on the left, towards the inclosures near Schaerken.

Cadogan proceeding to reconnoitre, descried several squadrons of the enemy on the farther side of the plain, and observed their foraging parties scattered about Heurne and Ruybroek. He instantly sent the cavalry to attack them, who drove them towards Synghem, and took several prisoners. But the alarm being given, Biron advanced with twelve squadrons, repulsed all the assailants, who had proceeded beyond Eyne, and advanced to the windmill behind the village. Here he saw the allied detachment in position, and observing at the same time the battalions posted near the bridges, and the columns of cavalry in the act of crossing, he withdrew, to avoid the shock of the whole confederate army, the greater part of which he supposed had already traversed the river.

The celerity of Marlborough, indeed, gave colour to this conjecture, for hearing, on his way, that the enemy were crossing at Gavre, he became alarmed for the safety of his advance. Directing the flank column of cavalry to guard against the movements which he supposed the enemy might make on his line of march, he and Eugene pressed forward at the head of the second column, which consisted entirely of Prussians. They proceeded part of the way at full gallop, and fortunately reached the bridges at the moment when the Marquis de Biron had advanced to reconnoitre the assailants, by whom his foragers had been so unexpectedly attacked.

The apparition of the allies created a general sensation throughout the French ranks. Vendome, however, did not partake of the alarm which seems to have seized the rest of

the commanders. From the distant clouds of dust, which marked the course of the moving columns, he judged that the main body was yet half a league from the Scheldt, and that there was still sufficient time to attack the confederates before they could form in order of battle. To secure the plain of Heurne, and cover the deployment of his lines, he directed seven battalions of the Swiss regiments of Pfeffer, Villars, and Gueder to occupy the village; and the cavalry of the right, consisting of part of the household troops, to draw up near the windmill. Under cover of this preliminary disposition, he intended to form his left on the plain of Heurne, and extend his right across the Boser Couter, towards Mooreghem. The duke of Burgundy, however, countermanded the order, either from persuasion that an army so numerous as that of the confederates could not make so rapid a march, or from the opinion, that the high ground of Huysse, with the Norcken in front, would afford a more eligible position. The altered direction of the French columns was visible to the allied detachment; it appeared doubtful whether they would risk an engagement, or hasten towards their lines, between Tournay and Lille: irresolution and perplexity were evident in all their movements.

Meanwhile Pfeffer, with his seven battalions, instead of occupying Heurne, advanced and took post at Eyne, either from inadvertence, or from a mistake caused by a similarity of names. Although this post was advantageous, the change in the direction of the French army placed him beyond the reach of protection; and the household horse, who had orders to cover him, were not only too far in the rear, but were afterwards recalled, and only a few squadrons left in their stead.

Marlborough and Eugene lost no time in taking advantage of the enemy's indecision. While the march of the infantry was accelerated by repeated orders, they jointly superintended the passage of the Scheldt, and posted the troops as fast as they arrived. Soon after two o'clock the second column of cavalry was formed in front of Bevere, and a battery of six field pieces placed on the hill above Schaerken. About three, the head of the first column of cavalry, and the whole infantry of the right wing reached the bridges. To accelerate the passage, the horse of the left column passed through Oude-

nard, and began likewise to appear. The four battalions, who had hitherto guarded the bridges, marched to join the advanced guard, and General Cadogan seized the favourable moment to strike the first blow. Having observed the insulated position of Pfeffer's brigade, and the diminution of the corps of cavalry left to protect him, he advanced with twelve battalions, and the cavalry of Rantzau. Brigadier Sabine, at the head of four English battalions, led the attack. They descended the hill, and forded the rivulet, near Eyne, while the cavalry passed above, and turned the rear of the village. A sharp conflict ensued, but the enemy were soon forced, and three entire battalions, with the brigadier, were made prisoners. The rest were either killed, or intercepted in their flight near the windmill. Rantzau, with his eight squadrons of Hanoverians and the quarter-masters of the army, then advanced upon the plain of Heurne, to charge the cavalry, who perceiving the destruction of the infantry, endeavoured to retire into the enclosures behind; but before they could effect their purpose, they were overtaken, routed, and driven across the Norken, among the columns of their own army, which were forming on the farther side. Twelve standards fell into the hands of the victors, and the colonel of the regiment of La Breteche was made prisoner. The electoral prince of Hanover, afterwards George II., with General Schulemburg, Count Lusky, and several volunteers of distinction, animated the troops by charging at the head of a squadron. Count Lusky was killed in the struggle, and the prince himself had a horse shot under him.

The French commanders were now convinced that to retire without an action was impossible, and many general officers who had thwarted Vendome, from blind deference to the duke of Burgundy, now loudly clamoured to be led against the enemy. Active preparations were accordingly made by the French commanders to repel a general attack, and the army drew up on the high ground of Lede, Huysse, and Maldeghem, in two lines, with a reserve. The greater part of the cavalry were posted on the right, opposite Oycke, the left extended to behind Mullem, the front being covered by the Norken, and the defiles along its banks. Had they remained firm in this position, it is doubtful whether the confederate forces, after a long march of near five leagues,

would have ventured to risk an attack that evening, and they might have retired in the night. But the duke of Burgundy and the clamorous officers were now as impatient to attack, as they were before desirous to remain on the defensive.

It was four in the afternoon, and the allies were not formed, when the duke of Burgundy directed General Grimaldi to lead sixteen squadrons across the Norken, apparently for the purpose of reconnoitring whether the right wing could advance and occupy the space between the two rivulets at Diepenbeck and Chobon. Grimaldi came to the brink of the first rivulet, but made no attempt to pass ; for observing the Prussian cavalry already formed, and the British advancing, he fell back to the small plain near the mill of Royeghem. Vendome, who disapproved of this movement, which he foresaw would produce a conflict, in the very manner the allies wished to engage, had, nevertheless, directed his left to advance at the same moment, with a view of bringing both wings into action together. But the duke of Burgundy again countermanded his order, under pretence that an impassable morass separated the two armies on that side, although Vendome had himself traversed the pretended swamp only an hour before. Whatever was the cause, the left wing of the French remained in position, and another invaluable hour was lost in useless movements.

Marlborough, observing the right wing and centre of the enemy passing the defiles in their front, and forming irregularly, judged that they intended to attack him by the right. He conjectured that they would speedily advance towards the castle of Bevere, line the rivulet to Diepenbeck and Herlehem, and under cover of this manœuvre, bring their left into the plain of Heurne, where the squadrons of Rantzau, and some battalions of Cadogan were yet unsupported. Two battalions of the four, who had covered the bridges, had been already posted in the hedges near Groenevelde, where the first attack was expected. To keep the hostile right in check, they were reinforced by the twelve battalions of Cadogan, who had partly occupied Eyne and Heurne. Marlborough himself advanced by Heurne, with the Prussian horse, and drew them up in front of the enemy. While this movement was in progress, the whole first column of the first line of the

right wing, consisting entirely of British, formed rapidly on the height of Bevere.

At this moment thirty battalions of the enemy's right, among whom were the French and Swiss foot-guards, the brigades du Roi, Picardi, and Royal Roussillon, debouched, as had been expected; and after some hesitation attacked the four battalions posted at Groenevelde, before the corps of Cadogan could arrive to sustain them. This small force, however, disputed the edge of the streamlet, and maintained their ground until the other battalions arrived on their right, and boldly attacked the enemy's centre. The duke of Argyle, who led the British infantry, hastened also into action with twenty battalions, and a few pieces of cannon.\* His left took post near Schaerken, and his right joined the infantry already engaged near Ruybroek and Groenevelde. A heavy conflict of musketry ensued, each battalion being engaged separately in the fields and enclosures which border the rivulet. The remaining part of the enemy's right, following the direction of the corps engaged, gradually prolonged their line, till they outflanked some Prussian infantry on the left of the British, and after pushing them back, occupied Barwaen and the farm of Banlancy. But Count Lottum, with the second column of infantry, consisting of Prussians and Hanoverians, had now likewise formed, and at six o'clock advanced in his turn, recovered the lost ground, and drove the enemy across the rivulet. As the lines extended, and the number of troops augmented, partial conflicts gradually increased into a general roar of musketry, which spread along the outer portion of the semicircle, formed by the two rivulets winding near Schaerken.

Marlborough and Eugene, who had hitherto remained together, now separated. The duke complimented the prince with the command of the right, comprising the British troops, whose valour he had often witnessed and applauded. He

\* From the rapidity of the march, and the peculiarities of local situation, this memorable battle was fought with little aid from artillery on either side. The only pieces employed on the part of the allies, appear to have been those which accompanied the advanced detachment; and on the part of the French, we find reference to only six pieces. For this reason no allusion is made to the artillery in the Gazette and official accounts.

foresaw that the stress of the action would lie on this quarter, and therefore ordered Count Lottum, with twenty battalions, to prolong his right, and strengthen the wing under Eugene. The opening which this movement occasioned, between the castle of Bevere and Schaerken, was filled up by eighteen battalions, drawn from the right of the left wing, who had just reached the scene of action, and formed across the Boser Couter, with the left in front of Mooreghem. Thus nearly sixty battalions fought under Eugene, while only twenty remained under the direction of the duke himself, in the centre.

The prince was warmly pressed, when the reinforcement arrived ; for the corps of Cadogan, occupying a kind of focus in the centre of the hostile position, had been driven out of the coverts and avenues near Herlehem into the plain. With this accession of strength, Eugene, however, again advanced and broke the first line of the enemy. General Natzmer took an immediate advantage of the disorder ; and at the head of the Prussian gens d'armes and cuirassiers, charged through the second line into the small plain, near the chapel of Royeghem. But his career was checked by the household squadrons, and his ranks swept away by the fire of musketry which flashed from every hedge. After losing half his men, and receiving himself several sabre and gun-shot wounds, he escaped with the utmost difficulty, by leaping over a broad ditch.

While the action thus raged with various success on the right, Marlborough, with the Hanoverian and Dutch battalions, pressed forward from the farm of Banlancy, and the hamlet of Barwaen. The enemy disputed every inch of ground, and set fire to some houses which they could no longer defend ; but the gallant commander passed the nearest rivulet, and forced one enclosure after another, till he reached the hamlet of Diepenbeck. Here he encountered such obstinate resistance, that his troops were compelled to pause. His vigilant eye, however, discovered that the right of the enemy extended only to the steep acclivity of the hill of Oycke, and that they had neglected to occupy the commanding ground above. Of this error he did not fail to profit. Concluding that their right might be turned, and cut off from the main body, he requested Marshal Overkirk, who

had brought up the rear, with nearly all the cavalry of the left, and twenty battalions of Dutch and Danes, to execute this bold and decisive manœuvre.

The veteran hero, unmindful of his age and bodily infirmities, roused his expiring energy, and obeyed with equal alacrity and spirit. The last column of infantry having reached its ground, and deployed for battle, he directed General Week, with the brigade of Dutch guards, and of Nassau Woudenburg, to force the ravines near the castle of Bevere. The troops moved rapidly to the attack, having the castle to their right, and after a vigorous conflict, drove back the enemy into the coppices which fringe the banks of the rivulet. The prince of Orange and General Oxenstiern instantly followed with the remainder of the twenty battalions, ascended the Boser Couter, sustained by the cavalry, under Overkirk and Count Tilly, and formed with the left behind the mill of Oycke. Finding no enemy on the summit, the whole mass changed front to the right, and extended their left towards De Keele. The allied army thus formed a vast semicircle round the right wing of the enemy, who could only partially communicate with their centre and left, through the ravines and passes of Marolen, and by the mill of Royeghem.

This manœuvre being announced to the duke, he urged Marshal Overkirk to make a farther effort with his left, and cut off the remaining communications of the enemy. The execution of this movement was intrusted to the young prince of Orange, whose impetuous spirit panted for distinction. Accompanied by General Oxenstiern, he rushed with the infantry down the height overlooking Marolen, penetrated through the defiles, and forming in two lines, was sustained by twelve squadrons of Danes, under Count Tilly. Here they encountered a corps of French grenadiers, supported by the household cavalry, and covered by the hedges which skirted the extremity of the plain. A series of volleys and charges ensued, and the enemy were evidently dismayed by so unexpected an attack on their rear.

The onset was visible from the right and centre. The frequent volleys of musketry re-echoed by the woods, and heightened by the growing darkness, infused new ardour into the ranks of the allies, and equally damped the courage

of the enemy. Cut off from their own army, the hostile troops slackened in their resistance, and were at length broken and driven back on each other. At this moment the French dragoons made a noble effort, to favour the escape of the infantry, and cover the retreat of the household squadrons; but their valour was fatal to themselves; for the greater part of seven regiments were either killed or taken, and the gendarmerie suffered no less severely from the charge of the Danes.

Meanwhile Marlborough had continued to gain ground, and at length established his line between Chobon and Diepenbeck. Vendome, indeed, made a personal effort to avert the fate of the army which was intrusted to his care, by dismounting from his horse, and leading the infantry, near Mullem, to the rescue of their companions. But his exertions were unavailing. This body, inferior in numbers, subdued in spirit, masked by Eugene, and entangled by the intricacy of the ground, could make no impression; while the left wing was thrown out of action by the defiles and river in their front, and held in check by the British cavalry, which was drawn up in perfect order on the plain of Heurne.

In this crisis darkness enveloped the contending hosts, and the positions were discernible only by the flashes of musketry which rolled round the narrowing circle of the devoted army, till the right of Eugene and the left of the prince of Orange approached the same point. They mistook each other for enemies, and their conflict might have produced the most deplorable effects amidst the victorious ranks, had not the generals exerted themselves with unusual activity to put a timely stop to the fire. About nine, orders were given for the troops to halt as they stood, and suffer the enemy to escape, rather than expose themselves to mutual destruction. To this order numbers of the enemy owed their safety. Favoured by the obscurity, the broken corps forced their way in tumultuous crowds, as they were impelled by fear or despair. Some thousands slipped unperceived through an opening in the allied lines, near the castle of Bevere, and directed their flight towards the French frontier; others endeavoured to rejoin their left wing, in the direction of Mullem; and a considerable number wandered to the posts of the allies and were captured. In the midst of this tumultuous scene,

Eugene ordered several drummers to beat the French retreat, and the refugee officers to give the rallying word of the different corps who were known to be in the enclosures; they thus succeeded in capturing crowds of fugitives without resistance.

When Vendome perceived the destruction of his right wing inevitable, he retired with the infantry, which was still posted on the bank of the Norcken, near Mullem, and joined the left wing at Huysse and St. Denast, where they were grouped together in great disorder. With his characteristic presence of mind, he proposed to the duke of Burgundy and a crowd of panic-struck generals to take advantage of the night for restoring order among the troops, so as to retire regularly; but his representations were fruitless. Finding therefore that his arguments could not persuade the reason, or allay the fears of the surrounding multitude, he consented to order a retreat. The word was no sooner given than generals and privates, horse and foot, hurried in the utmost disorder towards Ghent. He could only persuade twenty-five squadrons and some battalions to remain united, and with these he covered the flight of the crowd in person.

The allies, meanwhile, impatiently paused on the field; but dawn was no sooner visible, than Marlborough detached forty squadrons from the right wing, under Generals Bulow and Lumley, and a corps of infantry, commanded by Major-general Meredith to pursue the enemy. With the return of day opened a scene of the most distressing nature, which gave scope to the humanity of the British general. Among several thousand corpses lay a prodigious number of wounded of different nations, enveloped in carnage and surrounded with the wreck of war. By his orders the utmost exertion was instantly made to collect the survivors, and to bestow on all, without distinction, the care and relief which circumstances would permit. The agonies of suffering nature were thus soothed, and many were snatched from a lingering and painful death to acknowledge the beneficence and bless the name of their conqueror.\*

Various and contradictory accounts have been given of the loss of the two parties in this memorable battle. But we may estimate that of the allies at about 3000 killed and

\* For plan of the battle drawn up by Major Smith, see the Atlas that accompanies this edition.—ED.

wounded, and that of the enemy at no less than 4000 killed, 2000 wounded, and 9000 prisoners, including 700 officers.\*

We find two letters from the duke, written in the first exultation of victory. One to the duchess deserves notice, because it proves that in his mind the joy of success was considerably allayed by reflections on the perplexed state of affairs in England and the perverseness of the queen.

"*July 12.* — I have neither spirits nor time to answer your three last letters; this being to bring the good news of a battle we had yesterday, in which it pleased God to give us at last the advantage. Our foot on both sides having been all engaged, has occasioned much blood; but I thank God the English have suffered less than any of the other troops — none of our English horse having been engaged. I do, and you must, give thanks to God for his goodness in protecting and making me the instrument of so much happiness to the queen and nation, *if she will please to make use of it.*"

The other to Godolphin is particularly interesting, because it shows that the attack on the hostile army was as daring as the preparatory movements had been rapid and decisive; and that where the exigency of affairs required, our able commander overstepped the established rules of military science, and surprised and disconcerted his antagonists by efforts beyond the calculations of ordinary experience.

"*July 12.* — I have been so very uneasy and in so great a hurry for some days, that I should not be able to write, were I not supported by the good success we had yesterday. The particulars you will have from Lord Stair, who will give you this. You know his pretensions and the friendship I have for him; and I will own to you that I hope her majesty may have, by this message, an excuse for others if she is pleased to † distinguish him at this time.

"I must ever acknowledge the goodness of God in the success he was pleased to give us; for I believe Lord Stair will tell you they were in as strong a post as is possible to be found; but you know when I left England I was positively resolved to endeavour by all means a battle, thinking nothing else would make the queen's business go on well. This reason only made me venture the battle yesterday, otherwise I did give them too much advantage; but the good of the queen and my country shall always be preferred by me before any personal concern; for I am very sensible if I had miscarried, I should have been blamed. I hope I have given such a blow to their foot, that they will not be able to fight any more this year. My head aches so terribly that I must say no more."

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\* Berwick himself makes the number of prisoners amount to 9000 men. T. ii. p. 12.

† By conferring on him a British peerage.

## CHAP. LXX. — CAPTURE OF THE FRENCH LINES.— 1708.

THE two victorious commanders devoted little time to repose. The evening of the battle and the ensuing day were spent in concerting the necessary arrangements for their ulterior designs, and on the morning of the 13th Eugene departed to Brussels, for the purpose of forwarding the march of his army, which had already reached its vicinity. He was also to send out detachments for the protection of Flanders, and to superintend the conveyance of the heavy artillery and stores, which were to be drawn from Maestricht and the great towns of Holland.

Conscious that Berwick was hastening from the Moselle, Marlborough displayed his customary diligence. While the army remained on the field, Count Lottum was despatched at midnight of the 13th, with fifty squadrons and thirty battalions, to possess himself of the lines which the enemy had constructed from Ypres to Warneton, for the purpose of covering the country between the Scheldt and the Lys. The main army followed in the morning, and took up a position between Beleghem and Hauterive, with the head-quarters near Helchin. On the following day Marlborough resumed his march, and on his route had the satisfaction to receive intelligence that Lottum had forced the lines, captured Warneton, Comines, and Werwick, and made prisoners the whole guard left for the defence of the post, amounting to 500 men. This operation was effected at the very moment when Berwick was hastening to the spot, exhorting the officers to defend the lines to the last extremity, and announcing the approach of succours. Marlborough accordingly pressed forward, crossed the Lys near Menin, and on the evening of the 15th established his head-quarters at Werwick, having his left at Comines, and his right extended towards Menin.

We insert several letters written from this camp to his correspondents in England.

*To the Duchess.*

"*July 16.* — I hope before this you have had the news by Lord Stair of the good success we had on last Wednesday. I have been obliged

ever since to be in perpetual motion, so that I am a good deal out of order. I was in good hopes that the diligence I have made in getting into the French country (for I am now behind their lines), would have obliged them to have abandoned Ghent; but as yet it has not had that effect, but, on the contrary, M. de Vendome declares he will sacrifice a strong garrison rather than abandon that town, which, if he keeps his word, he will give me a great deal of trouble; for till we are masters of Ghent, we can have no cannon. The governor of Oudenard, to whom we sent our prisoners, assures me that the number is above seven thousand\*, besides seven hundred officers; and we have a great many killed and wounded on both sides. They were forced to leave the greatest part of theirs on the place where they fought. We did take care to send all ours into Oudenard, after which I ordered that such of the French as were yet alive should be carried into the town. I have no account of what that number may be, but it being a wet night, I believe a great many of them suffered very much. If we had been so happy as to have had *two more hours of daylight*, I believe we should have made an end of this war. The duke of Berwick came to Lille the day before yesterday, but his troops will not be here these three or four days; those of Prince Eugene came last night to Brussels, so that both our armies will be abundantly recruited. However, I believe the French will be careful not to venture any more this year; but the greatest mischief they can do is, the venturing all for the preserving of Ghent. I shall labour with pleasure the rest of this campaign, in hopes it may be the last, so that I may be blest with you and quietness."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"July 16.—My blood is so extremely heated, that I must refer you to what Mr. Cardonel will write to the secretary's office of what has passed since my Lord Stair left the army. If we had been six hours later, I am afraid we should not have been able to have forced these lines; for M. de la Motte was got with his little army to Ypres, and the duke of Berwick was at the same time at Lille. We are now masters of marching where we please, but can make no siege till we are masters of Ghent, from whence only we can have our cannon. The camp the French are now in, behind the canal of Bruges, makes them entirely masters of Ghent and Bruges; but at the same time they leave all France open to us, which is what I flatter myself the king of France and his council will never suffer, so that I hope by Thursday M. de Vendome will receive orders from court not to continue in the camp where he is, from whence we are not able to force him but by famine.

"I am taking measures for attacking Ghent as soon as he marches; and if the duke of Vendome's resolution, of staying where he is, be approved at court, I shall then endeavour to cut off all provisions, as much as possible, from going to him; for if he stays, and we can ruin that

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\* The reader will recollect that this letter was written only the day after the battle; and that the estimate here referred to relates to the number of prisoners in Oudenard alone.

army, France is undone ; but if they can subsist longer than we can, they will be able by that to hinder us from doing any thing considerable, for want of our cannon. Upon the whole, the hazard to them is so very great, that I cannot think the king of France will venture it. Four or five days will let us see their intentions. In the mean time I shall take what rest I can, in order to be the better able to serve, for at this minute my head is so very hot, that I am obliged to leave off writing.

" Prince Eugene's foot came last night to Brussels. My humble duty to the queen."

" *July 19.* — I have this day had the favour of yours of the 28–9th and 2–13th of this month, and am very sorry to see that England is capable of being so easily frightened ; for I dare say they have not one thousand men on all their coast. This country lies all open to us, but for want of cannon we are not able to do any thing considerable. One of our parties has burnt the suburbs of Arras. That, and some other burnings have given a very great consternation, insomuch that they are already come to tell us, that they have sent to the king for leave to treat for the contributions. That which hinders us from acting with vigour is, that as long as the French are masters of Ghent, we cannot make use either of the Scheldt or the Lys. But we are using our utmost endeavours to get some cannon by land, which meets with infinite difficulties ; but we must overcome them, or we shall have very little fruit of our victory. The duke of Vendome is not contented with having the canal before him, but he is also intrenching, as if he intended to stay there the rest of this campaign. But when the king of France shall see that we have a probability of getting a battering train, I believe he will not let his own country be abandoned, for the maintaining their treacherous conquest of Ghent.

" We have this day returned our solemn thanks to God, for the good success he has been pleased to give us ; and in the evening the cannon and both lines fired three times.

" You know my opinion as to La Braconnière ; but since he is come, I shall write to the elector of Hanover by him ; but he must not be trusted with the project we hope to put in execution. I wish I may be mistaken, but I fear he has no other design but that of getting ; however, I have promised him that Mr. Stanyan shall have thirteen blank commissions, which they may fill on the place. You will be pleased to speak to Lord Sunderland to despatch them ; one must be for a colonel, and the other twelve for captains. These will cost her majesty only the trouble of putting her name, and if they should not be sent, he will pretend all would have succeeded, if he had had these commissions. Prince Eugene has desired me to write to you to hasten the twenty crowns a man for the 4000 foot ; for till they receive that money they cannot begin to raise those men, which will be prejudicial to the service, so that I beg you will speak to the Comte de Gallas about it."

Soon after his arrival at the Camp of Werwick, Marlborough received numerous letters from his friends in England, congratulating him on the splendid victory, and

announcing the appointment of another thanksgiving day, for the purpose of offering up to the Lord of Hosts the grateful acknowledgments of an exulting people. We introduce two of these letters, one from Mr. Craggs, exhibiting the effusions of party malice, and the other from Godolphin, endeavouring to remove the impression which these malicious reports produced on his mind.

*Mr. Craggs to the Duke.*

"*London, July 24.* — My lord; as your glorious conduct must have altered the face of affairs at Paris, so it has disconcerted a world of knavish politics and designs here; and I am sure every body that told your grace the truth, must allow there never was more stirring, which nothing under heaven but your own great genius could have quelled. A very great peer was heard to say, that as this battle might be the occasion of reducing France, so it would give you such a power at home as might be very troublesome; or words to this effect.

"But I hope in God, as your valour has restored the crown to a power of giving protection, and doing justice to its subjects, that power will be maintained where it ought, in the queen and her ministers; for such deliverances from tyranny abroad, and anarchy at home, are not to be hoped for every day.

"There has been no mail from Holland since my Lord Stair's arrival, and the accounts were so ill related for two or three days, that the fine schemers and their allies, the disaffected, began to find ten thousand reasons against a total defeat, or having any great consequences from it. But by my Lord Stair's journal, and three mails which came from Ostend to-day, these wise well-meaning persons have again changed their notes, and begin to cry Hosanna with the foremost. My lord, I do not speak this as my own observation only, but by the instigation of some very great and faithful friends of your grace's, that when the differences shall be accommodated, which they will now very easily be, those who have taken unreasonable opportunities to find unnecessary faults, may not carry it off with an air of having been the only or best well-wishers to the public good. For my own part, I have a full and perfect joy, that God Almighty has given these great blessings to us, by the means of your grace's unexampled conduct and valour, which, in defiance of all the envy, hatred, and malice which the devil can invent, or villanous man design, must be a pillar of glory to you and your memory, as long as annals and tradition do last, which brings me to beg leave to subscribe myself."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Windsor, July 23.* — \* \* \* Since I had written thus far, I have the favour of yours of the 26th, with the enclosed letter from M. Buys. You know so much of my apprehensions of the temper of M. Buys and his neighbours, that you will not be at all surprised, when I tell you I did not expect a letter less strong from him upon that occasion, taking it

always for granted that they will endeavour to make use equally of good success, and of ill success toward their aim, which is peace; and on the other side, we must continue our endeavours as zealously, to keep them on as long as we can, in the expectation of farther advantages by doing so. And I hope you will not, upon second thoughts, be so much disheartened by the idle notions and expectations of impossibilities, which you may hear of from hence. Something of this arises from malice and envy, and from a desire to raise expectations, which they think cannot be made good; and when the Tories talk at this rate, these are the true reasons of it. But you will consider, besides, that it is the temper of our nation, confirmed by daily experience, that we are at the top of the house in prosperity; and in misfortune, indeed upon the least alarm, we are ready to sink into the earth."

But it was not the malice of his enemies, or the extravagant expectations of his admirers, that Marlborough had alone to regret; for attempts were even made to raise jealousies between him and Eugene, by exciting their emulation, and insinuating that justice had not been rendered to the merits of the German commander. These attempts were repulsed with becoming dignity by both parties; and Marlborough omitted no opportunity to bear testimony to the services of his colleague.

To Count Zinzendorf he observes, July 18., "You will have doubtless heard that the prince of Savoy has been with us nearly a fortnight. His presence alone was the greatest advantage during the battle, of which he has given you an account by express. All his troops are on this side Brussels, where they render us essential service, by keeping the enemy in check, while we are so far in advance."

In another letter to Mr. Travers, one of the agents for superintending the disbursements at Blenheim, he alludes more distinctly to the machinations which had been employed to create a misunderstanding.

"*Camp at Werwick, July 30.* — Sir; I have received your favour of the 8th instant, and am obliged to you for your compliments on the late happy success, with which Providence has blessed the arms of her majesty and her allies, against the common enemy. I believe I need not tell you, how much I desire the nation may at last be eased of a burdensome war, by an honourable peace; and no one can be a better judge than yourself of the sincerity of my wishes, to enjoy a little retirement at a place you have contributed, in a great measure, to the making so desirable. I thank you for your good wishes to myself on this occasion. *I dare say Prince Eugene and I shall never differ about our share of laurels.* While the public has any real benefit of my services, I shall

not be much concerned at any endeavours that may be used to lessen them.

"I thank you for your continued care and pains at Blenheim, and am with truth," &c.

Aware of the discontent which reigned in France, and the panic which prevailed in the defeated army, conscious also that some brilliant enterprise was necessary to prevent the Dutch from listening to overtures of peace, Marlborough proposed to mask Lille, and penetrate through the northern frontier into the heart of France. Collaterally with this design a small expedition was fitted out in England, under General Erle, which was intended to act on the coast, and if a landing could be effected, was to be supported by a detachment from the main army. But the design of penetrating directly into France was deemed too bold, even by Eugene, and of course encountered strong opposition from a government so timid and vacillating as that of Holland. Meanwhile, however, numerous detachments were sent out to excite alarm, by scouring the country and levying contributions; and the French commanders retaliated, by a similar irruption into the isle of Cadsand, which, besides the advantage of plunder, was expected to produce a great impression among the Dutch.

The correspondence which occurs at this period, will not only exhibit the sentiments of the British commander, but will show the utter impossibility of satisfying the extravagant expectations of his zealous admirers, and the difficulty of carrying even his own designs into execution.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"July 23.— \* \* \* \* We continue still under the great difficulty of getting cannon, for whilst the French continue at Ghent, we can make no use of the Scheldt and Lys, which are the only two rivers that can be of use to us in this country. We have ordered twenty battering pieces to be brought from Maestricht, and we have taken measures for sixty more to be brought from Holland. The calculation of the number of draught horses, to draw this artillery, amounts to sixteen thousand horses, by which you will see the difficulties we meet with; but we hope to overcome them. In the mean time, we send daily parties into France, which occasions great terror; so that I cannot think the court of France will suffer the duke of Vendome's army to continue where they are, as soon as they shall know we have a possibility of getting cannon; for by the intercepted letters we find that both in France, as well as in the duke of Vendome's army, they think it impossible for us to get a battering

train, which makes them as yet bear the inroads of our troops into their country. I have this morning sent 1600 men to Armentières, for the greater security of our parties.

"I am very glad you have sent Lieutenant-general Erle to hasten the troops on board, for though the number is not great, they will much alarm the coast. I hope you will not determine to send these troops for Portugal, till we first see, whether they may not be of much more use on the coast of France. You know formerly you sent me a project for Abbeville; I have looked for it, but cannot find it. I should be glad you would send it me, for I think something of that kind might be practicable, and in that case, those troops, as well as the fleet, will be necessary.

"The duke of Vendome's army is so frightened, I am very confident if we could get them out of their intrenchments, and from behind the canal of Ghent and Bruges, we should beat them with half their numbers, especially their foot. This is one of their reasons for their staying where they are. It looks affected to be complaining in prosperity, but I have so many vexations, that I am quite tired, and long extremely for a little ease and quiet.

"It has happened upon the Rhine as I formerly writ you, and the French talk of having another detachment from thence. This that the duke of Berwick has brought, consists of fifty-five squadrons and thirty-four battalions. He has been obliged to put some of his troops into Lille and Tournay, and is encamped with the rest at Douay."

"July 26. — Since my last I have received the enclosed by M. Buys. You will by it see the inclinations of the burgomasters of Amsterdam. Whenever their inclinations shall be known, you may depend upon it that the States will be of the same opinion; for let our success be what it will this campaign, I find the States are determined for peace, which I am afraid the king of France knows. By our news from Paris, Tortosa was taken the 11th, so that the troops from Italy will come too late. You may see by the Paris Gazette the turn they give to the battle of Oudenard, taking no notice of the 706 officers, nor the 7000 prisoners. We have also taken ninety-five colours and standards, besides three the Prussians keep to send to their king; but that which is our greatest advantage is, the terror that is in their army, so that it were to be wished that we could get near them.

"What you apprehend, in yours of the 8th, of the States is very just; for by what I hear from Buys, it is plain that they think enough is done for peace, and I am afraid they will not willingly give their consent for the marching their army into France, which certainly, if it succeeded, would put a happy end to the war. I have acquainted Prince Eugene with the earnest desire we have for our marching into France. He thinks it impracticable, till we have Lille for a *place d'armes* and magazine: and then he thinks we may make a very great inroad, but not be able to winter, though we might be helped by the fleet, unless we were masters of some fortified town. If it depended upon Pensionary Heinsius, he is so honest a man that he would not at this time think of peace; but he is in his nature so timorous, that he will never contradict

whatever the inclinations of the States may be. The letter I send you from M. Buys was written before they knew of the loss of Tortosa, by which you may be sure their inclinations for peace will increase. I am assured that if this action had not happened, some proposal of peace was to have been made towards the end of August.

"You will very easily believe me, when I tell you that I am a good deal vexed and mortified, to see that finding fault is more natural than helping to ease those that are forced to serve the public; for I see by my letters from England, that if impossibilities are not done, after this success, your humble servant is to be blamed. I beg you to consider our situation. We are in a country where the duke de Berwick, and M. de Bernier, the intendant, in the king's name, order all the people to abandon their dwellings and retire to the strong towns. This, joined with the difficulty of getting cannon, makes me uneasy to the last degree. It is most certain, that the success we had at Oudenard has lessened their army at least 20,000 men; but that which I think our greatest advantage, consists in the fear that is among their troops, so that I shall seek all occasions of attacking them. But their army is far from being inconsiderable, for when the duke of Burgundy's army shall join that of the duke of Berwick, they will be at least 100,000 men. If it had pleased God that we had had *one hour's day-light*\* more at Oudenard, we had, in all likelihood, made an end of this war. This is the true state of our condition, which is proper for the queen to know; and I beg you to assure her majesty, that I shall endeavour every thing that I think may be for the public good and her service. In my last letter you have had my thoughts as to the expedition. I long to hear they are sailed."

*To the Duchess.*

"July 26. — Since my last I have the happiness of yours of 8th. By that and some others from England, I find much more is expected from the success it has pleased God to give us, than I am afraid is possible. I am sure you and my friends are so just and kind as to believe that I shall do my best. I have the advantage of having Prince Eugene and very good troops, but our difficulties are much greater than can be imagined in England. I no ways doubt but the Tories will endeavour all they can to vex me, but I hope the Whigs will support me in this war, and then I don't doubt but to bring France to such a peace as they desire; but to effect it there must be one campaign more after this. This is not only my opinion, but the opinion also of Prince Eugene, which I desire you will let Lord Sunderland know, and that I desire he would acquaint his friends with it, particularly Lord Halifax and Lord Somers, and Lord Wharton, if he be in town; after which, I should be glad to hear from him on this subject; for Prince Eugene and I consult

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\* The duke had asked for *two hours'* more daylight in a preceding letter to the duchess, p. 267. Amidst the throng of affairs in which he was immersed, and the hurry and extent of his correspondence, it would be idle to expect verbal correctness or consistency of expression. — Ed.

daily, not only how to end this campaign, but also the war, with advantage; so that it will be of great use for me to know the opinions of those lords. You will see by the date of the enclosed letter, that I should have sent it you some time ago; but I have been in so continual a hurry, that for this, and, I am afraid, other omissions, that must be my excuse. I must end my letter with assuring you, that I am very sorry for what you mention in the beginning of your letter, of the fondness of the queen for Mrs. Masham. I do not mean it as a thing that may vex you or me, but as a thing that must at last have very ill consequences. I should have been glad on this occasion to have had a letter from the duke of Devonshire, so that I might, in some degree, have made amends for my last."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*July 30.* — We continue under very great difficulties of getting our cannon. Lille, Ypres, and Tournay, which should have furnished 5000 horses, have received positive orders to furnish none; so that I am afraid we shall be obliged to bring from Brussels at twice, what we were in hopes to have done at once, which must lose a great deal of time. We are assured that the dukes of Burgundy and Vendome have obtained the king of France's consent to continue in their camp, behind the canal of Bruges and Ghent, they having assured him that it will not be in our power to do any thing considerable, but the settling some contributions, and the plundering the country, as long as they continue masters, by the situation of the town of Ghent, of the two rivers of the Scheldt and Lys. They have another reason, which they do not give, for their staying where they are, which is, that they dare not trust their men in any camp where we might be able to come to them.

"M. de Boufflers is come to his government of Lille. I hope he will not have better success than he had at Namur\*, if we were once so happy as to get our cannon. M. de Chamillard was yesterday at Lille, and it is said he is gone to-day to Valenciennes. The alarm in France is very great, so that we should bring them to reasonable terms, if Holland would let us act as we ought to do. But I hear this evening that the French have forced their passage into the isle of Cadsand, which will give alarms to Zealand, and consequently make great noise at the Hague, and might occasion some unreasonable resolution, which might make us incapable of acting in this country. My only hopes are,

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\* Although the marshal had been compelled to surrender Namur to King William, he made a gallant defence, and he was justly ranked among the able French generals who had signalised the earlier part of the reign of Louis XIV. It will be seen that M. de Bouffler's subsequent defence of Lille, though unsuccessful, was not less scientific and pertinacious than that of Namur, and for which he was created a duke. In the following year he served under Marshal Villars; and after the loss of the battle of Malplaquet, directed in a masterly style the retreat of the French. He died in 1711, and, according to St. Simon, of a broken heart, because the court had refused to make him constable of France. — *Ed.*

that their eagerness for contribution may incline them to suffer a little, and let us act with the troops we have, we having already settled five hundred thousand crowns for the country of Artois, and we hope to get them much more from Picardy. This being a contribution that is likely to last as long as the war, I did flatter myself it might have inclined them to continue the war till we might have had a good peace. We shall now see what use the party that is for peace will make of the French being in the isle of Cadsand."

"Aug. 2.—I thank you for Lord Coningsby's letter, and send it back, not knowing but you may think it proper to show it to the queen, if you have not already done it. I wish her so well, that I would be glad she might know what is in everybody's heart.

"The delay that has been occasioned by cross winds to the embarkation, is a great *contre-tems*; but as I think most things are governed by destiny, having done all that is possible, one should submit with patience.

"We have got great part of our cannon to Brussels, so that now our greatest application is to have it here. The alarm the French have given by getting into the isle of Cadsand, has weakened our army of eleven battalions. As yet we do not know what effect it has had in Holland; but no doubt, those that are for peace will endeavour to make all the noise they can. We have an account that our parties have occasioned very great terror in Picardy, and that they exclaim very much against M. de Vendome staying where he is; but by the measures he takes, there can be no doubt of his intention of staying there all this campaign. If we can succeed in our undertakings, we must not think of winter quarters till we have obliged him to quit that country. It must be by force, for it is not in our power to hinder them from having subsistence, even for the whole winter, if they should be permitted to stay."

Meanwhile Count Lottum had accomplished the demolition of the French works, and, rejoining the main army, took post on the left, prolonging the line to Pont Rouge, near the confluence of the Marquette and the Lys. The heavy baggage, which had been left at Brussels before the engagement, was brought in safety to the camp, by the precautions of the duke. Having thus effected the re-union of his troops, and secured the requisites for the comfort and subsistence of the army, Marlborough turned his attention to the means of prosecuting his success.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Aug. 3.—I have this morning received yours of the 18th by the express. I must refer you to Mr. Secretary's letter, by which you will see Prince Eugene's and my opinion. I have spoke of it to nobody but the prince; for by several observations I have of late made of the deputies of our army, I am afraid the States would not be for this expedition, nor any thing else where there is a venture; by which I am confident they think themselves sure of peace; the thoughts of which may ruin

themselves and the allies, for I verily believe the intention of the king of France is to amuse them, in order to gain time. After we have succeeded at Lille, and that we shall think it feasible to support the project of Abbeville, I should agree with you that Lieutenant-general Erle should have the chief command during this winter, so that he should endeavour to inform himself of the number of troops that will be necessary for the supporting him in that post; for as one of the difficulties will be his subsistence, he must not ask for more men than what are absolutely necessary.

"You will see by Mr. Secretary's letter, that we are taking the best measures we can for the security of our cannon, which the enemy threatens; but I hope we are in no danger, Prince Eugene having for their security 90 squadrons and 53 battalions; and if the duke of Vendome should march with his whole army, I am ready to follow with the troops that remain with me. I am in haste to send this messenger, that no time may be lost in sending Erle to the coast of Normandy."

We add other letters, because they throw light on the offensive projects of the British commander, particularly the proposed descent on the French coast.

*To Secretary Boyle.*

"Aug. 3. — I received this morning the honour of your letter of the 18th of July, and have kept the messenger no longer than was necessary to advise with Prince Eugene, and to return you our opinions relating to the project. You know already, that by the unanimous concurrence of the States, and of the chief generals of the army, in the present juncture, the siege of Lille has been thought preferable to any other operation; and you cannot be insensible, from my several letters, of the difficulties we have been struggling with for this fortnight and more, to get the greatest part of our heavy artillery to Brussels, which being happily effected, the prince is going to-day with 25 battalions, and 25 squadrons from hence, to strengthen his army, in order to bring the artillery forward. This being our present situation, both the prince and myself are of opinion, it will be impossible for us to take any just measures for seconding Lieutenant-general Erle's design upon Abbeville till we are masters of Lille, and that, therefore, the fleet, with the troops, should go directly to the coast of Normandy, and land and make what impression they can there, till the siege be over; and then I shall give you timely notice when it may be proper to come this way. For we are of opinion no attempt should be made upon Abbeville, nor the least jealousy given that way till towards the end of September, that our people may have the winter season to favour them to keep their ground; for it is certain the French will use their utmost endeavours, if the weather will permit, to force them on board again. In the mean time, you will do well to advise with such French people as may be perfectly acquainted with the place, and the country thereabout, what number of troops may be sufficient to maintain the post all the winter. You must consider withal, that they may be supplied with provisions from England, for no doubt

the enemy will block them up so close, that they can have little or no assistance from the country. Now, after all, this project must depend upon our success at Lille; and then, if it shall be thought practicable, and can be executed, we must certainly reap a very great advantage by it, by joining them with a good body of troops in the spring, and carrying the war into the heart of France. As I have despatched the messenger back again, as soon as possible, and directed him to use his utmost diligence, I hope he will arrive in time before the fleet sails, that they may receive the necessary instructions. You will please to lay this, with my humble duty, before her majesty and the lords of the council. I am truly," &c.

*To General Erle.*

"*Werwick, Aug. 6.* — Sir; on Friday last one of the queen's messengers arrived here, and brought me a letter of the 18th of July, with the project that by yours just now come in of the 20th, I understand was communicated to you and Sir George Byng that day at Windsor. I despatched the messenger back the same morning, with my reasons against that project (of Abbeville), which I dare answer will be approved by her majesty and the council, since I acquaint them we are no ways in a condition here, at present, to second those designs; and seeing by these last letters, you were put to sea with all expedition, so that I fear the messenger may not arrive in time for you to receive instructions from court, I send this off from the coast of Flanders, to advise you and Sir George Byng of it, that you may not pursue your last instructions, but follow those that were given you first for the coast of Normandy or Brittany; and I hope, if need be, towards the end of the next month, we may be in a posture of seconding you nearer hand."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Aug. 6.* — Since my last, I have received yours of the 20th, as also the instructions of Lieutenant-general Erle, which makes me in pain, fearing he may be landed before he receives contrary orders, which I hope were sent as soon as you received mine of the 3d, it being impossible for us to send any detachment till our siege was over. I earnestly desire that, though he should be landed, you will send orders for their re-embarking, and that they lose no time in going to the coast of Normandy. I shall endeavour to send to Mr. Erle, but it will be great odds it never comes to him, so that nothing is to be relied on but one of the queen's ships. I am in hourly expectation of hearing that our cannon left Brussels this day. The French have several detachments abroad, in order to trouble the march, but I hope to no purpose; for the prince's army is now strengthened from hence by 47 squadrons and 30 battalions, so that I reckon he has 50,000 men with him.

"By some letters from England, I find in all manner of ways I am to be found fault with; for when I am lucky, I am negligent, and do not make use of the occasion; and if I should ever prove unfortunate, no doubt I should run the risk of being a fool or traitor. In my opinion, it is high time for me to think of retiring, by which I should be in nobody's power; but I will take no resolution, except by the advice of the

queen and you ; but I hope you will allow me to do it this next winter, which may be a proper time, if what I hear from the Hague be true, which is, that they are resolved to have peace."

# CHAP. LXXI.—COURT QUARRELS OF THE DUCHESS.—1708.

THE Duke of Marlborough being stationary for a month at the camp of Werwick, and the military movements suspended, we take this opportunity of resuming our account of the political feuds, and of introducing the interesting correspondence which passed with the queen and his friends in England.

In the midst of the cares and anxieties attendant on the great operations which he was now directing, Marlborough was still fruitlessly employed in combating the prejudices of the queen, and labouring to promote the cause of the party, to whose injurious suspicions and acrimonious reproaches he was continually exposed. Discouraged, however, by the ill success of his own representations, and wearied by the importunities of the duchess and Godolphin, who complained of the instances he had already made, as too lukewarm for the occasion, he forwarded to them the letters which he received from the queen, with draughts of his intended answers, and requested them to furnish, for his replies, such hints and arguments as their intimate knowledge of the state of the court and parties might suggest. Accordingly, we find at this period several draughts of letters, in the hand-writing of the duchess and Godolphin, relating to the topics which had lately been the incessant subjects of discussion and correspondence. Some of these he appears to have adopted, others his better judgment rejected ; and the different modifications and changes which he made in their draughts, as well as in his own letters, heighten our respect for his loyalty, circumspection, and firmness.

The discussion relative to the promotion of Somers, and the other demands of the Whigs, which had been suspended in the midst of the preparations for battle, was revived with

redoubled warmth, as soon as the assurance of victory had given a temporary relaxation to his anxious mind.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Windsor, July 6-17., at night.*—I have troubled you this morning with so long a letter, that I shall only make use of this opportunity of enclosing a letter from the queen, to tell you that when you answer it, I wish, in case you are of my opinion, you would take that occasion to let her see, that when God has blessed her arms with so great success, it would be a right time for her to show mercy and forgiveness to those who may have displeased her, and to put an end to her resentment against Sir J. Montague, which is a thing extremely prejudicial to her service; and I have hitherto been but just able to keep her from coming to extrenities in it, with all the industry and skill imaginable."

*To the Duchess.*

"*July 19.*—Since my last I have had none from you; but having had for some time two or three of your former letters to answer, I begin this morning very early, tho' the letters do not go till the evening, so that I may hear from you before this is sealed.

"You give me an account in one of yours of a conversation\* that the duke of Somerset had with Lord Wharton; and by the latter's answer, it looks as if he thought that the duke of Somerset spoke the thoughts of the lord treasurer and mine. You know that I have already assured you, that I shall be very far from endeavouring to divide the Whigs; and I beg you will have so kind an opinion of me, as to believe I can't be so indiscreet as to employ the duke of Somerset in any thing that is of consequence. You seem to think that the design of removing Lord Sunderland is over, but by the two enclosed letters I think it is not. My not being well, the battle, and the hurry I have been in, has been my excuse hitherto for my not having answered either of them. I beg that you will let nobody know that I send them to you, only Mr. Montgomerie, with whom I desire you will advise what answer I should give.

"I am very sorry to see by yours that the queen is fonder of Mrs. Masham than ever; I am sure, as long as that is, there can be no happiness, I mean quietness.

"By what you write me of Lady Tyrconnel†, I believe her discourse

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\* The duke here alludes to a conversation in which the duke of Somerset endeavoured to lure Wharton from his party, by the offer of some post under the government, and justified the queen's exclusion of Lord Somers, on the plea that he had personally offended the prince of Denmark. Lord Wharton contemptuously rejected the overture. An account of this conversation is given in one of Mr. Maynwaring's letters to the duchess.

† Lady Tyrconnel, the sister of the duchess, was at this period allowed to return to England, to obtain the payment of her jointure,

to you has been much the same as it was with me, which was, not to rely upon any body, and persuading me to think the government of this country to be the greatest and happiest thing that could happen to me. I could also perceive that she thought you and I were not so well with the queen as formerly. I do not wonder at that, for I believe it is the opinion of every body; but if I can end this war well, and you are kind, nothing can make me unhappy.

"Having writ thus far, I have received your two letters of the 28th of the last month, and the 2d of this. The two enclosed you have sent me of Mrs. Morley's are as one would wish; but I think, in prudence, you must not seem to have any doubts, and that may in length of time enable you to do good to the nation and the queen. I am very sensible of the very unreasonable opiniatrety of the queen; however, knowing the faults of those which were before her, and what, I fear, will be in those that are to follow her, I do from my heart wish her a long and prosperous reign, so that you must take pains; for the happiness of England depends upon her doing what is right and just. Besides my love to my country, I own to you I have a tenderness for the queen, being persuaded that it is the fault of those whom she loves, and not her own, when she does what is wrong. God has been pleased to make me the instrument of doing her again some service; *I wish she may make a right use of it.* I send you back your two letters, as you desire, with the two writ to me, which I again beg nobody may know but Mr. Montgomery."

*To the Queen.*

(In reply to her congratulatory letter of July 6. o. s.)

"*July 23.*—Madam; I have the honour of your majesty's letter of the 6th, and am very thankful for all your goodness to me; and I am sure it will always be my intention, as well as duty, to be ready to venture my life for your service.

"As I have formerly told your majesty that I am desirous to serve you in the army, but not as a minister, I am every day more and more confirmed in that opinion. And I think myself obliged, upon all accounts, on this occasion, to speak my mind freely to you. The circumstances in this last battle, I think, show the hand of God; for we were obliged not only to march five leagues that morning, but to pass a river before the enemy, and to engage them before the whole army was passed, which was a visible mark of the favour of Heaven to you and your arms. Your majesty shall be convinced from this time, that I have no ambition, or any thing to ask for myself or family; but I will end the few years which I have to live in endeavouring to serve you, and to give God Almighty thanks for his infinite goodness to me. But as I have taken this resolution to myself, give me leave to say, that I think you are obliged, in conscience, and as a good Christian, to forgive, and to have

which had run in arrear, in consequence of her absence abroad, and the exile of her deceased husband, for his attachment to the dethroned sovereign.

no more resentments to any particular person or party, but to make use of such as will carry on this just war with vigour, which is the only way to preserve our religion and liberties, and the crown on your head; which, that you may long enjoy, and be a blessing to your people, shall be the constant wish and prayer of him, that is with the greatest truth and duty."\*

The letter of July 12., which Marlborough had written on the field of battle to the duchess, was communicated by her to the queen, and she accompanied it with a commentary, containing the severest reflections on the ungrateful return which her majesty had made to the instrument of such success. She even indulged herself in pointed censures against Admiral Churchill, whom she indirectly accused of exerting his influence to the detriment of his own brother, and then launched out into a still more acrimonious invective against Mrs. Masham.

This imprudent effusion did not tend to soothe the wounded feelings of the irritated sovereign. She not only replied in a style of similar invective, but wrote to the duke himself, adverting to the misconstrued expression in his letter, and justifying her own conduct.

"*Windsor, July 13-24.* — I cannot let Lord Stair go without giving him a letter, and assuring you, that as soon as it is convenient for my affairs, I will do for him what he desires†; and, indeed, I think I owe it to him, he certainly having lost his election in Scotland, by being at that time doing his duty in Flanders.

"We have had the satisfaction to-day of hearing more good news by the way of Ostend, and I hope to-morrow we shall have it confirmed from you, and that I shall have another letter to thank you for by the next. I was showed a letter the other day, by a friend of yours, that you writ soon after the battle, and I must beg that you will explain to me one expression in it. You say, after being thankful for being the instrument of so much good to the nation and me, if *I would please to make use of it*. I am sure I never will make an ill use of so great a blessing, but according to the best of my understanding, make the best use of it I can, and should be glad to know what is the use you would have me make of it, and then I will tell you my thoughts very freely and sincerely.

"I will not trouble you with any more now, but I beg you would never have any doubts of my sincere esteem and friendship for you, which I do assure you shall be lasting as my life."

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\* Printed in the Conduct, p. 258.

† This was a request of Marlborough that Stair should be raised to the British peerage.

*To the Duchess.*

"*Aug. 2.* — The enclosed I send, you will see, is from Mrs. Morley. I have altered my answer, since I received yours of the 16th. What I write is the truth of my heart; nobody must see them but Mr. Montgomery. You must keep all her letters and my answers, for I keep no copies, and you must be careful in the conversations you have, not to let her think that you have any account of her letters; for that would make her more shy when she writes.

"I am afraid what you say of Abigail is but too true, but we must, for our own reputation, have all the consideration imaginable for the queen. I believe it is in the power of Mrs. Masham to do very ill offices, but I do not think she could get the blue ribbon for any body.

"Lord Raby is in friendship with Mr. Harley and all that cabal, so that I hope lord treasurer will give him as little countenance as possible.

"What you wish in yours of the 13th, of my being able to make so good a campaign this year, that I might never more stir out of England, I do with all my soul wish it; but I dare not flatter myself it will be so, for I fear there must be one year more to make a good peace. I am sorry that my brother George is gone to Oxford, fearing he may do what I shall not like. I can't hinder being concerned for him, tho' I find he is not at all sensible of the trouble he is like to have this winter, so that I shall certainly have mortifications upon his account.

"Having ended my letter, I received yours of the 16th, so that I am obliged to make some alteration in my answer, that it might agree with what you sent me. I have corrected my copy, and have marked in yours what I have left out, believing that it would rather do hurt than good; for I know the queen would venture every thing to effect the dividing of the Whigs; so that those expressions would have no other effect but that of encouraging her to go on in the fatal way she is now in. This is my opinion, but I submit to better judgment.

"You may from me assure Lord Sunderland, that I will always be in the interest of the Whigs, with which assurance I desire he would acquaint Lord Halifax, Lord Somers, and Lord Wharton; and at the same time, for their sakes, and that of the public, as well as my own reputation, I must be master of judging of my actions towards the queen; for sooner or later we must have her out of the hands of Mrs. Masham, or every thing will be labour in vain."

*To the Queen.*

"Madam,

*Aug. 2.*

"The uneasiness of my mind upon receiving your majesty's letters of the 18th and 22d of June, had such an effect upon my body as to make me very ill, till it pleased God to bless me with such good success, as in great measure recovered me; though my sickness before the battle, and the hurry in which I have been almost ever since, joined with the uneasiness of the subject, have hindered me from returning your majesty an answer so soon as I ought to have done. I was glad to observe that the impressions, which your majesty seemed to have in yours of the 18th, of my Lord Sunderland's having made use of your name in his letters to

Scotland, had been so far set right, by the assurances he gave you, as to let you see all possible endeavours had been used from thence to incense you against him. And though he may have done, upon that occasion, what your majesty does not like, yet I beg leave to say, with all humility and duty to your majesty, that I did flatter myself nobody could have prevailed with you, to carry your resentment so far against him in my absence, as is mentioned in your letters, and to give me so great a mortification in the face of all Europe, at a time when I was so zealously endeavouring to serve you, at the hazard both of my reputation and of my blood. But though any consideration of me were wholly out of the case, I should think, for your own sake, you would suspend any farther resentment in this matter, till I have the honour to see you, and opportunity of thoroughly examining and discoursing upon it with your majesty. For God's sake, madam, consider, that whatever may be said to amuse or delude you, it is utterly impossible for you to have ever more than a part of the Tories; and though you could have them all, their number is not capable of doing you good.\* These things are so plain, that I can't doubt but your majesty will be convinced nothing can be so fatal to your service, as any way to discourage the Whigs, at this time, when after the blessing of this victory, you may be sure, that if you show a confidence in their zeal for your interests, they will all concur very cheerfully to make you great and happy, as I wish. God Almighty bless and preserve you.

"I had writ this far before I had the honour of your majesty's of the 13th, by Lord Stair, and as I shall always endeavour to deserve from your majesty, so I shall never doubt of having your esteem and protection. Your majesty might see, by the shortness of the letter that was shown you, that I was in great haste when I writ it, and my fulness of heart for your service made me use that expression. What I then meant, as I must always think is, that you can make no good use of this victory, nor of any other blessing, but by following the advice of my lord treasurer, who has been so long faithful to you; for any other advisers do but lead you into a labyrinth, to play their own game at your expense. Nothing but your commands should have obliged me to say so much, having taken my resolution to suffer with you, but not to advise, being sensible that if there was not something very extraordinary, your majesty would follow the advice of those that have served you so long, faithfully, and with success." †

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\* The following words were here omitted, for the reason which he assigns in the preceding letter to the duchess:—

"Not more than their inclinations. They can do you hurt by making the Whigs jealous and uneasy, and that is their great aim; for they know that must have the consequence of dividing the Whigs, and by that means enabling them to cast the balance on the side of those who are, and always will be, in opposition to your majesty's administration and government."

† From the endorsement of the duchess, it appears that the draught of this letter was written by the duke, and transmitted to her and the

*From the Queen, in reply.\**

"I received yours of the 2-13th of this month on Saturday last, which was in answer to three of mine. I am very sorry to find you persist in your resolution of not advising me concerning my home affairs; but I would beg your pardon for disobeying your commands in that particular, it being impossible for me, who have on all occasions spoke and writ my mind very freely, as I think every friend ought to do to one another, to forbear doing the same still, and asking your opinion in every thing; there being nobody but you and lord treasurer that I do advise with, nor can rely on, which I will yet hope you will believe, since I tell you so, you having more than once or twice assured me you would credit what I said. Though I must confess, by what I am told every day of my being influenced by Mr. Harley, through a relation of his, and your saying you are sensible that if there were not something very extraordinary I should follow the advice of lord treasurer and you, I fear you have not a thorough good opinion of me, and if that be so, it is in vain for me to say any thing. However, I can't help asking, why my not complying with some things that are desired, and which you know I have ever been against, should be imputed to something extraordinary? Is not one body of one opinion, and *one of another*? and why then should it be wonderful that you and I should differ in some things, as well as other people, especially since my thoughts are the same of the Whigs that ever they were from the time that ever I have been capable of having notions of things and people; and I must own I can see no reason to alter mine.

"Since I began this letter, I have the satisfaction of receiving yours of the 9th†, by lord treasurer, who is just come out of the country. I am very sorry that your health is not yet confirmed. I beg you would be careful both of preserving that and your person, which is of so much consequence to me, and more sincerely and truly valued and esteemed by me than can be expressed. I have had so many hindrances since I began to write, that I can't say so much as I intended, nor any more to yours of the 9th, being in haste to send this to London, but must trouble you again some other time, till when, I beg you would be so just to me as to believe I am, and ever will be, your humble servant."

*To the Duchess.*

"Aug. 6. — I had not time by the messenger to answer yours of the 17th which he brought me. As to what you say of my brother George, you will see by my former letters that I think him in as wrong measures

treasurer for their approbation. It was returned, with corrections and additions, and the copy of the letter which was apparently sent, exists in the hand-writing of the duchess, with the parts which were omitted by the duke, interlined. The postscript was written by the duke himself, on the impulse of the moment.

\* From a copy in the hand of the duchess.

† This letter is missing.

as is possible.\* It is a very great satisfaction the assurances you give me that there will be care taken to make the mortification as easy as such a thing can bear; but in this country it must have a very bad effect as to my reputation, since he is my brother. I know not from whom you may have heard what you write, but I am sure Mr. Walpole ought to be satisfied with me; for I did say enough to him, that he might see that I was far from approving, but on the contrary, condemned the proceeding of my brother. The account you give me of the commerce and kindness of the queen to Mrs. Masham, is that which will at last bring all things to ruin; for by all you write, I see the queen is determined to support, and I believe, at last own her. I am of the opinion I ever was of, that the queen will not be made sensible, or frightened out of this passion; but I can't but think some ways might be found to make Mrs. Masham very much afraid. The discovery you have made of the queen's having the opinion that she has friends which will support her can be no other than the Tories; and it is true they would ruin lord treasurer and me, and will be able to bring it about, if it can be thought ruin, to be put in the condition of quietness, which of all things I wish for; but not to be forced to it, which I shall certainly be, if Mrs. Masham remains in that credit you say, and I believe she has with the queen.

"I find you are in pain for my not being able to make use of the letter you sent me. You will by the last post have seen how I have made use of it, tho' I said nothing by way of excuse in my letter to Mrs. Morley. I did it by the same post to Mr. Montgomery, in the letter of the 23d, with which he acquainted Mrs. Morley, without doubt, so that my letter may come very naturally to her.

"What I hear from the Hague is, that those people are resolved to have peace on any conditions. This may prove fatal, but if they are determined, we shall find it very difficult to hinder it, so that you will

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\* This passage alludes to a quarrel occasioned by the imprudent locupacity of Admiral Churchill, who, with a view to mortify the Whigs, circulated a report that the duke had given a regiment to a Colonel Jones, at the secret instigation of Harley. He assigned, as his authority, the avowal of Mr. Robert Walpole, then secretary at war, and the confidential agent of the duke in all military affairs. The report, which was communicated to the queen and prince by the admiral himself, created the greatest irritation on all sides, and was proved to be false. Mr. Walpole justified himself to his patron, in a letter, printed in the *Memoirs of his Life and Administration*, vol. xi. p. 9.; and in a second letter, dated June 29. (still preserved in the *Marlborough Papers*). The duke not only condemned the conduct of his brother, but endeavoured to soothe the wounded feelings of Walpole, as well as to exonerate himself from the censure which the report was calculated to excite among the Whigs. The extreme dissatisfaction of all parties is proved by the sensation which an incident so comparatively trifling produced, and evinces the embarrassment which Marlborough encountered from the imprudence of his brother.

let me have your thoughts how we may be most at ease. For when that happens I believe nobody will be against my living quietly with you, and then the court may govern as they please, the consequence of which, I would flatter myself will be, that we shall then be more esteemed by our friends as well as enemies; for the temper of England is such, that nobody in any great station can be liked; for if they are lucky they do not make use enough of their advantage; if unfortunate, they run the risk of being called fools and traitors.

"You will know from hence the public news in the printed papers. By my letters yesterday from Cadogan, I am in hopes the cannon may begin their march from Brussels to-day or to-morrow.

"Since I had finished this letter I have received yours of the 20th, and have only time to assure you that I am fully convinced that the Tories would ruin me. You know my resolutions by my former letters, of being firm to the Whigs; and if they support the queen, they will make me more capable of serving them and my country."

The last letter written by Marlborough drew from the queen a reply, in a more ungracious style than the preceding. It appears to have been destroyed at his request, but we may judge of its tone and contents by the deep impression which it produced on his mind.

*To the Duchess.*

"Aug. 9. — I have had the happiness of yours of the 23d; by the same post Mr. Montgomery sent me one from Mrs. Morley.

"I have had a good deal of struggle with myself whether I should burn it, or send it you to show lord treasurer. As I would have you two know every thing, that you might be the better able to act rightly, I have enclosed the letter I have received from the queen; but I must conjure you that you will not, in your discourse, or any other way, let any body know the contents of this letter, which has thoroughly convinced me that there is no washing a blackamoor white, and that we must expect this next winter all the disagreeableness imaginable; for the Tories have got the heart and entire possession of the queen, which they will be able to maintain as long as Mrs. Masham has credit.

"I do earnestly beg, when Mr. Montgomery has read Mrs. Morley's letter and this of mine to you, that they may both be torn to pieces, so that they may never hurt Mrs. Morley, whom I can't but love and endeavour to serve, as long as I have life; for I know this is not her fault, otherwise than by being too fond of Mrs. Masham, who imposes upon her."

In the course of this arduous struggle the Whigs became more inflamed, in proportion to the resistance of the queen. Disappointed of the effects which they expected from their preceding manœuvres, they resumed, with increasing warmth, the proposal of an invitation to the electoral prince, and en-

deavoured to gain the acquiescence of Marlborough. This imprudent design did not escape the notice of their political antagonists, who availed themselves of a topic so disagreeable to increase the resentment of the sovereign. Lord Haversham even waited on the queen to communicate the unwelcome intelligence, and wrought on her timidity, by dwelling on the necessity to which she would be reduced, of proposing the invitation herself.\*

The queen, in the agony of her mind, communicated to Marlborough the information which she received from Lord Haversham, less from a motive of confidence than from a wish to employ his influence in averting the expected mortification.

*"July 22. o. s. — I cannot end this without giving you an account in short, of a visit I had from Lord Haversham. He told me his business was to let me know there was certainly a design laying between the Whigs and some great men, to have an address made in the next session of parliament, for inviting the electoral prince over to settle here; and that he would certainly come to make a visit as soon as the campaign was over. And that there was nothing for me to do, to prevent my being forced to do this (as I certainly would), but by showing myself to be queen, and making it my own act. I told him, if this matter should be brought into parliament, whoever proposed it, whether Whig or Tory, I should look upon neither of them as my friends, nor would ever make any invitation, neither to the young man, nor his father, nor his grandmother.*

*"What I have to say upon this subject, at this time, is, to beg you would find whether there is any design where you are, that the young man should make a visit in the winter, and contrive some way to put any such thought out of his head, that the difficulty may not be brought upon me of refusing him leave to come, if he should ask it, or forbidding him to come, if he should attempt it; for one of these two things I must do, if either he or his father should have any desires to have him see this country, it being a thing I cannot bear, to have any successor here, though but for a week. And therefore I shall depend upon you to do every thing on the other side of the water to prevent this mortification from coming upon her that is, and ever will be, most sincerely," &c.†*

This pathetic appeal to his feelings and loyalty made a due impression; and however dissatisfied with the conduct of the sovereign, he refused to countenance so indecorous a

\* Letter from Lord Godolphin, Windsor, July 30.

† Printed in the Conduct, p. 164., but evidently only an extract from the original letter.

proposal, as we find by his reply\* to the duchess on the same subject.

"Since my last I have had time to read a second time your three letters of the 16th, 18th, and 22d of the last month, by which I see that I have not yet answered some things in your letters.

"In the first place, you may depend upon my joining with the Whigs in opposition to the Tories, in all things; but as to the invitation, or, what else may be personal to the queen, in regard to myself, as well as concern for her, I must never do any thing that looks like flying in her face. But as to every thing else, I shall always be ready to join with the Whigs, in opposition to the Tories, for whom I shall have no reserve. I am entirely of your opinion as to 37 and 222, that they may be had by those that shall think it worth their while to buy them. The first has already told me that he will do whatever I shall think fit for the service: but as I must be master of my own actions, which may concern the queen personally, so on the other hand I shall solicit nobody to be of my opinion, but be contented in giving my reasons and vote in the house. You judge very right of the queen, that nothing will go so near her heart as that of the invitation. I think the project very dangerous: I wish the Whigs would think well of it, but I am at too great a distance to be advising.

"The business of Mr. Walpole has very much vexed me, for by what he writes me my brother George has been much to blame. I wish, with all my heart, he would retire, for I have been long convinced it would be for his service and every body else. But as I am told the prince will not hear it, I shall never desist from being for it.

"I would by no means endeavour to change any opinion that Lord Sunderland may have, but I think there is no necessity of his saying any thing to the queen that she will take ill; but, on the contrary, that he would endeavour to please, as much as is consistent with his opinion; for it will be very mortifying to me, upon many accounts, if she should persist to have him removed, so that I beg of him, upon my account, that he would do all that is in his power.

"Having wrote thus far, I have received your dear kind letter of the 6th, and as my happiness depends upon your kindness, be assured as long as I have life I shall do all I can to deserve your esteem and love. I enclose you Mrs. Morley's letter, and the copy of my answer. You will let Mr. Montgomery see them both, but nobody else must know that I send them. We continue under the great difficulty of getting cannon. Till we have them, we must be contented with sending parties into France, which makes them very uneasy."

We continue the series of this melancholy, but interesting correspondence, for a short time after Marlborough quitted the camp of Werwick, that we may present a more distinct and connected portion of the history of this political intrigue.

It is necessary, however, to observe that at this period the

\* Without date, but certainly written early in July

Whigs again endeavoured to stimulate the zeal of the two ministers, by recurring to threats of hostility. Their determination was announced by Sunderland, in a vehement letter to the duke, and afterwards by repeated messages through the duchess, who warmly seconded their representations, as we find by the reply of the duke.

*To the Duchess.*

"*Helchin, Aug. 16.* — Yours of the 27th came so late that I could not, for want of time, do any more than thank you for it by the last post. You say that Lord Sunderland has assured you that I may depend upon the friendship of the Whigs, if I will make it possible. You and Lord Sunderland may be assured that I have no intentions or thoughts but that of deserving well from England, and consequently must and will depend on the friendship of the Whigs; and if my good intentions are not seconded with success, I think I shall have nothing justly to reproach myself withal, so that I may retire with quietness and honour.

"The siege of Lille, which was begun on Monday last, is of that consequence to France, that I nowise doubt of their drawing all the troops that is in their power together, to give us what disturbance they can. I pray God to bless this undertaking, and all others that may tend to the bringing of us to a safe and lasting peace, and then I will not put the visit of Lord Haversham to Abigail much to heart. But as that angry lord has not for some years made any visit to any belonging to the court, I think his visit to Abigail will not be much for her service, nor that of the queen, since it must appear to all the world that she is the protectress of those who would destroy the queen's ministers, which must occasion very great prejudice to her service.

"But I think we are now acting for the liberties of all Europe, so that till this matter is a little more over, tho' I love the queen with all my heart, I can't think of the business of England, till this great affair is decided, which I think must be by another battle; for I am resolved to risk rather than suffer Brussels to be taken, tho' the number of this army is very much diminished by the siege. But I rely on the justness of our cause, and that God will not forsake us, and that he will continue to keep our troops in good heart, as they are at present. I beg you to be so kind and just as to be assured, that my kindness for you is such, that my greatest ambition is bounded in that of ending my days quietly with you."

The embarrassment which Marlborough encountered from the difficulty of proving his sincerity to the Whigs, and combating the pertinacity of the queen, induced him to imitate the example of the treasurer in offering his resignation. We do not find his letter to the queen on this occasion; but one, in which he announced his resolution to the duchess, we lay before the reader.

"Aug. 20. — *I send you back yours to Mrs. Morley, as also that of Mr. Montgomery to her, as you desired, having marked the lines which I desire her to reflect on.\** I am doing my best to serve England and the queen, and, with all my heart and soul, I pray for God's protection and blessing; but I am so tired of what I hear, and what I think must happen in England, that I am every day confirmed, that I should be wanting to myself, and ungrateful to God Almighty, if I did not take the first occasion that can be practicable to retire from business. And as I have for several years served my queen and country with all my heart, so I should be glad to have some time to recollect and be grateful for the many mercies I have received from the hand of God. I would not live like a monk, but I can't with patience think of continuing much longer in business, having it not in my power to persuade that to be done which I think is right. I foresee the difficulty of retiring during the war, which is my greatest trouble at this time; but even that difficulty must be overcome, if I must be in some manner answerable for the notions of the queen, who is no ways governed by any thing I can say or do. God knows who it is that influences; but as I love her and my country, I dread the consequences.

"You say nothing of going to Blenheim, but the weather is so fine I could wish you there, by which the finishing within doors, I believe, would go on the faster. If it were possible I would flatter myself that I might be so happy to see it the next summer, especially if M. de Vendome keeps his word in endeavouring the relief of Lille, where the trenches are to be opened this night; and if they let us be at rest for a fortnight longer they will very much oblige us."

"Aug. 23. — You say Mrs. Morley has taken no notice of your letter. I think that is a true sign she is angry. There being three or four posts come from England since she has received Mr. Freeman's last letter, I take it for granted the same method will be taken of giving no answer. I am no ways dissatisfied at that manner of proceeding, for till the queen changes her humour and resolutions, the less the conversations are the better. What Mr. Craggs has told you of the meetings and resolutions of the Tories, and that they think they have good ground to stand on, is very natural to people that have always flattered themselves. I both hope and think they can succeed in nothing that can be of great consequence to the government; but they will always have it in their power to vex those that are in business. For my own part, I shall be in no ways surprised, when I see them act with all the malice imaginable against me. I shall ask no favour of them, being fully resolved of retiring, as soon as possible, to such a sort of life, that it shall not be in their power to vex me. I shall always endeavour to behave myself so, as that such of my friends as will be inclined to be kind to me, shall have no reason to be ashamed of it.

"I am very sorry that the inclinations of my brother are so violent for the Tories, as that they depend upon his interest with the prince; but all

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\* These lines in Italics were erased by the duchess, when she communicated the letter to the queen.

that would quickly signify very little, if it were not for the great power Mrs. Masham has with the queen. I am so fully convinced of this, that I should never trouble the queen with any of my letters, but that I can't refuse lord treasurer and you, when you desire any thing of me. I am sure that the interest of Mrs. Masham is so settled with the queen, that we only trouble ourselves to no purpose; and by endeavouring to hurt, we do good offices to her; so that in my opinion we ought to be careful of our own actions, and not lay every thing to heart, but submit to whatever may happen.

"I do not take Mr. Bromley for a great negotiator, but a less able man than himself will reconcile Lord Rochester and Mr. Harley at this time. I believe you may depend upon it that they will be all of one mind, and that they think themselves assured of the hearts of the prince and the queen, which is a very dismal prospect.

"If I had not made use of the leisure time I had yesterday, you had not been troubled with so long a letter, I having been on horseback all this day. The trenches were opened last night before Lille, so that we shall very quickly see what method M. de Vendome will take for the saving of that place."

To the duke's offer of resignation the queen replied\*:—

"I am sorry to find you in such a splenetic way as to talk of retiring, it being a thing I can never consent to, and what your country, nor your truly faithful friends can never think right, whatever melancholy thoughts they may have all this time. Besides, in my poor opinion, when after all the glorious successes God Almighty has blessed you with, he is pleased to make you the happy instrument of giving a lasting peace to Europe, you are bound in conscience, both to God and man, to lend your helping hand: and how can you do that, if you retire from business? You may be as grateful to God Almighty in a public station as in a private one; but I do not wonder at your desiring quiet, after all the fatigues and vexations you go through daily; for it is certainly the most valuable blessing in this world, and what every one would choose, I believe, that has ever had any thing to do in business, if there were nothing to be considered but one's self.

"Lord treasurer talks of retiring too, and told me, not many days ago, he would do all he could to serve me, by advising with people, and settling a scheme for the carrying on my business in the parliament, before he went to Newmarket; but that he would not come back from thence. I told him that must not be, that he could not answer it either to God or himself; and I hope you will both consider better of it, and not do an action that will bring me and your country into confusion. Is there no consideration to be had for either? You may flatter yourselves that people will approve of your quitting; but if you should persist in these cruel and unjust resolutions, believe me, where one will say you are in the right,

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\* Without date, but endorsed to the duchess, August 27. 1708.—  
From a copy in the hand of the duchess.

hundreds will blame you. Lord treasurer has gone to make a visit to 42\*, where the town says he will meet with four or five gentlemen†, who I can never be satisfied mean well to my service, till they behave themselves better than they did in the last parliament, and have done ever since the rising of it; for from that minute they have been disputing my authority, and are certainly designing, when the new one meets, to tear that little prerogative the crown has to pieces. And now, because my servants and I set up one they formerly liked to be speaker‡, they are against him; for no reason, I suppose, but because they will have none in any employment that does not entirely depend upon them. Now, how is it possible, when one knows and sees all these things, as plainly as the sun at noon-day, ever to take these people into my bosom? For God's sake, do but make it your own case, and consider then what you would do, and why a handful of men must awe their fellow-subjects. There is nobody more desirous than I to encourage those Whig friends that behave themselves well; but I do not care to have any thing to do with those that have shown themselves to be of so tyrannising a temper; and not to run on farther on those subjects, to be short, I think things are come to, whether I shall submit to the five tyrannising lords, or they to me. This is my poor opinion on the disputes at present, which could not be, if people would weigh and state the case just as it is, without partiality on one side or the other, which I beg, for the friendship you have ever professed for me, you would do; and let me know your thoughts of what may be the best expedient, to keep me from being thrown into the hands of the five lords."

The answer of the duke to this pathetic and pressing appeal is not extant, but a draught in the hand-writing of Lord Godolphin, which was sent for his use and approbation, will enable us to judge of the contents.

"As to the reflections your majesty is pleased to make upon my *real* inclinations to retire, tho' it be very natural and very desirable, after one has lived a great many years in a hurry, to enjoy some quiet in one's old age; yet I will own freely to your majesty, my inclinations to retire proceed chiefly from finding myself incapable of being of any farther use to your majesty. The long and faithful services I have endeavoured to perform to your majesty, and the goodness you had expressed to me upon several occasions, had created a general opinion, both abroad and at home, that your majesty placed entire trust and confidence in me; and upon that

\* From a letter written by Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess, alluding to this visit, it appears that the cipher 42 means Dr. John Moore, bishop of Ely. The meeting was purely for Whig purposes, as we find from Mr. Maynwaring, that the duke of Somerset was displeased because he was not of the party.

† The Whig Junta.

‡ Sir Thomas Hanmer.

foot I was the more capable of doing many great and effectual services, both here abroad and in England. But your majesty will give me leave to say, with all imaginable duty, that is now reduced singly to serving you at the head of the army this campaign; for your majesty having shown so publicly, last winter and this spring, that you have no more trust and confidence in me, nor any reliance upon my opinion, but much more upon the opinion of those who have neither honesty nor capacity to serve you, and who visibly ruined your service last winter in several undeniable instances, it is no longer possible for me to be of any further use to you; and to continue in your council to advise, without credit enough to prevail with you to follow good advice, would only expose myself and my reputation in the world, by making myself answerable for other people's follies, or worse.

"And by what your majesty is pleased to say in your letter of the lord treasurer, tho' I have nothing so far as that from himself, I believe his opinion, and his reasons for that opinion, must be the same with mine. Your majesty is pleased to think we shall be blamed for quitting; but, not to reflect upon that coldness, and that behaviour in yourself, which forces us to quit, by withdrawing your trust and confidence from us, to give it to insinuating, busy flatterers, who can't serve you one month this winter without danger of being torn in pieces in the streets. I don't doubt but these things are very sensible to the lord treasurer, as I am sure they are to me. However, I shall not trouble your majesty any farther with the consequences that must follow, since I find plainly by your majesty's letter, that all I have said and written hitherto is to no purpose, nor, indeed, ever can be, while your majesty's heart is possessed by all the false and malicious insinuations which are possible to be suggested by our enemies; and therefore, I shall conclude this head, with wishing your majesty may find abler servants than we have been; more faithful and affectionate, I will beg leave to say, you never can.\*

"As † to the tyranny of the five lords, which you seem so much to apprehend, and so much to desire that you might be kept out of their hands, if your majesty were disposed to hearken to the advice of those who have supported you for almost seven years upon the throne, and much more before you came to it, you would be in no danger of falling into any hands but ours, whom you did not, till very lately, use to think dangerous; and certainly we are not altered. By a maxim I have often heard, that 'interest cannot lie,' we can have no other interest but your majesty's, and to make your throne powerful and your government strong. But your majesty will allow some people may have an interest to our prejudice; they may have an interest to create difficulties every day in your majesty's mind against us, and by that means to force us out of your service, and then, indeed, I am afraid you may be in very dangerous hands. But as to these five lords, if your majesty will be inclined to do such

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\* This draught was transmitted to the duchess, to be forwarded to the duke, and we find two or three trifling alterations in her hand.

† On a separate paper in the hand of Godolphin, but evidently a continuation.

things only, as in themselves are not only just and reasonable, with regard to all that is past, but useful and necessary, for all that is to come, your majesty needs not to apprehend falling into any hands but ours, who have done you very many faithful services, and who, whatever return we are like to have for them, will never fail to pray for your majesty's long life and prosperity."

"I have written this in a good deal of haste and disorder, and therefore I believe it wants no little correction; but you may omit or alter any part of it just as you please."

We cannot quit this subject without again adverting to the interminable disputes between the queen and the duchess, which acquired new force at this particular period, and may be traced to the same source.

Soon after the victory of Oudenard their altercations produced an open quarrel. The duchess, as mistress of the robes, had arranged the jewels to be worn by the queen at the solemn *Te Deum* celebrated on that occasion. The queen refusing to adopt the arrangement, the duchess ascribed her objection to the ill offices of Mrs. Masham, and reproached her, by letter, for such a proof of unkindness and contempt. She also taunted her royal mistress in the coach, as they passed to the church, and during the service itself, reverting to the subject, she coupled her indiscreet remonstrance with a complaint in the name of the duke, that he no longer enjoyed the usual degree of confidence and favour. As the queen prepared to reply, the duchess interrupted her by abruptly requesting that she would cease the conversation lest they should be overheard.\*

Soon after the ceremony she sent the queen the letter from the duke, dated July 23., accompanied with an epistle in a more aggravated style of invective than she had hitherto ventured to employ. The displeasure which so uncourtly

\* At this stage the queen appears to have been fully awakened to a sense of her humiliation. Indeed, arrogance could hardly go farther, and the relations of rank be more distorted than for the robe-woman to command her majesty to be silent. So intoxicated had the duchess become from the engrossment of royal favour, and her own natural or acquired superiorities, that she could hardly refrain from personal insult. In performing her offices of duty, such as holding the queen's gloves, she did it, says Cunningham, with a haughty and contemptuous air; which Anne, who had sunk her own dignity in a degrading familiarity, was constrained to endure, but could not be obliged to forgive. — *Ed.*

and acrimonious an effusion excited was marked by the tone of the queen's reply.

"After the commands you gave me in the church, on the thanksgiving, of not answering you, I should not have troubled you with these lines, but to return the Duke of Marlborough's letter safe into your hands."

The sarcastic and contemptuous brevity of this note, drew forth a reproachful answer from the duchess, in which, among other equally unbecoming expressions, she observed:—

"I should think myself wanting in my duty to you, if I saw you so much in the wrong, as, without prejudice or passion, I think you are, in several particulars, and did not tell you of it." She then comments on the word *commands*, and concludes, with affected humility: "Though I have always writ to you as a friend, and lived with you as such, for so many years, with all the truth and honesty and zeal for your service that was possible, yet I shall never forget that I am your subject, nor cease to be a faithful one."

This epistolary wrangle was not long afterwards followed by an interview, in which the duchess set the seal to her indiscretion, by renewing her expostulations on the countenance manifested towards Mr. Harley and Mrs. Masham. The minute of this conversation, of which no trace appears in the Conduct, is preserved in her hand-writing, and was evidently suppressed on mature reflection. We give this characteristic document without abridgment or alteration.

[Heads of the conversation with Mrs. Morley, Sept. 9–20. 1708.]

"Nobody trusted or countenanced by her, but who is in some way or other influenced by Mr. Harley.

"Mr. Harley never had a good reputation in the world, but is much worse thought of, since he is out of her service, where people were content to suffer him, because he was thought to depend upon Lord Marlborough and lord treasurer. But since he was tempted by the favour of Abigail to set up for himself, and to betray and ruin those that had brought him into her service, and her service itself also, nobody alive can be more odious than he is, or more contemptible to all parties.

"Why will she not consider fairly and coolly the distinction she makes between some of the Whigs, who did her such real and acceptable service, in the union with Scotland and in the matter of the invitation, and my Lord Haversham, who, upon both these actions, and many others, talked so insolently and scandalously of her administration, in her own hearing. And yet that man was admitted to her presence with the air of a friend, though he is plainly in another interest, and can never serve her; and the others are kept at the greatest distance, contrary to the advice and opinion of all her servants, whom she has most reason to trust, though they have

shown themselves, in her presence also, both able and willing to serve her, and desirous to make her great and happy.

“ Even in this last session of parliament, the Tories joined to a man against the council of Scotland, and Mr. Harley himself, underhand ; when after all that was over, upon occasion of the late invasion, these men did expose the Tories to all the world, by showing their zeal for her and her government, by strengthening it every way in their power at that time of danger.”

In the course of this interview the altercation became so violent, that the high-toned voice of the duchess was heard in the ante-chamber ; and when she came out, her eyes were suffused with tears. The queen was found in a similar state of agitation, by those who first entered the apartment ; and we learn from a subsequent letter of the duchess, that she was dismissed with every proof of contempt and indignation.

These fatal contentions could not long be kept a secret from the royal attendants ; and the reports, which were industriously circulated on the occasion, produced the usual effect attending the decline of court favour. An instance of this kind occurred in the conduct of the earl of Kent, who being blamed by Mr. Maynwaring, for his assiduities towards Mrs. Masham, faintly excused himself, on the plea that he must behave civilly to all the queen’s servants. Some of the Whigs also began to anticipate the disgrace of their zealous patroness, and treated her with such coldness and reserve, as to excite her suspicion, that they were transferring their devotions to the new idol.\*

The mortifying result of this altercation, and the no less mortifying consequences which it produced, appear to have cooled the zeal of the duchess. In a fit of spleen and disappointment she testified to the duke her contempt of all party distinctions, and at the same time announced a decided resolution to discontinue her fruitless and unwelcome remonstrances. Her determination was not only applauded by her husband, who had so often lamented her warmth and imprudence, but even by the Whig chiefs, who perceived that her importunities injured, instead of promoting their cause.

\* Letter from Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess, without date, but evidently written at this period.

*To the Duchess.*

" Sept. 27. — Having received yours of the 10th this afternoon, I could not omit sending back all the enclosed papers you have desired, and letting you know, at the same time, what I have formerly writ in other letters, that I am glad you have taken the resolution of being quiet; for you are certainly in the right, that whatever is said or writ by you, the lord treasurer, and me, serves only for information, to do hurt. The copy of the letter you have sent, I think, should be delivered; for if it does no good, it can do no hurt. For my own part, I am quite weary of all business; and if amongst all these disagreeable bustles, I could be so happy as to have liberty of remaining quiet with you, I should be at the height of my wishes."

" Oct. 1. — By the French having taken all the posts along the Scheldt, makes it almost impossible for our letters to go that way without falling into their hands; and that by Ostend is very near as dangerous, so that we are obliged to be upon our guard of what we write, if we would not have them know it; so that you must not expect particulars as to news. But as for my personal esteem and kindness for you, I should rather the world should know it than otherwise; for if I am to be happy, it must be with you. I have read yours of the 10-21st three times, and am so entirely of your opinion as to the queen, that I cannot hinder repeating it again in this letter; for the resolution you have taken of neither speaking nor writing, is so certainly right, that I dare assure you, that you will find a good effect of it in one month. For I really am of opinion, that when the queen shall be sensible, which she will be in that time, that you, the lord treasurer, and I, are in such despair, that we offer nothing, but leave every thing to the direction of those that have the present power with her, it will so startle her, that she will take other measures; and this will make her comply with what is necessary for the saving herself, or nothing will do. I can't entirely agree with your opinion of the queen; I must own I have a tenderness for her, and I would willingly believe that all which is amiss, proceeds from the ambition and ill-judgment of Mrs. Masham, and the knavery and artfulness of Mr. Harley."

" Oct. 4. — Since my last, I have had the pleasure of yours of the 14th. Notwithstanding the difficulty in the passage of the letters, I did in my last explain my thoughts so fully, as to the queen, that you must not think my opinion changed, if I should not mention her any more this campaign. I do from my soul pity the lord treasurer; for his good sense must make him sensible how we are both exposed by the folly and opiniatrety of others." \*

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\* Appendix, note G.

## CHAP. LXXII. — SIEGE OF LILLE. — 1708.

AFTER long and mature deliberation, the confederate generals finally resolved to undertake the siege of Lille, an enterprise which, though less bold and decisive than an immediate invasion of France, was yet the only operation in which the views, means, and interests of all parties could be brought to coincide. The difficulties with which it was likely to be attended were, however, so great and multifarious, that it was made the subject of general ridicule in France; and Vendome publicly declared his conviction, that an able commander, like Eugene, would never venture to engage in so rash a design.

Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was one of the first conquests of Louis XIV. in 1667, and ceded to him by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. It is situated in a swampy plain, watered by several streams. The fortifications were constructed under the superintendence of the celebrated Vauban, who strengthened it with a regular citadel, in the form of a pentagon, defended with two ditches, and a double series of outworks. It was the key of the country watered by the Lys and the Scheldt, and connected with both rivers by canals. A project for its defence was drawn up by Vauban himself, which, on his death, in the preceding year, was consigned to his pupil and nephew. This able officer, as chief engineer, hastened to the place, as soon as it was threatened. The command was entrusted to Marshal Boufflers, governor of Flanders, who was distinguished for his skill in the defence of fortresses, and assisted by officers of his own choice, the most intelligent and skilful in their several departments.

The troops who had escaped in the route at Oudenard were formed into four battalions, and the garrison was reinforced by two others; the whole, with three regiments of dragoons, and 800 invalids, making a total of nearly 15,000 men; and to use the words of the French biographer, "never were preparations better concerted, nor more proper to frustrate the efforts of the enemy." Nor did the strength of the place create the only difficulty. The season was already advanced, the necessary circumvallation was extensive, and

the hostile army was not only superior to that which was to cover the siege, but commanded all the water communications with the nearest part of Holland.

On entering Lille the 29th of July, Boufflers prepared the usual means for a vigorous resistance. New works were constructed on the weakest points, the hedges and trees were cut down, to the distance of 800 paces, and fascines, and pallisades in abundance, were furnished by the district. Several mines were also formed under the covert way, in parts which appeared the most threatened; and every arrangement was made for maintaining a constant supply of arms and artillery, for the subsistence of the garrison, and for the regular distribution of the ammunition and stores.

This memorable enterprise excited universal attention, and drew to the spot many distinguished personages. King Augustus arrived on the 19th of July in the confederate camp, together with the landgrave of Hesse. Marlborough reviewed before them the two lines of his army, and afterwards the king repaired to the quarters of Eugene. It is not uninteresting to observe, that he was here joined by his natural son, Maurice, aged twelve years, afterwards so celebrated as Marshal Saxe, who had secretly departed from Dresden on foot, and reached the army, notwithstanding the fatigues of the journey, and the vigilance of his guardians. Here also Munich and Schwerin, who both rose to such a height of military fame, made their first essay in a species of warfare, of all others the most dangerous and critical. Lastly, here the young prince of Hanover added to the laurels which he had gained at Oudenard, and contributed to increase the fame of that nation over whom he was destined to reign.

For want of water conveyance, the train and stores for the siege, amounting to 94 pieces of cannon, 60 mortars, and above 3000 ammunition waggons, had been collected at Brussels. The whole attention of the two contending armies was therefore employed, one to secure, the other to prevent the march of this important convoy, which occupied a line of fifteen miles, and had to traverse a tract of twenty-five leagues, through a hostile force amounting to 100,000 men.

Eager to profit by so favourable an opportunity of striking a decisive blow, the French commanders detached a corps of

18,000 men, from the main army at Ghent, to Melle, with the view of annoying the convoy at its departure from Brussels. At the same time Berwick advanced to Mortagne, with a design of arresting it, in the passage across the Scheldt, towards the allied camp. On their part, the confederate generals were not less vigilant, in watching over the safety of a convoy on which their future success depended. Eugene visited the camp of Werwick at the latter end of July, to concert the necessary preparations with his colleague, and on the 3d of August departed with a reinforcement of twenty-five battalions and as many squadrons, to rejoin his army, which had hitherto remained in the vicinity of Brussels. As the convoy approached the point of destination, active measures were adopted by Marlborough to strengthen the escort, and facilitate the movements of Eugene.

On the 6th of August the convoy departed from Brussels under the immediate care of the prince of Hesse, while Eugene commanded the covering army. It took the route to Soignies, which it reached on the same evening. The hostile detachment instantly moved from Melle towards Ninove, but finding the convoy too strongly protected, withdrew to its first position. Berwick, on the other hand, considered Mons as threatened, and weakened his force, by throwing succours into the place. Contrary, however, to their expectation, the convoy on the 8th directed its course from Soignies to Ath, where it halted the ensuing day. Thence it proceeded to Trasne in the way to the Scheldt, which it was to traverse over bridges prepared at Pottes.

Meanwhile a constant communication had been maintained between the two allied commanders respecting its progress. Receiving intelligence on the 7th that it was preparing to move, Marlborough detached the duke of Wirtemberg, with 30 squadrons, to advance to Oudenard, and place himself under the orders of Eugene. On the 11th, being apprised that it had passed the Scheldt at Pottes, the preceding day, he sent General Wood, with thirty squadrons, to guard against the enterprises of the troops at Ghent; and the prince of Orange, with thirty-one battalions, to Marquette, on the Lower Dyle, to hold in check the garrison of Lille. On the following day he moved with the main army, and advanced to the vicinity of Helchin.

The convoy being now in safety, Marlborough had the gratification to meet Eugene, whose army had reached Templeuve, and to share in his exultation at the success of so arduous an undertaking. So perfect, indeed, were the arrangements, so indefatigable the exertions, and so consummate the vigilance of the two illustrious chiefs, that this immense train of stores accomplished its march, not only without losing a single carriage, but even without suffering a single insult. So consummate an enterprise extorted the wonder and admiration even of an enemy. The caustic Feuquières bears an involuntary testimony of applause, when he observes, "Posterity will scarcely believe this fact, though it is an indubitable truth." Nor can the French biographer refrain from exclaiming, "Never was a daring enterprise conducted with more skill or greater circumspection."

The arrangements were now completed for the investment of Lille. The prince of Orange, who had reached the Marquette on the 11th, had surprised a French post in the abbey, by the enterprising valour of a British sergeant, who swam across the river and let down the drawbridge. He thus straitened Lille between the Upper and Lower Dyle. On the 13th, Eugene led his army across the Marque at Pont à Tressin, and prolonged the investment to the Upper Dyle. On the same day detachments of 1500 horse and 1200 foot were ordered to Templeuve and Pont à Chin to watch the movements of the enemy from Tournay, while the investing troops were taking post. On the 14th the camp for the south and east attack was traced. The quarters began near Haubordin on the Upper Dyle, passed by Lambessart to the abbey of Marquette, and then bending in a curve towards the Marque, continued through Flers to the point where they commenced.

While Eugene thus straitened the place, Marlborough continued at Helchin, where he covered the operation, and protected the convoys from Ath, Brussels, and Oudenard. He at the same time retarded the immediate junction of the armies of Vendôme and Berwick, the first of which remained in the vicinity of Ghent, and the second near Mons. A large body of artificers and pioneers were employed on the lines of circumvallation, which were to be fifteen feet wide and nine deep, and to embrace a circumference of nine miles.

The camp of artillery was placed with the right at Pont à Marquette, and amounted to 120 pieces of heavy cannon, 40 large mortars, 20 howitzers, and 400 ammunition wag-gons.

On this event Marlborough thus writes to Godolphin:—

“*Aug.* 9. — I am obliged to you for the good counsel you give me, not to lay at heart the unreasonable behaviour of some of my countrymen. I think what you say is reasonable, but as I act to the best of my understanding, with zeal for the queen and my country, I cannot hinder being vexed at such usage.

“Our cannon is come safe to Ath, so that we now think it out of danger. The next thing we have to apprehend is, the intelligences they may have in our great towns, and particularly that of Brussels; for it is most certain the people are against us, so that we have been obliged to leave eight battalions and six squadrons for the security of the town. I shall be in pain till I hear that Erle is gone to the coast of Normandy.”

On the 18th of August each battalion was ordered to furnish fascines and gabions, and on the 19th the engineers examined the ground bordering the road from Lille to Werwick, to ascertain the places proper for batteries. Regulations were also published for the conduct of the attacks, which are justly considered as a model of judgment, skill, and precision.\* Of the 50 battalions employed in the siege, 10 were to be always in the trenches, and to be relieved in succession.

Before the line of circumvallation was fully completed, Eugene opened the trenches, on the night of the 22d, and the corps employed in the service consisted of three battalions of imperialists, four of palatines, and nine of Hessians, supported by nine squadrons, under the orders of General Wilks, and 4000 workmen. Attacks were traced on each side of the Lower Dyle, one on the right, against the gate of St. Andrew, directed by Des Roques; the other on the left, by M. du Mey, against the works between the Dyle and the gate of St. Madelaine. This operation was not performed without considerable loss, as the troops were charged by Boufflers with all the cavalry of the garrison. The following morning the army of Marlborough passed the Scheldt in two columns near Pottes, and took post with the right at Escanaffe and the left at Ainieres, his head-quarters being

\* Printed in Brodrick, vol. ii. p. 26.

placed at Amougies, and those of Overkirk at Vaudripont. He thus facilitated the foraging parties, and retarded the junction which Berwick was preparing to effect with the main army under the dukes of Burgundy and Vendome.

During these operations we find several letters addressed to Godolphin.

"*Helchin, Aug. 13.*—You will know by this post that our cannon is arrived safely at Menin, and that I have reinforced Prince Eugene's army with 31 battalions and 34 squadrons. That, with the detachments we have made for Flanders and Brussels, makes this army to consist only of 140 squadrons and 69 battalions, with which I am to observe the motions of the duke of Burgundy's army. That of Prince Eugene is for the siege and observation of the duke of Berwick. Prince Eugene's army consists of 90 squadrons and 53 battalions, by which you will see that when we join, which I believe we shall do, the whole will be 230 squadrons and 122 battalions. This day Lille is invested; I pray God to bless the undertaking. What I most fear is the want of powder and ball for so great an undertaking; for our engineers fear we must take the town before we can attack the citadel."

"*Helchin, Aug. 20.*—By the threatening of M. de Vendome, I did not think we should have continued thus long in this camp; but, as yet, he is not marched from behind the canal. But the duke of Berwick is drawing to his army with all the troops he can, from their several towns. M. de Vendome declares in his army that he has *carte blanche*, and that he will attempt the relief of Lille; that when the duke of Berwick joins him, they shall then have 135 battalions and 260 squadrons, which he flatters himself will be much stronger than we can be. If we have a second action, and God blesses our just cause, this, in all likelihood, will be the last campaign; for I think they would not venture a battle, but that they are resolved to submit to any condition, if the success be on our side; and if they should get the better, they will think themselves masters; so that, if there should be an action, it is likely to be the last this war. If God continues on our side, we have nothing to fear, our troops being good, though not so numerous as theirs. I dare say before half the troops have fought, the success will declare, I hope in God, on our side, and then I may have what I earnestly wish for, quiet; and you may be much more at ease than when you writ yours of the 31st of the last month, which I received yesterday.

"I find by Mr. Erle's letter that mine was very welcome, since it gives them ease as to their not landing at St. Valory. I wish they may be able to do any thing on the coast of Normandy. I do think their resolutions at the councils of war give no great encouragement, but they cannot avoid giving great alarms.

"Lord Haversham's visit makes a great noise. I should be glad to know the occasion of Lord Peterborough and he being friends; no doubt it was concerted. If God puts it into the heart of the queen to do what is right, the projects of these gentlemen will signify very little. The

pensioner did acquaint me with what M. Buys had said to him concerning peace, which, in effect, was nothing more but to inform himself if his friends were willing to make any offers, and that, accordingly, he should receive instruction from the king of France; but I believe neither he nor any body else will have any orders till they see the fate of Lille, and consequently the issue of this campaign. When I writ you that I must drive the French from Ghent and Bruges, I had no other thought than that it was absolutely necessary for the common cause. It certainly may occasion my coming ten days later; but if we are blessed with success in this part of the country, they will have less heart for the defence of these towns, and then I may come home early."

"*Amougies, Aug. 23.*—By yours of the 3d, I find you were going to be happy for some days in Wiltshire. If you have had the same weather we have had, you could not avoid being abroad the whole day. The trenches being opened last night, and the duke of Berwick having drawn all the troops of this part of the country to his army at Mortagne, I marched this morning to hinder his joining with the duke of Burgundy, between the Scheldt and the Dender, at Lessines, which I was assured was their design, which now will be very hard for him to do. We expect the duke of Burgundy will march to-morrow. His first march will let us see if he has any design on any part of Brabant, or if his intentions are what they write from Paris, of relieving Lille by a battle. As soon as I see what time the siege of Lille is like to take us up, I shall then let you know my thoughts as to the employing the troops with Lieutenant-general Erle. In the mean time they will have a month or six weeks, to do what mischief they can on the coast of France. I thank you for your good news of the galleons.\* If it has the consequence you mention, it will help to make us easy. The first thing we shall see will be the effect it will have on their credit. I am afraid they have found new methods of drawing money from Holland."

At this period the trenches were as rapidly pushed as the nature of the ground permitted. A sortie of the enemy was repulsed on the 23d, and during the night the first parallel was extended, and two batteries were ready to fire at day-break. A bloody struggle ensued for the possession of a chapel and wind-mill; but during the 24th and 25th, a second parallel, with the trenches of communication, was begun. Three batteries of cannon, mortars, and howitzers were now opened from this parallel, which fired with a tremendous effect on the nearest defences, and were answered with equal spirit by the garrison.

On the night of the 26th, a new contest ensued for the

\* The capture and destruction of seventeen Spanish galleons, richly laden, off Carthagena, by Admiral Wager, which took place in the course of the spring.

possession of the chapel, which was carried and rased by the French. The second parallel being extended toward the river, on the 27th, at eight in the morning, the principal batteries were opened against the works of the place, Eugene himself firing the first shot at one attack, and the prince of Orange at the other. The progress of the besiegers awakened the apprehensions of Vendome, and he began to dread lest an enterprise which he had treated with ridicule should be accomplished in the face of his superior army. He therefore concerted with Berwick the means of effecting a junction; but his movements did not escape the vigilance of his antagonist, as we learn from a letter to Godolphin.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Aug. 27.—\* \* \* \* I am in expectation of hearing every minute that the army of M. de Vendome and that of the duke of Berwick are on their march to join, so that I begin to write early this morning fearing I may not have time in the afternoon. Our cannon before Lille began this morning to fire, so whatever M. de Vendome intends for the relief of that town, he must not lose much time, since our engineers promise that we shall have the town in ten days, after which we must attack the citadel. But when we are once masters of the town, we shall have no occasion for so great a circumvallation, by which the army will be much stronger; so that if the enemy will venture, it must be before we take the town. Our troops are in good heart, and their foot in a bad condition. They are, in horse, stronger than we; but, upon the whole, I cannot think they will venture a battle, though it is said they have positive orders to succour the place. They write from the Hague what I hope is not true, that a French detachment is marching from the Rhine to this country; for my only hope on that side was that the elector of Hanover would act so as to hinder any detachment being sent hither. But it is so far from that, that the same news says they have also sent another for Dauphiné. They pretend these detachments should have begun their march on the 17th. Our next letters will inform us of the truth.

"I have this minute advice that M. de Vendome has begun his march, but as his army was very much separated, he would take up his camp this night, his right half a league from Gavre, and his left towards Ninove; so that his army will not be above one league and a half from Ghent, which has made me resolve not to march till to-morrow, that I know positively which way he takes for his second march; for, as I am now posted, it is impossible for him to get between me and the siege; and I have taken such measures with Prince Eugene for the strengthening each other, that I no ways doubt of preventing any thing they may flatter themselves with. And if they will attempt the relief of Lille, they must pass by Mons, which will cost them eight days, and I shall have it in my power to join Prince Eugene in less than three days, with

ease. I will keep the post till to-morrow, that I may give you an account of their further motions.

"By the slow motions M. de Vendome makes with his army, it looks as if his intentions were to make the duke of Berwick march round by Brabant to join him; for, as I am posted, he can do it no other way, so that, as to point of time, it is equal to us whether the duke of Vendome marches by Mons, or obliges the duke of Berwick to make the tour of Brabant. One day will inform us of his resolutions."

The junction took place, as Marlborough had foreseen. The dukes of Burgundy and Vendome, leaving the Count de la Motte with a flying camp of 20,000 men to protect Ghent and Bruges, directed their march by Melle to Ninove, where they passed the Scheldt, while Berwick moved on the 28th of August from Mons through Herinc. On the 30th they joined in the plain between Gramont and Lessines. Their force now amounted to 140 battalions and 250 squadrons, exceeding 110,000 men. The next morning they encamped near Leuse, passed the Scheldt near Tournay, and on the 2d of September, entering the plain, stretched between Blanden and Willemeau.

The confederate generals were not inattentive to these movements. Marlborough, repassing the Scheldt on the 30th of August at Pottes and Escanaffe, encamped between Ponte d'Espières and Avelghem. The next day he advanced to Templeuve and Willemeau, and on the 3d of September took post behind the Marque, his right at Antreuille, his left at Anstange, and his centre at Peronne. In the evening he held a conference with his colleague. The next day Eugene repaired to the army, and the two generals rode out to examine the ground where the enemy were expected to arrive, near Phalempin. Naturally judging that the French commanders would turn round the source of the Marque to pass through the interval between that river and the Dyle, they decided that on the slightest movement of the enemy, the right of the army of observation should be extended to the Dyle and supported on Noyelles, and the left brought to Peronne, in order to receive the expected attack. These arrangements were communicated to Godolphin.

"*Peronne, Sept. 3.*—When I came to this camp on Saturday, I immediately went to the siege, where I had the dissatisfaction of finding every thing backward than was represented to me by letter. We have this morning seized a man who was endeavouring to get in to Lille, who has

confessed that he was to assure the Marshal de Boufflers, from the duke of Burgundy, that he would attempt the relief. Prince Eugene dined with me yesterday, and we have marked the camp where we are resolved to receive the enemy, if they make good their boasting. The ground is so very much for our advantage, that with the blessing of God we shall certainly beat them; so that it were to be wished they would venture, but I really think they will not. What I think they may be most troublesome in, is in the hindering us from having provisions, for which they take all the measures they can, having defended, on pain of death, to all the French subjects, not to furnish any provisions.

"I am afraid the town and citadel will cost double the time which was first thought, by which the honestest people are like to lose their money in Holland as well as in England.

"Since my last I have received yours of the 6th, 8th, 12th, 13th, and 17th. I have so very little time to myself, that it will be impossible for me for some days to answer the particulars in your letters; and as for my thoughts of the troops with Mr. Erle, that will depend very much upon the time we take Lille.

"I see Lord Galway presses very much for troops. It is certain if the court of Portugal will not come into the queen's measures, whatever troops are sent, will be useless to the common cause; for they will do nothing but defend their own frontier. I desire this opinion of mine may be known to nobody but the queen and yourself."

Meanwhile the besiegers continued to advance, though slowly, and after several obstinate conflicts. Their communications were gradually pushed forward and extended, and on the 3d of September, the batteries being completed, the place was assailed with the fire of 120 pieces of cannon and 80 mortars. It is no wonder, therefore, as Marlborough expected, that Vendome should redouble his exertions to interrupt or raise the siege. After some disputes with Berwick, respecting the proposed movement, he took the route of Orchies, encamped on the 4th at Mons en Pouille, and on the 5th entered the opening between the Marque and the Dyle.

The confederates prepared to receive his attack. While the French were filing through Orchies, Marlborough took the position before chosen, and was assisted by a strong reinforcement from the besieging army. Here he was fully protected by the natural advantages of the ground, and had reason to conclude that any attempt to disturb his operations would involve his antagonists in new disasters.

Dangers and difficulties, however, appear not to have entered into the calculations of the enterprising Vendome, and he was only restrained from risking a sudden attack,

under all disadvantages, by the opposition of his more considerate colleague, the duke of Berwick. He passed the interval, from the 5th to the 7th, in opening passages leading to the allies, and thus Marlborough was enabled to fortify his position. His entrenchments were covered by ravines, leading from Noyelles towards Entières, and terminated near Fretin, on a marsh which borders the Marque. His infantry was posted along these entrenchments, and sustained in the rear by a double line of cavalry. The front, for the space of a league, was also strengthened with a ditch, 12 feet wide and 6 deep, and artillery was planted in proper situations.

The passages being at length opened by the enemy, with vast labour, the attack was found to be impracticable, or at least too hazardous. The duke of Burgundy accordingly appealed to the court for directions, and Chamillard reached the camp on the 9th, apparently with orders to risk an engagement. Accordingly, after a council of war, the French army passed the Marque on the 10th, and ranged itself in order of battle, the right behind Avelin, and the left extended in front of Phalempin, and stretching towards Seclin. The allies were immediately in a state of defence, and a heavy cannonade ensued; but the whole operation terminated in the attack of Seclin, which was carried by the French on the 11th. In vain they reconnoitred the position of the allies; even Vendome was compelled to acknowledge it impregnable, and another appeal was made to Versailles. They again received orders to risk an attack; but a new survey only convinced them that it was now too late. Marlborough and Eugene are said to have proposed to become the assailants, and the cautious Berwick admits that such an enterprise would have been fatal to their army, without support for its flanks, or space of ground sufficient for its movements. However, the proposal was counteracted, as usual, by the Dutch \* deputies; and the French commanders having at length received from the king the expected permission, to abandon their design of relieving Lille by a battle, endeavoured to accomplish their object, by intercepting the communications of the allies. Accordingly they retired on the 15th in four columns to Bac à Berse, encamping between Orchies and Mons en Pouille. The ensuing

\* *Memoires de Berwick*, tom. ii. p. 30.

day they moved to Orq, and crossing the Scheldt, occupied a position, extending from the windmill in the vicinity of Pottes to Aubert la Trinité.

Marlborough at the same time changed his position to observe their movements. On the 17th he extended his line from Peronne to Forest. On the 18th he continued to prolong his line from Forest to Leers, having Lannoy behind his centre; and on the 20th, he occupied a new camp, having his left above Leers, and his right at Treffry. We insert the correspondence which passed in this important crisis.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Fretin, Sept. 7.* — Since my last, I have had yours of the 20th, and am very sorry to see, by the journal and letters from the fleet, that we are not to expect much from the expedition; for it is certain, if the sight of tents and militia can hinder them from landing, they will, in some degree, find them all along the coast.

"M. de Vendome having drawn all the troops possible from the garrisons, and having a great train of artillery joined him from Douay, made his own army and ours believe we should have had a battle on the 5th, which was the king of France's birth-day, so that Prince Eugene joined me that morning with 72 squadrons and 26 battalions; but they not moving from their camp, which is in sight of ours, we sent back the foot the same night to the siege, resolving to entrench the front of our camp, which we began to do yesterday. The entrenchment is far advanced, that I have this morning sent him back all his horse, as also a detachment of 2000 foot, to assist him in the attacking of the counter-scarp this night, and for the carrying on the siege with more vigour than hitherto; for it is certain our engineers find much more work than they expected. By the success of this night, we shall be able to guess when we may have the town; for should we be obliged to fire much more powder and ball, we should be very much put to, to find enough for the citadel, this being the twelfth day our batteries have fired." \* \* \*

"*Fretin, Sept. 7.* — \* \* \* The elector of Hanover has called a council, and the opinions of the generals are given in writing, which are sent to Vienna, that the emperor may give such orders as he thinks proper. Mr. Bulau has promised me the whole in French. He says, by their reasonings nothing can be done; so that the elector, his master, is very uneasy; and that he is not sure, but that he may leave the army before the campaign is ended. The Dutch are very uneasy, because the elector is very much dissatisfied at the success that Prince Eugene and I have had, and cannot hinder showing it upon all occasions."

*To Prince George of Denmark.*

"*Camp at Fretin, Sept. 7.* — Sir; If the French had complied with their threats, I might now have given your royal highness an account of

the success of a battle. We drew up the army twice before them, and gave them fair opportunities of coming to us, which having declined, they may now find it more difficult, since we have thrown up a line at the head of our camp, before the *overtures* that lead into the plain, that we may not be subject to sudden alarms, and draw part of the troops from the siege to no purpose. The counterscarp has been delayed for some days: it is now intended for this evening. I send enclosed the disposition made for it, that your royal highness may please to see at your leisure how difficult a task it is."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Sept. 13. — Since my last, M. de Vendome is come so near to us that we did begin to believe that his intention was to attack us; but yesterday and the day before he did nothing but fire a great quantity of cannon, and this day we have been very quiet, he having drawn his cannon from the batteries on our left, as we think, with a design to see what he can do on our right. We are encamped so near, that there is no possibility of being at ease till Lille is taken. I have been so disturbed these two last nights and days, that I am as hot as if I were in a fever, so that you will excuse my saying no more by this post."

*To the Duchess.*

"Sept. 17. — Whenever I have a minute to myself, I make use of it to write to my dear soul; for M. de Vendome having gathered much more strength together than we could imagine, and being encamped so near, that in one hour's time we might be engaged, obliges us to be so very diligent that we have very little rest, by reason of the troops we are obliged to have at the siege, which makes him have near twice as much foot as I have in this army; but I am so well entrenched, that I no ways fear their forcing us. But the siege goes so on very slowly, that I am in perpetual fears that it may continue so long, and consequently consume so much stores, that we may at last not have wherewithal to finish, which would be very cruel. These are my fears, but I desire you will let nobody know them. I long extremely to have this campaign well ended; for of all the campaigns I have made, this has been the most painful; but I am in the galley, and must row on as long as this war lasts. The prince of Hanover has told me that as soon as the town is taken, he intends to return for Hanover. The French being marched by their right, I have been obliged to march by our left, so that we are now in our camp, where I was before I came to that which I entrenched. I believe the enemy will oblige us to march again this night, they having already sent a detachment towards Oudenard, which they say in their camp they will besiege.

"Since I had finished this letter, I have notice that the French are passing the Scheldt by Tournay, so that I shall not march till to-morrow morning."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Sanguin, Sept. 17. — I came to this camp last night, the French having begun their march on the 15th, towards their right. I did not

march till the next day, that I might be the better informed of their intentions, which seem to be for taking a camp between us and Oudenard, in order to hinder our convoys from Brussels, as also the provisions which come from that side to the army. They have carried their battering train to Tournay, and they say in their army, that they will besiege and take Oudenard, before we shall get Lille. For these last five or six days the siege has advanced very little, which makes every body uneasy. No doubt there will be many letters to the same effect, but I desire not to be named. If the enemy does not oblige me to march, which I fear they will, I shall go for two hours to the siege; so that I shall not seal this letter till my return, that if I have any thing good from thence I may send it you.

"I have this minute an account that the French army begin to pass the Scheldt by Tournay, which makes me resolve not to march till tomorrow. I have been with Prince Eugene and the deputies at the siege, and find every thing in a bad way, which gives me the spleen."

In this interval of suspense and expectation, the siege had proceeded with a slowness which ill accorded with his impatience. On the 6th of September Eugene returned with his detachment to press the approaches, and the trenches were advanced to the glacis of the two horn-works, against which the attacks had been directed. The bastions behind had also been considerably injured by the fire, and twelve batteries incessantly thundered on the place.

On the 7th Eugene resolved to attack the salient angles of the counterscarp on both sides of the Dyle, and above 14,000 men, besides the ordinary guard of the day, were in readiness for this perilous and critical operation. While the troops advanced along the trenches, the cannon continued a tremendous fire: at seven o'clock it suddenly ceased, and after an interval of half an hour three pieces were discharged as a signal. The troops rushed into the covert-way, but were suddenly assailed with a tempest of balls. Two mines were then sprung, and after a desperate effort they were driven back with great loss, except on two points of the works, where they continued to maintain themselves, against all the efforts of the besieged.

The night of the 8th the assailants secured themselves in their post, and pushed their trenches towards other parts of the works. They were disturbed by a sally from the place on the 10th, but the 11th recovered their lodgment, and prepared new batteries. The siege was delayed by the march of Eugene on the 11th to the camp of Marlborough at

Fretin; but the ensuing days the assailants improved their works, raised new batteries, and fired with such effect, that on the 17th, in the evening, they were ready to assault the tenaillons. They, however, advanced with great caution, extending their lodgments along the covert-way, and opening new batteries against the outworks and body of the place. On the 18th Marlborough himself visited the attacks, and held a conference with Eugene and the deputies. He was highly dissatisfied with the slowness of the siege, and in a letter to Godolphin heavily censures the misconduct of the engineers.

"Sept. 20.—\* \* \* \* It is impossible for me to express the uneasiness I suffer for the ill conduct of our engineers at the siege, where I think every thing goes very wrong. It would be a cruel thing, if after we have obliged the enemy to quit all thoughts of relieving the place by force, which they have done, by repassing the Scheldt, we should fail of taking it by the ignorance of our engineers, and the want of stores; for we have already fired very near as much as was demanded for the taking of the town and citadel; and as yet we are not entire masters of the counterscarp, so that to you I may own my despair of ending this campaign, so as in reason we might have expected. I beg you to assure the queen, that my greatest concern is on her account; for as to myself, I am so tired of the world, that were she not concerned, my affliction would not be great.

"When the fate of Lille is once known, we shall endeavour all we can to bring the French to a general engagement; but as that is what we shall desire, I take it for granted it is what they will avoid. Having drawn all the troops they can together, they are stronger than we; and our letters of yesterday from the Rhine assure us, that the elector of Bavaria was to leave the army the next day, in order to drink the waters near Metz; that the troops, Bavaroises and Spaniards, had orders to march for this country; and that the elector was to have his residence this winter at Mons.

"I also enclose a letter and a draught of what has passed at Lille to this day, which I desire you will, with my duty, give to his royal highness; and also let the queen know that I shall do myself the honour of answering hers of the 31st, which I received yesterday, by the next post; for my head aches at this moment so extremely, that I am not able to write any more at this time."

*Reply of Lord Godolphin.*

"Windsor, Sept. 20.—Oct. 1.—Yours of the 20th, which I received yesterday, gave me more trouble than I can express to you, both upon account of the public, and more particularly from the part I take in so much disquiet and uneasiness, which I am sure you had upon you, when that letter was written.

"I beg of you not to let any misfortune which is occasioned by other

people's faults, prey upon your spirits; for it will make you sick, and you must consider that all good people here, who wish well to the public, look upon your life and health, as not only what has been, but what must, and I hope in God will be, the support of us all. I beg you therefore once more not to neglect either of them; and I choose to send this letter by the way of Ostend, hoping it may come some days sooner to you than by Holland, since by a letter from Mr. Erle of the 27th, I find the communication between that place and your army had been opened; and if we may believe some extracts of letters, which we have seen from thence, of the 30th, the attempts of the enemy to hinder it have been very much disappointed.

"In case this should prove true, and that you find yourself able to preserve this communication with Ostend, you will best judge whether any provisions or ordnance stores, that we could send from hence to Ostend, could either be of use to you, or arrive in time. There are two regiments at Portsmouth, under orders to be sent thither, as soon as transports can be any way had for them."

"*Windsor, Sept. 21.*— \* \* \* \* I was indeed extremely desirous to let you know, as soon as I any way could, that my greatest concern and uneasiness for the very ill posture of affairs at Lille, which appeared in yours of the 24th, was, lest you should suffer your own mind to be too much affected with it, and let it prevail to the prejudice of your health, which must be the support of all those who really love their country and the public good; and when that is the question, I make no question for my part, but those will show themselves to be the majority in England, though in the mean time nothing appears so much as the ill will of those, who care but little, either for one or the other.

The urgent representations of the duke incited the assailants to new exertions. On the night of the 20th, the works were deemed sufficiently advanced for an attack of the *tenaillons*, and the assailants were instantly strengthened by 5000 English troops chosen from the covering army. It was resolved to assault at once the counterscarp of the Lower Dyle, that opposite the bastion on the right, and the places of arms between the hornwork, the bastion, the ravelin on the left of the river, and the covert-way, as far as the Port de la Madelaine. Prince Eugene placed himself in an advanced battery, to animate the troops by his presence. The signal being given, they rushed to the attack. The fire was tremendous, and the struggle sanguinary. The assailants giving way, Eugene hurried forward, and rallied those who were retreating. In the heat of the engagement a spent musket-ball grazed his forehead, above his left eye, and struck off his hat, but fortunately occasioned no serious fracture. He was with difficulty persuaded to retire to his

quarter, while the attack was continued. After a terrible conflict, however, the assailants succeeded in establishing themselves on the right of the angle of the left-demi-bastion of the tenaillon, and on the left of the places of arms in the covert-way, opposite to the principal breach. This advantage was purchased with the loss of nearly 2000 men.

On the ensuing morning the British general visited his colleague, and finding him preparing to mount on horseback, and resume his duty, pressed on him to remain in his quarters till he was perfectly recovered. He succeeded only by promising to take on himself the superintendence of the siege, as well as of his own army. The care and anxiety in which this additional command involved him, were increased by the unexpected discovery, that the stores began to fail, and that there was not sufficient ammunition to continue the attack more than four days. He was even importuned to raise the siege, by the Dutch deputies, who were alarmed with the difficulty and expense of the enterprise.

During the confinement of Eugene, Marlborough superintended the siege, with as much activity and vigilance as if he had no other occupation, riding daily from his headquarters to the approaches, and returning in the evening. On the 23d, in particular, he was in the trenches, when a grand attack was made on the tenaillon, on the left, and part of the counterscarp. He himself issued the requisite orders, animated the troops by his presence, witnessed their successful lodgment in the covert-way, and did not retire till they were masters of the whole tenaillon. A letter written to Godolphin on the ensuing day, will show the weight of his cares and labours.

“*Sept. 24.*— Since my last, Prince Eugene has received a wound in his head, which I thank God is no ways dangerous; and I hope to-morrow or next day he may be abroad. Ever since Friday, that he was wounded, I have been obliged to be every day at the siege, which, with the vexation of its going so ill, I am almost dead. We made a third attack last night, and are not yet masters of the whole counterscarp; but that which is yet worse, those who have charge of the stores have declared to the deputies that the opiniatetry of the siege is such, that they have not stores sufficient for the taking of the town. Upon which, the prince has desired to speak with me to-morrow morning. My next will acquaint you of what is resolved, but I fear you must expect nothing good. I have this afternoon a letter from Lieutenant-general Erle, from

Ostend. He is ill of the gout. The enemy has cut in three several places the canal of Nieuport, by which they have put that country under water, to hinder our communication with Ostend. However, I shall find ways of letting him know what I desire. I am so vexed at the misbehaviour of our engineers, that I have no patience, and beg your excuse that I say no more till the next post."

Notwithstanding these successes, the efforts of the assailants were opposed with equal spirit by the garrison. To remedy the want of ammunition, which began to be felt in the place, a body of horsemen, each loaded with a sack of powder, were sent by Vendome to cut their way through the besieging force; and though many fell victims to their temerity, they succeeded in carrying such a supply into the fortress, as considerably raised the spirit, and augmented the resources of the garrison.\*

In the midst of these operations, Marlborough had the satisfaction to receive a new and flattering proof of gratitude from king Charles. On the first intelligence of the victory at Oudenard, the king eagerly seized the opportunity, not only to repeat his offer of the administration of the Netherlands, but even proposed to grant it for life.

*King Charles to the Duke of Marlborough.*

"*Barcelona, Aug. 8.* — My lord, duke, and prince; if your letter of June 26th, delivered to me by General Stanhope, had not been very agreeable to me, you may believe, my lord, that I was transported with one which I have received from the duke of Savoy, announcing to me the recent victory at Oudenard. I want expressions to testify the share I take in this new glory, which is added to your skill, merit, and courage. Since all your great actions in this war have had no other object than the recovery of my monarchy, you may judge of my heartfelt gratitude to you for the beneficial effects to my cause, which must result from this glorious victory, not less perhaps than the reduction of my whole monarchy, if you will continue the same vigour in the prosecution of the war one year more.

"Thus, my lord, it seems that to the hand which has secured the liberty of Germany and the Netherlands, Spain will also owe hers. With this confidence, you will find me, my prince, always willing to renew the patent for the government of my Low Countries, which I sent

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\* For the contents of this chapter, we are principally indebted to the Correspondence; the Journal of the Siege, in Lamberti, t. v.; the accounts in Lediard and the foreign biographers, as well as the Memoires de Berwick; Broderick; Milner; Vie du Prince Eugene; and other authorities.

you two years ago, and to extend it for your life. You may depend on the fulfilment of my royal word ; and be assured that I will, in conformity with this promise, expedite the despatches, as soon as I am in possession of Madrid. I need not recommend to you the propriety of maintaining this secret, as well from the consideration due to the elector palatine, as from a fear of giving umbrage to the States."\*

Many of the duke's letters contain allusions to this grant, which was afterwards repeatedly made. His motives for declining an offer, which he was evidently anxious to accept, were, the fear of offending the Dutch, of acting contrary to the opinion of the British cabinet, and of drawing on himself the importunities of the duchess, by whom it was vehemently opposed. He, however, flattered himself, that at some future period he might enjoy so honourable and lucrative a station; for he observes, in a letter to Godolphin, "This must be known to nobody, but the queen; for should it be known before the peace, it would create inconveniencies in Holland, and I beg to assure the queen, that it is not compliment, but real duty, that when the peace happens, if she shall not think it for her honour and interest that I accept of this great offer, I will decline it with all the submission imaginable."

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#### CHAP. LXXIII. — CAPTURE OF LILLE. — 1708.

As the enemies were completely masters of the route to Brussels, by which the army had hitherto received succours and supplies, it became necessary to open a new channel of communication. For this purpose Ostend offered the only eligible point, and the services of the troops who had been selected for the descent on the French coast were called into action.

This expedition, which in the early part of the campaign had excited such lively hopes, and occupied so prominent a place in the correspondence, had failed in its principal object. General Erle, who was chosen for the command, was the most improper officer who could have been selected for an enterprise which required decision, activity, and confidence. On the contrary, his letters prove that he looked rather to difficulty than to success, and that he not only ac-

\* From the French original.

knowledge his own unfitness, but utterly disapproved all such hazardous undertakings. His original instructions directed him to make an attempt on the coast near St. Valory, where it was expected he might be supported by a detachment from the army of Marlborough. But as no detachment of sufficient force could be spared, he was ordered to effect a descent on the coasts of Normandy or Brittany. The appearance of military preparations, and the assembly of the militia, were, however, sufficient to deter him from the attempt; and after lingering for some time in the bay of La Hogue, he returned to the Downs.

The design being utterly relinquished, Godolphin was desirous of transporting the troops to Portugal; but his wishes were overruled by Marlborough, who felt the necessity of a competent force at Ostend, to maintain his communications with England. Having obtained the approbation of the cabinet, he imparted the proper orders to General Erle, by Captain Armstrong, the same confidential officer who had arranged, with Prince Eugene, the movements before the battle of Oudenard.

The troops reached Ostend at the moment when their services were rendered doubly necessary, from the position of the enemy, and were accompanied by a fleet of transports, conveying an abundant store of ammunition, and other requisites. General Erle being now employed in a service adapted to his talents, carried into effect the instructions which he had received from the commander-in-chief, for facilitating the passage of supplies from the coast to the covering army. He partially drained an inundation, which the enemy had caused between Ostend and Nieuport, occupied Oudenburg, and threw bridges over the canal of Nieuport, near Leffinghen, where he also established a post. Having thus restored the communication, a large convoy was prepared, and 700 waggons were detached from the army of observation, to receive the supplies. This operation naturally called forth the same care, vigilance, and activity, as had attended the passage of the first convoy from Brussels. Vendome and Berwick were both desirous to attempt its destruction; but the task was finally confided to Count de la Motte, who from long residence in these districts, was supposed to be intimately acquainted with the country. He was remanded from the vicinity of Brussels,

and sent to Bruges, with a corps amounting to 22,000 men, which was deemed more than sufficient to overpower any covering force that could be furnished from the main army.

Marlborough, who yet continued in the camp at Lannoy, first detached two bodies of troops, consisting of twelve battalions of infantry and 1500 horse, under generals Landsberg and Els, to protect its passage. On learning the movements of Count de la Motte, he, on the 26th, sent a new detachment of twelve battalions under General Webb, to advance as far as Tourout, in order to protect the march of the convoy from Cochlaer, through the wood of Wynendale; and soon afterwards, twenty-six squadrons and twelve battalions, under Cadogan, marched to Hoghlede, to cover its passage between Tourout and the camp.

On the 27th of September the convoy departed from Ostend, crossed the canal of Nieuport, at Leffinghen, during that night and the morning, and directed its course by Slype and Moerdyke, to defile through Cochlaer, behind the wood of Wynendale. The moment it commenced its march, the utmost vigilance and activity were displayed by all the officers on the line of its passage. General Webb detached 1600 infantry, under the command of Brigadier Landsberg, to strengthen the corps posted at Oudenburg, with orders, after covering the convoy, to rejoin him at Tourout. This force arrived in time to prevent the occupation of Oudenburg by the enemy. Meanwhile the horse under Cadogan had reached Hoghlede, and Count Lottum, with 150 dragoons, was sent forward to explore the road by which the convoy was advancing, and join the escort. Approaching Ichteghem, however, he discovered several French squadrons, and returned to Tourout to give the alarm. On this intelligence, General Webb moved forward with the infantry, Count Lottum, with his small party of cavalry, forming the advanced guard, with orders to gain Ichteghem, by the way of Wynendale. Reaching Wynendale, they perceived the enemy, through the opening of the plain, between a low coppice and the wood. The quarter-masters and grenadiers were instantly formed, and posted in the coppice, while General Webb, with the 150 horse, advanced to reconnoitre and amuse the enemy. As fast as the infantry arrived, they were posted in order of battle, in the opening between the wood of Wynendale and the coppice, where the quarter-

masters and grenadiers were stationed. Scarcely had six battalions formed, before the enemy commenced a heavy cannonade; but the small party of horse kept its ground with such firmness, that General Webb had time to complete his dispositions. The troops formed two lines, the left wing extending beyond the coppice, to prevent the enemy from turning that flank, and the right resting on the wood and castle of Wynendale. In the wood on the right was the regiment of Heukelom, forming an ambuscade, and another regiment was thrown into the coppice on the left. Parties of grenadiers were posted among the brushwood on each side, for the same purpose, with orders not to discover themselves, till they could take the assailants in flank. The regiments which escorted the convoy formed a third line, as they arrived.

On the first news that the convoy had departed, Count de la Motte advanced to Oudenburg, but the post being already occupied, he hastened by Ghistel, to intercept it in the defile of Wynendale. Finding himself anticipated by the allies, whom he descried at five o'clock in the afternoon, he opened a cannonade, which lasted two hours. In the interval he formed his troops in several lines, the infantry in front, the cavalry in the rear; and then advanced, in full confidence, to overwhelm a force which did not amount to one half of his own. Within a few minutes the enemy began the attack, but approaching the allied lines, were received by such a fire from the ambuscade in the wood, that the left wing gave way on the centre. The fire of the opposite ambuscade was then opened, and soon threw their whole line into confusion. They, however, still advanced, and broke two battalions; but reinforcements being drawn up from the rear, they were repulsed. They made a third attempt, but the fire in front and flanks again throwing back their wings on the centre, they retired in the utmost dismay. Neither the threats nor example of their officers could induce them to return to the charge; but after some distant and scattered volleys, they feebly relinquished the contest.

Towards the close of the action, Major-general Cadogan came up with some squadrons of horse, and offered to charge the retreating enemy; but it was not deemed advisable to encounter so superior a force of cavalry; and the commanders contented themselves with securing the convoy,

which during the action had passed in rear of the wood, and arrived the same evening at Rousselaer. The next day it reached Menin, where it was welcomed with exultation; and on the last day of September, Marlborough was gratified by its passage through the lines of his camp, which in the interval had been established between Pont à Marque and Menin.

The correspondence will show the effect of this brilliant action, and the opinion which the commander-in-chief entertained of General Webb, by whom it was achieved.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Sept. 27.* — You will have seen by my last letter, the unhappy circumstances we are in, by the very ill conduct of our engineers and others. Upon the wounding of Prince Eugene, I thought it absolutely necessary to inform myself of every thing of the siege; for, before, I did not meddle in any thing but the covering of it. Upon examination, I find they did not deal well with the prince, for when I told him that there did not remain powder and ball for above four days, he was very much surprised. I own to you, that I fear we have something more in our misfortunes than ignorance. Our circumstances being thus, and the impossibility of getting a convoy from Brussels, obliged me to take measures for getting some ammunition from Ostend, which we could never have attempted, but for the good luck of the English battalions being there.

"Having time, I begin to write in the morning, but as the letters are not to go till the evening, I hope to send you some certainty of the convoy; I having sent yesterday Major-general Cadogan with 26 squadrons and 12 battalions to meet them, so that they might come with the greater safety, with which we must do our best; for should this not come safe, I am afraid we must not flatter ourselves of hoping to get any other, though you may be sure we shall leave nothing unattempted. It is impossible to express the trouble this matter has given me; for I am sensible that not only her majesty, but all the common cause must suffer, if we miscarry in this undertaking, which we have but too much reason to apprehend. Our letters from Germany assure us, that on the 15th of this month a great detachment was made for this country, and that the elector of Bavaria is to come with them, which will give no little alarm in Holland."

"*Sept. 29.* — I have kept this mail till now, that you may be informed of the success we have had in bringing our convoy safe from Ostend. I must refer you to the particulars sent to the secretary's office, my head having ached extremely for these last two days. I must own to you that I have not strength to bear long the necessary trouble I undergo; but I now hope for some ease, since Prince Eugene will be abroad to-morrow. Last night the French attempted to send in succours and powder into Lille. About 300 men forced their way through a palatine regiment; several were blown up and killed, and about 40 men and 4 officers taken prisoners, the rest returned to Douay. Our letters run much risk of

being read by the enemy, which makes it not safe to write some things I have a mind to say."

"Oct. 1. — In my last I had not time to give you any account of our last action, but that of referring you to what was writ to the secretary's office; I have since had a particular account. Our loss in killed and wounded is very near 1000; by what the enemy left dead on the place, they must have lost at least three times as many as we. They had above double our number; all our horse, except 300, and 2000 foot, being sent on before, for the security of the convoy, so that there were not above 8000 men; and it is said by the officers who were left wounded on the field of battle, that they had 40 battalions and 46 squadrons, as also cannon.

"Webb and Cadogan have on this occasion, as they always will do, behaved themselves extremely well. The success of this vigorous action is, in a great measure, owing to them. If they had not succeeded, and our convoy had been lost, the consequence must have been the raising of the siege the next day. All her majesty's subjects have had the good fortune this campaign in all actions to distinguish themselves; so that I should not do them justice, if I did not beg the queen, that when this campaign should be ended, she will be pleased to make a promotion among the generals of this army only, which will be a mark of her favour and their merit; for hitherto, though almost all the action has been in this army, yet every general has advanced equally with them, though two parts of three of them have not so much as served this war. If the queen and prince approve of what I desire, in favour of this army, I should be glad it might not be known to any body, till I have an opportunity of giving the names for their approbation. Count Corneille, M. Overkirk's son, has, on this occasion, behaved himself extremely well."

*Reply of Lord Godolphin.*

"Sept. 27.—Oct. 8. — According to your commands, I have communicated to the queen and to the prince the favour of yours of the 1st of October. They both seemed very well pleased with the account of your success at Wynendale, and the satisfaction you express for the very good conduct of your troops upon that occasion. They agreed very readily to the distinction you desire for the general officers of your army, at the next promotion; and the prince added, it was his opinion, that distinction ought to have been made much sooner."

The safe arrival of this convoy gave new energy to the army; while the recovery of Eugene relieved Marlborough from a load of care and labour, though not from anxiety. The besiegers continued to advance by the tardy movements of the sap, to raise new batteries, to complete the lodgments which they had effected, and to fill up the ditch. At length, at mid-day, on the 3d of October, they carried the tenaillon, under the direction of Eugene, while the besieged were sunk in repose; and the ensuing night established themselves on

the salient places of arms, opposite to the great breaches. The lodgments were soon completed, new batteries mounted, and the trenches extended along the front attacked.

The slow, but irresistible progress of the besiegers induced Vendome to make a new effort. He moved with a considerable detachment from the Scheldt, passed through Ghent, joined Count de la Motte, and advancing between Moerdyk and the canal from Bruges to Plassendael, opened the sluices, and inundated the country to the very border of the Dyke. He also reinforced the garrison of Nieuport. He thus hoped to render the communication utterly impracticable, by intercepting the passage between Ostend and Leffinghen, where a post of 1000 foot and 600 horse was stationed.

This movement induced Marlborough to draw towards the enemy. Having sent forward a considerable detachment, he left a part of his army at Ronques, at the disposition of Eugene, and moving with the rest, crossed the Lys at Menin. On the 7th of October he encamped between Rombeck and Hoglede, having his head-quarters at Rousselaer. Determined to attack the French at Oudenburg, he the next day advanced to the heath of Wynendale; but on his arrival, was disappointed to hear that Vendome had retired. On this news he returned to Rousselaer, and sent forward the infantry of the second line, and the Prussian general Lottum, to be near the siege, but recalled him on the news that the enemy were increasing their force at Ghent and Bruges.

The inundation caused by Vendome put a momentary suspension to the arrival of stores and provisions. A new expedient was therefore devised. The ammunition was packed in skins, and conveyed in flat boats from Ostend to Leffinghen, where it was received by carriages, mounted on high wheels, and conveyed to the camp. In this difficult task Cadogan distinguished himself, as he did on every occasion, which required extraordinary diligence and activity, and the convoys were brought in safety, in spite of the hostile batteries and the incessant attacks of armed gallies.

The critical situation of affairs rendered it necessary to hold conferences with Eugene and the deputies, for the continuance of their difficult enterprise; and the chiefs of the army accordingly assembled at Menin on the 11th of October.

This meeting was rendered melancholy by the loss of the veteran Overkirk, who continued to act with his usual alacrity till a few hours of his death, being under arms the whole night of the 22d. Worn out with the fatigues of the service, and the infirmities of premature age, he expired in his 67th year, in the camp, while the two generals and deputies were arranging their operations. The loss of this active, brave, and devoted veteran drew a tear of sympathy from both the commanders, particularly from Marlborough, who had ample cause to admire and estimate his devotion and docility, so different from the captious spirit of his colleagues. In recompence for his services, Marlborough obtained a pension from the British government for his son, Count Corneille. Overkirk was succeeded in the command by Count Tilly, who, to the activity of a less advanced age, added equal zeal and devotion.

We shall refer to the correspondence for those particulars, which we have purposely passed over.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Rousselaer, Oct. 9.* — You will know by this post that we are in great want of another convoy, so that I marched on Sunday morning, with 110 squadrons and 60 battalions, and camped that night at Rousselaer; and yesterday I was in hopes to have been in sight of the duke of Vendome, who was encamped at Oudenburg, to hinder our having any thing from Ostend. But as soon as he was informed of my being at Rousselaer, he decamped, and marched to Bruges. During the time he has been at Oudenburg, he has cut all the dikes, so that the whole country is under water, which makes it impracticable for our carts to pass; but I have sent to Ostend, to see if they can put the powder into bags, which may be brought by horses; for we hope to find a passage by which they may come. God knows how this siege may end; I have but little faith, and am quite uneasy, but resolved to persist as long as there is the least hope.

“Major-general Webb goes for England; I write to her majesty by him. I hope she will be pleased to tell him, that she is very well satisfied with his services, and that when she makes a promotion this winter, he may be sure of being a lieutenant-general, which really this last action makes his due.

“I am returned to this place, where I am conveniently camped, as well for assisting at the siege, as for assisting and protecting what we may get from Ostend. I dare not write some things I should be glad to say to you, which gives me a great deal of trouble; for I see every thing is going to distraction, and that it is not in my power to help it.

“The electoral prince of Hanover is this day gone for Ostend, in

order to return to Hanover. The enemy has drowned the country to that degree, that he could take no part of his baggage with him."

"*Tourout, Oct. 8.* — The uneasy march of this day cannot hinder me from repeating again the obligation the queen and all the allies have to Major-general Webb, who will give you this letter, and I beg you will present him to the queen; and were it not for measures I am obliged, for the queen's service, to keep with the States-general, I should desire her majesty would declare him a lieutenant-general, which he does extremely deserve. But as it must be done with management with them, I humbly desire the queen will assure him, that when she makes a promotion this winter, he shall be one; and I will be answerable, that not only now, but at all times, he shall deserve it from her."

*From Lord Godolphin, in reply.*

"*Newmarket, Oct. 7-18.* — Major-general Webb brought me your letter to this place. I had heard of his coming before I left London, so the queen was prepared to use him very kindly, and with a great deal of distinction, as I find she has done, both by what he says himself, and by a letter which I have received from her by him. But I am very uneasy, and so I find he is, at his having made himself incapable of serving with you for the rest of the campaign, when there may yet be great occasion for men of service. Might it not be an expedient, if the queen should write to you, to give him the distinction of acting as a lieutenant-general now immediately? or if this has its objections, might she not desire you now to acquaint the States that she intends a promotion? Pray let me have your answer, if either of these will do, that I may speak to her majesty to write accordingly, or what else you would have done in this matter."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Oct. 19.* — Having had no letters since Mr. Craggs went from hence, I have little more to acquaint you, than that the waters are so grown upon us, that our communication with Ostend is at an end for some time. During the time we had the passage open, we have got above 1600 barrels of powder, and a great many other things which are of use.

"Poor M. Overkirk died yesterday, by which her majesty will save the pension I am told she gave to Lord Grantham. It would be an act of goodness and generosity, if the queen would be pleased to give some part of it to Count Corneille, who is as virtuous and as brave a man as lives. His father has been able, I fear, to leave him nothing. If I were not sure that he did deserve, and would be grateful to the queen, I would not say so much for him.

"We hope in four or five days to give a general storm, if they will venture it, which I fear they will. I wish I may be mistaken, since it will cost a great many lives. God continues to bless us with good weather."

After in vain attempting to prevent the passage of convoys over the inundation, Vendome resorted to new expedients. Langeon, who commanded the galleys of Dunkirk,

prepared at Nieuport a flotilla, manned with troops of the marine, to act on the canal, and a force of 50 companies of grenadiers and 1000 dragoons was detached to second his enterprises. A species of amphibious warfare now took place; and a vigorous, though ineffectual cannonade, was maintained, as well on the allied posts as on the boats employed in conveying ammunition and stores. At length, to intercept the communication entirely, the enemy determined to attack Leffinghen, which had not only afforded protection to the allied troops, but cut off the communication with Nieuport and other places on the frontier, and was now occupied by a considerable corps of English and Dutch infantry, who were sustained by another post beyond Dixmund. Trenches were accordingly opened along the causeway of Bruges, and pushed with all the rapidity which the narrow front, and the difficulties of the ground, would permit. The assailants profited by the negligence of the troops guarding the post. Taking advantage of a dark and rainy night, they opened a heavy fire from the trenches, to occupy the attention of the garrison, while parties of grenadiers traversed the inundation, on each side of the Dyke, to attack the rear, and cut off reinforcements from the small camp on the coast. This design succeeded. Fifty men who guarded a post on the side of Nieuport, were put to the sword, and the front of the village was instantly assaulted. The officers being absent from their duty, the garrison was completely surprised, and yielded at discretion, with a considerable sum of money, 1200 barrels of powder, and other ammunition.

At the moment, however, when the French commanders deemed their labours crowned by this successful enterprise, the fate of Lille was decided.

The besiegers had continued to extend themselves along the covert-way, and in spite of the gallant resistance made by the garrison, had perfected their lodgments, augmented their batteries, and by mines, and other warlike artifices, continued to ruin the defences of the place. On the 16th, they commenced the descent and passage of the principal ditch. The breaching batteries were now augmented, and no less than fifty-five pieces of heavy artillery, with thirty-six mortars and howitzers, were mounted in the lodgments on the covert-way and outworks. Amidst a carnage, which

seldom occurs even at a siege, the decisive moment approached. On the 21st, crowds of volunteers, carrying forward sand-bags and fascines, the enlargement of the trenches, the completion of the passage across the ditch, and a tremendous fire of artillery for twenty-four hours, alarmed the garrison with a prospect of an hourly assault. On the 22d of October, therefore, after sixty days' siege, Boufflers beat a parley at four in the afternoon. Hostages were immediately exchanged, and conferences held for the surrender. Eugene treated the garrison with the generosity which their brave defence so justly merited. He paid the most flattering compliments to the heroic governor, and even left him to regulate his own conditions. The gate de la Madelaine was yielded to the allies at mid-day on the 23d, and the remains of the garrison, amounting to 5000 men, retired into the citadel on the 25th. The sick and wounded were to be conveyed to Douay, and prisoners on both sides exchanged. The government of the place was confided to the prince of Holstein Beck, who had distinguished himself by his skill and judgment in the siege.

By the capitulation of Lille, and the attack which was preparing against the citadel, the leading object of the campaign was nearly attained. Marlborough therefore resumed his original plan of carrying the war into the heart of France, and earnestly pressed the treasurer to obtain a powerful augmentation of troops, for the accomplishment of a design, which he considered as the only means to obtain a speedy and honourable peace. He made this request a particular article in his instructions to Sir Richard Temple\*, who conveyed the news of the surrender, and repeatedly and strongly enforced it in his subsequent letters. He also imparted the resolution adopted by Eugene and himself, to keep the field, till they had effected the reduction of Ghent and Bruges, the possession of which was not only necessary for the completion of their conquests, but even for the safety of their quarters. He farther stated, that either he, or his illustrious colleague, must remain in Holland during the winter, as well for the purpose of forwarding the military preparations, and tranquillising the Dutch, as for guarding

\* Afterwards Lord Cobham.

against any sudden and desperate effort on the part of the enemy.

While the attack was preparing against the citadel of Lille, measures were adopted by the allied generals to obviate the difficulties in which they were placed, by drawing their supplies from the French frontier. At La Bassée they had stationed thirteen battalions and thirty squadrons, and at Lens another considerable corps. Under the protection of these posts, numerous parties were continually pushed into the neighbouring province of Artois, and secured the greater part of the crops, which had either not been removed, or had hitherto escaped their researches. On the other hand, a detachment was sent to the side of Dixmund, to draw supplies of corn and cattle from the district of Furnes.

Meanwhile they acted with their usual vigour and decision against the citadel. The attack was already arranged, and the French garrison had scarcely quitted the town, before the troops were employed in forming epaulements on the esplanade, and completing works to protect the opening of the trenches. At the same time, the extensive circumvallation was contracted, and a new line drawn from the Gate des Malades, to Haubourdin, from whence it was to be continued to the Lower Dyle.

On the 29th of October the trenches were opened, and the sap advanced to within forty paces of the exterior covert-way. The besieging force was augmented with nine battalions, and continued to push their approaches in spite of the inundations formed by the enemy. On the 8th they lodged themselves on the two salient angles of the covert-way, and though checked by several vigorous sallies, still continued their progress. On the night of the 16th, they seized a place of arms, and on the 19th were masters of two points of the second counterscarp. The interval between that day and the 22d was employed in enlarging their communications and strengthening their lodgments. The attack and defence were maintained with equal spirit, and the chiefs so lavishly exposed their persons, that Eugene had an aide-de-camp killed by his side, the prince of Bevern received a musket-shot in the head, and M. de Surville, one of the principal officers of the French garrison, was mortally wounded.

During this important crisis, Vendome and the duke of

Burgundy continued in the camp of Salsoy. Awed by the spirit and perseverance of their antagonists, they appear to have been confounded, and to have spent the time in discussing plans of operation. What was proposed by Vendome was generally thwarted by Berwick, or overruled by the prince; and the hour, which was to decide the fate of the place, found them still uncertain, whether to restrict their enterprises to a war of convoys, or to make a great and desperate effort for raising the siege. Appeals were again made to the court, and Chamillard reached the camp on the 2d of November, with injunctions to the chiefs to avoid a general engagement.

The letters of Marlborough, written at this period, will supply the necessary explanation on his views and circumstances.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Nov. 1. — Since my last I have had none from you; besides, I have instructed Sir Richard Temple so fully with all my thoughts, that I shall not for some time trouble you with long letters. We are carrying on our attack on the citadel, and hope by the middle of next month to be masters of it; for we do not think they will stay the last extremity. If they do, they must expect no capitulation. We have been blessed with extraordinary good weather, so that we have very few sick in the army, though we are now afraid the weather is changing; yet it will not be so troublesome to us as it must have been before we were masters of the town, for now the greatest part of the men, that attack the citadel, are quartered in the town, which is a very great ease."

"Rousselaer, Nov. 6. — Having a safe opportunity of sending this letter to Brussels, I shall write with more freedom than I have done for some time past. The greatest difficulty we now meet with, is the want of corn; so that we are more apprehensive of wanting bread, than of any thing the enemy can do. In order to see what corn we can get from the county of Artois, I sent yesterday Major-general Cadogan to La Bassée, where there are already two thousand horse, and ten battalions of foot. He has taken with him ten squadrons more.

"The French are expecting detachments both from the Rhine and Dauphiné, being resolved to make their utmost effort in this country. I hope we may take the citadel before they come, though we go on very slowly, being very careful of losing as few men as possible; for we cannot yet guess when this campaign may end, but as soon as we have the citadel, we shall then be more at liberty to act against the enemy; and I do assure you that our intentions are to do all that lies in our power to bring them to action. They give out, that as soon as the troops they expect join them, they will seek us. These resolutions seem more agreeable to the beginning of a campaign than the month of

November. If God blesses us with farther success before we go into winter-quarters, there is no doubt of having a good peace; but if all things remain as they now are, the only way of having a speedy and good peace is, to augment the troops, so as that we may enter France the next campaign with a good superiority; and that the fleet may be assisting to us, which, with the assistance of Almighty God, is what will, in all likelihood, bring this troublesome war to a happy end, which is, I believe, more wished for by your humble servant, than by any other body living."

"Nov. 16. — I know not whether it proceeds from the enemy, or that the letters are not come from England, but we have had none these last two days. Believing that this letter will go safe to Brussels, I shall venture to write more freely than by the post. We have been extremely uneasy for want of corn, not having in our stores for longer than this day, which obliged me to send Cadogan to La Bassée, where we got some, but not sufficient to make us subsist the remaining part of this month; so that Thursday last, I detached the earl of Stair, with ten squadrons of horse, and as many battalions of foot, for Dixmund, with orders to attack the fort the enemy has on the canal at that place. He succeeded so well, that he made a lieutenant-colonel and upwards of 200 men prisoners of war, by which we have secured a passage into that country, and I hope to draw subsistence sufficient for the army from thence. They have already sent a thousand oxen and cows, and great numbers of sheep to Lille, where provision was much wanted. Notwithstanding the arbitrary government with which they have been governed, they are no ways inclined for us; but on the contrary, give as little assistance as is possible, suffering their bills to be protested, though they have by them an advantage of 7 per cent. But I hope, when we have the citadel, every thing will mend, which we think will be by the end of this month. It might be sooner, but that we have great management both of our men and ammunition; besides, we employ also this time in repairing the breaches of the town. As we have had the visible protection of God Almighty on several occasions this campaign, we both hope and pray, that he will give us farther success, which we shall endeavour to seek, when we are masters of the citadel. Considering the losses we have had at this siege, and the frequent actions with the enemy, yet we are in as good a condition as can be expected at this time of year; we having very few sick, and both men and officers full of resolution.

"I beg of you to assure the queen, that I act with all my heart and soul, that this campaign may end very much for her glory and safety. The situation of the enemy, as well as ours, is such, that I think it impossible for either to take their winter-quarters before we have an action, which, if it can be brought to be a general one, will decide the fate of this war. I could wish it might come time enough for the opening of the parliament; but I fear it must be the month of December, before we shall be able to send you good news.

"Not knowing when I may have another opportunity of writing freely, I must again press you to take, what I believe to be the only way of bringing France to a speedy and good peace, which is, that you should

not only resolve in England upon an augmentation of troops, but lose no time in prevailing with the States-general to do the same; for their declaration would have a greater effect in France. I have, and shall continue to press them in Holland, which I hope may have its effect, their deputies here assuring me, that they are convinced there is no other way of bringing this war to a happy end. We could wish here, that the elector of Hanover and the duke of Savoy could have continued with their armies some time longer in the field, the French threatening us with the great number of troops they will bring into this country."

*From Lord Godolphin, in reply.*

"Nov. 12-23. — It is above a fortnight since we have any letters from you by the post. I had the favour of yours of the 6th by Brussels, of the 8th by Ostend, and this day it was no small pleasure to me to see the outside of yours of the 16th, by the way of Brussels; but the inside of it does not give me so much satisfaction. I am sorry it will be at least a week before you have the citadel, and after that to find you think of beginning a new campaign, when you have been in the field a month longer than ever was known. Can you hope the good weather will continue to the end of the year? I am sorry to find you think there must be yet more action. If that must be, I believe it will be, because you have a mind to disturb their winter-quarters, for I cannot think they will pretend to hinder yours. Lastly, I am sorry to find, that, be the event of these things as one could wish, we must not hope to see you here till Christmas, or very near it."

"In the mean time, till you do come, give me leave to assure you, no endeavour shall be wanting, nor pains omitted, on my part, to make every thing go on as you could wish it might do, at the opening of the Parliament. I have got it into the speech that an augmentation should be desired for Flanders, and I hope it will be granted.

"I have been a good while of opinion, that somebody should be sent on purpose from the queen to the States, to press them very earnestly to declare themselves upon that matter. I have written to know your thoughts upon this for a month together, but not having had any answer, I believe my letters have not yet come to your hands. Upon the whole, as things now stand, I believe nobody will be sent, till there be a return from the parliament to the speech, by the addresses of either house; and I hope this will be such as may very much contribute to the success of him that carries them over.

"I have had the honour to read your letter to the queen. She seemed to be much concerned that we were like to be so long without seeing you.

"I think you have but too much reason to repine at the coldness and indifference of the elector of Hanover and the duke of Savoy. For my part, I cannot help thinking there is most cause to complain of the latter. He has had most done for him, and had most in his power to do for us."

Marlborough was not however swayed by the more timid

policy of the treasurer. But sensible that the most effectual mode of suppressing and foiling the cabals at home, was by success abroad, he persisted in his purpose ; and we find his letters still filled with suggestions and proposals, for closing the actual campaign with glory, and opening the next with an equal prospect of success.

The French had observed the progress of the allies, in their attacks against the citadel, with greater tranquillity, because a plan was formed to divert them from their purpose, or make some amends for the loss of the place, by a more important capture. This design did not escape the vigilance of Marlborough, as we find by a letter to Lord Godolphin, from Helchin, without date, but evidently written at this crisis.

“ Yours of the 27th came so late, that I had not time by the last post to give you my thoughts, nor, indeed, have I as yet any time for other thoughts than what is now acting in this country, on the success of which, I think, depend the liberties of all Europe. The French are endeavouring to get all the troops that is possible together, and by the intelligence we have from M. de Vendome’s army, as well as the motions of the duke of Berwick, it looks as if their resolutions were to act in Brabant ; and though this army is very much weakened by the siege, I am resolved to venture every thing, rather than let them take Brussels, which, I believe, is their design, believing me too weak for the relief of it. I beg you to assure the queen, that I have that duty and love for her, that I shall have no reserve in venturing every thing that may be for her service, hoping that God will protect her just cause. If it pleases God to give us one success more this campaign, I hope that may bring such a peace as may give her security abroad for the rest of her life. I do, from my soul, wish there were a better prospect at home ; but by all the accounts I have, I see nothing but confusion, which is another argument for my engaging the enemy, if possible ; for they will otherwise reap the advantage of our division.”

At length this design was developed. While the French troops commanded the course of the Scheldt, the elector of Bavaria, who had been recently called from the Rhine, prepared to surprise or capture Brussels, where his efforts were likely to be seconded by numerous partisans, and where the allies had formed their principal magazines. He assembled 15,000 men at Mons, and marched from thence on the 22d of November. Arriving before Brussels, he summoned the place ; but M. Paschal, who had been appointed governor, with a garrison of 7000 men, rejected all proposals, and

made preparations for resistance. Trenches were accordingly opened by the elector on the night of the 24th, between the gates of Louvain and Namur, and pushed with such rapidity that the assailants speedily lodged themselves on the covert-way. In this imminent danger, the governor despatched courier after courier to Marlborough, and in the mean time awed the partisans of the elector by arresting the most disaffected, and by holding forth the prospect of instant succour, to deter those who were only waiting the event to declare for the enemy.

On receiving intelligence of the danger, Marlborough proceeded to execute his purpose of relieving the place, by forcing the enemy in their strong positions behind the Scheldt. This admirable enterprise, which was worthy the rest of so extraordinary a campaign, was concerted between the two great commanders, and carried into effect with equal energy, secrecy, and decision. The difficulty may be more readily conceived, when it is recollected that the front of the enemy was protected by a wide and deep river, which was bounded by precipitous banks, and that they had employed three months in fortifying their position. Their posts extended from Tournay to the vicinity of Ghent; but their principal force was collected above, below, and opposite Oudenard, which being considered as the only practicable passage for the allies, they spared no labour in preparing entrenchments, to withstand the most formidable attack.

It would have been almost impossible to force an enemy so fully prepared, without the loss of half the army; and, therefore, to lull his antagonists into security, Marlborough, as on other occasions, affected to pursue a design foreign to his real purpose. Reports were spread that the allied troops were to be distributed into cantonments, till the siege of the citadel was finished; and that an attempt would then be made to effect a passage over the canal of Bruges, in the vicinity of Ghent. To give colour to these rumours, orders were issued for the conveyance of forage to Menin and Courtray; the field artillery was sent to Menin, and the proper officers employed to select quarters at Courtray for the commander-in-chief and his staff, and cantonments in the vicinity for the troops. So completely were appearances preserved, that the troops themselves were deceived; and both officers and men

hourly expected the notice of a temporary repose from their labours.

After these preparatory measures, which were calculated at once to conceal and forward the real design, Marlborough broke up his camp on the 25th, and moved to Harlebeck, near Courtray. Here dispositions were made for forcing the passage of the Scheldt on three points. In the morning of the 26th, a detachment of 16 battalions and 40 squadrons, under Count Lottum, with a sufficient number of pontoons and artillery, were ordered to take the route of Gavre, to throw two bridges over the river, and, if they encountered no opposition, to march towards Eename. About the same time, Cadogan, with ten battalions and the train of artillery, was sent forward to effect a similar passage near Kirkhoff. At seven in the evening, Marlborough began his march, in the same direction, with the rest of the main body, amounting to 30 battalions and 50 squadrons.

A reinforcement of five battalions and as many squadrons was also sent to the governor of Oudenard, who was enjoined to post them in the covert-way during the night, and, at the first discharge of artillery on the other points, to sally forth against the enemy who were stationed opposite the town. Collaterally with these dispositions, Eugene had left with the prince of Wirtemberg a sufficient force to restrain the besieged in the citadel, and at the head of 20 battalions and 50 squadrons, directed his march through Roubaix, to force the passage from Hauterive to Escanaffe. It was settled between the different commanders, that if they respectively effected their purpose, they should so order their movements as to unite on the heights above Oudenard; or, if they encountered unexpected opposition, that they should turn to the place where the attempt was first successful.

The different columns reached their assigned points during the night and early next morning, expecting, as an eye-witness observes, "to engage in the bloodiest day they had ever yet experienced;" but such was the effect of the feints and false reports previously circulated, that they found the enemy totally unprepared, and unconscious of danger. A thick fog, rising from the river, contributed to conceal their operations to the last moment. Before the dawn, Count Lottum laid his bridges near Gavre, without opposition, and advanced

against the hostile corps which was posted in that quarter. Soon afterwards the detachment of Cadogan effected the passage at Kirkhoff, with the same good fortune, and the ten battalions were immediately posted in the meadows on the farther bank. A few squadrons of the enemy's horse catching the alarm, rode down as if to charge, but discovering the firm countenance and prompt disposition of the confederates, wheeled about and withdrew. Arrangements were then made for attacking the village of Berchem, where the hedges were lined with hostile infantry; but no sooner was the signal given for advancing, than the enemy made a hasty retreat.

At this moment the main body, led by Marlborough himself, drew near, and General Fagel and the prince of Hesse first passed the bridges at Kirkhoff, with the second line of infantry and part of the horse, and were rapidly followed by the remainder, who were impelled by the presence and exertions of the commander-in-chief. A pursuit instantly commenced after the hindmost squadrons of the enemy, who were overtaken and charged in a defile, but effected their escape to Tournay, with a trifling loss in men, and the greater part of their baggage. Eugene, in the interim, had reached Hauterive; but hearing that the passage was already effected at Kirkhoff, he directed his march thither, and crossed over the bridges laid by Cadogan.

The troops having thus overcome the principal difficulty, moved towards the heights of Oudenard, where the chief force of the enemy was collected. Instead, however, of aiding the general dispositions by a sudden sally, the governor of that fortress retained his troops quietly within the works, alleging, in excuse, a counter-order from the Dutch deputies. Thus the enemy were enabled to withdraw towards Grammont, with the loss of about twelve hundred men, who were taken or killed by the foremost of the allied squadrons. The pursuit being suspended, the different corps of the army united, and encamped towards evening on the high grounds overlooking the Scheldt.\*

\* The account of this operation is principally taken from a letter of Captain Molesworth to his brother: he was an aide-de-camp of Marlborough, and accompanied Cadogan's detachment; from the Correspondence; Burnet; Lediard; Dumont; Vie du Prince Eugene; and the articles in the Gazette.

This signal success, which was effected with so trifling a loss, was immediately announced to Godolphin, from Oudenard, where the general took up his quarters the night after the passage.

" *Oudenard, Nov. 28.* — The disagreeableness of the French having it in their power to see all our letters, has made me for some time not very regular in writing. But from henceforward I shall write very punctually, for yesterday morning we forced the Scheldt, and beat the troops that were posted about this town. Prince Eugene is gone back this morning for Lille, and I am marching for the relief of Brussels, which, if it be not taken by to-morrow night, I do not doubt, with the blessing of God, the saving of it. After which, there is necessity of my getting more powder to Lille, by which you may see that our campaign is not at an end, though my next letter must be dated in December, which is very unusual in this country.

" My Lord Haversham may be angry, but Prince Eugene and myself shall have that inward satisfaction of knowing that we have struggled with more difficulties, and have been blessed with more success, than ever was known before in one campaign. If at last it shall bring a safe and honourable peace to the queen, I shall esteem myself happy. When you see a proper time, you will assure her of my concern for the death of the prince. I have four of your letters to thank you for, but I am in such a hurry, with the many orders I am obliged to give, for this march to Brussels, that I have not time: but I cannot end this without telling you that I very much approve of Mr. Webb's being gratified with a government, but I do not think it for her majesty's service to give a promise before the vacancy happens, especially since he shall be made a lieutenant-general this winter. I have for some days been so tormented with a sore throat, that if the time could permit it, my chamber were the properest place for me."

After the passage of the Scheldt, Eugene returned to prosecute the siege of the citadel, and Marlborough, having stationed the main body of his troops at Omberg, proceeded with a strong detachment to Alost. Here he left part of his escort and departed for Brussels, where he arrived on the 29th, a little before noon, as well to testify his satisfaction with the governor and garrison for their brave defence, as to take measures for continuing the supplies to the army at Lille. He was received with demonstrations of joy and gratitude, being met without the gates by the gallant governor and the officers of the garrison. After commending their courage and conduct, he repaired to the governor's house, where he was complimented by the council of state, the magistrates of the town, and the deputies of the States,

who gratefully attributed their deliverance to his rapid and skilful march. He was accompanied on this occasion by the dethroned king Augustus, who had personally engaged in all the operations before Lille. From Brussels he again wrote to Godolphin.

"Nov. 29. — I gave you an account, in mine of yesterday, of our having forced the passage of the Scheldt. At my arrival last night at Alost, I had an account of the precipitate retreat of the elector of Bavaria. He began to draw off from the siege two hours after he had knowledge of my passage, fearing I might have fallen upon him, if he had stayed for the carrying of his cannon and wounded men, the leaving of which is most scandalous; and consequently must be a great mortification to the elector. Lord Hertford having a mind to return for England, I send these letters by him, so that there needs be no present; but the opportunity being safe, I shall venture to tell you, that the forcing of the Scheldt was not only necessary for the saving of Brabant, but also for the sending more ammunition to Lille. So that as soon as I have given the necessary orders in this town, I shall return this evening to the army, to take such measures as may secure the passage of one thousand barrels of powder from Ath to Lille.

"I cannot prove what I am going to say, but I really believe we have been, from the very beginning of that siege, betrayed; for great part of our stores have been embezzled. \* \* \* \* God is most certainly with us, or it would have been impossible to overcome the many difficulties we have met with.

"You are so pressing in your letters for my return, that I must tell you the truth, and beg you will not think it vanity, that if I should leave the army, it would not be in any body's power to keep them in the field; so that you see the necessity. The truth is, that I am very ill in my health, so that if we should have very ill weather, it may kill me. But I must venture every thing, rather than quit, before we have perfected this campaign. My heart is in England, and nobody has greater desire for the enjoying quietness there than myself; but should I take ease at this time, I should hurt the queen and my country more than my whole life could repair."

After partaking of a splendid entertainment given by the governor, Marlborough returned the same evening to Alost, where he received the glad tidings that the besiegers had effected a lodgment on the second counterscarp of the citadel. From his correspondence, we find that in the midst of these extraordinary exertions he was labouring under one of those feverish attacks to which he was constitutionally subject. His tender solicitude on this occasion to spare the feelings of the duchess, is no less conspicuous than that energy of

character which sustained him under bodily exertion, suffering, and debility.

*To the Duchess.*

"Dec. 3. — As my greatest happiness is in your tenderness, and that I do flatter myself with your having a tender concern for me, I have endeavoured all I could, not to let the army know the ill condition of my health for these three last weeks, fearing some officers might write it to England, by which you might be made uneasy. But I thank God I am now much better, and if I could have two or three days' quiet, I do not doubt but it would set me right, for my greatest uneasiness is a constant drought."

"Dec. 6. — I have received your dear letter of the 19th, by which I see the kind concern you had at that time for me, which I shall ever, by my kindness, endeavour to deserve. You will have known by Lord Hertford, by this time, the success God has been pleased to bless us with: considering the pains they had taken, by fortifying every place of the river, where they thought we could pass, I think it next to a miracle our surprising them as we did. Our passage has had all the happy effects we could propose, which has encouraged me to take measures for the siege of Ghent, though the season is so far advanced, that I tremble every day for fear of ill weather. If we take Ghent, I think we shall have a certainty of a good peace, which is every day more and more wished for by me."

From Alost, Marlborough again moved on the 1st of December, and encamped between Belleghem and Oudenard. General Dedem with 20 battalions here passed the Scheldt and posted himself beyond, while General Hompesch remained on the side of Menin with a corps of 38 squadrons and eight battalions. The communications with Eugene were thus secured on every point, and avenues again opened for the passage of supplies.

During this interval, the approaches had been continued against the citadel, and the batteries were already preparing. The first care of Eugene, on returning to the spot, was to apprise Boufflers of the passage of the Scheldt, and offer him the most honourable conditions. But the marshal was too sensible of the importance of retarding the allies to accept the overture. The siege was accordingly prosecuted with new vigour. On the 1st of December the salient angles of the second covert-way were carried; and before the 6th, the necessary lodgments and communications were made for raising breaching batteries on the counterscarp.

## CHAP. LXXIV.—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.—1708.

WHILE the British commander was anxiously expecting the surrender of the citadel, his active mind was employed in forming plans for the recovery of Bruges and Ghent. He was still also devising means for the farther prosecution of the war, and earnestly solicited his friends, both in England and Holland, to obtain such an augmentation of force as would enable him to open the ensuing campaign at an early period, and with a decided superiority. Writing to Lord Godolphin, who had complained of the protraction of the campaign, under date of Dec. 3., he says :—

“ I agree with you that this campaign is already much longer than has been usual in this country ; but you will remember that I have formerly told you, we must end this campaign with the re-taking of Ghent, if possible. The length of the siege of Lille puts us to great difficulties ; for from henceforward, if we continue the army together, we must subsist them with dry forage, which is very difficult and expensive. This expense must be made by England and Holland ; for even with that, we shall find it very difficult to persuade the foreign troops that it is reasonable, at this time of the year, to be from their winter-quarters. But I think the taking of Ghent and Bruges, with the augmentation which I hope will be made by England and Holland, will procure an honourable and safe peace. I have proposed this expense to Holland by the last letters ; and if they agree to it, I hope her majesty will approve of it.

“ I acquainted you in a former letter that I had ordered Lieut.-general Erle to send five battalions to Antwerp, upon the first notice I had of the attempt on Brussels. I have now ordered him to leave at Ostend a brigadier with the six battalions, and himself and the rest of the general officers to return for England. I have also directed him to take as many officers as is possible of those six regiments with him for England, so as to recruit them, if possible, they being extremely weak.

“ For the troops of augmentation, there must be early care taken with the king of Prussia and others, to let them see that there must be no advance money given ; but that we shall be willing to pay such troops as are not already in the service. If there be not great care taken in this matter, my Lord Raby, by his flattery to the king of Prussia and that court, will spoil all. The 50,000 odd crowns was last year promised so solemnly, that they must be paid as soon as he has signed the treaty for this year ; but I think it should stay for that. You know also, that the queen is engaged in honour to pay this winter the 200,000 crowns to the

landgrave of Hesse. I know all these things must give you great trouble, but for God's sake let the queen's promises be kept sacred; for that will for ever establish her reputation, which is now very great.

"I cannot end this letter without assuring you that I know the difficulties of Holland to be so great, that I hope every honest man in England will be contented with their furnishing only one-third in the augmentation; for it is most certain that they now subsist only by credit, and that the ill-affected in that country have no hopes left but that England will insist upon their giving one half.

"I have been troubled some time with the Count Guiscard, which has given me the opportunity of being sure that his head is turned to impracticable projects; he has desired me to send you the enclosed paper, and at the same time tells me he has no money. You must let me know what I am to say to him. If you can make any use of him, he is better any where than in England.\*

"I have this minute received a letter from Prince Eugene, writ last night, that he hopes by Thursday to have all his batteries ready, and then he will summon the marshal, and at the same time let him know that he may send an officer to see our cannon and ammunition. After which, if he obliges us to make the breach, he must expect no other capitulation but that of being prisoners of war. The 1000 barrels of powder I send to Lille are this morning come out of Ath, and will be with the prince on Wednesday night; so that on Thursday or Friday I hope the French will be obliged to see or hear them. I think the last will be the better, for though there are not above 4000 men in the citadel, they consist of two regiments of horse, two of dragoons, and twenty-two of foot, so that there will be a great number of officers, and consequently an impossibility of raising the regiments for the next campaign. If we can be so happy to get every thing necessary for the attack of Ghent, I think to direct it, and the prince to cover the siege with the troops that shall march with him from Lille.

"God has blessed us for a long time with good weather, so that it would be ungrateful to complain; but this day we have rain with a southerly wind, which makes us fear we must expect much more."

"Dec. 6. — Since my last I have received yours of the 19th, by which

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\* In reply to his remarks on Guiscard, Godolphin observes: —

"Dec. 2. — I agree entirely in your character of him, and that he is better any where than here, as also that he wants money to carry him any where, though he had 500*l*. when he went from hence, to carry him first to you, and afterwards, by your approbation, to the duke of Savoy, and to concert with him how he might be of most use to his operations next year, either by his intelligences in Dauphiné, or in the Cevennes, to both which he pretends. I can propose nothing better for him than to follow his first intentions; and if, in order to it, you will direct Mr. Cardonel to help him with his credit at Amsterdam or Brussels, with any sum not exceeding 400*l*. or 500*l*., I will see it repaid; and he must give Mr. Cardonel an account of his proceedings from time to time."

I see the letters from Holland had given you fears for Brussels and Antwerp. There was but too much reason for fears, for had not God favoured our passage of the Scheldt, they must have been in danger; for not only the towns, but the people of this country hate the Dutch. Our passage of the Scheldt has so disordered M. de Vendome's projects that I hope in God we shall succeed in this undertaking of Ghent, which is of the last consequence, not only for the finishing of this campaign, but also for the operations of the next. As it is impossible for me to stay her majesty's orders, without hurting the service very much, I have taken upon me, hoping the queen will approve it, to send this day Major-general Cadogan to Brussels, in conjunction with the deputies of the States, to contract for the dry forage that must be delivered to the army during the siege of Ghent, the States having resolved to give it to those troops they pay. This arrangement is absolutely necessary, so that I must beg you to lay it favourably before the queen and the lords of the cabinet; for should I have stayed for orders, we might have lost the opportunity of making the siege, for both our horse and foot already suffer very much by the cold weather we now have.

"As we are assured by our letters from all parts that the French draw all the troops in their power into this country, we have resolved to keep as many of the German troops as we can persuade to stay; so that I should wish you had sent, as I desired formerly, the two Scottish regiments of foot; and, if it be possible, I could wish they might be yet sent to Antwerp; for God knows when this campaign may end, and we have many of our regiments very weak; yet I think we must have Ghent and Bruges, let it cost what it will. Our men are very hearty, and desirous of taking those two towns; so that I hope they will suffer a great deal before they grumble. This country is not used to see an army so late in the field; but they all suffer patiently, believing it is what will forward the peace."

In a letter to the duchess, dated December 10., he says:—

"I am now struggling with my own health and the season, that, if it be possible to finish the campaign with the taking of Ghent and Bruges, and, if God blesses us with success, I think we may, without vanity, say, that France will, with terror, remember this campaign for a long time, there never having been any in which there has been such a variety of action."

Both Marlborough and Eugene were particularly anxious to reduce Boufflers to an unconditional surrender; but the advance of the season, and the state of the fortress, induced them to relinquish this object, for the sake of ulterior advantages. The besieged having beat a parley on the 8th of December, at seven in the evening, were admitted to a capitulation on the 9th, and the same day, marching out with all the honours of war, were escorted to Douay. On this occasion, the confederate chiefs vied in the testimonies of their

respect to the gallant defender of the place, who obtained not only the merited rewards of his own sovereign, but the admiration of his conquerors. Thus ended a siege which may be justly regarded as one of the most arduous and difficult, as well as one of the longest and most sanguinary, in modern warfare. The loss of the garrison amounted to 8000 men, and that of the besiegers, in killed, wounded, and sick, or incapable, to no less than 14,000.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Dec. 10. — I am very glad to tell you, that Prince Eugene sent Colonel Cronstrom to me yesterday, to let me know that he was to have possession of one of the gates of the citadel that day. I have taken measures with him for their sending 20 battalions and 30 squadrons to join me, with all expedition, so that I might give as little time as possible to those in Ghent to strengthen themselves, which they now do, by working day and night. You will see by the enclosed letter, which we have intercepted, the number of troops the enemy have for the defence of Ghent and Bruges, which are so numerous, that I am afraid they will be able to give us more trouble than were to be wished at this season; but the consequences of taking these places are so great, that we must venture every thing for the being masters of them. I never, in my life, felt colder weather than we have had for these last three days, so that our men and horses must suffer. I shall march to-morrow, so that my next march will be for investing the town, which will be as soon as I shall be able to have the cannon at Dendermond. I hope my next will acquaint you with the day. If God bless us with the taking of this place, and a good augmentation be made, I think a good peace must follow before the middle of next summer."

The French monarch was discouraged by the failure of all his projects for the relief of the citadel of Lille. Calculating that the surrender of that fortress would close the campaign, and that the allied commanders would not expose an army, reduced by past exertions, to new hardships at the commencement of winter, he ordered his generals to strengthen the garrisons of Ghent and Bruges, and distribute their troops into quarters, in opposition to the remonstrances of Vendome, who was anxious to retrieve the disgrace which he had encountered in the course of the campaign.\* When, however, the movements of the confederates indicated the prosecution of farther operations, Count de la Motte, who was charged with the defence of Ghent, was enjoined to maintain his post

\* *Memoires de Berwick*, t. ii. p. 55.

to the last extremity, and earnestly exhorted to imitate the gallant example of Boufflers.

Measures were, however, already adopted by the two chiefs, to abridge the time, and lessen the means of resistance. On the 11th of December, Marlborough quitted Berleghem, and encamped with the right at Melle, and the left at Merlebeck; and gave orders for laying bridges over the Upper and Lower Scheldt, as well as over the Lys, for maintaining his communications. On the 16th, Eugene passed the Scheldt, and halting his army at Eename, proceeded to Melle, where he held a conference with his colleague. The requisite arrangements being settled by a council of war, it was decided that Marlborough should direct the siege, and Eugene head the covering army. In pursuance of this resolution, a detachment was sent, on the 17th, from each army, one to take post at Gamarage, and observe the motions of the enemy beyond the Dender, the other to Osterzelle, to straiten Ghent, between the Upper and Lower Scheldt. The ensuing day, the troops of Marlborough making a general movement in four columns, invested the place on all sides: Count Lottum between the Upper Scheldt and the Lys; the prince of Hesse between the Lys and the canal of Sas; the duke of Wirtemberg between the canal of Sas and the Lower Scheldt; and Count Tilly, to the south, between the Upper and Lower Scheldt. Marlborough himself took up his quarters at Merlebeck, as the most convenient point to superintend the attack.

On the 24th the trenches were opened by Count Lottum, and no other resistance being encountered, except a single sally, the batteries were speedily in a condition to bombard the town. On the 30th, therefore, Count de la Motte sent out a trumpet, to demand an honourable capitulation, which Marlborough granted, from an anxiety to spare his troops, as the frost had already commenced. The incidents of this enterprise will sufficiently appear in the correspondence.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Dec. 13.* — The wind having been for some time in the east, we have had no letters from England. Till this frost breaks, we can neither break ground for our batteries, nor open our trenches; and which is yet worse, if this weather continues, all the canals will be frozen, so that we shall not be able to get forage from Holland, which is the only place that can

furnish us. But my reliance is, that God, who has protected and blessed us hitherto, will enable us to finish it with the taking this town, which you will be sensible of the use it will be to us, when you read the enclosed letter. We begin to give dry forage to-morrow : we have contracted for as much as will serve us for three weeks, but after that time, the towns of this country, as well as the army, will, I am afraid, find no forage but what must be brought from Holland."

"Dec. 17. — I am to return you my thanks for yours of the 23d and 26th, and I do, with all my heart, rejoice at what you write, that you believe every thing will go well in parliament. I pray God we may succeed in this necessary undertaking. The enemy knowing the consequence of our having Ghent, have left 30 battalions and 19 squadrons for the defence of it, which in other countries would be thought a good army. Their numerous garrison, and the season of the year, have made them flatter themselves hitherto. But now they begin to see our ammunition boats, so that I had this evening a deputation from the town, to desire that their houses might not be burnt. You will see my answer in the paper which goes to the secretary's office, it being too long to trouble you with in this letter. To-morrow the town will be invested on all sides. After which, we must for some time have patience, till we get our cannon. By the next post I intend to let Mr. Walpole know what number of men we shall want for the twenty English battalions of this army. Those with Mr. Erle are in a much worse condition. He must let you know the numbers. Those in Spain and Portugal should also be taken care of."

"Dec. 20. — I hope by this time the House of Commons are come to a resolution for an augmentation, so that there may be time for the getting of the men. Besides the advantage it will be, that our friends as well as enemies may see that the war next year is to be carried on with vigour. I am earnest in this, because I think it will make an end of the war.

"The thaw continuing, the enemy now make use of the advantage of their sluices on the Scheldt and Lys, by overflowing all they can ; so that we are forced to make new ways for carrying of our cannon, which I hope we shall begin to do in three days, all diligence being used for the landing of them."

"Dec. 24. — The enclosed is a copy of a letter writ by M. Chamillard to the Count de la Motte.\* It should not be seen by many, for fear the French should hear of my having a copy. You will see by it that he is not to manage his garrison, which, by a certain account we have from the town, consists of 34 battalions and 19 squadrons. However, I have no doubt of God's blessing us with success, though it may last something longer than we first proposed to ourselves. At this time we have very fair weather, which we make use of for hutting and covering ourselves, so that we may resist ill weather if we must have it ; for the soldiers as well as officers are convinced of the necessity of having this town. Prince Eugene is returned from Brussels, and is desirous to be going for Vienna, where he says his presence is necessary for putting the troops in a con-

dition for the next campaign; but as he is also desirous of my going to the Hague with him for two or three days, he must stay till this siege is over, or not go to the Hague. What you say as to the prohibition of letters is certainly very right, but the States will never consent to it. We shall open the trenches before the town this night, and before the castle to-morrow."

"Dec. 27. — I have received the favour of yours of the 7th. Our frost left us about the same time yours did, and ever since we have had very fine weather, except yesterday and the day before, in which two days we had so great a fog that we could not see ten yards before us; so that we could not see, till yesterday in the evening, where to place our batteries. We are now working so diligently, that I hope our cannon will fire on Sunday morning at farthest. In one of the sallies the French made yesterday they carried into the town Brigadier Evans and Colonel Groves, the latter dangerously wounded. They were so soon beaten back that we did not lose above thirty men, which were all of Lord North's regiment.

"You will see by the letter I have received from the States, which I have sent to Mr. Secretary Boyle, that they are desirous I should stay here till the beginning of the winter, in hopes the emperor will consent to send Prince Eugene in the beginning of March. I have told the prince that, provided the queen allows of it, I will take care of the months of January and February, and that he must take care of March and April, which he is willing to do. I am sure all the troops cannot be in their quarters till the beginning of February, so that this will not keep me above three weeks longer abroad than naturally I must have been. But if the queen will have it otherwise, I will not stay one day, which I desire you will assure her.

"This fog, and my feet being wet every day in the trenches, has given me so great a cold and sore throat, that it is very uneasy to me to hold down my head, so that you will excuse my not answering yours till next post."

The surrender of Ghent produced an interesting spectacle. On the 2d of January, the garrison evacuated the place with the usual honours of war, and were received, as they filed off, by Marlborough and Eugene, surrounded by their officers and soldiers. The march began early in the morning, headed by the commander and his suite; and the cavalcade was so numerous that the procession was not concluded till seven in the evening. After attending this ceremony, Marlborough supped with his colleague, enjoying the happy termination of their fatigues, and in the evening visited the town *incognito*. On the following morning he examined the fortifications and trenches, and on his return was met at the gate of St. Leven by the magistrates, who, according to custom, presented him with the keys of the town in a gilt ewer.

Returning the keys with a gracious compliment, he was conducted through lines of burghers, under arms, to the town-house, where he partook of a splendid entertainment. In the evening, the tower of the town-house was illuminated; and, as if to make amends for their former defection, all ranks testified, by loud acclamations, their joy on returning to their obedience under the Austrian sovereign.

The satisfaction which Marlborough felt on this occasion was augmented by new success. The magistrates of Bruges arrived on the 2d, to announce the evacuation of their town by the enemy, and to offer their submission. At the same time, intelligence was received, that on the capitulation of Ghent, the garrisons of Plassendael and Leffinghen had followed the example of Bruges, and retired into the French territory. Thus the enemy abandoned all the conquests which they had made during the course of the campaign.

The two generals having arranged the plan of winter-quarters, and left the command to Count Tilly, proceeded through Brussels to the Hague, where they arrived in the beginning of January.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Dec. 31. — I sent yesterday an express by Ostend, to acquaint her majesty that the troops of Ghent were to march out on Wednesday, if not relieved before. This place will secure the conquest of Lille, and give us great advantages for the next campaign. The Dutch, thinking it for the service, as really it is, to keep the emperor's troops in this country, have assured the prince of Savoy that they will be willing to give their part for enabling them to subsist. I beg her majesty will approve of my assuring, that whatever the Dutch will allow, England may do the same; for should these troops return for Germany, we should not have them till the month of July, at soonest. I have this morning sent a trumpet with letters to the governor and town of Bruges, offering them the same capitulation as given to Ghent; but if they give me the trouble of marching with the army, they must not expect it. I am afraid that I shall have the return of a civil answer, and the trouble of marching, which I shall give you an account of by my next. . \* \* \*

"The prince of Savoy bids me assure you, that every thing possible will be done to finish the dispute with the pope."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Ghent, Jan. 3. 1708-9. — I was yesterday from ten in the morning till six at night, seeing the garrison of Ghent and all that belonged to them march by me. It is astonishing to see so great numbers of good men, to look on, and suffer a place of this consequence to be taken, at

this season, with so little a loss. As soon as they knew I had possession of the gate of this town, they took the resolution of abandoning Bruges. This campaign is now ended to my own heart's desire; and as the hand of the Almighty is visible in this whole matter, I hope her majesty will think it due to him to return public thanks; and, at the same time, to implore his blessing on the next campaign. I cannot express enough to you the importance of these two towns, for without them we could neither be quiet in our winter-quarters, nor open with advantage the next campaign.

"I shall to-morrow give the necessary orders for separating the army, so that in two days they will be all on their march for their winter-quarters. I must go with Prince Eugene for some few days to the Hague, after which I shall take a little care of my health.

"I desire you will give my humble duty to her majesty, and assure her that I do, with all my heart, pray that the Almighty God may bless her arms the next campaign, as visibly as he has been pleased to do in this."

Thus terminated this extraordinary campaign, perhaps one of the most scientific occurring in the annals of military history. From the commencement to the close, the confederates had to struggle against a force *superior in numbers*; to attack an army posted in a position considered as impregnable; to besiege a place of the first magnitude, at the very moment when they were themselves in a manner invested; to open and maintain their communications in spite of innumerable obstacles, both of nature and art; finally, to reduce, in the depth of winter, two fortresses defended by garrisons, which, in other circumstances, would have been considered as forming an army of no common magnitude. Nor can we omit paying a due tribute of approbation to the merits of Vendome, whose firmness, perseverance, and spirit, rendered him a rival worthy of his great antagonists; whose skill and resources, though thwarted by his prince and colleagues, alone saved the French monarchy from that degradation which seemed the natural and inevitable consequence of the defeat at Oudenard.

The stupendous events in the Netherlands having diverted our attention from objects of less importance, we shall now take a brief retrospect of the military operations in other quarters.

Spain, the principal object of the war, first claims our notice. By repeated and urgent remonstrances, Marlborough had at length induced the emperor to send to the support

of his brother 7300 men, who, in the commencement of the year, landed at Barcelona. But notwithstanding this succour, the disastrous events of the battle of Almanza were still deeply felt. The army in Catalonia was weak and discouraged, without money, magazines, or clothes, and instead of offensive operations, was scarcely competent to defend the frontier. The same jealousies and disputes still reigned, and Lord Galway unwillingly resumed his irksome post; but his presence produced a continual cause of irritation in the mind of the king and ministers. The death of Count Noyelles, commander of the Austrian forces, which happened in April, increased, instead of diminishing the existing difficulties; for the influence which he possessed over the mind of the king, though often injuriously exerted, had yet preserved some consistency in the military operations. Particular jealousy was also shown of the Portuguese troops, who were considered as an incumbrance to the country, without contributing to the defence. The most pressing instances were accordingly made for the departure of Count Staremberg and the Austrian troops, who were yet to be detached from Italy; and the command held by Noyelles was transferred to Count Uhlfeld, an officer without military talents, and whose chief merit was a conciliating and docile temper.

To remove one of the many sources of contention which had so long existed, a British squadron was sent to convey the Portuguese troops to their native country, and they were accompanied by Galway, who eagerly seized the first opportunity to withdraw from his obnoxious post. At Lisbon they were strengthened by supplies and recruits from England, and sent to the frontier to divert the attention of the enemy. But the same jealousies which had been manifested against Galway in Spain, were displayed in the Portuguese court; and after a long contention, he was excluded from the supreme command. Even his colleague, Das Minas, was discarded, as a general of too enterprising a character, and the direction of the army was consigned to the marquis of Fronteira, who was not likely to overpass the limited views and orders of his court. Galway, who still remained at the head of the British troops, was invested with the character of ambassador; but all the interest of his

own government could not secure to him any predominant influence in the direction of military affairs.

At length Staremberg arrived at Barcelona, and the command of the British and Dutch troops in Spain was transferred to General Stanhope and Count Belcastel, who were both invested with the character of ambassador from their respective governments. The troops were drawn from their quarters, and camps were formed on the road to Cervera and Lerida. But they were too weak and ill-provided to undertake any movement of importance; and, at the latter end of June, the Bourbon chiefs invested, without obstruction, the important fortress of Tortosa. Although this place was the key of Catalonia on the side of Valencia, the fortifications had been left in an imperfect and dilapidated state, and the garrison, consisting of palatines, were disaffected, and little disposed to make a vigorous resistance.

Sir John Leak having reached Barcelona with the fleet which had conveyed the succours to Lisbon, a council of war was held by the military and naval chiefs; but their deliberations merely served to exhibit their perilous situation. The only hope of relieving Tortosa rested on the speedy arrival of further Austrian reinforcements, which had been so long promised, and so long delayed, and the admiral proceeded to Italy to transport them to the scene of action. He was at the same time commissioned to convey the Princess Elizabeth Christina of Brunswick Blackenburg, who was destined to share the tottering throne of the Austrian prince. He returned with 8000 men; but the time which had been wasted in delays and deliberations, rendered this succour of no other avail, than to avert the fate of Catalonia; for the governor of Tortosa had surrendered the place after a faint defence of a month, and part only of the garrison joined the confederate troops, who were now assembled in the camp of Constantine, the rest having deserted to the Bourbon standard. Staremberg took post at Cervera, and prevented a design which had been formed by the Bourbon commanders, to unite the two armies in Roussillon and Aragon; but in accomplishing this object, he was obliged to sacrifice Denia, which was reduced by the Chevalier d'Asfeld in November, and to witness the investment of Alicante, the only remnant of the Austrian conquests in Valencia. These losses were

in some degree compensated by the reduction of Minorca and Sardinia. The first was accomplished by the incredible exertions and consummate skill of General Stanhope; the latter effected by the count of Cifuentes, recently created marquis of Almonzel, who sailed with a small force and obtained possession of Sardinia, with the assistance of the natives.

In the course of this campaign a singular incident demands our attention. The capital of Spain had been agitated by the same feuds and jealousies as the rival court of Barcelona. Philip was governed by his young and spirited queen, and she in her turn swayed by the celebrated Princess Orsini, who had been selected to direct the inexperience of both.\* This aspiring woman was involved in perpetual contentions with the duke of Orleans, who commanded the army, as well as with the Castilian nobles; and numerous intrigues and counter-plots existed, not only between the two Bourbon courts, but between the courtiers of both nations.

The partial successes of the campaign on the side of Catalonia, could not counterbalance the embarrassment arising from these contentions; and Louis, like the allies, found the peninsula a constant drain for those resources which his misfortunes in the Netherlands rendered necessary in other quarters. Deeming the cause of his grandson hopeless, he suggested, or connived at a design, formed by the duke of Orleans, to succeed Philip in the throne of Spain, or at least to secure a part of the peninsula, by a private accommodation with the allies. Towards the close of the campaign, the duke availed himself of a former intimacy between his dependent, Dubois, and General Stanhope, to offer his assistance in reducing Spain, provided the allies would accede to a partition of the country, and allow him to retain Navarre and some of the northern districts with the title of king. The communications being transmitted to the British government, it was deemed a favourable opportunity to hasten the humiliation of Louis; and the general was authorised, by instructions from the secretary of state, to offer the French prince, with the assent of Charles, which was previously obtained, the possession of Navarre, and the assistance of the allies in annexing to that territory Languedoc,

\* *Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain, chap. xv.*

with such of the southern provinces of France as their united forces could subdue. Not only Stanhope, but the British cabinet appear to have been captivated by the disclosure of this plausible scheme, and great hopes were entertained of drawing considerable advantage from the defection of the duke of Orleans, who was beloved by his army. But Marlborough viewed the negotiation with less sanguine eyes, and considered the attempt as made by the connivance of Louis, to create dissensions with the courts of Barcelona and Vienna. He observes, in a letter to Godolphin, dated Jan. 23., —

“ I send over by this opportunity an officer that is sent express from Mr. Stanhope. His letter to Lord Sunderland will inform you as to what has passed with the duke of Orleans. He desires my opinion, which I am fearful of giving in a matter of this consequence. But I really believe the duke of Orleans would not act this part, but that he has the king of France's permission.”

*To General Stanhope.*

“ Jan. 26. — I read and forwarded your letter to the earl of Sunderland, and do entirely agree with your sentiments in that matter. I am persuaded the duke of Orleans could never venture so far without direction from court, the rather, for that by what I have heard from other parts, the king of France begins to despair of being able to keep his grandson on the throne. However, it is a matter of such consequence, that I dare give no opinion of my own in it; but I hope you will soon be instructed from England how far you may proceed.”

The event justified his sagacity; for the design being either purposely or accidentally disclosed to the court of Madrid, the clandestine intercourse was suspended, and Louis himself interfered to soothe the resentment which Philip conceived at what he considered as an insidious attempt to deprive him of his crown.\*

In Italy the event of the campaign was far from corresponding with the heavy charges incurred by the allies, and the expectations conceived from the prowess and spirit of Victor Amadeus, duke of Savoy. Satisfied with having

\* Letter from General Stanhope to the earl of Sunderland, Nov. 11. 1708; *Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain*, ch. xvi.; *Memoires de St. Simon*, who has given an interesting account of the conversations which passed between Louis and the duke of Orleans on this mysterious subject, t. v. p. 11.; *Instructions from Lord Sunderland to General Stanhope*, Dec. 10.

recovered his dominions, he was principally anxious for his own security and personal aggrandisement, and seized every opportunity to start objections against any distant or offensive enterprise. At the opening of the spring, he refused to act, till the court of Vienna had conferred on him the investiture of part of the Montferrat, which had been promised him by the treaty of 1703; and when the influence of Marlborough had procured the accomplishment of his wishes, he availed himself of the tardiness of the German reinforcements, to invent new pretexts for delay.

At length the arrival of the Austrian general, Daun, with a considerable corps of troops, left him no further excuse; and he yielded to the importunities of the British court, in taking the field. With a force of 35,000 men he scaled Mont Cenis and the Little St. Bernard, as if with a design to penetrate into Savoy. Having by this manœuvre drawn the attention of his antagonist, Marshal Villars, to the side of Fort Barreaux, he suddenly invested the small forts of Exilles and Perusa. Villars could not arrive in time to obstruct his operations, and the fall of these places, which held out only a few days, was followed by the investment of the more important fortress of Fenestrelles, where the French had erected a strong citadel after the destruction of Pignerol. The siege of this place detained him till the end of August, when the fall of the autumnal snows precluded all farther operations. Both parties then retired to their quarters, and the only fruit of the campaign was the possession of the passes leading across the Alps, which was not likely to produce any other advantage than an additional security to Piedmont. This irruption also incidentally caused a diversion in favour of the allies in Spain, by obliging the French to reduce their army in Roussillon, for the purpose of strengthening that in Dauphiné, under Marshal Villars.

Another contention contributed to weaken the army in Italy, and to disappoint the hopes conceived of the operations in that quarter. From the commencement of the contest for the Spanish succession, Clement XI., the reigning pope, had manifested a decided partiality towards the Bourbon cause, and consequently equal hostility towards that of Austria. This conduct led to jealousies and irritation on both sides, until Clement publicly provoked the emperor, by

excommunicating the Germans for exacting contributions in the duchy of Parma. Joseph repelling this insult by asserting his sovereign rights over all the cities of Italy, the pope was urged, by the instigation and promises of the French, to recur to temporal arms in aid of his spiritual pretensions. He raised troops, opened the treasures of St. Angelo, made preparations for war, and endeavoured to form a new holy league among the states of Italy. But his impotent resentment was soon foiled. The emperor was not of a temper to be alarmed by the thunders of the Vatican; and the German troops had no sooner recrossed the Alps into Piedmont, than Marshal Daun marched with a corps towards the ecclesiastical state. The hasty levies of the church were speedily dissipated, Commacchio was captured, Ferrara besieged, and Bologna threatened, while a corps of Austrians from Naples advanced to menace the opposite frontier, and the combined fleet, which had recently subjugated Minorca, blockaded the principal ports of the ecclesiastical state. During these contentions, Marlborough laboured to prevent a war, which was likely to spread through Italy, and divert the attention and efforts of the allies from the French frontier. In his correspondence with the Austrian ministers, we find him labouring to extenuate the conduct of the pope, and soothe the resentment of the emperor. He had at length the satisfaction to succeed in mediating an accommodation, though he could not restore cordiality. The emperor accepted an apology, and the pope agreed to refer the existing disputes to arbitration, to give Charles the title of king, to reduce his force 5000 men, to grant the imperialists quarters, and a free passage through his territories, and to leave Commacchio in the possession of an imperial garrison, till all arrangements were completed.

From our narrative of military operations in the Netherlands at the commencement of the campaign, the reader will doubtless have anticipated a series of bickerings with the elector of Hanover. A prince who was ambitious of military fame, and who valued himself on his splendid prospects and personal influence, must have possessed an unusual portion of generosity and moderation, to witness, without displeasure, glories in which he was not permitted to share. He could not so far repress his feelings as to appreciate the

necessity of that profound silence which Marlborough and Eugene had maintained on the intended junction of their two armies; and, therefore, he resented their prudent reserve as unjust and disrespectful towards himself. This feeling operated with double force when he compared his own limited sphere of action with the brilliant career which the two generals, whom he regarded as foreigners, had opened in a quarter more exposed to observation; and every success which marked their progress contributed to aggravate his disappointment and sharpen his chagrin. His discontent was increased by the jealousies which prevailed between the courts of England and Hanover, and particularly by the lukewarmness which the resentment of Anne obliged her ministers to maintain towards his family. These feelings were inflamed by the insinuations of the party agents, who were privately deputed to Hanover, to increase the odium fostered against the general and the treasurer. Hence, though at the head of an army amounting to 30,000 men, and superior to that of the enemy, the elector sullenly refused to act offensively, and coldly looked on while detachment after detachment was drawn from the Rhine, to swell the French force in the Netherlands. Hence the campaign in Germany was distinguished by no event of importance; and after wasting the season in mere camp details, the elector quitted the scene of action with the same sullenness and discontent which he had manifested at the commencement and during its progress.

The indications of displeasure which escaped from the elector were described by Mr. Howe, who attended him as British agent, in mysterious, and often exaggerated terms, and made a deep impression on the sensitive mind of the British commander. In transmitting one of these accounts to Godolphin, he observes:—

“Mr. Cardonel having shown me Mr. Howe's letter, I could not omit sending it to you; but I should think it should be communicated only to the queen, for if Mr. Howe be not mistaken, their behaviour is very extraordinary, and very wrong, I think, for their own interest. But passion is very capable of making men blind.”

On the other hand, Godolphin laboured to soothe the dissatisfaction of his friend by arguments which do credit to his moderation and sound sense.

"Sept. 29.—Oct. 10.—As to the elector of Hanover, I agree that what you say of his conduct is certainly true, and yet I am of opinion that Mr. Freeman should endeavour to manage him, if possibly he can; for I can plainly see, by what Lord Sunderland throws out upon some occasions, and also by other ways, that the elector's ill-humour and uneasiness is fomented from hence by some of both sides; and he is told that he has been very ill used by you as well as by Prince Eugene, in not leaving him a *stock*\* sufficient to carry on the trade in those parts to advantage. Now, though nothing of this be really true, yet we must allow a little for impressions, which people here are inclined to believe, whether they be true or not true. My only fear is that people may take a handle from hence to do ill offices to you in England."

"Dec. 6–17.—As to the letter you send me from Mr. Howe, I think it is so little fit to be shown to any body, that I am not inclined to show it even to the queen, who is but too apt to take prejudices to that court; and I doubt Mr. Howe is so too."

#### CHAP. LXXV. — TRIUMPH OF THE WHIGS.—1708.

DURING the stay of the British general in the camp of Rouselaer, he was visited by Mr. Craggs, who was deputed on the part of Godolphin and the Whigs to describe the state of political affairs in England, and to propose those arrangements which could not be accomplished by a less direct communication. From the period of his departure, the letters of Marlborough contain less reference to domestic transactions, either because the vigilance of the enemy obstructed his epistolary intercourse, or because a definitive plan of conduct was already concerted. On his return, however, to the Hague, his correspondence with his friends in England resumed its usual character and interest.

Notwithstanding the communications conveyed through the channel of Mr. Craggs, the former difficulties recurred with double force. The impatience of the Whigs increased at the obstacles which obstructed their admission to power; and they even turned their resentment against the two ministers who had so long and fruitlessly endeavoured to promote their cause. Lord Somers, laying aside his natural reserve,

\* An equivocal expression adopted to signify an army, in order to conceal the cipher more effectually.

peevishly complained to Swift, in a casual visit, of the ingratitude which his party had experienced from those two noble persons, adding, "after the service which I and my friends have performed in promoting the Union, they will hardly treat me with common civility."\* When these querulous complaints fell from a nobleman of such caution and sedateness, what could be expected from the impetuous temper of Sunderland? In a letter to Somers, after inveighing against the conduct of Marlborough and Godolphin, and asserting that they were not capable of doing any right thing with a good grace, he recommends extorting their acquiescence, adding, "if it continues to be pressed by all of us, they must and will do it at last. If these instances should prove fruitless, when the proper time is come, which I think is just before the meeting of parliament, let us take our leave of them by quitting, and have nothing more to do with them."†

Soon afterwards, therefore, Sunderland, in the name of the leading members of the party, again announced to the duchess a distinct and decided resolution to withhold their support from government, unless their demand was granted; a commission which the duchess did not hesitate to execute, and support with her customary zeal.

Nor were the duke and Godolphin the only objects of their invective. Not only Sunderland and Halifax, but even Somers ascribed their repeated disappointments to a want of zeal in the duchess herself; and we find them occasionally receiving the representations and excuses of her agent, Mr. Maynwaring, with a degree of sullenness bordering on incredulity. Besides their disappointment at the delay respecting the promotion of Somers, other causes, though of minor consideration, contributed to inflame their resentment. These were the difficulties which still obstructed the arrangement for the offices of attorney and solicitor-general, and speaker.

They did not, therefore, hesitate in carrying their hostile denunciations into effect. After recurring to the invitation of the electoral prince, and every other irritating topic, they decided on resuming their attack against the Admiralty, which they well knew would sensibly affect the feelings of the queen for her husband, and of the Duke of Marlborough

\* Swift's Change of Ministers, p. 14.

† Hardwicke State Papers, vol. ii. p. 479.

for his brother. The imprudent conduct of the prince of Denmark, and of his adviser, Admiral Churchill, unfortunately furnished a plausible pretext for their determination.

The prince not only fomented the partiality of the queen to the Tories, but expressed a personal antipathy to Somers. When he found the Whig interest too powerful to be combated, he secretly encouraged the duke of Somerset in his attempts to divide them, and, through his agency, endeavoured to lure Lord Wharton, by holding forth hopes that the queen would admit him or any of the party into power, provided she could be spared the mortification of receiving into her service a nobleman who had shown so little consideration for himself. Wharton contemptuously rejected this indiscreet proposal, and by his communication of the overture increased the resentment of the other chiefs.\*

The conduct of Admiral Churchill himself aggravated the discontents of the party; for the more zealously he was supported by the queen and prince, the more he appears to have exerted his influence to the prejudice of the Whigs, in spite of his brother's incessant remonstrances. By the effects of this mutual irritation, his removal from office became a matter of state, and the Whigs prepared to expel him, as a step preparatory to a direct attack against the prince. In this cabal the duchess, as usual, took an active part. We find her not only importuning her husband with incessant complaints, but addressing a letter to the queen, full of bitter invectives, and declaring that all the brilliant services of the duke could not shield his brother against the clamours of the nation. Her violent language made as little impression on this as on other occasions; and Admiral Churchill was attacked on one side, and defended on the other, with equal resolution and perseverance. At length Godolphin not only found it necessary to gratify the Whigs, but himself became sensible that the only resource which remained was to remove the obnoxious favourite from his situation. His unbiassed opinion weighed with the duke, and we find the copy of a letter to his brother, indicating the warmth with which he entered into the feelings of the duchess and Godolphin.

\* This conversation is detailed in a letter from Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess.

"Oct. 19. 1708. — Finding you still continue in the prince's council, and the parliament now so near, I cannot be so wanting, either to you or to myself, as not to tell you plainly, with all the kindness of a brother and the sincerity of a friend, that if you do not take an unalterable resolution of laying down that employment before the parliament sits, you will certainly do the greatest disservice imaginable to the queen and prince, the greatest prejudice to me, and bring yourself into such inconveniences as may last as long as you live, and from which it is wholly impossible to protect you. Whereas, on the other side, if the considerations of making the queen's affairs more easy next session, of avoiding a great deal of trouble and disagreeableness to the prince, and of real danger to yourself, as well as prejudice to me, prevail with you to comply with my earnest desire in this thing, I think I could be answerable to you, that you could not fail of finding your advantage in it, doubly to what you do now, both in profit and quiet. These motives being all of them as strong as it is possible for me to suggest, I hope you will give me the satisfaction of letting me know very soon, that my mind may be at ease in this matter, and that you have virtually laid down before my coming over."

This was doubtless a serious sacrifice on the part of the duke, and both the treasurer and the duchess hoped that the resignation of the admiral would restore cordiality. It appears, however, that the Whig lords were so incensed against the prince, and so determined to force themselves into power, that they would not be satisfied with the resignation or dismissal of his obnoxious favourite, though it had hitherto seemed to be their principal object. Their pertinacity was strengthened by a wish to have the management of the Admiralty transferred to Lord Pembroke, that his two posts, the presidency of the council and the vice-royalty of Ireland, might be vacated for Somers and Wharton. In vain the lord treasurer endeavoured to soothe their resentment, and persuade them to content themselves with the dismissal of the admiral, by offering to propose\* a law for rendering the council responsible. In this resolution they appeared immoveable, and were supported by Newcastle, Devonshire, Townshend, and some of the more moderate of the party. It was evident, indeed, that no compromise could be effected, and that the prince himself would be sacrificed unless Lord Somers was admitted into office.

The danger which menaced a person so dear operated powerfully on the feelings of the queen, who seeing no other

\* Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess.

resource to screen her husband from an attack, notified to Lord Godolphin a reluctant, but unqualified acquiescence in the demands of the Whigs, as we learn from one of his letters.

"*St. James's, Oct. 22.—Nov. 2.*—The queen is at last brought to allow me to make such condescensions, which, if done in time, would have been sufficient to have eased most of our difficulties; and would yet do it, in great measure, if the Whigs will be but tolerably reasonable; and I am really of opinion that if you were in England at this moment but 48 hours, all might yet go well, I mean as to the public."

Even after this solemn promise, however, the queen suspended her decision, as well from her prejudices as from the indisposition of her husband, who had long been sinking under a mortal disorder. An interval of some days elapsed, which was marked with the utmost anxiety, till the long-expected dissolution superseded all other considerations. The treasurer felt the peril of the crisis, and in the most pressing terms urged Marlborough to hasten his return to England.

"*Oct. 29.*—My last will have prepared you in some measure not to be surprised with the news of the prince's death, which happened yesterday, about two in the afternoon. Nature was quite worn out in him, and no art could support him long. The queen's affliction, and the difficulty of speaking with that freedom and plainness to her which her service requires, while she has so tender a concern upon her, is a new additional inconvenience, which our circumstances did not need, and will make it more necessary than ever that you should not delay your return to England; for I really foresee that unless that can be compassed very, very soon, it will be next to impossible to prevent ruin. I should not write so pressingly upon this head, if I were not entirely convinced of the necessity of it; and I cannot mingle any thing else in the present letter, because I think nothing else that I can say is of half so much consequence."

This melancholy event, however, finally removed all difficulties, and silenced all objections.\* Admiral Churchill lost

\* Prince George of Denmark died of the effects of long-continued asthma, which during the last few years of his life, had kept him hovering on the brink of the grave. He was in his fifty-fifth year, and had been married twenty-five years to the queen. Throughout her married life the queen had been a pattern of domestic affection, and towards its close had been exemplary in her attentions towards her afflicted consort. The prince merited her affection, and from his mild temper and unassuming disposition, was well suited to the delicacy of his position. Latterly

his office and influence by the dissolution of the board and the death of his patron. Lord Pembroke was nominated lord high admiral, the vice-royalty of Ireland was transferred to Lord Wharton, and the place of president of the council, so long the subject of contention, was conferred on Lord Somers, who candidly acknowledged his obligations in a letter to the Duke of Marlborough.

"Nov. 30.—My lord, be pleased to allow me the honour to congratulate your grace upon the good news which the earl of Hertford brought us. We heard of it before from Ostend, but we could not be so sure of the truth of such a success as the importance of it to the common cause required to put us at ease, till an express arrived from your grace. This campaign seems to have been as long and as full of difficulties as any one reads of in history; and by what has been already done, and what your grace gives hopes we may hear before the end of it, is like to prove as glorious, and, by the blessing of God, as productive of great events as ever was known. It gives a near prospect of a safe and honourable peace to Europe, and to your grace no remote view of some rest after the fatigues and dangers of so many glorious campaigns. I do not pretend to acquaint your grace with the honour the queen has been pleased to do me in admitting me into her service, but rather to return my humble thanks to you on that account, since I am well assured, without your grace's concurrence, nothing of that nature had been done. I hope your grace will believe that according to my poor capacity I will serve her majesty diligently and faithfully, and that I shall always be with the utmost truth and respect," &c.

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he appears to have evinced a dislike of the Whigs, especially of Lord Somers, and his patronage of Marlborough's refractory brother, Admiral Churchill, tended to embarrass the triumvirate in their management of the queen. Generally, however, he kept aloof from politics; indeed, he was void of executive ability, though not deficient in information. So little demonstrative in talent was he, that even King James had affected airs of intellectual superiority, and contemptuously designated him the *Est il possible!* a favourite exclamation of Prince George when any remarkable occurrence was mentioned to him. King William would never entrust the prince with any public employment, and treated him, as was remarked at the time, with hardly more respect than "a page of the backstairs." Despite of all this contumely, the prince was a man of respectable conduct, spirit, justice, and humanity. For his loss the queen was inconsolable, expressed a desire to be buried in the same vault with him, and twice, as she relates, (*Memoirs of the Duchess of Marlborough*, ii. 161.) "scratched at dear Mrs. Freeman's door," hoping to find the lord treasurer in the duchess's apartment, to enjoin him to have a sufficient number of strong yeomen in attendance at Kensington, to carry "the dear prince's body" down the great stairs, which were very steep and slippery, so that it might "not be let fall." — ER.

Before these arrangements, the minor difficulties respecting the offices of attorney and solicitor general were obviated. Sir James Montague was appointed attorney-general on the 19th of October, and his vacant place was conferred on Mr. Robert Eyre. An appointment was also found for Sir Peter King, who had been originally a candidate for the solicitorship, and was supported by the zealous Whigs. As the queen refused to yield to his nomination, in resentment for his violent attacks on the Admiralty, he was first proposed for the situation of speaker; but the dispute respecting this important station being settled by a compromise with the court in favour of Sir Richard Onslow, he was gratified with the appointment of recorder to the city of London, which was purposely vacated by the nomination of the actual recorder to the office of baron of the court of exchequer. By these arrangements the Whigs were apparently gratified, and again tacitly coalesced with the court. The joint influence of the united parties being predominant in the new parliament, the proceedings met with no difficulty in foreign affairs and the grant of supplies, and encountered only a faint opposition on the part of the Scottish members to the arrangements arising from the Union.

With the death of the prince of Denmark may be connected an event, not unworthy of a place in these pages, although it produced no permanent effect on the state of domestic politics. This was the temporary renewal of the intercourse between the queen and the duchess. After the last acrimonious interview, a sense of wounded pride induced the duchess to remain silent, in conformity with the resolution which she had announced to the duke; and the unusual interval of several weeks appears to have elapsed, without any communication between her and the queen. As the crisis of the prince's last malady approached, her feelings of respect and attachment towards her sovereign revived; and she sent a letter of condolence to her afflicted mistress, though she could not avoid recurring to their recent altercation.

*“ Windsor Lodge, Oct. 26. — Though the last time I had the honour to wait upon your majesty, your usage of me was such as was scarce possible for me to imagine, or for any body to believe, yet I cannot hear of so great a misfortune and affliction to you, as the condition in which the*

prince is, without coming to pay my duty, in inquiring after your health ; and to see, if in any particular whatsoever, my service can either be agreeable or useful to you, for which satisfaction, I would do more than I will trouble your majesty to read at this time."

She had scarcely written this letter, before farther accounts of the prince's danger induced her to travel all night, and repair to Kensington. She desired the person charged with her letter to inform the queen that she waited her majesty's commands. She was accordingly summoned into the royal presence, in the afternoon ; but the queen received her, to use her own expression, "very coolly, and like a stranger." It was not to be expected that, after the recent dispute, the queen should accept this mark of attention, introduced as it was with expressions calculated to recall her past indignities ; but the duchess was not discouraged by the repulse. She again waited on the queen the ensuing morning, and was present at the moment when the prince expired. With affectionate zeal she removed her royal mistress from this sad spectacle to her closet, and desiring the other attendants to withdraw, she knelt down, and endeavoured to soothe the agonies of her grief, continuing in that posture till the first emotions had subsided. She then urged the imprudence of remaining in a place which must continually awaken her sorrow, and pressed her to remove to St. James's. Her importunities were for a considerable time fruitless ; but at length her arguments prevailed. The queen delivered her watch to the duchess, desiring her to retire till the hand had reached a particular point, and ordered her to send Mrs. Masham. Though shocked at this mark of preference, the duchess withdrew, but did not summon the favourite, from an unwillingness to show her own decline of influence before the crowd which was collected in the ante-chamber. After preparing her own coach for the queen's reception, and desiring the company to retire while her majesty was passing, she returned at the appointed moment, announced that the carriage was ready, and excused herself for not delivering the message to Mrs. Masham, adding, "your majesty may send for her at St. James's, when and how you please."

The queen acquiesced, and Mrs. Hill, the sister of Mrs. Masham, approaching to put on her hood, her majesty gave her some commission in a whisper. As she passed through

the gallery, leaning on the arm of the duchess, Mrs. Masham herself appeared, accompanied by Dr. Arbuthnot, one of the physicians of the household. The queen did not speak, but cast on her a look of regard. After giving some orders relative to domestic business, she entered the carriage; and immediately desired the duchess to request the lord treasurer to order an examination, whether there was room in one of the royal vaults at Westminster to receive the body of the prince and her own; and if not, to select another place of burial.

Having escorted her majesty to St. James's, and induced her to take some refreshment, the duchess retired, and the lord treasurer was admitted. But the queen soon followed her to her apartment, and not finding her there, sent a note, which marks her minute attention to all the details of the interment.

"I scratched twice at dear Mrs. Freeman's door, as soon as lord treasurer went from me, in hopes to have spoke one more word to him before he was gone; but nobody hearing me, I wrote this, not caring to send what I had to say by word of mouth; which was, to desire him, that when he sends his orders to Kensington, he would give directions there may be a great many yeoman of the guards to carry the prince's dear body, that it may not be let fall, the great stairs being very steep and slippery."

In the evening the duchess found the queen at table, and attended by Mrs. Masham, who instantly retired; but she carefully avoided any allusion to the new favourite, and the queen treated her with marks of renewed regard and familiarity. This was, however, a mere momentary change; for the duchess observes, that in her subsequent visits, she either found Mrs. Masham with the queen, or retiring on her entrance, and, indeed, reaped nothing from this sacrifice of her pride, except the mortification of observing the superior favour of her rival, and the decline of her own influence.\*

\* From a narrative of the events which took place on the death of the prince of Denmark, by the duchess.

## CHAP. LXXVI.—STIPULATIONS WITH THE ALLIES.—1709

IN the general arrangements, Marlborough had not only to combat the intrigues of the party in Holland, who were obstinately bent on peace, but he had likewise to resist the exorbitant demands of the Dutch government, for the extension of their barrier, and particularly for the possession of Ostend. He encountered additional difficulty in vanquishing their objections to the intended augmentation of troops. He found the pensionary timid and hesitating, the adherents of France pertinacious and vehement, and even the best intentioned, more deeply impressed with their own financial embarrassments, than with the importance of the stake for which they were contending. He, however, exerted, with effect, his customary influence over the mind of Heinsius, overawed the partisans of France, and extorted the consent of the government to an augmentation of 6000 men, which, though not equal to the urgency of the case, was yet commensurate with their means, and proportionate to the supply which he had obtained from the British administration.

In his negotiations with the imperial court, he experienced no difficulty respecting the conduct of the war in the Netherlands, as Eugene, who was the channel of his communications, was no less satisfied than himself, that the principal effort of the enemy would be made in that quarter. It was therefore readily settled, that the imperial troops should winter in the Netherlands, and that a proper augmentation should be made. As the States refused to consent that both he and Eugene should be absent at the same time, he obtained from his colleague a promise to return to the Netherlands in the latter end of February, and himself wrote to procure the sanction of the emperor.

“The prince of Savoy,” he observed, “will communicate to your imperial majesty the letter of the States, urging the necessity that one of us should remain in the Low Countries during the ensuing winter; and as there is no time to receive the necessary orders, we have agreed, under the good pleasure of your imperial majesty, that his highness should immediately depart for Vienna, with the hopes that your imperial majesty will consent to his return, to relieve me towards the latter end of February.

Having since received the approbation of the queen, on the conclusion of the campaign, we repaired hither without delay, and instantly began to concert with the States and the ministers of the allied powers, the measures for an augmentation of troops, and the necessary preparations, for opposing the mighty efforts of the enemy the ensuing campaign in the Netherlands, whither they are drawing from the Rhine and Italy fifty-two squadrons and fifty-one battalions more than they had last year. We find the States well disposed to make all possible exertions; but in truth their efforts have so much exhausted them, that we cannot expect the assistance necessary in the present extremity. I can assure your imperial majesty, that the state of England is not much better, the queen having strained every nerve; so that we are under the necessity of imploring your assistance, and earnestly exhorting your imperial majesty to forward, with all possible expedition, the succours of troops, as well for Italy as other quarters, which, with all due submission, policy, as well as the principles of war, require in the present crisis, leaving, however, the 20,000 men under the command of the duke of Savoy, since we expect a powerful diversion on the side of Piedmont in our favour, provided a speedy accommodation can be effected with the pope, either by persuasion or force.

"I ought not to conceal from your imperial majesty, that the prospect of an approaching peace induces the States to make their final exertions, with the hopes that the next campaign will be the last; so that we ought not to omit any effort which may lead to a happy termination of the war. Your imperial majesty will permit me to refer you for further information to the prince of Savoy, who will deliver this letter, and do justice to my respect and devotion." \*

Meanwhile the negotiation for peace had produced a considerable sensation at the court of Vienna; and the proposal relative to the cession of Naples and Sicily to the Bourbon prince, again prompted the emperor to anticipate the sacrifice of his interests, by adding the conquest of Sicily to that of Naples. Marlborough, however, strenuously combated a design, which would create the same mischief as the invasion of Naples, and, at length, not only succeeded in dissuading him from the enterprise, but even obtained a promise, that he would send from the army in Naples a farther succour of 3000 men, to the assistance of his brother. This resolution was communicated in a letter from the emperor himself, dated January 28th, to which we find a grateful and respectful reply from the duke.

\* Translated from a copy of the original, which is preserved in the archives at Vienna, communicated by his imperial highness the Archduke John.

"Feb. 13. — Sire ; I received with profound respect the letter which your imperial majesty did me the honour to write me the 20th of last month, with that of Count Zinzendorf, in which I observe, with great pleasure, the resolution you have taken to assist his Catholic majesty vigorously, in order to bring the war in Spain to a happy termination. Within three days I shall depart for the Hague, where I will not fail to represent in a proper light, the laudable designs of your imperial majesty to the States, in order to induce their high mightinesses to concur in them ; and I do not doubt that the queen, my mistress, will continue, as she has hitherto done, to exert her utmost efforts for procuring the restitution of the Spanish monarchy to its legitimate sovereign. I write by this post to the court on the subject, and I flatter myself that your imperial majesty will soon find it confirmed by the Count de Gallas. With regard to myself, I am persuaded that you will do me the justice to believe, that I have never spared my exertions to promote the interests of your august house, and that I shall never cease to testify my respectful and inviolable attachment."

While engaged in these negotiations, Marlborough had the satisfaction to hear that the long-pending dispute with the see of Rome had been arranged, on terms no less honourable to the emperor than advantageous to the common cause. The particulars of the transaction, and the acknowledgment by the pope of King Charles of Austria's settlement with the pope, were communicated by the Marquis de Prié, imperial ambassador at Rome.

"Rome, Jan. 18. — My lord ; the anxiety which your highness has manifested, to be acquainted as early as possible with the termination of the engagement which his imperial majesty has formed with this court, obliges me to impart to your highness the fortunate conclusion of the treaty, which, after much dispute and difficulty, was signed the 15th of this month, by Cardinal Paulucci and myself as plenipotentiaries of the pope and the emperor. I have every reason to hope that this sincere reconciliation will, in future, remove every subject of suspicion, and overthrow all the hopes of our enemies ; since not only the public, but the court itself has sufficiently known the reason that his imperial majesty had to take umbrage at this armament, and the moderation with which he has acted in the occurrence. The new levies of the pope will be disbanded in a fortnight, his troops and his garrisons will be re-established on the ancient footing, and all suspected and foreign officers are already dismissed. His holiness has even engaged to prevent all the intrigues which the malcontents of Naples, who are settled at Rome and in the ecclesiastical state, may employ against the repose of that kingdom. Comacchio is to remain in the hands of the emperor, till the rights of the emperor and of the holy see have been explained and discussed in the congress, which I am to hold with a deputation of cardinals. The differences which exist, relative to Parma and Placentia, will be examined

in this same conference, in order to treat on them amicably; that his holiness and his imperial majesty may reciprocally satisfy each other, and render mutual justice on their respective pretensions. These, my lord, are the most essential articles of the treaty, of which the publication has been deferred, till it has received the ratification of his imperial majesty.

“ I have obtained a point still more essential for the glory of the most august house, and for the interest of the common cause. It is the acknowledgment of his Catholic majesty King Charles III., to whom his holiness grants all the prerogatives which depend on the holy see; among which, are the Crusado, the Indultos, and the nomination, as well to bishoprics and benefices, as to the cardinals' hat. His holiness will send a nuntio to the court of Barcelona, and will receive at Rome an ambassador from his majesty. He will even grant a bull, with regard to the ecclesiastics of the kingdoms which shall be under his obedience, in conformity with that which has been granted to the duke of Anjou, which has occasioned so many abuses in Spain, to the great prejudice of the public cause. The Spanish people may thus be entirely disabused of the false impressions given by the ecclesiastics, who are partisans of that prince. We have every reason in the world to hope that this declaration of his holiness, which renders justice to the rights of King Charles III., will favour the success of the allied arms, which no longer encounter the same obstacles from the prejudices of the Spanish people.

“ All the French party at this court have made inconceivable efforts to oppose our accommodation, and above all, to prevent this acknowledgment, which is thought likely to be very fatal to the duke of Anjou. After having employed all sorts of machinations, by means of their numerous partisans and emissaries, they have acted openly by protests and menaces. Your highness will easily judge to what a degree the disquietude and resentment of France have been excited, by the last letter which the marshal de Tessé wrote to his holiness. The ministers of the two crowns have declared very openly their intention of quitting this court, and breaking off all communication as soon as this acknowledgment shall be published. Notwithstanding these protests, the pope shows much good disposition, and even firmness, to support the assurances that he has already given, and to proceed to this declaration in form, in a congregation of cardinals to be held for the purpose. I shall be too fortunate, if this petty dispute, which we have had with this court, should terminate in a quarrel with that of France; and if the pope should be obliged, by the violent proceedings of the enemy, to favour the interests of the public cause. I have endeavoured to make known to the pope and the sacred college, that those of this court, and even of all Europe, will be incontestably attached to the entire re-establishment of the Spanish monarchy, under the ancient domination of the most august house of Austria.

“ We have thus terminated this engagement, which gave so much alarm to all the allies. All the imperial troops and auxiliaries are going as soon as possible to quit the ecclesiastical state, according to the orders of the emperor. They will repair to their usual winter-quarters, after having drawn near three months' subsistence from this country.

"I thought proper to beg Vice-admiral Whitaker to suspend the bombardment of Civita Vecchia, in order not to irritate this court and raise new difficulties to the treaty. I continue at present the same instances in promoting a reconciliation. The pope hopes that his imperial majesty will employ his good offices with her Britannic majesty, and that they will not be useless, in relieving us entirely from disquietude. He strongly protested to me, that he had given no succour in money to favour the expedition to Scotland.

"Our quarrel with the pope being entirely terminated, and the disarming being already begun, there will be no more difficulty in the embarkation of the troops for Catalonia, which would have been very dangerous, while we were in very great alarm for the armaments of this court, and the troubles which our enemies fomented in Naples. I have had directions from the king to hasten the conclusion, which I have executed as I ought, although the orders of the emperor, and the attention of Cardinal Grimani will render my cares very little necessary. I beg you, my lord, to accept this new assurance of the perfect attachment with which I am," &c.

"*Rome, May 18.* — My lord; Your highness will doubtless have learnt by way of Lisbon, that the nuntio has been driven out of Madrid, and that the nuntiature there has been shut up, a thing unheard of in Spain, and what was never done at Vienna, at the very time when we were in the greatest misintelligence with this court. The duke of Medina Sidonia, who was charged with the commission of intimating this to the nuntio, left in his hands the protest of which I do myself the honour to send you the annexed copy. The offensive terms in which it is conceived, and the precipitate resolution that has been taken, mark sufficiently the resentment entertained at Madrid, in consequence of the acknowledgment of King Charles the Third, and of the assurances which have been given by the pope, although these have not been hitherto published. The nuntio reported to the pope, that the council was divided on this deliberation. The wisest ministers were not willing to proceed to such an extremity, without being assured that France would enter into the same engagement; but those who are more zealous Anjouists, have rather followed passion than the interest of the duke of Anjou, in carrying things to a rupture. They have even published, by this proof of resentment, the acknowledgment of his Catholic majesty, and undeceived the people from the error into which the ecclesiastic partisans of that prince had led them, as well with regard to the justice of his cause as to the impressions they had given that this was a war of religion. It is pretended that the council of the cabinet (in which the Princess Orsini and the French ambassador have a great share) has much contributed to this resolution. The step has produced so bad an effect in Spain, and so much prejudice to the interests of the duke of Anjou, that many people have suspected that the good Spaniards and well-intentioned have given the impulse to all this, to complete the ruin of that prince's affairs.

"I have done all I could to inflame the indignation of the pope against a son who is so little grateful, that he has forgotten, in an instant, all the distinctions and favours he has hitherto enjoyed. I have taken this

indirect way to urge him no longer to keep any measures, and to publish the acknowledgment in the consistory, which is still stopped by some little difficulties on certain points to which the pope lays claim, as well with regard to sequestrations as to the counter-declaration of nullity, which his imperial majesty has made relative to Parma and Placentia. I have discovered from good authority, that the strongest reason which at present restrains the pope is, the reports which the French propagate here, that the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily will fall to the share of the duke of Anjou. Although I have contradicted these ill-founded rumours, the French partisans, who are very numerous, do all they can to intimidate this court, and to show the danger of having a powerful and hostile prince for a neighbour. The same reports have been spread at Naples by the Anjou party, and have inspired the ill-intentioned with new courage. What gives them more appearance of truth is, seeing Sicily still in the hands of the enemy; and as this conquest is very easy, both from the good disposition of the people, and the weakness of the enemy, we cannot convince this court, that the two Maritime Powers will not furnish transports, because they are of opinion that the enterprise should not be attempted, lest it should disconcert their views of a partition. These are false reasonings, which, however, make much impression, and prevent us from tranquillising the kingdom of Naples, and bringing back this court entirely. Hence it is to be wished, that we could quickly draw the enemy from that kingdom, or at least shut them up in Messina.

"The duke of Medina and cardinal del Giudici have received orders to depart, and are, in fact, gone this week; so that we are masters of the field of battle. Although the change is very considerable here, I hope this court will enter still more into its true interests, and that the successes of the campaign will contribute more to it than negotiation, which will always be carried on to more advantage the instant we press the least to enter into it. It is certain that the pope appears much alarmed, lest Naples and Sicily should be detached from the body of the monarchy, because this court would be reduced to slavery, if those kingdoms were to fall into the hands of a prince of the house of Bourbon." \*

Among the different cares which pressed on the attention of Marlborough during his continuance at the Hague, we may assign a prominent place to the arrangements with the duke of Savoy. This prince, as usual, making the attainment of one acquisition the prelude to a new demand, required the cession of the Vigevenasco, which he had before claimed of the court of Vienna, or in lieu of it, the Novaresi. He claimed also the imperial fief of Savona, in liquidation of his arrears. He strenuously laboured to interest the Maritime Powers in his behalf; and declared his resolution not to take the field unless his wishes were gratified. In

\* Translation from the original letter in the French tongue,

addition to these pretensions, he even solicited the queen to negotiate a marriage between his son and an archduchess. These proposals encountered the same opposition as his former demands from the court of Vienna, who now finding his services less necessary, suffered their jealousy of his encroaching and ambitious spirit to obliterate their sense of the obligations which he had rendered at the most dangerous crisis of the war.

At the same time that he produced this series of demands, he suggested different plans of operation for the ensuing campaign, which he conceived calculated to lure the attention of the allies. The principal was, a proposal to penetrate into Upper Dauphiné, on which point three objects presented themselves: the reduction of Mont Dauphin and Briançon; the capture of Fort Bareaux, and an irruption into the heart of the Lyonnais; and the last and most important, an invasion of Franche Comté, where he proposed to act in concert with the army on the Rhine, provided that army was commanded by Prince Eugene. For this object, he required a force of 50,000 men, a considerable subsidy in money, and an absolute authority over all the troops under his command, both in the field and in quarters.

Marlborough was perfectly aware that the project was too extensive and chimerical to be realised, and that many of the conditions were proposed, with a conviction that they could not be granted. But the services of a prince, who held the keys of Italy, and who was at this time sedulously courted by France, were too important to be undervalued. As it was, therefore, necessary to retain him in the interest of the alliance, the British general laboured to procure such a compliance from the court of Vienna, as would prevent his defection. With this view he deliberated on the proposed projects with Prince Eugene, in the presence of Count Maffei, minister of Savoy, Count Schulemburg, the imperial envoy at the Hague, and General Palmes. They approved the design of penetrating into the Lyonnais, and Palmes was commissioned to promote the pretensions of the duke at Vienna. He was afterwards to repair to Turin, and convey such assurances from the queen as were calculated to satisfy him that no endeavours would be wanting to obtain the fulfilment of his demands, and to forward his design of invading

the Lyonnais.\* Marlborough was, however, too well acquainted with the characters both of the emperor and the duke, to place any reliance on the successful event of this arrangement; and he drew but an unfavourable augury of the effect which was likely to result from the military operations on the side of the Alps.

The negotiations with the court of Berlin were attended with the same difficulties as at the close of every campaign. The king of Prussia, as usual, produced a long series of complaints and demands. He cavilled with the Dutch, for obstructing his pretensions to the petty county of Meurs, and for delaying to discharge the arrears of their subsidies. He even expressed displeasure with the British government for undervaluing his services, and omitting any mention of his name in the speech or address, while they lauded and rewarded the zeal of the landgrave of Hesse and the elector of Hanover. These grievances were accompanied with the usual threat of withdrawing his auxiliary troops. His example influenced the dependents of his court; for the grand chamberlain expressed strong jealousy at the applications which were made to other ministers; and his lady demanded the same gratification for her assistance as had been granted to Count Piper, through his countess.† Lastly, Lord Raby, who had been maintained in the office of British ambassador by the influence of Marlborough, emulated the querulous style of those with whom he associated, by expatiating on the slights with which he had been treated, in being refused the order of the Garter, the title of earl, and a place in one of the public departments. He even profited by a temporary journey to England, to pay court to Harley and Mrs. Masham.

The interference of Marlborough could alone obviate the mischiefs arising from this combination of jarring interests, and his interposition was attended with the usual effect. A single letter from him appeared to pacify the king of Prussia; while the chamberlain and his lady either obtained a partial gratification, or yielded to the change of sentiment which they perceived in their sovereign. Lord Raby was awed by that master spirit, which habit had taught him to

\* Instructions for General Palmes on his mission to the duke of Savoy.

† Letter from General Palmes to the duke.

respect, and we find his letters soon resuming the language of compliment and adulation. In short, the brief interval of a few weeks produced a sudden change in the lowering aspect of the Prussian court; and the auxiliary troops were not only permitted to continue in the stations where their services had been employed with advantage, but the king consented to an augmentation of 5000 men for the ensuing campaign, an acquisition of no ordinary value in the eyes of the commander-in-chief, who expressed the highest opinion of their valour and discipline.\* This revolution of sentiment was announced in the most gracious terms by the king himself.

Notwithstanding this solemn promise, and the apparent renewal of his good humour, the capricious monarch soon began again to contend for more advantageous terms, and accused the duke of having spoke slightly of himself, and of neglecting his interests. His chagrin was augmented by the intrigues of Lord Raby.

To pacify the monarch, Lieutenant-general Grumbkow was deputed to Berlin, with the hope that an accurate knowledge of the king's character, and an acquaintance with the cabals of the court, would enable him to effect an accommodation. He was authorised to grant the allowance of bread and forage to the cavalry; and instead of the former mode of payment for the infantry, to offer a subsidy, by which the king would be entitled to the extra pay of a company in each regiment, and to the salary of more officers than he was obliged to maintain. Marlborough also remitted the usual deduction of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., which, as commander-in-chief, he was empowered to receive from all the princes who furnished auxiliary troops. General Grumbkow transmitted an interesting account of this mission, which proved in every point satisfactory.

"*Berlin, March 9.* — My lord; I arrived here Tuesday last, and the same evening saw my Lord Raby, but I could not draw much information from him. I went the next morning early to the house of M. Ilgen, who told me that the grand chamberlain was mortally ill of a pleurisy, accompanied with a high fever; that I should find the king very obstinate

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\* To Lord Godolphin, Dec. 20., and letter from the Duke of Marlborough to Lord Raby, Dec. 31. 1709.

on the point of the fifth battalion, which he had dismissed; and that the field marshal and he were extremely eager that this affair should be finished, so that he placed his hope only in me. He begged me, in the name of God, to speak freely to the king. I said that should not be long delayed; and, at the same time, a servant of the king, who had heard of my arrival, was already in search of me. His majesty received me with much affection, embraced me warmly, and after a moment's conversation, inquired for the health of your highness, adding, 'Is he still my friend, and does he sometimes remember me?' I told him that your highness would be much more his friend, if his majesty would reflect a little more, and pay a little more attention to the just propositions made him on your part. He said, 'Can I do more than I do? I make treaties, and yet the emperor breaks his word with me, as well as Holland, every moment. This disgusts me. Besides, it is impossible, without great inconvenience, to give more than three battalions, and he is a wretch who would advise me otherwise.' Being then quite full of the republican air which I had recently breathed in Holland, I told him boldly, that I thought he was a wretch who should advise him not to do it, and that I would prove this by many arguments. He said with much emotion, 'You speak very boldly, and you may perhaps repent it, if your arguments are not conclusive.' I replied, if he would listen to them, without prejudice or prepossession, he would find them so; and in about half an hour I changed him so entirely, that he sent for the field marshal, and, in my presence, related to him word for word what I had said, ordering him, as an honest man, to give his opinion on what ought to be done. The field marshal in a few words observed, that it was necessary not only to do it, but that if he was master, he would advise him to do still more to oblige the queen, and preserve so true and good a friend as your highness. The king then said, 'Well, it is decided; consult, and see what you think ought to be done. I shall not be the person who will make the most difficulties.' On this the field marshal retired, and I remained half an hour longer with the king, and he told me his views, which are not ill digested. I shall give your highness a detail of them when I have the honour to see you.

"As I thought there was a little bitterness where your highness was concerned I turned him so many ways, that he observed, he would tell me what was the matter. But as he was persuaded that it was false, by all I had told him of your highness, I must not speak a single word of it to you. 'First,' he said, 'I have been informed that the queen refused to take my troops entirely into her pay, which would have relieved me much, and that it was no one but my lord duke who prevented her. Secondly, that you had shown in many instances this campaign, that you did not think it necessary to have much regard for a prince, whom you managed as you pleased, and that you made a good use of his troops, because he understood nothing of the business.' I told him for the second article, nothing was more ridiculous than to imagine such a thing; since even if your highness was capable of a similar thought, you had too much discernment to speak of it to any one. For the first, I thought he who had spread the report would have much difficulty to prove it. At last the

king swore, that if your highness would continue his friend, he would do every thing in the world to give you pleasure. But he ordered me to remind you of every thing he had done, from consideration for the queen, and particularly for your highness, during this war, there being no prince, except the emperor and the two Maritime Powers, who had so many troops in the field as himself, although he had neither crowns nor states to expect like the elector of Hanover, the duke of Savoy, and the elector palatine. But he hoped that your highness would continue in the same sentiments which you had testified to me, namely to promote a close alliance between himself and Great Britain, when attempts should be made to conclude a peace.

"On the morrow we examined the project in the presence of the prince royal, the field marshal, M. d'Ilgen, and Messrs. Krant and Beck. I had much trouble to make them comprehend many things; and to prevent them from introducing into the project a thousand points which would not have been accepted on the part of your highness. The words are changed, but the sense and foundation are the same, except 50 rations more, which they demand for each battalion, during the winter, and without which the officers cannot subsist. When I opposed this article, the prince royal told me he was persuaded your highness would grant that; and when it was considered that we sent all our best and finest troops, and that the king paid the regiment of Mecklenburgh entirely, and added two squadrons more, he was very well assured that your highness would make no difficulty, since the maintenance of 14 squadrons, of which the king received the *agio* for only 12, cost him, besides the subsidy, three hundred thousand francs. After some other remarks, he continued, with a petulant air, 'My lord duke may grumble to no purpose. If he lays his hand on his heart, he must own that he does not find among other princes so much facility and so much good faith as with us; and if this new corps is not as fine as that of Count Lottum, let him accuse me, for I am sure he will be satisfied, and I will pledge my word that the troops shall be on the Meuse the 1st of May.'

"Afterwards, the prince insisted much on the article of not putting the infantry in garrison in the maritime places, or those of Flanders, alleging the treaty for the Hanoverians, and showing letters from our officers, who are in garrison at Lille, and who bitterly complain.

"The rest is such as I think your highness will find no difficulty in, and there will be no objection with regard to the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., I having told them that it should be abated, with which they are satisfied.

"Lastly, I am in the joy of my heart that this business is finished, and that I have been happy enough to justify the confidence which your highness has reposed in me. And I may assert that the king has never shown me more confidence and friendship than since I have opened his eyes on many things. My Lord Raby could not refrain from showing me how much he is piqued, because your highness did not name him to sign this treaty. He assured me that if he had chosen to exert himself, the court would have solicited your highness for him to have had that satisfaction, which has not happened to him since his residence here; but that he did not wish to insist on it, for fear of displeasing your highness."

All I can say is, that he has not seen the king since I have been here ; and that he has told one of his confidants with a sneer, that I played the minister of the queen so well, he had no occasion to interfere. I must own, that if Madame la Grande Chambellane was as much mistress as she wishes, the thing might have gone as Lord Raby desired. But, happily, it is not so ; and the king told me this evening that he was delighted because the business had passed through the hands of General Cadogan. \* \* \* \*

“ The king dined at noon with the prince royal, and has made him a considerable present. The prince is highly gratified to serve this campaign. He presents a thousand compliments to your highness, for whom he has a hundred bottles of Tokay. He will go from hence the 26th of next month, and will travel post to Brussels.”

The king announced this fortunate change himself, in a letter to the duke.

“ *Berlin, March 9.* — My cousin ; Brigadier Grumbkow has just delivered to me the letter which you wrote to me on the 24th of February, and has at the same time explained to me the conditions on which you were pleased to agree with me, touching the augmentation of my troops in the Low Countries. As the said brigadier praised much the good intention which you have displayed on this occasion for my interests, and as you have very obligingly assured him that you would always continue the same, both with regard to my interests during the war and to those which concern me in peace, I have not only chosen to testify to you by this letter, the obligation I am under to you, but to give also, above the 12 squadrons that you have asked of me, two others, as a more certain proof of the zeal and warmth I feel in giving pleasure to the queen your mistress, and to yourself ; and to concur with all my forces in the glorious designs that you have formed for the ensuing campaign. I will tell you at the same time, that except a few necessary explanations, for which I refer you to Grumbkow, I have accepted your offers, and do not doubt that you will be satisfied with the counter project which will be delivered to you, and that you will give full power to General Cadogan to sign it on the footing above mentioned, with Brigadier Grumbkow, when he shall arrive at Brussels, which will be at the end of this month.

“ I cannot avoid also stating to you, that as I have deemed it necessary to join to the new corps which I send you, a lieutenant-general, a major-general, and a brigadier, I do not doubt that you will gratify them with such douceurs as may enable them to serve with comfort ; and as besides I know perfectly the service which I have received from Brigadier Du Troussel and Grumbkow, I will pay all the consideration you can wish to what you write me in their favour.

“ Moreover, my cousin, I am glad of this opportunity to tell you again, that notwithstanding the court of Vienna has not paid me the money for the recruits, which has been owing to me several years, and notwithstanding I see no appearance of touching any part of it for a long time, I have nevertheless given orders that the recruits necessary for the troops I have in Italy should march immediately, hoping from your

equity, that you will be pleased to employ the credit, which her majesty ought so justly to have with the emperor, to induce him at last to give me the requisite satisfaction, as well with regard to these recruits as to many other articles which I have long solicited at the imperial court, with much reason, but without any appearance of success." \*

Marlborough had thus the satisfaction of forming the most advantageous arrangements with the principal members of the *Grand Alliance* for the ensuing campaign; and he would have proceeded without delay to attend his parliamentary duty in England, had not his presence been required at the Hague, to watch the negotiations for peace which the king of France had recently opened with the Dutch government.

#### CHAP. LXXVII.—THANKS OF PARLIAMENT. —1708, 1709.

THE Duke of Marlborough did not personally witness the struggle which terminated in the promotion of Somers, being detained at the Hague, by military and political business, till the session was nearly closed. The new parliament, which was the first elected since the Union, met on the 18th of November; and, as the queen was too much afflicted by her recent loss to attend in person, the session was opened by commission. The choice of a speaker having been previously arranged, by a compromise between Godolphin and the Whigs, Sir Richard Onslow, a Whig of moderate principles, was called to the chair. The commissioners having approved the speaker, Lord Chancellor Gowper addressed the two houses in the name of the queen. He dwelt with a mixture of piety and exultation on the past successes of the allied arms, and the near prospect of an honourable and lasting accommodation, adding, "her majesty believes it impossible that the representatives of the British nation can submit to an insecure and dishonourable peace." After demanding adequate supplies for the war, he employed expressions calculated to quiet the minds of those who had carried

\* This letter, as well as the preceding ones, are translated from the French originals.

on a clandestine correspondence with the court of St. Germain's, preparatory to a comprehensive act of grace, which was introduced in the course of the session.

The addresses of the two houses were perfectly in unison with the style of the speech, and the sentiments of the ministers. After condolence on the death of the prince, the Lords testified their readiness to give all proper support for the prosecution of the just and necessary war in which the nation was engaged; and in reference to the pending negotiations, concluded with repeating their former declaration, that no peace could be safe or honourable, till the whole monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria. The Commons pledged themselves to grant such supplies as should enable the queen to obtain an honourable and lasting peace; and concluded with an assurance, that they would defend her title to the crown, disappoint the hopes and designs of the Pretender, together with his open and secret abettors, and maintain the Protestant succession, as by law established.

Arrangements were made for the scrutiny of the contested elections, and the partiality manifested in the decisions fully proved the ascendancy of the Whigs. Meanwhile both houses entered into the consideration of the means for the prosecution of the war. An augmentation of 10,000 men was voted, and a supply of seven millions assigned for the service of the year.

Notwithstanding the powerful support which the government derived from the Whigs, neither the merits of the great commander, nor the zeal of his friends, could shield him from the attacks of factions opposition. The incidents connected with the action of Wynendale furnished an opportunity of which the Tories did not neglect to profit. The first information of that brilliant exploit, which appears to have been transmitted by some indirect channel, ascribed the principal merit of the achievement to General Cadogan, as the senior officer. This statement being hastily printed in the Gazette, General Webb was deeply offended, and published an explanatory narrative in support of his own fame. Every endeavour was used by government to counteract the consequences of their own mis-statement; the gallant general was honoured with the recommendation of the commander-in-chief, and the

rewards of his sovereign, and appears to have been satisfied with the reparation which he received. But the enemies of the duke accused him of envy towards a subordinate officer, as well as of partiality to his own favourite, and brought the question before parliament.

A motion was accordingly made by Sir Thomas Hanmer to remedy this act of injustice, by passing a public vote of thanks to General Webb, for his conduct in the action at Wynendale. On this occasion Mr. Bromley sarcastically remarked, "I do not disapprove the custom which has been recently introduced of returning thanks to those generals who have performed eminent services, especially when they receive these compliments as modestly as the worthy member to whom they are made, has now done. But I observe with grief that a certain commander, on whom not only the thanks of both houses, but also great rewards have been bestowed, appears yet to be unsatisfied."

The friends of Marlborough were conscious that the omission of Major-general Webb's name in the official account, though a mere oversight, was an act of injustice, and therefore were not provoked by this cruel sarcasm to make any opposition: the motion, accordingly, passed unanimously. The Lords, however, acted with more dignity, in declining to take the matter into consideration; and both houses of parliament made ample amends by a congratulatory address to the queen on the victories of the great commander, in terms worthy of his stupendous successes.

Nor were the partisans of government and the friends of Marlborough satisfied with this reparation, however public and distinguished; for soon after the recess, the Commons passed a vote of thanks to the duke himself, "not only for his great and eminent services in the last successful campaign, but for his indefatigable zeal and perseverance in the common cause." This vote being transmitted to him abroad, by the speaker, he replied in a letter, dated Brussels, Feb. 13th.

"Sir; I am extremely sensible of the great honour which the House of Commons have done me in the vote you have been pleased to transmit me by their order. Nothing can give me more satisfaction than to find the services I have endeavoured to do the queen and my country so acceptable to the House of Commons; and I beg the favour of you to

assure them, I shall never think any pains or perseverance too great if I may, by God's blessing, be instrumental in producing a safe and honourable peace for her majesty and my fellow-subjects."

Notwithstanding the triumphant result of the motion for an address of thanks, an opportunity was soon afterwards taken by the opposite party to attack the administration in general, and Godolphin and Marlborough in particular. On the customary discussion relative to the state of the nation, Lord Haversham adverted to the late invasion, accused the ministers of negligence or treachery, and commented with great severity on the conduct of the government towards Lord Griffin and the two sons of Lord Middleton, who, though taken in actual rebellion, had been screened from justice. He adverted also to the arrest of the duke of Hamilton and other suspected Jacobites, which he represented, not as a measure of prevention, but as a reprehensible artifice to secure the majority in the Scottish elections.

These accusations were evidently intended as a revival of the charges formerly advanced against the general and treasurer for their correspondence with the exiled family. But the Whigs did not suffer the attack to pass unrepelled. A statement of the conduct of government was submitted to the legislature by Secretary Boyle, and both houses concurred in an address, justifying the ministers, and declaring that much effectual care had been taken by those employed by her majesty, at the time of the intended invasion, to disappoint the designs of her enemies, both at home and abroad.

The result of these motions, and the zeal which the Whigs manifested in support of government, seemed to indicate a cordial union between them and the two ministers, as well as the tacit satisfaction of the sovereign in the recent appointments. But these auspicious appearances, which awakened the hopes of the treasurer, and tranquillised the mind of the general, were soon dissipated. The queen was indignant at the violence offered to her feelings and prejudices, by the compulsory promotion of the Whig chiefs; and turning on Godolphin the resentment which she had hitherto fostered against the obnoxious party, she treated him with unusual reserve; while she held forth every encouragement to those who were opposed to her government. The effects of this treatment appear in a letter from the treasurer.

"*Dec. 24. Christmas Eve, 1708.*—By the last post I acknowledged the favour of yours of the 30th, by the messenger, with the good news of the surrender of Ghent, which I confess to you is very much allayed to me, by finding at the same time that the hopes I had of your coming over to us very soon after so happy an end of the campaign, are still adjourned to a farther time, of which time also there is no other certainty but that it is very remote. Now, I must beg leave to be so plain as to assure you, that though by all that has passed hitherto in this session of parliament, things may appear beyond sea to be upon a very good foot here as to the support of the war; yet with relation to the credit of the government and the administration at home, they are in a very uncertain and precarious condition, full of all manner of distractions and jealousies, which our people are but too apt to have of one another at all times. But what gives the greatest occasion for the present ferment at this time is, that the queen's intimacy and present conversation leans only to those who are enemies to all that are most useful to the public service. Now this does not only create endless jealousies of one another, among those who are best inclined; but it makes others, who are willing to support the government, and are friends to the administration, uncertain to whom they should apply, or upon whom they shall depend. This is certainly, as well as I am able to describe it, our present condition; and I know nothing so capable of remedying it as your being here, whose authority, when it appeared plainly, would be of so much weight as to extinguish much of this uneasiness, if not remedy the whole.

"But I give you the trouble of all this rather to acquit myself in opening freely my thoughts to you, than with a view that you can be at liberty, just now, to comply with what I both wish and want so much. However, when you come to the Hague, things may turn so that even the States may think it more necessary for you to be here than there, at least not to constrain your own or your friends' desires. In case, therefore, of any room for your speedy coming over, I could not be at quiet, till I had endeavoured to show you nothing is of more consequence."

The numerous difficulties which Godolphin experienced in conducting the government, drew from him querulous complaints concerning the irksomeness of his situation, to which he gave vent in his letters; and his complaints were re-echoed by his friend and colleague. After regretting the absence of the duke, he observes, in one of his letters:—

"*Jan. 10.* — I don't use to trouble you with complaints of my own circumstances, but so much advantage is taken of your absence, and I suffer so much, that I must give myself the vent of saying, the life of a slave in the galleys is paradise in comparison of mine: but at first the length of the campaign would not let you come, afterwards the States would not let you come, and now God Almighty won't let you. So I must yield to fate."

In reply the duke said:—

"*Brussels, Jan. 10.*— I am extremely concerned at the latter part of yours, and I beg of you to do me the justice to believe, that if any thing in my power, though never so hazardous, could give you ease, I should with pleasure do it. I can easily believe your being tired with business, and the great desire you have of enjoying quietness, by my own inclinations; for though I meet with here all the marks of friendship and approbation of what I have done; yet I am so desirous of retiring, that nothing but my duty to the queen and friendship to you could make me resolve going through the trouble of this war. This has been a very laborious campaign, but I am sensible the next will be more troublesome; for most certainly the enemy will venture, and do their utmost to get the better of us; but I trust in the Almighty that he will protect and give success to our just cause."

And again:—

"*Feb. 21.*— \* \* \* \* If Lord Sunderland's news-letter be true, I should hope the king of France were in earnest, and then there would be a peace, which, upon all accounts, I long for, being extremely weary of the life I am obliged to live; for my spirit is so broke, that I am become fit for nothing else but a lazy, quiet life, which I prefer before all the pleasures of this world."

Nor were these the only discouragements which Marlborough and Godolphin experienced. Instead of being gratified by the promotion of their chiefs, the Whigs were not only offended with the reluctant compliance of the queen, but, as before, made the attainment of one object the prelude to the acquisition of another. Lord Halifax, in particular, considered his services as treated with unmerited neglect, and resumed his claims for the office of joint plenipotentiary at the congress, which was shortly expected to be held for the negotiation of peace. He was naturally irritated at the secret opposition which Marlborough and Godolphin had already made to his appointment, and with the previous promise to Lord Townshend; but he hoped to gain his object by the support of his party, and gave vent to the most splenetic effusions against the general and the treasurer. In a letter to the duchess he expatiated on his services, and the slights he had experienced from them both; and in a conversation with Godolphin, when on his way to thank the queen for the appointment of his brother, he uttered the most violent invectives against the duke, to whom he ascribed all the disappointments which he had encountered.

His cause was supported by the other members of his party, but by none more strenuously than by Sunderland,

who, with his characteristic vehemence, re-echoed the complaints against his father-in-law, and did not spare even the duchess herself. The alienation to which these sentiments gave rise, was so strongly manifested towards Lord Godolphin and the duchess, as to awaken in them the suspicion that some of the Whigs were covertly paying court to the new favourite. The impression was strengthened by a haughty overture from Halifax, in which, after professing his readiness to support the government, he appeared rather to exact submission than to solicit confidence.

"If your grace," he observes, in a letter to the duchess, "thinks it of any service, I give you full power to answer both those noble lords, that I am desirous to serve them in every thing, and will certainly go along with them in all things that are not contrary to my principles and the good of my country. If the lord treasurer has a mind to speak with freedom to me, I will return it with great sincerity and affection; but if he has a better opinion of other sorts of notions, I will give him no trouble in forcing him to hear me."

Godolphin was deeply mortified by the studied insult conveyed in this epistle.

"I beg leave to return you," he wrote to the duchess, "not by the post, but by the first safe hand, the letter you sent me from Lord Halifax, because it ought to be kept, in the first place as a curiosity, and next, because whoever could write such a letter, in his present circumstances, may hereafter give such provocation, that one would not but have it in one's power to show so much impertinence under his own hand. When I have said this, I must own I think the impertinence greater to me than to you; but I shall not take any notice of it to him, nor ever make any court to him for his assistance, which I see by the letter he expects; but let him have his full swing with Mr. Harley and his friends, whom, for seven years together, he has called enemies to the government, rather than not ruin those who have done all that was possible for men to do to oblige him."\*

The contemptuous reserve and insulting reproaches of the Whig chiefs were still more deeply felt, and more warmly resented, by the duchess than by Godolphin. In the height of indignation at their ingratitude, she forgot her darling predilections, and professed an utter disdain of those party distinctions for which she had sacrificed her own tranquillity and the favour of her sovereign. In her correspondence

\* Lord Godolphin to the duchess, Monday night, at six, probably written in the beginning of November.

with her husband she now depicted the Whig chiefs in the same exaggerated colours which she had hitherto applied to the Tories. She described Somers as repulsive and disrespectful, and Halifax as vain, ambitious, and petulant; but in adverting to the conduct of Sunderland she could find no terms sufficiently strong to express her abhorrence.

The communications of the treasurer and the duchess augmented the chagrin of Marlborough at the continued failure of all his attempts to conciliate the Whigs. Although he expressed his full conviction that a strict union between the queen and the Whigs was necessary for the welfare of England, he at the same time testified his displeasure at the doubts which their leaders entertained of his sincerity, and at the violence with which they pursued their object. We accordingly trace in his correspondence the language of smothered disappointment, strongly contrasted with the tone of affected indifference and resignation. Indeed, it awakens our regret, to find a man of his powerful mind and political experience so easily ruffled, and uttering bitter invectives against the chiefs of the party on whom he was obliged to depend. But while he acrimoniously inveighs against Halifax, Sunderland, and Orford, he does full justice to the temper and good sense of Somers.

But the change of sentiment in a wife whom he was so anxious to conciliate, compensated for many of his other perplexities. Hitherto her excessive partiality to the Whigs had exposed him to repeated rebukes, for his apparent lukewarmness; but he now looked forward to more peace and congeniality of opinion in their future intercourse; since she seemed to accord with him in an utter dislike of mere political connexions, and to consider both parties as equally domineering. These sentiments frequently occur in his letters, and we find him exulting in the hope that their domestic harmony would no longer be interrupted. Indeed, although the duchess occasionally relapsed into her habitual prejudices, he at least enjoyed a temporary respite from her importunities and sarcastic reflections.

Giving implicit credit to the suspicions of the treasurer and the duchess, that some of the Whig chiefs were tampering with Mrs. Masham and Harley, he affects not only perfect indifference, but even satisfaction at the report; and

although the limits of our work will not permit us to publish all his letters to the duchess at this interesting period, we cannot avoid giving a few extracts, which will show the poignancy of his feelings at the increasing ascendancy of Harley and Mrs. Masham, as well as at the warmth and intemperate conduct of Halifax and Sunderland.

*To the Duchess.*

"Nov. 28. — \* \* \* I wish with all my heart that matters may be settled so as to give content, as I am of opinion that England can't be safe but by a right understanding between the queen and the Whigs. I am pleased at what you write, that the lord treasurer has reason to believe, that some of the Whigs are making up to Mrs. Masham; for I hope you are of my mind, that when England is safe, I had rather any body should govern than I. \* \* \*

"What you say of Lord Halifax, I have believed for a long time. If he had no other fault but his unreasonable vanity, that alone would be capable of making him guilty of any fault. For God's sake do not endeavour to injure any body making their interest with Mrs. Masham, but agree with me in condemning any thing that others may think vexes me; for I swear to you solemnly that your love and quiet I prefer to all the greatness of this world, and had rather live a private life than be the greatest man England ever had. I do not wonder, nor shall be much troubled at any thing Mr. Harley may say of me, for I shall desire nobody's friendship; but that my actions shall speak for me, which shall be governed by the understanding God has given me to what I shall judge best for the interest of England. Yours of the 2d of this month, o. s., which gives me an account of all things going on well in England, gives me an entire content of mind."

"Jan. 7. — I find by your's of the 17th, that Mrs. Masham does not think it worth while to keep any measures with me and those I love. I can't help flattering myself, that if it were possible to make the queen sensible of her malice, she would not suffer it; but I am afraid it is very difficult to persuade her to see any thing which Mrs. Masham would not have her believe, so that patience and peace must be the cure. My real intentions are to be as quiet as is possible. I do not mean by that to quit the employment, but to serve my queen and country to the best of my understanding, without being either minister or favourite."

"Hague, Jan. 16. — \* \* \* I find by yours of the 22d of last month, that Lord Sunderland was indisposed; and the concern he had for what he thought might give me pleasure. I desire you will return him my thanks, and at the same time assure him that I am not desirous that any thing should be altered that might give disadvantage or trouble to my friends; for I shall esteem myself happy if England be safe, and that I may have leave of living quiet with you. I shall always wish happiness to the queen, but I must have some time for myself, which could not be, if I had not taken the firm resolution of having no ambition, nor desire of favour."

"*Brussels, Feb. 4.* — \* \* \* \* The assurances you give in yours of the 14th of January, of being of my mind as to parties, have given me all the hopes imaginable of future happiness; at the same time I assure you that I think the principles of the Whigs are for the good of England, and that if the Tories had the power, they would not only destroy England, but also the liberties of Europe. I shall always govern my actions by joining with such as are for the good of England, but will never be a slave to either party, and consequently not expect favour from either.

\* \* \* \* \*

"As to my being uneasy at the changes that have been made, they are very unjust, for I have the vanity to think that some letters which I wrote to the queen were of use. Lord Sunderland must be distracted, if he can have a thought of hurting or disobliging you and me, for the satisfaction of Lord Halifax. You should speak plainly and kindly to him. I shall do it when I come home; and I do with all my heart hope that Lord Somers, the duke of Devonshire, Lord Townshend, and the duke of Newcastle, will be reasonable."

"*Brussels, Feb. 7.* — As to the compliments I desired might have been made to Lord Sunderland, it was upon what you wrote; but you may be sure that I shall neither desire nor make any, when you have so much reason to be dissatisfied, as you must have, when you call his designs monstrous. If Lord Halifax and Lord Sunderland are so extravagant, be assured that you will find others unreasonable, which will at last tire those who now serve, and then Mrs. Masham will be able to bring the queen into what scheme she pleases, which will be that of hurting the Whigs; but I agree with you that Lord Halifax has no other principle but his ambition; so that he would put all in distraction, rather than not gain his point. But the behaviour of Lord Sunderland looks to me like madness, for it is impossible for him to have a thought of being tolerably well with Mrs. Masham. I have marked two lines in the enclosed letter, by which you may see he apprehends all things are like to go wrong. Pray let nobody know of the letter but the lord treasurer."

"*Feb. 13.* — \* \* \* \* I desire you will say all that you can think reasonable from me to Lord Wharton, and I do, with all my heart, wish that Lord Somers would always follow his own good sense, by which he would serve both his queen and country. But I fear you will, on many occasions, be sensible of his giving way to the violence of Lord Halifax and Lord Sunderland; for parties are governed much more by passion and violence than by reason. The duke of Devonshire is certainly a very honest man, but Lord Orford has too much power with him. Walpole, who I agree is a very honest man, may be of use in keeping of the duke of Devonshire and Lord Townshend in good-humour. I believe the duke of Somerset is a friend to you and me, but his ill judgment and great desire of having credit with the queen, will make him both troublesome, and do hurt; but whilst in the world we must bear with such uneasinesses."

CHAP. LXXVIII. — PERPLEXITIES OF THE DUKE. —  
1708, 1709.

ONE of the principal motives which induced Marlborough to prolong his stay on the Continent was, his desire to watch the progress of the negotiations now pending between France and the States. Since the failure of the proposal made to open a public treaty with the Maritime Powers, through the elector of Bavaria, the king of France had regarded all attempts to lure them jointly into a peace as nugatory, and therefore became doubly anxious to gain some individual member of the Grand Alliance. He accordingly made many secret overtures to those chiefs of the Dutch republic who were inclined to peace, affecting a readiness to relinquish Spain and the Indies, with the Milanese and the Netherlands, provided he could obtain the kingdom of the Two Sicilies for his grandson. With this proposal, he coupled the offer of a satisfactory barrier on the side of the Netherlands, and great commercial advantages,—concessions which he was well aware would weigh with a timid and interested people like the Dutch. While, however, he thus amused his partisans in Holland, he applied to the emperor, through the mediation of the pope, offering to yield to the archduke Charles the Spanish territories in Italy, with the Netherlands, provided Philip should be allowed to retain Spain and the Indies.

The duplicity which these contradictory offers evinced, and the apprehension that some member of the alliance might be tempted to sacrifice the general good to private views, doubtless induced the Whigs to propose the unexpected declaration, which pledged the British parliament to continue the war, till the whole Spanish monarchy was restored to the house of Austria. This declaration did not, as was expected, deter the Dutch from their private intrigues. On the contrary, the pacific party continued to tamper with the French agents, and laboured to impress their countrymen with the opinion, that France was sufficiently humbled, and that it was impolitic to prosecute the war for the advantage of other powers, since they were

already assured of those acquisitions which they deemed necessary for their own security.

This sentiment was not confined to the partisans of France alone, but actuated in a greater or less degree even those who were most zealous for the connexion with England, from a conviction that their country was unable to support much longer the burdens of a protracted contest. In these circumstances, means were found to continue an intercourse, which was no less advantageous to France than detrimental to the common cause. Petcum, a meddling minister of the duke of Holstein, and Bergueick, the Spanish intendant of the Netherlands, were successively employed in these negotiations; and found co-operators in Buys, pensionary of Amsterdam, and Vanderdussen, member of the secret council and pensionary of Gouda.\* In addition to these clandestine overtures, more direct and explicit propositions were made, by means of Menager, an opulent merchant and able negotiator, and Rouillé, president of the parliament of Paris, who had formed intimate connexions with many considerable persons in Holland. The effect of these overtures was, a strong attempt among the pacific party to bring the rest of the States into a disposition to accede to a partition of the Spanish monarchy between the two rival candidates.

This secret negotiation was not only disclosed to Marlborough, but strenuous efforts were made by Buys and his friends to obtain his approbation of their proceedings.

On his return to the Hague from Brussels, he was visited on the 16th of January by Buys and Pancrass, president burgomaster of Amsterdam. They confidentially imparted to him the proposals of France, which had been communicated only to the chief magistrates of that city, stating that their pensionary would be ruined, should it be known that he had received such overtures without laying them before the States. They represented that they had maintained this reserve till they should know the duke's opinion, in hopes of obtaining his concurrence; and, at the same time, added, that no proposals should be received, without the approbation of the queen.

The overtures from France were these: that some persons of trust and confidence should be sent privately, with

\* *Mem. de Torcy*, tom. i. p. 229.

such proposals of peace, as would be agreeable to all the allies, with previous assurances that Spain, the Indies, Milan, with the Low Countries, should be no obstacle, and that a secure barrier should be granted to the Dutch; that, finally, as a proof of his sincerity, Louis would not endeavour to create jealousy among the allies, but would give just satisfaction to each of them, upon their reasonable pretensions. Buys and his colleague expatiated on the low condition to which Holland was reduced by the burdens of the war, and urged the necessity of peace; though at the same time they repeated their declaration, that no measures should be taken without the concurrence of the queen, and that an answer to that purpose had been returned by Petcum to Torcy.

On this delicate occasion, Marlborough acted with his customary prudence. Conscious that he was accused of prolonging the war from interested motives, he avoided exposing himself to the dangerous responsibility which he must have incurred by the absolute rejection of these offers. He therefore declined giving any opinion, but requested their permission to lay the overtures before the queen for her instructions, through the lord treasurer, under the strictest pledge of secrecy, adding, that her majesty had no greater desire than to promote a solid and durable peace. Having obtained their acquiescence, he transmitted the proposal to the treasurer for the royal consideration.\* He recommended also that these overtures should be concealed from the Dutch, who were so desirous of peace, that, for the sake of obtaining it, they would willingly agree to a partition treaty. But he enforced the necessity of making some declaration to the republic, relative to a plan of mutual co-operation, to prevent a schism in the Grand Alliance.

This interesting negotiation became a prominent subject in the correspondence between the general and the treasurer, and created an occasional discordance of opinion which had not occurred at any preceding period. Marlborough was apprehensive that the king of France was not yet sufficiently humbled, to agree to the terms which the allies were entitled to demand, and consequently represented the expediency of obtaining such an augmentation of force as might enable

\* Letters from the Duke of Marlborough to Lord Godolphin, Jan. 16, and 17.

him to dictate the conditions of peace ; while the treasurer imagined that the threats and preparations of the enemy were merely designed for intimidation, and was accordingly anxious to confine the military preparations to the narrowest limit, which his opinion of the state and means of France led him to deem sufficient.

In the course of their correspondence, Marlborough appealed continually to the advice of the Whig chiefs in general, and to Lord Somers in particular, by whom the treasurer was principally directed. He also adhered to the opinion, that an honourable peace was to be obtained, rather by action in the field, than by negotiation in the cabinet ; and that as the French were preparing to increase their army in the Netherlands, it became necessary to augment the confederate forces in a still greater proportion.

Unfortunately, in addition to the difficulty of obtaining such an augmentation of British troops as he deemed necessary, he had the mortification to be informed of a resolution in the British cabinet to send seven regiments, which were quartered at Antwerp, to Spain, the loss of which would have too considerably diminished the army in Flanders. Against this resolution the general warmly appealed to the treasurer, and in one of his letters strongly observed, —

“ *Brussels, Feb. 7.* — I received last night the favour of yours of the 18th of the last month, in which you continue being of the opinion that the seven battalions at Antwerp should be sent to England. I can say no more on that subject. You will see what the enclosed letter says as to the designs of France. As they draw their troops from all parts to strengthen their army in this country, if we at the same time must be obliged to leave our troops where they cannot be of much use, there can be no doubt but at length my Lord Haversham will be gratified by our being beaten, for a great superiority at last must undo us. I am of your opinion, that one reason for the enemy's marching their troops from all parts so early into this country is, in hopes that may incline the Dutch to hearken to peace. But I also am of opinion that, if that fails, their great superiority will incline them to venture a battle.”

“ *Brussels, Feb. 11.* — I know not how you may reason in England, but I am fully persuaded that it is of the last consequence to have the troops of Wirtemberg, and the seven regiments, serve in this country the next campaign ; for with those, all the troops that we may be able to get, for the sum of money given by parliament for the troops of augmentation, will fall very short of the number of troops the enemy will have in this country. Is it possible that men of good sense, and that mean sincerely well to the common cause, can be in the least doubt that if the enemy

make their greatest, and, indeed, their only effort in this country, but that we must do the same, or expect to be beaten? which I pray God Almighty to prevent, for that would be a fatal blow.

"If any orders have been sent me for the march of these seven regiments, I do most earnestly beg you will once more lay before her majesty and the lords of the cabinet council, my apprehensions."

This spirited remonstrance had its due effect, and though the seven regiments were assigned by parliament for the service of Spain, her majesty consented that they should be recruited in Flanders, and not be removed, as long as their presence was necessary; and that, at least, the duke might rely on their service at the commencement of the campaign. He likewise had the satisfaction of obtaining the consent of the States and the queen for a reinforcement of the 4000 Wirtembergers alluded to in the above letter, who were to be drawn from the Rhine. Yet with this additional force, he continued to regret that the confederate army in the Netherlands would be still inferior to that of the enemy, though he should be under the necessity of acting offensively, as the only means of extorting an honourable peace from France.

"I shall be sure," he writes to the treasurer (Brussels, Feb. 13.), "to observe your directions as to peace, but I am far from thinking the king of France so low as he is thought in England, and, as I am afraid, will appear very quickly; for it is hardly to be credited the people make me, whom I employ on the frontier, of the vast numbers of troops they have in all their towns, and that all their villages and farm-houses between the Sambre and Meuse are full of their horse. I do agree with you, that they may flatter themselves, that numbers of troops may intimidate, and consequently incline the States to hearken to such terms as they would not, if we had the superiority; but that which alarms me is, that I do not observe that they are very pressing for an opportunity to explain what they have offered, but are very vigilant in making their magazines, and obliging their troops to march in a very cruel season. I wish, with all my heart, I may be mistaken, but I beg this may not be seen by any body but the queen; for no measures can farther be taken than we are doing. For if they will venture, we must, let their numbers be what they will; and I hope God will, as he has hitherto done, protect and bless us with success."

And again, Feb. 14.:—

"Since mine of yesterday, by Mr. Abercromby, I have received yours of the 25th, by the way of Holland. By it I find we differ in opinion, as to the intentions of the enemy. I wish you may judge right, but I fear

it may prove otherwise. When I have the happiness of being with you, I shall be better able to inform you of my observations and reasons for my opinion."

After delivering his sentiments in these strong terms, he deferred the final settlement of the conditions for a general pacification until his arrival in England, for which country he was preparing to embark.

Such was the doubtful and troubled state of affairs when the duke took his departure from the Hague, not with the exultation which his successes might have inspired, but with melancholy reflections on the past, and forebodings no less melancholy for the future. He embarked at Ostend on the 25th of February, old style, and after a tedious and dangerous passage, reached London on the 1st of March.

The Duke of Marlborough made his appearance in the upper house on the ensuing day, and on taking his seat was welcomed with warm congratulations. The chancellor, after expressing the thanks of the peers for his great and eminent services, concluded by observing, "I shall not be thought to exceed my present commission, if, being thus led to contemplate the mighty things your grace has done for us, I cannot but conclude with acknowledging, with all gratitude, the providence of God in raising you up to be an instrument of so much good, in so critical a juncture, when it was so much wanted."

In the usual and modest style of his replies, he answered, "My lords; I hope you will do me the justice to believe, there are very few things that could give me more satisfaction than the favourable approbation of my service by this house, and I beg leave to assure your lordships, it shall be the constant endeavour of my life to deserve the continuation of your good opinion."

As it was imagined that Marlborough was the bearer of some proposals for peace, an address had been previously carried in the House of Lords, on the motion of the Whig peers, that the queen would be pleased to take care, at the conclusion of the war, to continue and establish a good and firm friendship with the allies, and that the French king might be obliged to own her majesty's title, and the Protestant succession; it was farther requested that effectual

methods should be taken for removing the Pretender out of the French dominions.

This address was sent down to the Commons, who added an amendment, proposed by Secretary Boyle, requiring, as a condition of peace, the demolition of the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk. Such a condition was perfectly in unison with the sentiments of the treasurer, and Marlborough had the satisfaction of giving his vote in favour of the address.\*

During his short stay in England, he was personally engaged in few of the parliamentary transactions; and, consequently, for the proceedings of the period, we shall refer to our national historians. One act, however, which was proposed during his stay, and passed soon after his departure, deserves particular notice, not only for its relative importance, but for its effect, as it regarded himself and the treasurer, as well as many distinguished characters of the time. This was the fulfilment of the promise given in the speech, at the opening of parliament by an act of grace, the first which had been granted in the reign of Anne, and the most general since the Revolution; because it comprehended every species of treason, except such as were committed on the high seas. It was proposed by Lord Sunderland on the 20th of April, and passed in both houses with the usual forms. This act could not be otherwise than agreeable to Godolphin and Marlborough, and to the numerous persons of all ranks and descriptions, who, since the abdication of James, had carried on a correspondence, either by letter or message, with the Stuart family, and who had been held in perpetual anxiety, lest by some unforeseen change of politics, the sympathy which they had shown toward their dethroned sovereign should be visited with the heaviest vengeance of the law.

After the act of grace no material business occurred, and the session of parliament was closed by commission, on the 21st of April, with the usual formalities, and with the appearance of perfect cordiality between the sovereign and the legislature.

During the continuance of Marlborough in England, he had the mortification to experience the same coldness which

\* Journals, March 3.

the queen had already manifested towards the treasurer, and to observe aggravated symptoms of her immoderate aversion to the Whigs. He had also the chagrin to witness the increasing influence of Mrs. Masham, and the eagerness with which persons of all ranks and distinctions hastened to pay their court to the new object of royal affection. He was no less grieved to observe the favour of his wife declining in the same proportion, to learn that her interviews with the queen were short, formal, and ceremonious, and to behold the herd of courtiers withdrawing the homage which they had long been accustomed to pay to her, as the reigning favourite. But a no less painful feeling was awakened by the conviction, that he as well as Godolphin were still the objects of jealousy to the Whigs, and that a cordial union with them, on which the safety of all depended, was of doubtful and distant accomplishment. He found also that the Whigs were meditating to extend their influence, by placing Lord Orford at the head of the Admiralty, and he foresaw that, in the accomplishment of this object, he should again be driven to the unwelcome task of combating the prejudices and antipathies of the queen, and should be exposed to acrimonious reproaches, should the success of his efforts not keep pace with the impatient wishes of the party. Finally, he had the melancholy reflection to perceive that his victories began to lose their splendour in the eyes of a capricious public; that he was accused more than ever of prolonging the contest from selfish motives; that the sovereign herself had ceased to take an interest in the triumph of her arms; and that impatience of the public burdens, and even the want of foreign luxuries, outweighed, in the consideration of many, all regard for national liberty, and the safety of their country.\*

Meanwhile the negotiations in Holland began to assume a more regular and definitive shape. Hitherto Louis had rather consulted the dictates of his pride and honour, than the sentiments or welfare of his subjects; but France was now reduced to the extremity of wretchedness and despondency. Most of the strong towns on the frontier were in the possession of the allies, while the interior provinces, exhausted and depopulated, were threatened with instant

\* Cuninghame, vol. ii. p. 220.

invasion. Domestic misery contributed to aggravate the sense of public misfortune. The people, who had already experienced the privations arising from scanty harvests and the waste of war, were menaced with all the horrors of famine, in consequence of the severity of the recent season, which had destroyed the fruits of the earth in the germ. Numerous insurrections broke forth in different quarters, and the public ferment was increased by the effects of religious persecution. The highways were infested with banditti; while in the larger towns, the fury of the populace was restrained only by the presence of that military force which was required for the defence of the frontier. Every invention for raising new taxes had failed; and a forced circulation of fictitious money, which had hitherto furnished resources to the government, had sapped the foundations of commerce, and destroyed the credit of the nation abroad.\*

In these deplorable circumstances, a clamour for peace was raised by a powerful party, at the head of whom was the duke of Burgundy, presumptive heir to the throne. They re-echoed the complaints which had been heard in the distant provinces, and disclosed those unwelcome truths, which fear and severity had hitherto withheld from the royal ear.

Baffled in all his vast designs, the French monarch had

\* The war was ruinous to France, and she hardly recovered under the elder branch of the Bourbons its disastrous calamities. But she was exhausted rather than beaten in the struggle. It will be remarked in the sequel that towards the close of the contest, and after the defection of England from the allies, she recovered many of the strong places she had lost in Flanders, and again became formidable in the field under the able generalship of Marshal Villars. But the country was brought to the verge of ruin from the neglect and oppression of industry by heavy war taxes, aggravated in their pressure by the exemption of the nobility and clergy from imposts. From the decline of trade and general consumption, the revenue fell off, the currency was depreciated, and the choice of the population was carried away to recruit the armies. Louis XIV. having seized for his camps the chief subsistence of the people, said that "they would follow the bread waggons;" but they did not, they had to be dragged to the frontiers like malefactors. England did not suffer in an equal degree, but in this country, too, the war had begun to be unpopular. Splendid as the victories of Eugene and Marlborough had been, they had failed to make any serious impression on the power of France, and the vast contributions we had made in men and subsidies had greatly increased the public debt and taxes. — En.

no resource, except to open a new negotiation, which, if successful, would relieve him from his multiplied embarrassments, and, even if it failed, might induce the allies to slacken their efforts, and encourage his own subjects to bear more cheerfully the extremities to which they were reduced. With this view he despatched the president Rouillé to Holland, with powers to offer such terms as he hoped would be accepted by the allies.

The French agent was met, on the part of the Dutch government, by Buys and Vanderdussen, who were commissioned to receive and report his proposals. Their conferences were first held at Moerdyke, and afterwards at Worden; and the result is thus communicated to the Duke of Marlborough, by General Palmes, who derived his information from the pensionary.

"M. Rouillé made offers of giving up Spain, the Indies, and the Milanese to King Charles. Upon which, being asked what instructions he had concerning the rest of Italy, he answered, as to the islands, his master was ready to give them, but would insist upon Naples and Sicily for his grandson. The Low Countries he was willing to give up, as at the peace of Ryswick, and join to them Menin; '*mais pour Lille, que son maître s'en demettrait mal volontiers*,' but would consent to give up Ypres in lieu of it. As to the empire, his master would restore every place to the state it was in after the peace of Ryswick. The answer of the deputies was, that they could not enter into any treaty, but upon the foot of what was proposed after the battle of Ramilies; that they had treaties with their respective allies, and would not give any answer to these proposals, till satisfaction was given to the said treaties."

Although these proposals were vague and unsatisfactory, the overture was not peremptorily rejected; and Rouillé departed for Paris, to procure farther instructions. Accordingly, Eugene was remanded from Vienna, and was soon afterwards followed by Count Zinzendorf, as imperial plenipotentiary. At the same time, Marlborough was directed to return to the Hague, and charged with the following instructions.

"As the president Rouillé has held several conferences with certain deputies of the republic, which have excited alarm and jealousies among the confederates, the Duke of Marlborough is enjoined to declare to the pensionary the opinion of the queen, that no negotiation for peace should be concluded with France, until the preliminaries are adjusted between England and the States. He is to announce her hope, that the States will concur in her sentiments and those of her people, so often expressed

in the addresses of parliament, that no peace can be safe or honourable unless the whole Spanish monarchy be restored to the house of Austria. That the French king shall be obliged to acknowledge her title and the succession to the crown; the Pretender be removed from France, and the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk be destroyed. He is likewise to announce her majesty's desire, that other preliminaries should be required for the security and interest of the States, particularly a barrier, for which a treaty had been so long depending, and of which the queen was willing to become a guarantee, not doubting but the States would, in like manner, guaranty the Protestant succession. He is to endeavour to engage the rest of the allies to be also guaranties."

He was instructed to stipulate, that if the preliminaries were not agreed to before the opening of the campaign, the allies were to consider themselves at liberty to propose additional articles; and he was to inform the pensionary of the queen's desire, that at the conclusion of the war a firm alliance and friendship should be formed between all the confederates.

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#### CHAP. LXXIX. — NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.—1709.

ON the 9th of April Marlborough reached the Hague, where he found Eugene, who had arrived on the preceding day. They immediately held conferences with the pensionary, Buys, Vanderdussen, and the heads of the government; and after a mature discussion, the terms offered by the French agent were declared inadmissible for the ground of a treaty. Orders were accordingly issued for hastening the military preparations, and the two Dutch agents returned to Worden, to communicate the result of the meeting to Rouillé. As, however, he deprecated any further decision, till he had received more explicit instructions from Versailles, his application was granted, and he was suffered to wait the return of his messenger.

Soon after his arrival at the Hague, he communicated his instructions to Pensionary Heinsius, intimating, at the same time, the great confidence which the queen and the allies reposed in his integrity and zeal. The pensionary having expressed his apprehensions that France would never submit

to terms so severe, the duke replied, that he could not depart from a single article of his instructions, and testified hopes that the extreme distress of France would oblige her monarch to accept any conditions which the allies, if united, would demand. But the pensionary expatiated on the still greater distresses of Holland, and the inability of the Dutch to carry on the war. He deplored the fatal consequences which must ensue, should the negotiations prove abortive, and insinuated that the people would lay the whole blame of the failure on England. "I will use my endeavours," he added, "that no steps shall be taken but what are agreeable to the queen and the allies; but I recommend you, strongly, not to impart any of your instructions, at the first conference, but what may concern the barrier and the Protestant succession, for the purpose of gaining time, till the return of the French courier."

This opinion of a statesman so friendly to England, and so well inclined to the principles of the Grand Alliance, will prove the extreme difficulty which Marlborough had to encounter; and he soon afterwards perceived still stronger symptoms of the dissatisfaction prevailing among the other members of the Dutch republic, lest the negotiation should be broken off, by insisting on a condition so impracticable as the restoration of the whole Spanish monarchy to the house of Austria within two months. He had the satisfaction, however, to be convinced that the "solid part of the Dutch government were inclined to prosecute the war," till a good and lasting peace should be obtained. He was gratified likewise with the repeated declarations of the pensionary, that no step should be taken without the concurrence of the queen and the other allies; and he states his conviction that a general opinion prevailed in Holland not to proceed to any treaty without their participation.\*

We have already seen, by the correspondence, the embarrassments which arose from the interminable disputes with the Dutch republic on the subject of the barrier. At this period the difficulties increased, because the prospect of an approaching peace rendered the Dutch impatient of further delay, and indicated the necessity of settling the barrier in

\* Letters from the duke to Secretary Boyle and Lord Godolphin, April 12.

the preliminaries, if England expected that the republic should agree to guarantee the Protestant succession. As Marlborough disapproved their exorbitant demands, and particularly opposed the inclusion of Ostend and Dendermond among the towns of the barrier, he was unwilling to irritate the leading men by a formal refusal. He therefore maintained a cautious silence, and declined holding any conversation on the subject. This reserve offended several of the chiefs, and they threatened to send M. Buys to England, with a view to obtain from the cabinet a specific acknowledgment of their claims; a measure which would have been attended with considerable inconvenience, and which he had great difficulty in evading.

Meanwhile, Godolphin and the other members of the British cabinet were displeased with the apparent lukewarmness of the pensionary, and irritated at the Dutch, who, while they advanced such extravagant demands for their own barrier, were unwilling to offend France by insisting on the rasure of Dunkirk, or by allowing equivalent advantages to England. The letters of the treasurer on this occasion are filled with violent invectives against the selfishness and obstinacy of the Dutch republic; and he enjoined Marlborough to lose no time in laying before their government his full instructions on the subject of the proposed preliminaries. It required the greatest discretion and judgment to reconcile these conflicting interests.

Marlborough was also become extremely unpopular among many in Holland, from a suspicion that he would accept the government of the Low Countries, and the recent offer of King Charles to grant it for life increased their jealousy. Nor was it easy to quiet these alarms, because he had not sent a positive refusal, and because he was strongly solicited by Lord Somers not to decline the offer, in hopes that some favourable circumstances might occur to quiet the apprehensions of the Dutch. Even when he had received information from the lord treasurer that the queen left the matter to his own decision, he still deferred his final refusal; lest Charles, or the court of Vienna, should appoint a person who would not be acceptable to the other allies. The solemn asseverations of the duke, that he would not accept the government, came therefore too late to allay the ferment, and,

as he himself allows, weakened his influence over the minds of a people scarcely less repugnant to the ascendancy of England than to that of France.\* This jealousy had excited great murmurs, and was supposed by many to have induced a considerable party in Holland to listen to the overtures of the French monarch, and to clamour for the continuance of the negotiation.†

At length the Dutch government formally delivered a list of the places which they required for their barrier, and which Marlborough transmitted to the treasurer in a letter, bearing date April 19.

"The deputation of the States-general were with me yesterday above two hours: the whole time was spent on the subject of the barrier. After I had given them all the assurances I thought necessary, of the intentions and inclinations of the queen and English nation, of concurring with them in what might be reasonable for their barrier, I did endeavour to cure them of any jealousy they might have of my being particularly concerned. I hope it has had a good effect with them. However, I have done all I can, and shall do so to keep them in good humour, if possible. The enclosed is what they desire for their barrier; it encloses what might be thought a great kingdom. I hope to persuade them from some of it, so that I beg very few may see it; but when I have done all that may be in my power, I shall then send it to the secretary, so that it may come regularly to her majesty, and the cabinet council.

"M. Rouillé's messenger returned last night; but I am told that he desires two days to decipher his despatch; so that Tuesday will be the soonest I shall be able to give you an account of this matter. This is so critical a time that I dare not be of any opinion; but I tremble when I think that a very little impatience may ruin a sure game."

In announcing the receipt of this list, Godolphin replies with a degree of unusual asperity, in a letter dated April 12-23.

"I must now acknowledge the favour of yours of the 19th, with the list of towns proposed for the barrier, by which one may observe very little consideration for King Charles, any more than for the queen. I hope they will think fit to have a little more regard to both, before the conclusion of this affair; and one can't help admiring the great modesty of the States, in asking all those terms for themselves, when, at the same time, they make a difficulty to have the single town of Dunkirk demolished, at the instance of the queen. \* \* \* \* \*

"You call it in your letter by a very civil term, *a little impatience*,

\* Letter to Lord Godolphin, Hague, April 16.

† Abrégé de l'Histoire de la Holland, p. 1098.

which you say you tremble to think may spoil a sure game; but I confess I look upon that word impatience to be a very gentle one in this case, and I wish it may not prove a determined resolution of gratifying their enemies, and gaining advantages for themselves, at the expense of their allies."

At this moment new perplexities arose; memorials poured in from all the allied courts, exhorting the queen to support their respective pretensions at the approaching peace; and these memorials were transmitted to Marlborough, "for the sole purpose," as Godolphin observes, "of showing to the States how indifferent a figure her majesty makes in this peace, and how very different from that which she has made during the whole course of the war."

Among these, we cannot omit to notice a very singular application from the court of Barcelona. King Charles, not satisfied with the entire monarchy of Spain, even required the restitution of Roussillon, and all the territories yielded at the peace of the Pyrenees; and he joined with the emperor in a strong remonstrance against the cession of the places which the Dutch had required for their barrier. It was impossible that Marlborough could reconcile these jarring pretensions, and we cannot wonder, therefore, that he found great difficulty in adjusting such terms as were likely to be approved by all the contracting powers. He proceeded, however, in conforming himself to the strict tenour of his instructions.

On the 23d of April, he formally announced to the pensionary the specific articles of the preliminaries on which her majesty insisted; namely, the cession of the whole Spanish monarchy to king Charles; the recognition of the Protestant succession; the removal of the Pretender from the French dominions, and the demolition of Dunkirk. He also informed the British government that he was preparing to make the declaration for these conditions in the name of the queen, that Prince Eugene would imitate his example in regard to the emperor's pretensions, and that the other foreign ministers would produce similar acts in the name of their respective sovereigns. In his letter to Secretary Boyle, as well as in others to Lord Godolphin, he intimates the prevalence of a general inclination in Holland for peace, and praises the conduct of the pensionary, who, on mature

reflection, had expressed his determination to act in concurrence with England.

The peremptory resolution of the British cabinet on one hand, not to depart from the articles intended for the preliminaries, and on the other, the selfish disposition of the Dutch government, threw him into an unusual embarrassment; and as the only means of arranging so delicate a transaction, he determined on a temporary return to England. He communicated his purpose in a letter to the treasurer\*, adding, that he had not hitherto disclosed it to any one but Prince Eugene.†

During the presence of Marlborough in England, the subject of peace was amply discussed in the British cabinet; and, at his instance, and the recommendation of Somers, Lord Townshend was associated with him in the office of plenipotentiary. In addition to the former instructions, they were enjoined to insist, "that the towns and forts of Furnes, Ypres, Menin, Lille, Tournay, Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge, be delivered up, at a treaty of peace, from France to king Charles, to be garrisoned as shall be hereafter settled."

To promote an honourable and lasting peace, they were authorised to induce the allies to conclude, without delay, a grand alliance, in which they should mutually guarantee their respective pretensions, to use all their endeavours that the French Protestants should be restored to their civil and religious rights, and to prepare an advantageous treaty of commerce between England and France, in conformity with subsequent instructions. Lastly, the pensionary and members of the States were to be informed that the queen could not agree to a peace, unless Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay were restored.

To these, additional instructions were added, that if the

\* Hague, April 24.

† The biographers and historians have mostly erred in the date respecting the time of the duke's departure from the Hague. Lediard, Tindal, and the French biographer assert that he arrived at the Hague on the 9th of April, and reembarked on the 13th, *n. s.*; whereas, his letters from the Hague bear date as low as April 27, and he was then on the point of embarking. Torcy more justly says, that he embarked for England towards the end of April, *n. s.* Vol. i. p. 324.

revenues of the towns and territories, which were to form the barrier, should not be sufficient for the necessary expenses, the plenipotentiaries should be authorised to consent to the addition of such farther sum or sums as should be deemed necessary, out of the income and revenues arising from the Spanish Netherlands.\*

On the 18th of May, Marlborough and Townshend arrived at the Hague, and found that the negotiation had assumed a more favourable form.

In consequence of the report transmitted by Rouillé, the king of France was alarmed with the prospect of an immediate rupture of the negotiation. He accordingly despatched his secretary of state, the marquis of Torcy, with the hope that his character, as a confidential minister, would give greater weight to his mission; that he would be able either to lure or awe the States into a separate accommodation, or procure more favourable terms than the allies had hitherto appeared disposed to grant. This minister had reached the Hague soon after the departure of Marlborough, and with some difficulty induced the Dutch government to consent to a renewal of the suspended negotiation. He accordingly held a conference with the two deputies, and proposed some changes in the terms already offered. The States, however, declared their resolution not to treat separately, and declined any decision, till they were apprised of the opinion of their allies, particularly the sentiments of the queen of England, by the Duke of Marlborough, who was shortly expected.

The instructions with which the plenipotentiaries were charged, and the disposition which the British government evinced to gratify the States, in regard to their barrier, gave a more flattering aspect to the negotiation than it had assumed at the commencement, and full confidence seems to have been again restored on the great question of peace and war. On the very day after his arrival, Marlborough notified to Lord Godolphin, with great exultation, that he had overcome the pensionary's objections, and prevailed on the Dutch commissioners to accede to the principal articles; and that he was not without hopes that the cession of Newfoundland to England would be admitted, adding, that the

\* Additional instructions printed in the *General Collection of Treaties*, &c., vol. ii. p. 479.

pretensions to Hudson's Bay would be settled by commissioners. He allowed that the most difficult part of the negotiation would be the article respecting the cessation of arms. After commending the friendly behaviour of the pensionary, he concluded, "M. de Torcy has offered so much, that I have no doubt it will end in a good peace." He observed also to his wife, in a letter of the same date, "Every thing goes so well here, that there is no doubt of its ending in a good peace;" and as if auguring the certainty of that happy event, he added, "but for some little time it must not be spoken of. You must have in readiness the side-board of plate, and you must let the lord treasurer know, that since the queen came to the crown, I have not had either a canopy or chair of state, which now of necessity I must have, so the wardrobe should have immediate orders; and I beg you will take care to have it made so as that it may serve for part of a bed, when I have done with it here, which I hope will be by the end of this summer, so that I may enjoy your dear company in quiet, which is the greatest satisfaction I am capable of having. I have so great a head-ache that you will excuse my saying any more by this post."

The great difficulties, however, relative to the barrier, again nearly interrupted the good harmony which subsisted between the Dutch and the other allies. These pretensions appeared so exorbitant, that Eugene and Zinzendorf refused their assent, and it required all the influence of Marlborough to induce the Dutch to moderate, or at least to suspend, some of their claims.

Having discussed the points at issue with the States, Marlborough and his associates commenced their diplomatic intercourse with the French minister, and after the usual visits of respect and ceremony, entered on the business separately or jointly, as circumstances occurred. Conferences followed on conferences, both public and private, and Torcy exerted the dexterity and blandishments for which he was distinguished. He was furnished with such powers as enabled him to display all the artifices of diplomacy, and supplied with considerable funds to corrupt the fidelity of those with whom his own eloquence, or the influence of his master were unavailing. After having in vain attempted to gain

over the Dutch government, or to vanquish the opposition of the pensionary and imperial plenipotentiaries, he did not hesitate to address himself privately to Marlborough, and to make him the offer of an enormous bribe on the fulfilment of certain conditions. He pledged the word and honour of the king to remit him two millions of livres, if he could obtain the reserve of Naples and Sicily for his grandson; or even Naples alone, at the last extremity; or, if that could not be procured, the same gratification for the preservation of Dunkirk in its actual state, or even for that of Strasburg. He also increased his offer to four millions, if he could obtain the Two Sicilies, or even Naples alone for Philip, and Strasburg, Dunkirk, and Landau, for France.\*

In announcing these offers, Torcy took an opportunity to hint at the former correspondence of Marlborough with Berwick and the exiled family, with the evident hope that it would alarm him into compliance. The duke was doubtless much embarrassed by these covert insinuations; yet he parried the attack with the dexterity of a courtier and the politeness of a gentleman. He testified profound respect for the king of France, and esteem for his nephew the duke of Berwick, and professed his desire to serve the son of a sovereign for whom he would have shed the last drop of his blood; but he received the indelicate proposal of a bribe with silent contempt, and whenever it was resumed, hastened to change the conversation. He was neither alarmed nor tempted by the artful proposals of the French plenipotentiary, to recede from a single article of his instructions. He strenuously insisted, that no compensation would be granted to the duke of Anjou, and that no British minister would dare to propose the cession of Naples or Sicily to a French prince. He discouraged any hopes of obtaining the payment of the dowry to the exiled queen; nor did he less enforce the demand that the prince of Wales should be removed from France, adding, that he might fix his residence in any other country, and enjoy proper security and freedom. He dwelt also on the stupendous successes of the war, as an indication of providential interference; and to the same cause he ascribed the wonderful union that actuated the members of the Grand Alliance, and impelled eight nations to

\* *Memoires de Torcy*, tom. ii. p. 104—111.

act and speak as one man. He therefore earnestly exhorted the French monarch to accept the proffered terms, as a means of preserving his country from inevitable destruction, and urged him not to flatter himself with the hope of exciting divisions among the allies, or of inducing them to depart a tittle from their demands.\*

In the course of the public conferences, proposals and counter-proposals were made on both sides. The minor points were gradually conceded, or referred to future discussion; and, after labouring in vain to obtain some compensation for the duke of Anjou, Torcy reluctantly admitted the grand principle that the whole monarchy of Spain should be delivered to the house of Austria. The mode of this relinquishment, however, became the subject of warm and continued discussion, and was, in fact, still the point on which the negotiation turned. The allies required an unequivocal surrender, within a limited time, by insisting that Louis himself should induce his grandson to deliver up the whole monarchy; while the French minister protested against the demand, as impracticable, and derogatory to the feelings and honour of his sovereign. He tendered several expedients, which he affected to regard as equivalent, but which were successively rejected by the allies, as insufficient or illusory, and tending to engage them in a separate contest on Spanish ground, while France enjoyed the advantages of peace.

To terminate a discussion which appeared to be endless, and to bring the question to an immediate issue, the ministers of the allies entered into an engagement for the maintenance of their respective pretensions, and embodied their demands on France in a series of preliminaries, consisting of forty-four articles, embracing the principal points at issue, and establishing the mode for the unequivocal surrender of the whole Spanish monarchy to the house of Austria within

\* We have described this conversation, as nearly as possible, in the very words of Torcy, that we may not seem to extenuate the conduct of Marlborough; but we must at the same time caution the reader that the account is given by a French minister to his sovereign, and, consequently, that we must expect the circumstances to be represented in the manner most pleasing to the person to whom it was addressed, and probably in the mode least honourable to the British general.

two months. This ultimatum was formally delivered to the French minister by the pensionary of Holland as an irrefragable proof that the Dutch acted in full concurrence with England and the other allies.

The basis of these preliminaries was the cession of the whole Spanish monarchy to the house of Austria, and the acknowledgment of Charles as king of Spain and the Indies. No part of the Spanish dominions was ever to be possessed by a prince of the house of Bourbon; and French subjects were not to be admitted to trade to the Spanish Indies. Finally, Louis was to restore all the towns and forts which he had either conquered or occupied in the Spanish Netherlands.

To secure the fulfilment of the article relative to the evacuation of the Spanish monarchy, the duke of Anjou was to relinquish Spain and deliver up Sicily within two months; and should he refuse to consent, the French king was to withdraw his troops from Spain, and not only withhold his assistance, but enter into proper measures with the allies for giving effect to the proposed evacuation. He was likewise, at the same period, to put into the possession of the allies, Namur, Mons, Charleroi, Luxembourg, Condé, Tournay, Maubeuge, Nieuport, Furnes, and Ypres.

In favour of the States, France was to deliver up to them as a barrier, Furnes, Menin, Ypres, Warneton, Comines, Werwick, Paperingen, Lille, Condé, and Maubeuge. The Dutch garrisons were likewise to remain in Huy, Liege, and Bonn, till otherwise agreed with the emperor and empire.

To England Louis was to acknowledge the title of the queen and the Protestant succession, raise Dunkirk, send the Pretender out of France, and cede Newfoundland. He was likewise to settle a treaty of commerce between the two countries. Certain stipulations were made in favour of the emperor, empire, the duke of Savoy, and the other allies.

It was stipulated expressly that if the whole monarchy was not delivered to Charles III. within two months after the conclusion of the treaty, the cessation of arms, which was to take place on the ratification of the preliminaries, was to terminate. A general congress was appointed, at which the allies might make further demands. It was to begin on the 20th of June, and the ratification on the part

of the king of France, the queen of Great Britain, and the States, was to be announced on the 15th of June, and on the part of the emperor by the 1st of July. These preliminaries were regularly signed by the imperial and British plenipotentiaries, as well as by the pensionary and Dutch commissioners, and delivered in form to the French secretary.

After ineffectually attempting to obtain some mitigation of the articles, Torcy publicly objected to the 37th and 39th, relative to the restoration of the whole Spanish monarchy within two months, and the limitation of the suspension of arms to the same period. But although he declared that he had not full powers to sign such conditions, he testified his intention of proceeding to Paris, with the hopes of prevailing on his royal master to ratify all the preliminaries. He likewise promised to send the king's final answer by the 4th of June, and Rouillé remained in Holland to continue the negotiation. His professions were considered as indicating a pacific disposition on the part of his sovereign, and his departure was hailed as the signal of approaching peace. All ranks exulted in the prospect of terminating this bloody contest, and none more than the general, who now deemed himself secure of that tranquil retirement for which he had long sighed in vain; and his correspondence at this period is strongly indicative of his own satisfaction and that of his friends at the certain prospect of an approaching peace.

The disposition for peace which prevailed in Holland was equally general in England. All the friends of Marlborough, and the duchess in particular, circulated the most cheering reports that peace was actually concluded. Letters of congratulation poured in from all quarters, lauding the dexterity and firmness which he had manifested in wielding the discordant interests of the Grand Alliance, and celebrating his success in negotiation no less than his prowess in arms.

These elevated expectations were, however, soon dissipated by the intelligence which arrived from the French court. Torcy, on his road to Versailles, was met by a messenger from the king, announcing his rejection of the preliminaries; and on his arrival he imparted the communication in a letter to Eugene, which reached him on the 4th at Brussels. The same messenger arrived at the Hague on the 5th, and conveyed to Rouillé an order to notify the decision in form to

the Duke of Marlborough, as well as to the other plenipotentiaries. Notwithstanding this severe disappointment, the general still clung to the hopes of peace, and continued to regret the rupture of the negotiation. In the letters written before and after his departure from the Hague, he expressed his conviction that the preliminaries would yet be ratified. He was so confident in this expectation, that he even commenced arrangements with the treasurer for the return of the army to England and the payment of the arrears due to all foreign troops, so that, to use his own words, "they might have no pretext to refuse marching, when ordered home, agreeably to their treaties."\*

He was, however, grievously disappointed, not only by the failure of his sanguine hopes, but by the effect which the rupture of the negotiation produced both in England and France. Louis derived essential advantages from the suspension of the naval preparations in England, and from the fresh impulse which it enabled him to give to the spirit and ardour of his loyal subjects. In a circular letter which he addressed to the prelates and magistrates of the realm, he detailed, with great address, his own anxiety for peace, and the sacrifices which he had offered to make; while he expatiated with equal art on the insulting demands of the allies; and their refusal to continue the cessation of arms, unless, within two months, he expelled his grandson from Spain. "If I must continue the war," he added, "it is better to contend with my enemies than with my own family." This manifesto, addressed to the feelings and passions of his people, kindled a spark of general enthusiasm and loyalty; all parties vied in contributing their property and personal service for the maintenance of the war, and the campaign was opened by the enemy with greater unanimity and energy than had been manifested in the whole course of the contest.

We cannot close this brief review of the negotiation without adverting to the accusation advanced against the Duke of Marlborough, for clandestinely obstructing the overtures, and prolonging the war for his own interest; an accusation so long and so repeatedly urged by the advocates of the Tory ministry as to be generally credited, and considered as *authentic* and well-founded, even by several of our respect-

\* Letter to Lord Godolphin, June 4.

able historians. He is represented as the principal arbiter of the negotiations, and it is confidently asserted that the other ostensible agents were not more significant than puppets which echoed his voice and moved by his impulse.\*

Against this imputation we must protest, as equally unfounded and unjust. The extracts from his confidential letters, which have been submitted to the reader, will sufficiently prove that he was anxious for peace, and regretted the premature rupture of the negotiation; while these, as well as the whole series of correspondence, clearly show that he was the organ of government, bound by instructions founded on the public resolutions of parliament, and emanating from the cabinet council. These he had not the power to modify, nor would he have fulfilled his duty in departing from them. With regard to the terms themselves, most were unquestionably just, whether considered in the light of equity or of policy; others, which were harsh in appearance, were defensible in principle, when we consider the character of the prince to whom they were offered, and the repeated acts of perfidy and aggression which had marked the long course of his reign.

We are, at the same time, far from condemning Louis for rejecting conditions which we think warranted by circumstances. He was justified in procuring the most favourable terms which he could obtain, and in risking the continuance of war rather than submitting to the dictates of his enemies; but we cannot refrain from censuring Godolphin and the Whig leaders, for imposing terms which were doubtless harsh and revolting to a monarch long flattered by success and accustomed to awe the surrounding nations, without at the same time providing the surest means for giving efficiency to their pretensions, and extorting acquiescence by force when persuasion failed. Marlborough, as his correspondence testifies, perceived the necessity of such preparations, and urged that the only means of dictating the terms of peace was by providing a force in the Netherlands far superior to that of the enemy. His representations were, however, unavailing, and to his disappointment in procuring a greater augmentation of troops, we may attribute the pro-

\* Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 395.

longation of the war, and the sacrifices which that prolongation entailed.

Although he remained firm to the grand principle in his instructions, that the whole Spanish monarchy should be transferred to the house of Austria, and no part ever appropriated to any prince of the house of Bourbon; yet he differed from Godolphin and the British cabinet on the grand question, relating to the evacuation of Spain. They concluded that nothing less than the cession of the whole monarchy to the house of Austria, at the expiration of two months, would secure the fulfilment of the preliminaries; whereas he was of opinion that the cession of the towns specified in the 22d article would place France in such a situation as to give ample security to the allies; and that if Philip should refuse to evacuate Spain, the combined forces would speedily accomplish its reduction. We find this sentiment unequivocally expressed in a letter to Mr. Stanhope.

"May 27. — \* \* \* \* The French ministers insist positively that they were not authorised to go this length, so that M. de Torcy is gone to lay the preliminary articles before his master, and is obliged to return his answer by the 4th of next month, till when, we have deferred taking the field. We have reason to hope, from the circumstances France is reduced to, they will be under the necessity of complying with these articles, which I believe you will agree with me, is the utmost that we could dare to expect. I own to you that we still may meet with some difficulties about the duke of Anjou's evacuating Spain; but when the French have delivered us all the cautionary towns, and complied with every thing else on this side, we shall have the better end of the staff, and be more able to force them."

He expresses himself still more strongly in a confidential letter to the treasurer, dated Ghent, June 16.

"I have received the favour of your two letters of the 27th and 31st of the last month. I must own to you that I did think upon the arrival of M. Rouillé at Versailles, that the king of France would have offered some expedient that might have given satisfaction as to the evacuation of the entire monarchy; but if we hear nothing of it in a day or two, we may then depend upon it that they resolve to go on with the war. I have as much mistrust for the sincerity of France as any body living can have, but I will own to you that, in my opinion, if France had delivered the towns promised by the preliminaries, and demolished Dunkirk and the other towns mentioned, they must have been at our discretion, so that if they had played tricks, so much the worse for themselves; but I do not love to be singular, especially when it was doing what France

seemed to desire. I shall endeavour, and everybody else ought, to do every thing in their power to keep up the spirit that is at this time in Holland against the French; and if you can, by sea, hinder corn going to them, they must submit."

Godolphin justly considered some expressions in this letter as indicating regret at the premature rupture of the negotiation; "but," he adds, "I shall keep your opinion in that matter, to myself, because, if it were known, I am afraid it might discourage people both here and in Holland."\*

No stronger proof surely can be required, that Marlborough was not the arbiter of peace and war, and that he was controlled by the cabinet at home, who suppressed or gave currency to his opinions, as they suited or opposed their own views. We have, however, still stronger evidence to produce in his favour.

When he repaired to the army, Lord Townshend continued at the Hague to conduct the negotiations and conclude the barrier treaty; but no definitive arrangement was to be effected without their joint signatures, as they were equally invested with full powers.

We have already alluded to the difficulty which subsisted between the Dutch and British cabinets for a formation of the barrier, a difficulty which Marlborough compared to that of washing a blackamoor white; for the Dutch increased their demands for its extension, while the house of Austria objected to the insertion of many of the places proposed. The British cabinet endeavoured to mediate between the two extremes, and formed a project which they hoped would accord with the views of both parties. The Dutch, however, insisted on the admission of Dendermond, and the castle of Ghent, against which the house of Austria strongly protested, and their protest was supported by Marlborough. At the same time it was proposed to insert two articles; viz. that the Dutch should conclude no peace until the whole Spanish monarchy was restored to the house of Austria, and the fortifications of Dunkirk were demolished. These articles he strongly supported, as a means of pledging the Dutch to adhere to the general principle of the Grand Alliance; but they, with their characteristic prudence, objected to the insertion, as it might retard the conclusion of peace. On this

\* From Lord Godolphin, June 10-21.

subject the pensionary was unusually violent, and paid no regard to the remonstrances of Marlborough\*, and a vehement altercation took place, which nearly produced a schism in the Grand Alliance. †

The king of France artfully taking advantage of this discordance, made an offer of an expedient for the 37th article, in the hopes of persuading the Dutch to renew the negotiation. On the day of Rouillé's departure from the Hague, Petcum, though not formally authorised, offered in the name of Louis, as the modification of the 37th article, that three cautionary towns in Flanders should be delivered to the allies as a pledge of his sincerity for the execution of the preliminaries. This proposal seemed to be favourably received, and though it could not be acceded to, as not emanating officially from the French cabinet, it was taken into consideration. Through the same channel an answer was conveyed, evincing an inclination to accept the offer, if the three places in Flanders were named by the Dutch, and three additional towns in Spain, which they also should designate, were included in the cession. During these proceedings, however, the king of France recalled his garrisons from the Spanish towns, and Torcy informed the pensionary that his master was unable to comply with their demand on the latter point. But he confirmed the proposal of ceding any three towns in Flanders, with the exception of Cambray. He likewise proposed that Petcum should be removed to France for the purpose of receiving fresh overtures.

The pacific party among the Dutch evinced, as usual, a strong inclination to treat on this proposal, and were even joined by the pensionary and the friends of England. The British cabinet, alarmed at these symptoms of a change of policy, found it necessary to recede from the obnoxious articles in the barrier treaty, and at the same time to consent to the introduction of Dendermond, and the castle of Ghent. Lured by these offers, the pensionary and his partisans firmly closed the discussion, by announcing their positive determina-

\* We beg leave to call the attention of the reader to this circumstance, as it will sufficiently contradict the assertions of Torcy and his adherents, that the pensionary was completely governed by Marlborough.

† See these two projects in Swift's Remarks on the Barrier Treaty.

tion not to depart from the 37th article, unless Louis would deliver into their possession three towns in Flanders at their own nomination, and the same number in Spain; or, if none of the latter were in his power, offer an expedient which they should deem of equal advantage and security. The mission of Petcum, or any other minister, to Paris, was peremptorily rejected. \*

In conformity with their promise, the British cabinet gratified the Dutch by a modification of the barrier treaty. The new project being completely arranged, the conduct of the negotiation was confided principally to Townshend, and Marlborough was consulted only for the sake of form. During its progress he frankly testified his objections to the cession of Dendermond and the castle of Ghent, as prejudicial to the interests of England, and his letters to the treasurer are filled with remonstrances against the omission of the two articles relative to the monarchy of Spain, and the rasure of Dunkirk. He never relied on the sincerity of France, but was willing to accept such pledges as, even if she should be insincere, would secure the reduction of Spain. He therefore proposed that a previous treaty should be concluded between England, the emperor, and Holland, specifying their respective contingents in men and money, and in such case was confident that the war would not last six months; but he persisted in his opinion, that by the omission of the two articles, France would derive hopes that the Dutch would agree to peace, although the whole Spanish monarchy was not restored, nor Dunkirk rased.

“ I find by yours of the 12th, from London, the great desire you have for an expedient for the monarchy of Spain, so as that the treaty for the barrier might be finished. In the first place, the constitution of Holland is such, that no article can be a secret. I know that Lord Townshend and lord president are very fond of having the treaty for the barrier settled; but at the same time I must let you know that I am positively of the opinion, that if you ever conclude that treaty, and do not, at the same time, make it a condition for the entire monarchy, as also for the demolishing Dunkirk, you will have next spring a peace without the demolishing of Dunkirk, and some part of Spain given to the duke of Anjou. Be assured that whenever England shall comply with the States as to their barrier as now desired, they will think it more their interest to be well

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\* Letter from Lord Townshend to Secretary Boyle, Aug. 9. and 30.

with France than England : this is my positive opinion, but nobody shall ever know it but yourself." \*

His friend, the treasurer, alarmed at these strong and repeated objections, laid before him the positive resolution of the Whigs to gratify the Dutch, to which he was apprehensive he should be obliged to accede ; he, therefore, earnestly entreated him to waive his objections, and to take the merit of this conciliatory measure, that he might oblige the pensionary and the States so essentially, as to have the absolute power of making peace, which otherwise must depend entirely on them. "And," he added, "this will put it out of every body's power to say that your want of compliance with the States in this point has been a great prejudice to peace." †

No solicitations, however, could induce the duke to accede even to the wishes of the treasurer, in opposition to his own conscientious conviction. A strong remonstrance from King Charles, against the omission of these articles and some other points of the barrier treaty, confirmed him in his opposition, and he thus declared his unalterable sentiment:—

"I continue of the opinion that, if the entire monarchy be not in the treaty of the barrier, the duke of Anjou will have some part of it, so that for the queen's honour and interest, and the safety of her minister, I beg you will think well of it before you depart from that article ; for I believe it will be next to a miracle if we have another campaign ; and whatever happens on that point, I should think it much more for the service of the queen not to have it appear as if she had willingly consented, as it must be taken by every body, if that article be left out of the treaty of the barrier. I do agree with you, that if the States could be firm, we might in one year more have what we wish from France ; but, as I fear Buys and his faction will every day grow stronger, the queen ought to be on her guard, as you see the malice of Harley gives us fair warning to be on ours." ‡

From the reply of Godolphin, we find that the queen fully concurred in the sentiments of the duke ; and he adds, —

"I must tell you that Lord Townshend, and the lord president, and most of those who are like to have the consideration of this matter, are

\* This letter to the treasurer is without date, but was evidently written in 1709, probably in July or August, while the barrier treaty was in agitation.

† Letter from Lord Godolphin, Aug. 2. o.s.

‡ Letter to Lord Godolphin, Aug. 16.

directly of another opinion. As for myself, I think your arguments are unanswerable; however, this thing has been already so much pressed by Lord Townshend, and in the name of the pensionary, that it is with a good deal of difficulty I have been able to give it any delay; and I expect all those instances should be renewed as strong as ever, upon the arrival of the four posts which are now due. Upon the whole, we must pray heartily for your good success abroad; for at home I begin to be sensible we are to expect all the same difficulties next winter, which we struggled with in the last, and from the same people." \*

In adverting to this information, Marlborough bitterly complains, "that though Lord Townshend is a very honest man, he does not understand the temper of the Dutch, and will probably mislead Lord Somers." Nor does he scruple to regret the warmth of Lord Townshend and his party, adding, "I pray God that they may be in the right, if otherwise, the fault will be laid to the charge of you and me." And in reply to an expression of the treasurer, that without peace all will fall to pieces in England, he justly observes:—

"I find by yours of the 14th, as well as a former letter, that you are of opinion that the affairs of England require peace, and yet all the orders of Lord Townshend are full of obstructions. All my hopes are, that France is in so miserable a condition, that when you shall insist only on what is in their power, they must comply. I am entirely of the opinion, that you should by no means oppose what is pressed by Lord Townshend, but I beg you will do nothing of yourself, but let 97† be answerable."

While the treasurer, with his usual deference to the opinion of his friend, was moved by these remonstrances, he was on the other hand assailed by the arguments of the Whigs for the immediate conclusion of the treaty, which they deemed necessary to conciliate the Dutch, as well as to promote the Protestant succession. "I must own," he observes in one of his letters, "I think there is a good deal to be said for both these opinions, and am, therefore, very far from taking upon myself to determine which is the rightest:" yet at this very time he was overruled by the Whigs, and consented to comply with their wishes.

Thus while the treasurer was encouraging the Duke of Marlborough to expect that his advice would be followed,

\* Lord Godolphin to the duke, Aug. 11. o. s.

† Either the cabinet council, or, more probably, those who were charged with the management of the negotiation at the congress.

and enjoining him to concert with Eugene the project of a treaty between, England, the emperor, and Holland, for the speedy reduction of Spain; and while the cabinet professed to the duke, that instructions should be sent to Lord Townshend, for making similar arrangements with Zinzendorf and the pensionary, he had the mortification to be informed that they acquiesced in Lord Townshend's project, of concluding the barrier treaty, without stipulating for the evacuation of Spain and the rasure of Dunkirk. On this intelligence, he sent a protest against the treaty, and could not refrain from candidly expressing his sentiments in a letter to Godolphin.

"Not being upon the place I must not pretend to judge, but from my heart I wish it may meet with no ill consequences, for most certainly there is a very great party in Holland that thinks it their interest to give some part of Spain to the duke of Anjou; and I am afraid the same party are of opinion that the demolishing of Dunkirk is more for the interest of England than theirs."

On the very same day he desired the duchess to represent to the queen his unwillingness to sign the treaty.

"*Aug. 19.* — \* \* \* You will see by a paper I have writ to the lord treasurer, which I desire may not be seen by any body but yourself and the queen; it is necessary she should see it that she might be prepared if possible, that I might not be obliged to sign what I think so very prejudicial to England, and what may meet with such accidents as may prove very troublesome to all those that have given the advice; for it is most certain that Lord Townshend does not judge right in that matter; for as soon as they have obtained their desires in the barrier, they can have no other thoughts or interest but that of making the peace as soon as possible. I dare not write what I think is reasonable on this subject, since our best friends will think that I am partial to the house of Austria; but I call God to witness, that my concern proceeds from the love I have for the interest of my country, and my concern for such of my friends as are now in the ministry."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Aug. 26.* — \* \* \* How far the Dutch may continue firm, I have my doubts, notwithstanding what is written by Lord Townshend, in his letter of the 20th, to Mr. Boyle. I must also continue of opinion, that when the States shall be acquainted with the orders Lord Townshend has received, that he will find them every day more unreasonable in their demands. I wish I may be mistaken, for I have no wish but the queen and my country's service; but I am afraid I shall live to see this proceeding\* found fault with, since, in all probability, the Dutch will not be contented, unless they obtain some advantage on our trade."

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\* The barrier treaty. — His prediction was verified by the events, for

In consequence of this decided opposition, Godolphin sent full powers to Lord Townshend, by which he was enabled to conclude the treaty, as it was arranged between the English and Dutch cabinets, adding, that when it was signed, the duke would support it, though he had refused to affix his signature. At the same time he announced this determination to Lord Sunderland as one of the Whig chiefs, and declared his opinion that it would not be productive of those fatal consequences which the duke apprehended.\*

In conformity with these orders, Lord Townshend signed the barrier treaty alone, and it was afterwards objected to by Swift, who, in his celebrated pamphlet, "The Conduct of the Allies," observes, "this treaty was only signed by *one* of the plenipotentiaries; and I have been told *the other* was heard to say, he would rather lose his right hand, then set it to such a treaty."

These instances, among many others, will sufficiently prove that Marlborough did not direct the negotiation, that he differed in many material points from the cabinet, and was guided by positive instructions, which he could not venture to transgress. Had he, indeed, possessed the sole management of affairs in peace and war, he would doubtless have framed such conditions as would have been accepted, or would have made such mighty preparations as would have enabled him to dictate his own terms in the heart of France. In this case, the treaty of Utrecht would not have stained the annals of this deluded and devoted country.†

the treaty was stigmatised by Parliament; Lord Townshend, who signed it, severely censured; and all who advised its ratification declared enemies to the queen and kingdom. See ch. cvii.

\* Lord Godolphin to Lord Sunderland, Aug. 17.

† We regret that the limits of our work will not permit us to introduce more of this interesting correspondence between Marlborough and Godolphin, because it would still more strongly prove that the duke was sincerely anxious for peace, and that he was overruled by the decisions of the cabinet.

## CHAP. LXXX. — SIEGE OF TOURNAI. — 1709.

ALTHOUGH Marlborough was disappointed in his hopes of peace, he yet did not rely so implicitly on the sincerity and apparent distress of France, as to delay the necessary preparations for an early and vigorous campaign. We have seen at the close of the preceding year his efforts to anticipate the enemy, and his anxiety to collect a superior force. The French, however, were equally active on their side, and drawing troops from all quarters, were in a condition to take the field before the allies. Indeed, the very circumstances on which the negotiators had founded their hopes of peace, contributed to rescue the French monarchy from disgrace ; for famine and misery drove crowds of recruits to the camp, and verified the unfeeling remark of Louis, that hunger would compel his subjects to follow his bread waggons. An army was thus assembled, scarcely inferior in numbers or appointments to that of the allies. In the place of Vendome, the chief command was conferred on Villars, who had gained high reputation for checking the designs of Marlborough on the Moselle, and who was considered as the most fortunate and enterprising of the French generals, and honoured by the French monarch with the name of invincible.

Notwithstanding the excessive scarcity of provisions and forage, the most active exertions were made in all the frontier provinces to collect necessaries for the army ; and early in June the French troops were in motion for the plains of Lens, where they purposed to take a defensive position, to cover the places on the Scarpe and Lys, which they considered as principally menaced.

The rainy weather, as well as the extreme backwardness of the season, prevented the confederate generals from assembling their troops so early as they intended ; but, without waiting for the definitive answer of France, they collected the army in the beginning of June. They issued orders to form a camp between Menin and Oudenard, and despatched a corps of twelve battalions and as many squadrons, under the command of Lieut.-general Dompré, to take post at Alost, and to cover Brussels. Having visited the

different divisions of the army, they repaired to Lille on the 18th; and on the 21st their whole force, amounting to 110,000 men, assembled between Courtray and Menin. On the following day, taking the route towards Lille, they encamped between Lincelles and Roubaix. On the 23d, the two generals, assuming the command, divided their troops into two great bodies. The right, consisting of imperialists and Germans, under Eugene, crossed the Lower Dyle, below Lille; while the left, comprising the British, Dutch, and the auxiliaries, traversed the Marque, at Pont à Marque; and they established their respective camps on both sides of the Upper Dyle. Marlborough fixed his head-quarters at the abbey of Looz, and Eugene at the castle of Lompret. Orders were sent for the advance of the field artillery from Menin, and General Dompré, commander of the flying camp at Alost, was directed to join the army with the utmost speed.

It was the first object of the two commanders to force the enemy to a battle, or, if that could not be effected, to undertake a siege; and for the purpose of forming their decision, they sent out different detachments to reconnoitre the position of the enemy.

Meanwhile Villars, having learnt the advance of the allies, took up a position between Douay and the Lys, behind a regular line, strong both by nature and art, extending from Aunay, near Pont à Vendin, to the west of Bethune. The right flank abutted on the high-crested canal of Douay, and was protected by numerous rivulets and impassable marshes; the centre was covered by La Bassée, and the left supported on Bethune and the adjacent streams and marshes. Along the whole line were fortified villages, redoubts, and partial inundations. His great object seems to have been to protect the frontier provinces, and prevent the siege of Ypres. As he expected that the enemy would attack him in this position, he made the most active preparations for resistance; and the movements of the allies afforded sufficient grounds for his opinion. For the formation of the confederate army between Menin and Courtray, as well as the passage of their battering train up the Lys, appearing to threaten Ypres, Villars retained his position, and increased the garrison by 16 battalions. The march of the allied forces to the Upper Dyle did not relieve his alarms. On the 23d Eugene crossed at

Haubourdin, and united with Marlborough between Seclin and Wattignies; and on the 24th, as they reviewed their troops, and made demonstrations as if they were moving with their whole force against the enemy, Villars reinforced his army from the neighbouring garrisons, particularly from Tournay and the places on that side which appeared to be less threatened.

The extent of his precautions evinced a persuasion that his antagonists were determined to risk an engagement. Such, at least, was the impression which the movements of the confederate generals tended to convey; for on the 26th a council of war was held, and reports were industriously spread, that the resolution had been taken to attack the enemy. To give strength to these rumours, the heavy baggage was sent back to Lille. But, in reality, the views of the allied commanders were now directed to another object; because, after reconnoitring the French lines, it was the unanimous opinion of all the generals that it was too hazardous to attack the enemy in their camp, intrenched as it then was.\* They therefore turned their attention to the siege of Tournay, though, to deceive Villars, they still continued to make demonstrations on the lines of La Bassée.

The feint thus practised on the French commander produced its full effect, and the same deception was continued to cover the final and decisive movement. The battering artillery was remanded to Menin, bodies of troops from the army of Eugene directed their march towards the right of the hostile lines, and some even approached to the vicinity of La Bassée; while Marlborough appeared to move in the direction of Tournay.

In the midst of the perplexity occasioned by these different alarms, Villars continued to strengthen his position and prepare for the approaching conflict; but, on the 29th of June, he learnt that the allied forces had re-united and marched towards Tournay, and that their battering train was reascending the Lys to approach that place. Their march was indeed made with the same skill and secrecy, which characterised their operations on so many occasions. They decamped from Seclin at seven in the evening without beat of drum, and advanced part of the night in a direction towards the

\* Letter from the Duke to Lord Godolphin, June 27.

French camp ; but when the troops of Marlborough expected the signal to engage, they were ordered to file towards the left, and to move in the direction of Tournay. They marched in two columns, one by Pont à Bovines, and the other by Pont à Tressin. At seven in the morning, the advanced corps reached the vicinity of Tournay, while the prince of Orange, with 10 battalions and 30 squadrons, drew towards St. Amand and Mortagne, from whence he dislodged the French posts, and covered the movement in that direction. The governor of Tournay was so ill prepared for their approach, that a part of the garrison, sent out to collect the cattle of the vicinity, were intercepted. General Lumley, with 24 battalions and 45 squadrons, began the investment at noon. At night Eugene led his army to the same point, and the whole force united in the vicinity of Tournay. Marlborough, who was to superintend the siege, took up his head-quarters at Villemeau ; and Eugene, with the covering army, posted himself in a line extending from Pont à Tressin, on the Marque, toward St. Amand, on the Scarpe, for the purpose of observing the movements of Villars.\*

Villars was so completely deceived by these masterly movements, that he observes, " their artillery, which ascended the Lys, again descended it on the side of Tournay ; and it was evident that their object was, after defeating me, to thunder against Aire and St. Venant with their heavy artillery, to penetrate as far as Boulogne, and after laying all Picardy under contribution, to push their detachments even to Paris. In this they would have succeeded, if listening to the timid counsels of certain general officers, *je m'étais* (to use his own expression) *blotti derrière la Scarpe*. It was a

\* Before retiring to rest, after so fatiguing a march, Marlborough thus briefly explains the motives of these successful operations, in a note to the duchess : —

"June 27. — If it had been reasonable, this letter would have brought you the news of a battle ; but Prince Eugene, myself, and all the generals, did not think it advisable to run so great a hazard, considering their camp, as well as their having strengthened it so, by their intrenchments ; so that we have resolved on the siege of Tournay, and accordingly marched last night, and have invested it, when they expected our going to another place, so that they have not half the troops in the town they should have to defend themselves well, which makes us hope it will not cost us dear. I am so sleepy that I can say no more, but am entirely yours."

great relief to me that the enemy fixed on the siege of Tournay, which ought to occupy them the whole of the campaign."\*

Tournay, which was thus rendered the object of general solicitude, is most advantageously situated on the frontier of France. Its circuit is large; the interior walls were of ancient construction, but a series of advanced works had been added by Vauban; and the citadel, which was a regular pentagon with exterior works, was considered by the great Condé as the most perfect of its kind. The town was commanded by no height, and a considerable part of the circumference could be additionally defended by partial inundations of the Scheldt. The citadel also, with several parts of the works, derived a considerable strength from a regular system of mines and connecting galleries. The fortifications were in the best state, and the magazines filled with ammunition and military stores. Its strength was duly estimated, and a pompous inscription, placed in one of the half moons, shows the opinion entertained of this bulwark by the French court. It states, that Louis XIV., in 1667, took this ancient seat of the Nervii in four days; and, to render it impregnable, had added to it all military defences, and had assisted in the construction of this work, which the victorious hands of his troops had raised from its foundations in eight days.

The attack of such a place, if properly provided and garrisoned, must have been an act of extreme rashness, which could only terminate in disgrace. We cannot, therefore, sufficiently admire the skilful manœuvres of the two great commanders in deceiving Villars, himself a master in military stratagem, and in laying siege to the place, at the moment when the garrison was not half equal to its defence, when many of the officers were absent, and even this scanty proportion of troops was ill supplied with provisions.

From the 3d to the 6th of July, the whole town, including the citadel, was regularly invested on both sides of the river, from Cercq, on the Upper Scheldt, to the castle of Constantine, on the Lower. Three grand attacks were traced: the first by Count Lottum, general of the Prussians, against the citadel, opposite the gate of Valenciennes, near the left bank of the Upper Scheldt; the second by Count Schulemburg,

\* Mem. de Villars, tom. ii. p. 63.

general of the Saxons, against the horn-work of the gate of the seven fountains, near the left bank of the Lower Scheldt; and the third by the Dutch general Fagel, on the right bank of the river, against the gate of Marville.

On the night of the 7th, the trenches were opened within half musket-shot of the works, with inconsiderable loss, as the approach of the assailants was not perceived by the garrison till break of day. The battering artillery, which had been anxiously expected, reached the besieging camp on the 10th. Notwithstanding the heavy rains, the advances were made with continued success, under the direction of the British commander. On the side of the town, the enemy were repulsed in all their sallies; the out-works were successively carried; and, on the 21st, the besiegers established themselves on the exterior covert-way. Towards the citadel, however, the dread of the numerous mines compelled them to proceed by the tedious operation of the sap, and, therefore, no effectual lodgment could be made on that point at this early period of the siege.

During these operations, Villars continued behind his lines, sending out numerous detachments to harass the besiegers, and take their connecting posts. Amongst others he directed large bodies against the posts on the Lys, to intercept the communications of the allies with the country beyond. He succeeded in taking Warneton, before the reinforcement despatched by the confederate generals could advance to its relief. But the conquest produced no essential advantage, except that of razing the fortification, for, on the approach of the allied troops, the French detachment retired; and Comines and Pont Rouge, which were equally threatened, were preserved.

In the midst of these operations, the confederate armies made a small movement; that under Eugene encamped with the right at Luchin, and the left at Esplechin, to which place Marlborough extended his right, stretching his left to Spain.\* By this disposition all the attempts of Villars to harass the besiegers were effectually frustrated.

Having received reinforcements of 14 battalions and 22 squadrons from the Upper Rhine, the French marshal advanced in the direction of Douay, leaving 10,000 men

\* Gazette, from the camp before Tournay, July 4.

behind the lines at La Bassée, and drawing thither the militia of Picardy and the Boulonnais. In order to cover the towns on the Upper Scheldt and the Scarpe, he formed another line from Douay along the Scarpe, by Auchain to Homage, opposite Marchiennes, and from thence to the Scheldt, near Condé. His infantry, amounting to 122 battalions, was posted behind this line; and, to complete the defence, he attacked and carried the post of Hasnon, on the right bank of the Scarpe, above St. Amand, making several demonstrations between the Scarpe and the Scheldt, as if he designed to interrupt the siege. These movements, however, neither checked the operations nor distracted the attention of the allies; for while Marlborough was engaged in superintending the approaches, Eugene repaired from the army of observation to visit the post of St. Amand, and place it in a state of defence, in order to obviate any sudden attack.

On the 26th, a ravelin covering the gate leading to Valenciennes was carried by assault, and the besiegers even established themselves on the covert-way leading from that gate to the Scheldt. At the same time Count Schulemburg filled up the ditch, and on the 27th carried the horn-work of the seven fountains, with a contiguous bastion, and maintained the post against two sallies of the garrison. Meanwhile, General Fagel had made himself master of the whole counterscarp, near the gate of Marville; and a general assault was retarded only by the rains and inundations.

Convinced of the straits to which the place was reduced, Villars quitted his camp on the 29th at the head of a considerable force, with the view of breaking through the quarters of the assailants; but he had scarcely marched two leagues before he was met by a messenger, with the unexpected news that the town had capitulated after a siege of twenty-one days.

In fact, the governor perceiving preparations for a general assault, had hoisted the flag of truce at seven in the evening of the 28th. On the following day, Marlborough announces this auspicious event to his correspondents in England. His letter to Godolphin testifies his deference to Prince Eugene, and the good harmony which subsisted between them.

"*July 29.* — I obey your commands in sending no officer with the news of the town of Tournay capitulating. They sent last night a brigadier to

my quarters, and another of the same quality to Prince Eugene's quarters : but I shall take care there shall be no uneasiness between us, for I would not see the capitulations till I first spoke with him, so that we shall settle the capitulations this day at his quarters. By the Holland's post you shall have the particulars, for I send this morning Collins by Ostend. With my duty, I desire you will make my compliments to her majesty on this success."

A letter to the duchess evinces no less his sincere desire for peace, than his compassion for the sufferings of those who were exposed to the horrors of war.

"*July 30.* — We have at last signed the capitulation for the town of Tournay, so that to-morrow night we shall continue the attack on the citadel. The taking of it we fear will cost us more time and men than this of the town ; but that which gives me the greatest prospect for the happiness of being with you is, that certainly the misery of France increases, which must bring us to a peace. The misery of all the poor people we see is such, that one must be a brute not to pity them. May you ever be happy, and I enjoy some few years of quiet with you, is what I daily pray for."

According to the terms of capitulation, 4000 men, the remains of the garrison, retired into the citadel ; the sick and wounded were conducted to the neighbouring towns of France, under condition of sharing the fate of their fellow-soldiers, and the possession of Tournay was consigned, in form, to the earl of Albemarle, who was appointed governor.

On the surrender of the town, no time was lost in prosecuting the siege of the citadel, and the line of circumvallation was contracted the same evening. But the difficulties of this operation were much greater than those attending the siege of the town ; for the garrison was sufficient to defend a place comparatively so small in extent, and dangerous of approach, from its numerous mines. However, a new attack was opened against it on the side of St. Martin's gate, under the direction of Schulemburg.

Hitherto the attempts of Count Lottum to discover the mines had been unsuccessful, for he had only gained two feet of the gallery belonging to the bastion Dauphine. The governor, however, no sooner retired to this fortress, than he drew a new parallel, and opened a heavy fire of shells to favour the establishment of his batteries. A trench was also pushed, on the night of the 4th of August, to the salient angle of the bastion de la Reine.

To preserve so admirable a piece of fortification, as well

as to spare the effusion of blood, the commandant proposed that the attack should be converted into a blockade, and that the citadel should surrender, if not relieved before the termination of a month. He requested permission from the allied generals to despatch a messenger to Versailles for the approbation of his sovereign. Marlborough and Eugene, with their characteristic humanity, declared their consent; and the former observes, in a letter to the duchess, —

"Aug. 5. — \* \* \* We should have marched this day, but for a proposition M. de Surville\* has made to Prince Eugene and myself of sending an officer to Paris, for the obtaining of the king's leave for the surrendering of the citadel the 5th of the next month, in case they should not be relieved before that time. We have given a pass to the officer, so that we are to have an answer by the 8th. I should be glad the king would approve of their proposition, since it will save the lives of a great many men, and we can't hope to take it much sooner. If the king consents, I think it is a sign he will have peace; for this is the strongest place he has."

This proposition was doubtless made with a view to gain time, and amuse the allies; for Louis refused his consent, unless a cessation of arms should be proclaimed throughout all the Netherlands, and in the mean time he offered to resume the negotiations for peace. The allied generals were not, however, induced to suspend their operations by this overture, and redoubled their efforts on the arrival of the answer from France, which they rejected as inadmissible. About the same time, Marlborough advanced the army near to the lines of Douay, and took up his head-quarters at Orchies.

As the peculiarity of this siege arose not so much from the strength of the fortification as from the multiplicity of the subterraneous works, which were more numerous than those above ground, we cannot enter into a specific detail of the destructive combats and explosions which took place in what the French biographer calls "*this infernal labyrinth*." Since the discovery of globes of compression, the danger of mines have been considerably diminished; but at the period of this siege this species of service was the most horrible which imagination could conceive. The miners frequently met and fought with those of the enemy, and sometimes

\* Villars falsely asserts that this proposition came from the allied generals. We are sorry to observe that his Memoirs abound with such misstatements.

the troops, mistaking friend for foe, killed their fellow-soldiers; sometimes whole companies entered the mines at the very moment when they were ready primed for explosion. They were often inundated with water, suffocated with smoke, or buried alive in the cavities and left to perish; on some occasions whole battalions were blown into the air, and their limbs scattered to a distance like lava from a volcano.

A quotation from "Dumont's Military History"\* will give a lively and striking picture of this terrific warfare.

"On the 15th M. de Surville made a sally and drove the besiegers from a post they had taken; but being repulsed, and a hundred and fifty men taking possession of the lodgment, the enemy sprung a mine, blew them all into the air, and overturned all the gabions. In the night, between the 16th and 17th, there happened a long and fierce combat in the mines, which ended at last in favour of the besiegers. On the 20th M. de Surville caused a wall to be blown up which hung over a sap, and thereby smothered a captain, a lieutenant, thirty soldiers, and five miners. On the 23d, a mine was discovered, the opening of which was 60 paces in length, and 20 feet in depth, which would have blown up a whole battalion of Hanoverian troops; but the same night the besieged sprung another, which was beneath it, and did a great deal of mischief. On the 26th, an inhabitant of Tournay went to the earl of Albemarle, and offered to discover one of the principal mines of the citadel, on condition he would make him head gaoler of all the prisons in Tournay: this was agreed to, and the man performed what he had undertaken, so that three hundred men were posted in the mine, with eight hundred in the town ditch to support them; but in the middle of the night, M. de Megrigny sprung two mines, one immediately under the large mine, in which all the three hundred men before mentioned were stifled; the other threw up part of the ditch, and buried a hundred men."

The miners of the confederates not being sufficiently numerous, the regular troops were obliged to assist in the service; but many of these, who had bravely faced visible dangers, recoiled from these subterraneous attacks with that feeling of horror which is naturally augmented by uncer-

\* Vol. ii. p. 104.

tainty and darkness. Such was their reluctance, that Eugene and Marlborough visited the trenches in person, and encouraged their troops to venture on so appalling a service. Great rewards were offered to stimulate their ardour, and Eugene employed 200 miners who had been engaged in the defence of Turin, and who, pushing into the works, were followed with greater confidence by the more inexperienced soldiers. At length, the skill and perseverance of the assailants triumphing over all obstructions, the small garrison, exhausted by fatigue and famine, beheld with dismay the progress of the approaches, and breaches made preparatory to a general assault.

On the 31st, in the morning, Marlborough had the satisfaction to perceive white colours hung out as a sign of capitulation, and a parley took place in the house of the earl of Albemarle, and in the presence of the two commanders. But their demands, that the garrison should surrender prisoners of war, being rejected, the conference ceased, hostilities recommenced, and the besieging batteries poured their fire upon the citadel with increasing effect. This vigorous effort, joined to the want of provisions, and the dread of a general assault, in which no quarter would be given, forced at length the commandant to surrender at discretion. The two generals, respecting the bravery of the garrison, mitigated the hardship of their lot, by permitting them to march out with the honours of war, retaining their swords and baggage, on the condition of leaving behind them their other arms and colours. They were to return to France, and not to serve till an equal number of prisoners, captured from the allies, were restored in exchange. On the 3d of September the gate of the citadel was delivered to the confederates, and on the 5th the garrison was conducted to Condé.

Thus ended this memorable and destructive siege. The possession of Tournay, a rich and populous city, was rendered more valuable by the acquisition of a province in the French Netherlands, remarkable for the fertility of its soil, and its numerous manufactures. In a military point of view it was peculiarly important, as it covered Spanish Flanders.\*

\* For the account of this siege and the previous operations have been consulted — Dumont's Military History — Memoirs of Villars — Lives of Eugene and Marlborough; and Vie du Prince Eugene, 4 tomes.

## CHAP. LXXXI.—MOVEMENTS FOR A BATTLE.—1709.

BEFORE the citadel of Tournay capitulated, the two confederate generals resumed the design which they had previously formed, of besieging Mons, the capital of Hainault, which was both ill supplied with troops, and scantily provisioned. They had already matured the necessary preparations for the accomplishment of an object no less difficult than the siege of Tournay; because it was necessary to force the lines which extended from Mons behind the Trouille to the Sambre, and which could easily be defended should Villars suspect their design, as he had a much shorter distance to traverse. Having turned their eyes to the hostile position, and attentively examined the measures taken by the French marshal to cover the western frontier of France, the lines, abatis, inundations, and redoubts, which concealed or defended his front, they concluded that it would be impossible to attack him with a prospect of success. But the eye of genius sees omissions, and discovers resources which are imperceptible to ordinary intellects. While Villars deemed himself unassailable, behind his defences on the Scheldt and the Scarpe, they perceived that he had not paid sufficient attention to those on the Trouille, and they hoped, by a combination of rapid movements, to force this obstacle, invest Mons, and perhaps engage him in a battle.

On the 31st of August, anticipating the surrender of the citadel, the duke detached Lord Orkney from the camp at Orchies, with all the grenadiers of the army, and 20 squadrons. He was to attempt the surprise of St. Ghislain, and secure the passage of the Haine; but if he failed, to occupy the opening between the woods of Etambruges and Bandour, in order to mask the intended movements of the main army.

On the 3d of September, after the capitulation of the citadel, the prince of Hesse Cassel was despatched at four in the afternoon with 60 squadrons of horse, and 4000 foot, under the command of General Dedem. He was to follow Lord Orkney, and if he found him master of St. Ghislain, to pass the Haine and invest Mons on the south-west; but should that fortress remain in the possession of the enemy,

he was to take a circuitous route by Nimy and Obourg, and effect his purpose by forcing the ill-guarded lines on the Trouille.

At nine in the evening, Cadogan marched with 40 squadrons in the same direction. At midnight the two confederate armies broke up from Orchies, and moved in two columns by the left, while the principal part of the besieging corps quitted the vicinity of Tournay, leaving 26 battalions under Lottum, Schulemburg, and Wood, to superintend the evacuation of the citadel, to observe the movements of Villars, and when he quitted his position, to reinforce the main army.

The besieging corps from Tournay crossed the Scheldt on the bridges of the town; the grand army in two divisions, by those of Anthoine and Mortagne. The different columns joined on the march, and halted in front of Brissoeul, where they encamped on the 4th, in two lines. The next day a violent autumnal storm deluged the camp, and inundated the roads; yet the army resumed their march by the left to Siraut, and the tents were pitched fronting the Haine, at the distance of three miles from that river. Here they were joined by Lord Orkney, who had approached St. Ghislain at break of day on the same morning; but finding De Legal with seven battalions prepared to receive him, had contented himself with preventing all communication across the river.

Notwithstanding the severity of the weather, the prince of Hesse had prosecuted his march with unremitting ardour. Finding that the attempt on St. Ghislain had failed, he proceeded north of the Haine by Nimy, and taking advantage of the woods of St. Denis, to mask his dispositions, passed the Haine near Obourg at two in the morning of the 6th.\*

\* To convey an idea of the extraordinary rapidity of this march, we may compute the distance from the camp of Orchies to Brissoeul 5 leagues, to Siraut 4, to Havre 6: the Brabant leagues being about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles each, 15 leagues amount to  $52\frac{1}{2}$  English miles, which the prince of Hesse performed in 56 hours, through bad roads, and in a rainy season. Milner observes that they scarcely halted in the whole course of the march.

[This performance has been greatly outdone. Mackenzie's brigade, which joined Wellington's army after the battle of Talavera, marched, according to Napier (vol. ii. 412.), sixty-two English miles in twenty-six hours. — Ed.]

His troops rested on their arms in the meadows and orchards behind the woods, while some squadrons observed the avenues from Mons over Mount Palisel. At seven he moved forward in columns across the hill behind St. Simphorien to Espiennes in the valley, and at noon entered the lines of the Trouille without opposition.

Marshal Villars had received early intelligence of the prince's march, and taken measures, though too late, to oppose him. He sent orders that a detachment from Mons should advance to the defence of the lines; directed the chevalier de Luxembourg, who was stationed near Condé with 30 squadrons, and the brigade of Picardy, to draw towards the Trouille, and ordered Legal to support him. On the 6th the chevalier was in full march to the lines, which were then only protected by three regiments of dragoons and the detachment from Mons. Next day, while he was advancing in the vicinity of Ciply, he discovered the Hessian prince entering the valley of the Trouille, near Espiennes, in such apparent force that he deemed his own detachment not sufficiently strong to dispute the passage. He therefore sent to Legal, who had reached Bousou, to hasten to his assistance; but that officer did not venture to quit his post near St. Ghislain, as the confederate army had already reached the vicinity of Siraut. Luxembourg accordingly directed the three regiments of dragoons to fall back to his corps, and the detachment of infantry from Mons to return to the garrison. Thus the prince of Hesse received the best reward a skilful and active commander can obtain, — success without bloodshed. He fixed his head-quarters at the abbey of Belian, and extended his post from Jemappes towards Frameries. By this movement he intercepted the communication between Mons and the army of Villars.\*

During these skilful and vigorous operations, Villars had

\* The position chosen by the prince of Hesse was well adapted to its object. The right, being on the heights near Jemappes (where the Austrian right was posted in 1792), cut off the road from Mons to Valenciennes, and overlooked the plain of St. Ghislain, and the defiles of Wasmes and Paturages. The centre crossed the roads to Bavay and Maubeuge, and commanded a view of the two openings of Aulnoit and Louviere, and the left covered the communication with the grand army beyond the Trouille.

decamped from the lines of Douay, soon after mid-day on the 3d, with the cavalry of the right wing, consisting of the body-guards; and directing the infantry to follow with the utmost speed, he passed the Scheldt at Valenciennes, and reached Quevrain at two in the morning of the 4th. He posted his cavalry in order of battle, waiting in anxious suspense the movements of his antagonists. From thence he sent orders to his left wing, to take up the position abandoned by his right, with directions to observe the strength and intentions of the hostile corps, which still remained under the walls of Tournay.

With the hopes of arriving in time to support Luxembourg, he moved on the 5th towards the Trouille; but receiving a report in the evening, announcing the appearance of the allies near St. Simphorien, he fell back to cover the centre of his lines.\* He could now no longer doubt the real intentions of his opponents; but his infantry had not joined, and therefore he drew up on the height above St. Ghislain and Bousou till the 6th, when about mid-day he returned to Quevrain, whither Albergotti had marched with 40 battalions. Villars remained in position behind the Honeau till the next day, when d'Artagnan with the left wing arrived. He then re-crossed the rivulet, and encamped in two lines between Montroeuil and Attiche. He was still perhaps in time to advance and secure the plain of Mons, had not the infantry of his left been exhausted by forced marches.

Meanwhile the confederate army, after a repose of a few hours in rain and mud, moved on the 6th from Siraut in two columns by the left. Soon after information was received that the prince of Hesse had crossed the Haine, and was about to attack the lines. Upon this intelligence the march was accelerated, the confederate generals advanced with considerable speed towards Obourg and Havre, and made instant preparations for completing the investment of Mons. Count Tilly, with the forces of Marlborough, crossed the Haine, and encamped between Obourg and Hyon; while general de Vehlen,

\* A considerable controversy has arisen among the French historians and tacticians respecting the cause which occasioned the ill defence of these lines, each party throwing the blame on the other. As it does not fall within our province to decide this controversy, we refer the reader to the Memoirs of Villars, Quincy, &c. &c.

with the imperialists, remained near the woods of St. Denis, and detached a corps to mask Mons on the side of Nimy. At the same time the generals themselves pushed forward with an escort of horse, to join the prince of Hesse, and passing the lines at Espiennes, found this gallant officer in his head-quarters at the abbey of Belian. Both Eugene and Marlborough complimented him on the complete success of his expedition; to which he modestly replied, "The French have deprived me of the glory due to such a compliment, since they have not even waited my arrival." The outposts of the advanced guard were then pushed forward to Paturages, Genly, Quevy, and Cauchie, in order to observe with particular attention the defiles of Wasmes and St. Ghislain, and the roads leading through the woods of Montroeuil, Blangies, and Sart.

Mons was thus invested on the side of France; and thus was the French marshal again baffled by the superior activity and skilful manœuvres of his great antagonists. The place, as already remarked, was scantily provided, ill prepared for defence, and the garrison so sickly that Villars called it the hospital of his army.

It was evident, therefore, that the hostile commanders would leave no means untried to avert the siege, or at least to throw reinforcements into the town, even at the risk of a battle. On the 7th, Marshal Boufflers arrived in the French camp, with the intention of giving a noble example of devotedness to his king and country, by serving under Villars in the quality of a volunteer, although he was his senior in rank.\* Upon a nation so susceptible of enthusiastic emotions, this testimony of genuine patriotism had an electric effect, and from the spirit thus excited, Villars anticipated, with sufficient reason, the most happy consequences. The bustle and rejoicings which it produced in their camp inducing the allied outposts to conjecture that an attack was

\* In the series of articles already referred to in *Blackwood's Magazine*, it is remarked that a similar incident had occurred in the British service, when Sir Henry, now Lord Hardinge, and Governor-general of India, served as second in command to Sir Hugh Gough, his senior in military rank, but subordinate in station, at the glorious battles of Ferozepore and Soobraon, with the Sikhs. "How identical," exclaims Mr. Alison, "is the noble and heroic spirit in all ages and countries! It forms a freemasonry throughout the world." — Ed.

preparing, the prince of Hesse communicated the information to Marlborough and Eugene, as they were sitting down to dinner at head quarters. They immediately mounted their horses, and issued orders for Marlborough's forces in the vicinity of Havre to march left in front, leaving the baggage behind and the tents standing. A detachment of Eugene's corps undertook to mask Mons on the east, and the rest crossed the Haine, and followed the columns of the Dutch and British. After passing the lines and the Trouille at Espiennes, the leading columns halted on the heights above the village till the troops of Eugene arrived; while the prince of Hesse concentrated his corps on the hill of Bertiamont, having his right at Quasmes, and his left extended towards the Trouille. Meantime farther information arrived, that the enemy had not moved from Quevrain. The two armies were therefore ordered to pass in the rear of the Hessian prince to Ciply and Noirchin, and bivouac on the spot in order of battle, with the right above Ciply and the left near Little Quevy. Intelligence having reached Marlborough that the garrison of Mons consisted of only nine incomplete Spanish, and two Bavarian battalions, with the dragoons of Pasteur, he concluded that the forward movement of Villars was only a feint to induce the confederates to concentrate their forces in the neighbourhood of Belian, while he pushed a reinforcement into the fortress by way of Jemappes. To frustrate this design, a strong detachment was sent forward to Quaregnon and the heights above St. Ghislain.

At a council of war on the 8th, it was determined to secure the plain of Mons; and as Marshal Villars menaced to advance with his right through the opening between the woods near Aulnoit and Blaregnies, and his left through the defiles of Bousou and Wasmes, it was deemed expedient that Marlborough should mask the former and Eugene the latter. Accordingly, the whole army marched in several columns. As these vast and magnificent masses of different nations moved over the bold swellings of an undulating plain, the advanced guard fell in with the French hussars, and a report was spread that the enemy were approaching. The heads of the columns were therefore instantly turned towards their centre, and the whole army was suddenly brought in view,

forming a vast crescent of 90,000 men, and affording a military spectacle seldom equalled. At night the imperialists occupied the heights of Quaregnon, and the duke moved his right in front of Genly, his left resuming nearly the former position about Quevy.

In the vicinity of an enemy just roused to enthusiasm, the advanced parties of the confederates could make no movement without repeated skirmishes, and small, but sanguinary conflicts, the usual preludes to the awful bursting of the storm. The success was various, and many prisoners were taken on both sides. Among the captures of the day was the French brigadier-general Sheldon, by whom Marlborough was apprised that Villars had obtained the consent of his court to risk a general battle.

The two opposing armies being now collected near the spot which was soon to exhibit the most stupendous conflict of this eventful war, we submit to the reader a description of the surrounding country and field of battle.

That portion of the province of Hainault which was the theatre of these operations may be represented as a species of parallelogram, of which the angular points are Mons, Quevrain, Bavay, and Givry. It is traversed by several streams, of which the principal are the Haine, the Trouille, the Honeau, and the Hon. The grounds rise from the Haine into a hilly surface, intersected by valleys and ravines, which becoming still more broken towards Blaregnies, Malplaquet, and Quevy, are watered by numerous streamlets, derived from marshy sources, and flowing into the Upper Trouille at Hyon. Over this surface are scattered numerous villages and hamlets, and, except a small plain or heath, near Malplaquet, the whole face of the country is well cultivated, or covered with woods and coppices, the remains of a forest originally extensive.

Of these woods, two deserve particular mention. The first stretches from Longueville, in a north-eastward direction to Cauchie, and is called the wood of Laniere. It is traversed by few roads except the great causeway leading from Tongres to Maestricht, known by the name of Chaussée Brunehaud. The second, which is still larger, extends from the Chaussée de Bois towards the village of Bousou, and bears different names from the surrounding hamlets; the south-

eastern angle is denominated the wood of Taisniere. Within the space between these woods are two glades or openings, called *trouées* in the language of the country. The first, *Trouée de la Louviere*, is formed by a plain, bounded on the south-east by the Hon and the Honeau, which narrows as it approaches the angle of the wood of Taisniere, where a streamlet forms a ravine crossing the plain near the farms of Camperdu and Louviere. Eastward, towards Malplaquet, in the wood of Lanieri, is the second opening, which spreads partly along a hollow ground, formerly bounded by a hedge, and named *Trouée d'Aulnoit*, from the village of that name, near which is Blaregnies, and a little beyond the small wood of Tiry. Still farther down the plain is the wood of Cliou, and to the west the village and wood of Sart. These places are divided from each other by ravines, formed by rills which rise near the top of the plain. Towards the north, on the western side of the plain, is another opening, called *Trouée de Bousou*, between the point of the wood which terminates near the village and the Haine: it is also intersected by a rivulet. Advancing still nearer to Mons, two other rivulets occur, which form the passes of Wasmes and Quaregnon, and beyond is the defile of Jemappes. The features of the ground may, therefore, be said to form a species of natural barrier, stretching across the angle comprised between the Trouille and the Haine, and pervious only by the two openings of Louviere and Aulnoit, both equally difficult of access.\*

Such was the ground on which Marlborough and Eugene deployed their magnificent army, amounting on the day of battle to 129 battalions and 252 squadrons, with 101 pieces of cannon and four mortars, making a numerical force of

\* For the topographical particulars relative to the field of Malplaquet and its immediate vicinity, Major Smith was principally indebted to the superb original plan in the king's library, to which is annexed a long explanation. The construction was completed by an excellent plan of the environs of Mons, designed by the Austrian quarter-master general's department, and by a personal inspection of the ground which he reconnoitred in 1814, as far as Ciply, Frameries, Wasmes, and Bousou. He was thus enabled to clear up the confusion thrown on the subject by the French authors, who have misnamed and misplaced the woods and villages.

about 93,000 men.\* The troops consisted of various nations, differing in language, religion, and manners, but were combined, by the genius and unanimity of the two heroes, into one body, actuated by one will. Subordinate to them were Marshal Count Tilly, who commanded the Dutch troops; the gallant princes of Orange and of Hesse Cassel; Generals Schulemburg, Bulau, Lottum, Albemarle, Vehlen, and Fagel. We remark, besides, a train of inferior generals, bred up in the school of their mighty masters. Among these, history is familiar with the names of Cadogan, Argyle, Lumley, the prince of Auvergne, Dohna, Oxenstiern, Spaar, Rantzau, Aurochs, Withers, Stair, Grovestein, and Hamilton; and perhaps it may not be improper to add the prince royal of Prussia, and the youthful heroes, Saxe, Munich, and Schwerin.†

Villars, on the other hand, was encamped between Montroeuil and Attiche, with the defiles of Bousou and the woods in his front, and with forces not inferior in number. In his army he counted no less than 130 battalions and 260 squadrons, and was provided with a train of 80 pieces of cannon.‡

\* By the order of battle published in Holland, Eugene had brought across the Haine, including the detachment from Tournay,

59 battalions.	110 squadrons.
Marlborough 80	143

Total 139

253

Of these, 18 battalions blockaded Mons and occupied St. Ghislain, detaching 1900 men to the army, together with 31 squadrons, part of whom were left to guard the camp equipage, and to mask the debouché of Bousou. This enumeration agrees exactly with the disposition in the plan at the king's library, in that by Bruckman, captain of engineers in the service of Hanover, present at the battle, and in that executed by a member of the Dutch quarter-master general's department.

We think it needless to advert to the exaggerated accounts of Villars, Boufflers, Quincy, and their copiers, who, to extenuate the shame of the defeat, employ the indefinite superlatives *infini* and *prodigieux*, to swell the amount of the allied forces beyond all reasonable calculation. Nor shall we, on the other hand, adopt the equally exaggerated accounts of the numbers of the enemy, given by Milner and others, to augment the glory of the victory. From every rational estimate, the numbers on both sides appear to have been nearly equal.

† Young Count de Saxe served with the Saxon light dragoons under Eugene; Schwerin was an Ensign in the Dutch regiment of Schwerin, his uncle; and Munich was captain in a Hessian regiment.

‡ This estimate, given by Quincy, is corroborated by the letter of

In this camp were collected the choicest troops in the French service, the gardes du corps, mousquetaires, light horse, horse grenadiers, and gens d'armes. Among the cavalry of the line were the carabineers; among the infantry, the French and Swiss guards, the Bavarian and Cologne guards, and the Irish brigade. Villars was assisted by the matured experience of Marshal Boufflers, and under him served Lieutenant-generals d'Artagnan, Legal, Chemerault, Puysegur, Guebriant; Counts Villars, Albergotti, and Palavicini. The names of St. Hilaire and Folard adorn the page of history and the annals of science. With these were young Coigny, the duke de Guiche, and, let us add, the youthful pretender, under the name of the Chevalier de St. George, combining the graces of person with the valour hereditary in the Stuart race. It thus seemed as if the chivalry of Europe had spontaneously assembled to swell the opposing armies, and contend for the laurels of victory.\*

On the morning of the 8th, Villars learnt that Mons was invested, and that the army of Eugene was still encamped on the heights of Quaregnon. Anxious to recover the communication with the fortress, he hoped to compel the allies to change their position, by threatening the lines on the Trouille, and to try his fortune through the openings of La Louviere and Aulnoit, the only avenue which he expected to find accessible. Having sent his baggage to the rear behind the Ronelle, he despatched, in the evening of the 8th, an officer with an escort of 200 horse, in the rear of the woods,

Villars to the king, vol. ii. p. 87, in which he allows Albergotti to have 40 battalions, and d'Artagnan, who had not then joined, at least two-thirds of the whole infantry, that is, above 80 battalions; therefore, in all, he must have had *more* than 120 battalions. The authors who wrote out of France, and even some of that nation, allow that the sufferings of the people had rendered recruiting very successful; and as no sanguinary action had yet occurred during the campaign, the strength of the respective corps must have been equal to that of the allies; in cavalry it indeed appears they were rather superior. Besides, it must be recollected that Villars had increased his army by draining the garrisons of Ypres, Dunkirk, Aire, Douay, Arras, and Cambray.

\* Among the French nobles present at this battle, we find no fewer than twelve who were afterwards marshals of France; Artagnan, marshal de Montesquiou; De Guiche, Marshal de Grammont; Puysegur; Montmorenci; Coigny; Broglio; Chaulnes; Nangis; Isenghien; Duras; De la Motte Houdancourt; and Senneterre.

to the farm of La Louviere. At eight in the evening the ordinary relief of the outposts, commanded by the colonel of hussars, d'Aremberg, marched in the same direction, sustained by the chevalier de Luxembourg, with orders to occupy the opening between the woods. On the morning of the 9th, the French marshal was apprised that the allies still remained in their former positions. Before five he therefore detached Chemerault with 1000 grenadiers, the brigades of Picardie and Poitou, 1000 horse, and two regiments of dragoons. The whole army followed in four columns, by the right, through Dour, Montignies, and Attiche; the two columns of infantry each preceded by a brigade of artillery, and the two of cavalry each by one of dragoons. Count Broglio commanding the rear guard, which consisted of the reserve, kept all the outposts standing, and formed on the heights of Bousou. At ten the columns occupied the opening of La Louviere. The grenadiers and advanced battalions, protected by a corps of cavalry, then crossed the plain of Malplaquet to the wood of Lanierie, and drew up facing the opening of Aulnoit, in front of the position occupied by Marlborough.

Meanwhile the confederate generals were not inattentive to the movements of the enemy. Early in the morning of the 9th, they assembled at the mill of Sart, to reconnoitre with an escort of 30 squadrons, and were accompanied by Goslinga, one of the Dutch deputies. Reports were brought that the enemy were assembling on the heights of Bousou; but they soon discovered, from prisoners and deserters, that the whole hostile army was in full march toward the plain of Malplaquet, and that Villars himself was in the act of occupying Lanierie, Taisniere, and Sart. Soon after, the patrols and outposts reported that his columns were discerned at the distance of a league and a half. Returning, therefore, towards the left, Marlborough ordered his army to advance from Little Quevy and Genly, the right towards Sart, and the left to the wood of Lanierie. On reaching their ground, the French cavalry were observed in several lines, drawn up across the opening, and some slight skirmishes took place. The head-quarters were fixed at Blaregnies, in the rear of the centre. Meantime, the heads of the French columns of infantry halted on the plain of Malplaquet, and their rear

advanced with the utmost expedition to close the line of march.

While Villars was engaged in arranging his disposition, the left of Marlborough approached so near his right, that at two in the afternoon, a cannonade commenced. Now was the golden moment of attack, before the French could increase the natural strength of their position by intrenchments; but the difficulty of Eugene's immediate junction with his troops from Quaregnon seems to have suspended the engagement. Eighteen battalions of his left wing, however, received orders to reinforce the duke; and, in this awful interval, a council of war\* was assembled, at which were present two of the Dutch deputies, Hooft and Goslinga. After much debate, and considerable opposition from these deputies and several of the generals, the opinion of Marlborough and Eugene prevailed †; that if the enemy did not attack, they should force them to an engagement, as soon as the whole of Eugene's army could join, and the troops from Tournay were within reach. It was likewise determined to complete the blockade of Mons, and, for the purpose of maintaining a direct communication with Tournay, and securing an additional point of retreat, it was also resolved to attack St. Ghislain by escalade, an enterprise the more feasible, as Villars had withdrawn the greater part of the garrison. Accordingly, on the 10th, General Deden marched with a detachment from the blockading corps, and accomplished the capture with equal vigour and promptitude, taking the post with 200 prisoners and 5 pieces of cannon.

\* So many vague and contradictory accounts have been published of the debates in this council of war, that we have given only the result, and refer the reader for particulars to Lediard, *The Life of Eugene*, &c.

† It is singular that circumstances somewhat similar were the subject of debate in the council of war before the battle of Jemappes, in 1792, when the army of Dumouriez was posted, like that of Villars, behind the woods of Taisniere and Lanier. The Austrian quarter-master general, judging like Marlborough and Eugene, advised the prince of Saxe Teschen to attack, notwithstanding the inferiority of his forces; because the Austrians, being disciplined and manœuvring troops, could operate in conjunction against the raw, unwieldy masses of the revolutionary army, and by passing through the opening of Aulnoit fall upon a part only, leaving at the same time space for a retreat. His advice being overruled, the Austrians awaited the attack, and were defeated.

In the mean time the French reserve and outposts broke up from Bousou, and followed their army. When the direction of their march was ascertained, the other troops of Eugene quitted Quaregnon, marching by the left towards Ugies, and after bivouacking during the night, joined the right of Marlborough on the ensuing morning.

Villars, however, instead of attacking the allies, as Marlborough had at first expected, established himself in a defensive position. He resolved to form a concentric order of battle across the highest ground in the opening of Aulnoit, with the wings projecting along the skirts of the wood on either side. He purposed to cover the flanks and centre with intrenchments, so disposed that cross fires might sweep the little plain on every point, and, to use the expression of Dumont, render its approach an infernal gulf. His right, therefore, occupied in force the wood of Lanierie, and made abatis across the Chaussée Bruneaud. From the skirt of this wood, along the little plain south of the farm of Bleron, is a slight hollow, at that time bounded by a hedge which terminated near the chapel of Jean Vauquier, and which, having been the point first occupied by the French grenadiers, now became the line of the intrenchments. One was constructed along a great part of its length; and a second, projecting in a point, some hundred paces in front, extended near Bleron. Between both was placed a heavy battery, and behind the hedge was constructed a third intrenchment, besides several detached and connecting works, traverses, and abatis, according to the nature of the ground or the thickness of the wood. From the end of these works, near the chapel, where the ground rises to a summit, nine *redans* were constructed, with openings between, sufficient to allow cavalry to advance and charge. Before the centre of the redans was a battery of 20 guns, which swept the plain to right and left; and at the western extremity a small marshy source of a rivulet, close to the wood of Taisniere, which constituted the left of the centre. The contiguous woods of Taisniere and Sart, projecting before the general line of the position, formed a salient and a returning angle, a part of which was faced by the rivulet. These two angles were covered with similar intrenchments and abatis, and on this side were

raised two more batteries, while several smaller pieces were distributed along the line.

On the plains in the rear other lines were constructed at Malplaquet on the right, and *Chaussée de Bois* behind the wood on the left. Upon these works great labour was bestowed and continued, even till the signal was given for battle. The troops who constructed them, and were destined to defend them, were posted in the following order : — d'Artagnan, senior lieutenant-general, commanded the right wing of the infantry stationed in the wood of Lanierre, and the triple lines of Malplaquet ; under him were Lieutenant-generals d'Hautifort, Guiche, and Tresilliere, with eight brigades ; some grenadiers and two battalions of Boufflers formed the extreme right ; next followed the brigades of Bourbonnais, Piémont, Royal, and the Swiss of Bandell. Beyond these, in front of the chapel, were the French and Swiss guards. Immediately behind the Bourbonnais was the brigade of Navarre, and in the rear the second line, in order of battle. The avenues to their right were encumbered with hedges, ditches, and hollows ; but behind it was a space sufficient for 25 squadrons to draw up in line ; this ground, as well as the whole of the rear, was cleared from all obstacles which might impede their movements. Next to the brigade of guards, who had the left of the right wing, were the Irish brigades of Lee and O'Brian, while the Bavarian and Cologne guards occupied the redans along the centre. Brigadier de Steckemberg, at the head of the brigade of Laonois, and supported by that of Alsace, maintained the intrenchment which projected in a point. The right of the brigade of Alsace rested on a breastwork and battery which enfiladed the opening. The left wing occupied the eastern fringes of the woods at Taisniere and Sart, following the angles of the intrenchments and hedges. The brigades of Bretagne and L'Esparre formed the right, nearly in prolongation of the centre, behind the source of the rivulet. Next followed the brigades Du Roi and Champagne, facing the plain, the left flank of the latter resting on the angle of the wood. To the left of these, and thrown back towards the rear, were the brigades of Picardy and La Marine Royale, flanking an opening in the wood ; and in front of their left, across the road from Blaregnies to *Chaussée du*

Bois, were La Reine and Charost, the left of which last rested on a marshy source. In their rear the brigades of Gondrin, Tourville, Perche, La Sarre, and one of dismounted dragoons, formed reserves, or were posted with some others on the plain behind the wood and in the works of Chaussée du Bois.\* The cavalry, drawn up in several lines, as the nature of the ground would admit, stretched along the rear of the whole, from the heath of Malplaquet to beyond the farm of La Folie, near Jean Sart. On the right were the gardes du corps, in the centre the gens d'armes, and on the left the carabineers.

While the French marshal was actively exerting himself to strengthen his position, the two allied commanders and the prince royal of Prussia passed the night at the quarters of Goslinga, in rear of the Dutch, that they might be near in case of alarm. Their forces had been stationed, since the preceding night, in the following order, beginning with the left: —

The Dutch infantry and their auxiliaries, commanded by Marshal Tilly, and subordinately by the Prince of Orange, were posted in two lines, extending from the wood of Lanierie, in front of Aulnoit, to the small wood of Tiry: 14 battalions, Hanoverians and British, occupied this wood, with the opening between it and the farm of Bleron, within musket-shot of the enemy's lines, but covered by a small rise, as well as by the hedges of the farm, and some brushwood. From the wood of Tiry, the two lines of infantry, composed of British and Prussians, were thrown back behind the farm of Cour-Tournant, about which were several detached battalions. The 18 battalions of Eugene's army, who had arrived in the evening, extended from hence to the farm of Cou, in the direction of Sart. The cavalry were drawn up in two lines behind. The Dutch on the left, per-

\* Thus far we have followed Quincy, who, without understanding the ground, seems to have had good information relative to the details of the first position of the French army. It agrees with the position marked upon the king's plan, from which, however, have been borrowed some slight additions, to make the disposition more clear. With regard to the names of the woods, and their relative situation, Quincy was doubtless misinformed. The wood of Ransart and Jean Sart is not comprised in that of Lanierie, but is a part of the wood of Blangies, and belongs to Trieu Jean Sart, near Attiche.

pendicularly (*en potence*) with the left wing, extended to the farm of Nivergies, the right to the infantry, and the front facing the wood of Lanriere. The British, Prussian, and Hanoverian cavalry were posted in the rear of their respective infantry, and the 18 battalions of Eugene; so that this whole corps formed four lines, in front of Blaregnies. In the morning the corps of Eugene arriving, prolonged the right of the army, already posted, by forming two lines of cavalry in rear of Sart, and in front of the windmill next the infantry; and at the extreme right the rest of the cavalry extended to beyond the farm of Flegnies, near Frameries.

At break of day the commanders in chief and generals of corps went out to reconnoitre, and were surprised to observe the defences which the enemy had thrown up since the preceding afternoon. The result of this survey induced Eugene to represent to the council of war which ensued \* the necessity of waiting the arrival of the detachment from Tournay; while Marlborough recommended an immediate attack †, before the enemy had rendered their intrenchments complete. But the advice of the prince, supported by the Dutch deputies, prevailed, and the remainder of the day was spent in arranging the dispositions. Orders were sent for Schulemburg, Lottum, and Wood to join the main army, leaving the detachment under Withers to follow with the utmost speed. The commander of each division received specific instructions for his guidance in the conflict, the substance of which will indicate the plan of the chiefs. The onset was to commence on the right of the centre, and the left of the right, where 22 battalions under Lottum, and 40 under Schulemburg, each in three lines, were to attack the two flanks of the intrenchments in the woods of Taisnere

\* There is some confusion among the accounts of these councils of war; but from the alteration of circumstances, the formidable appearance of the intrenchments, the delay of the detachment marching from Tournay, and the absence of the deputy Rantwyck, I have no doubt that two if not three were held between the passage of the Haine and the battle.

† Rousset, who was in the engagement, positively asserts that the Duke proposed to attack on the 10th; but though it is not improbable, I can find no proof of it in the Duke's letters, or in any other authentic writer. — Lediard, vol. iii. p. 542.

and Sart. Half an hour after, 31 battalions of the left wing, consisting principally of Dutch infantry, sustained by the 19 battalions drawn from Tournay, under General Withers, were to form in several bodies, and advance against the grenadiers, who covered the right flank of the enemy. Lord Orkney, with 15 battalions in a single line, was to act defensively, at some distance, in front of the opening of the plain, and to move forwards as soon as Lottum and Schulemburg had succeeded. Finally, a corps of 1900 men from the blockading army near Mons, was to traverse Sart, from the source of the marshy rivulet, and aid the general attack, by pressing on the flank and rear of the hostile intrenchments.

To sustain these operations, the prince of Hesse was directed, with 21 squadrons of the Dutch first line, to follow the prince of Orange in two lines, between the woods of Lanierre and Tiry; and 30 squadrons of the second line of Dutch horse, led on by the prince of Auvergne, were to draw up in the rear of Lord Orkney's infantry. The British, Prussian, and Hanoverian cavalry, who were formed according to circumstances, received orders to cover Count Lottum; and the whole of Eugene's cavalry to draw up in two lines, for a similar purpose, in the rear of Schulemburg. They were generally instructed to keep out of the reach of grape shot, yet to be sufficiently forward to sustain the infantry. When the intrenchment on the plain was carried, they were to rush forward, to form on the farther side of the lines, to charge the hostile squadrons, and drive them from the field. The infantry were enjoined not to penetrate beyond the intrenchments, woods, and obstacles of ground, but to occupy them in force, and afford protection to the cavalry. The heavy artillery was to be distributed in several batteries, — 28 pieces in front of the left, 40 in the centre, and the rest, with the field-pieces, to accompany the several brigades, as passages should be effected in the woods. Their fire was ordered to be directed against the intrenchments and opposing batteries; and the signal of attack was a volley from the grand battery in the centre.

But the commanders, as they proceeded in their survey, observed that the intrenchments opposite the left were of the most formidable nature, and they learnt that all the troops from Tournay could not reach the field of battle till

next morning. They accordingly decided on converting the attack on the left into a feint; and to shorten the march of the expected detachment, General Withers was directed not to join the army, but to leave three battalions and four squadrons about Paturages, and to march with the remainder between the woods of l'Eveque and Montroeuil, for the purpose of turning all the intrenchments raised on the plain behind, and penetrating between Trieu Jean Sart and the wood by La Folie, into the rear of the enemy's

The day was now far advanced, when Villars began to reflect that the measures he had hitherto pursued might fail of the desired effect. He found that he could not discover the situation and movements of his opponent's right, which could attack him on the left, while the opposite flank was masked by the wood of Tiry.\* He therefore ordered a new line of intrenchments to be formed, extending from the hamlet of Malplaquet, quite across the plain, to the farm of La Louviere. The cavalry were employed during the whole night in carrying fascines to the spot, but the evening approached before the undertaking could be completed. In the same evening, or during the night, Lottum, Schulemburg, and Wood, reached the confederate army, and resumed their respective commands; and, before day-light, Withers drew to his station near La Folie, with the corps from Tournay under his orders.

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#### CHAP. LXXXII. — BATTLE OF MALPLAQUET.† — 1709.

As the morning of the eventful 11th of September began to dawn, a mist overspread the woods, and concealed the armies from each other.

\* To this little wood have been misapplied the various appellations belonging to the woods in the vicinity, Ronsart, Jean Sart, La Merte, &c.; we follow the name on the king's plan, though we doubt the existence of the wood at the present time.

† For the battle of Malplaquet the following authorities have been consulted and compared: — Lediard's *Life of Marlborough*, 3 vols. 8vo. Leven van Marlborough, 4 vols. 8vo. Quincy, *Histoire des Guerres de Louis XIV.* 6 vols. 4to. Père Daniel, *Histoire de France*, 10 vols. 4to.

In the camp of the allies divine service was solemnly performed at three in the morning, with the usual marks of devotion, after the example of their chief; silence and order reigned through all the ranks, as they steadily marched from the bivouac to their posts. Under cover of the fog, the pieces composing the grand battery of the centre were conveyed to the appointed spot, and covered with an epaulement, to prevent an enfilade, while the Dutch likewise moved forward their heavy guns on the left.

The grand guard of the enemy giving instant notice that the allies were making their dispositions for the attack, the French soldiers discontinued working at the intrenchments, and stood to their arms. The troops on both sides, though harassed by fatigue and want of rest, manifested no diminution of their usual spirit at the approach of this long-expected engagement. The French gave signal proofs of unbounded confidence in their new general, whom they adored, and in whose abilities they confided. Eight campaigns had been successively marked with disasters; all their former leaders had seen their laurels wither before the two great opponents and the formidable troops that now stood arrayed

Vie de Villars, 3 vols. 12mo. Histoire de la Maison d'Autriche, par le Comte de C., 6 vols. 12mo. Histoire du Comte de Saxe, par d'Espagnac, 3 vols. 4to.; also *Reveries du Comte de Saxe*, 2 vols. 4to. Du-  
mont and Rossuet, 3 vols. great folio. Vie de Marlborough, par ordre de Buonaparte, 3 vols. 8vo. Tindal's Continuation of Rapin. Lives of Marlborough and Eugene, 1 vol. 8vo., 1713; and Lives of Eugene and Marlborough, 2 vols. 12mo., 1742. Vie du Prince Eugene, 4 vols. 12mo., 1750. Leben und Thaten des Marlborough, 8vo. Commentaires de Folard, 6 vols. 4to. Mémoires de Feuquières, 4to. Mémoires de Lamberti. Milner's Journal of Marches and Battles, 8vo. Vaderlansche Historie, 25 vols. 8vo. Brodrick's History of the late War, 8vo. Kane's Memoirs, 8vo. Dictionnaire des Sièges, et Batailles, 6 vols. 8vo. Field of Mars, Dictionary of Battles, &c., 2 vols. 4to. History of Regiments in the Military Library. Abrège de l'Histoire Générale des Provinces Unies, 3 vols. 8vo. Military History of Great Britain, 2 vols. 8vo. Life of Marshal Muniöh, 8vo. (German). Biographisches Lexicon alter Preussischen Helden, 4 vols. 8vo. Barre Histoire Générale d'Allemagne, 4to. Chronologie historique et militaire, 7 vols. 4to. Relas van den slagh bey Taisnière en Malplaquet. Burnet. President Henault. Vie du Prince Eugene, par d'Avrigni. Vie du Prince Eugene, en 5 tomes. Kort en Naukeurigh verhaal van der lesten velttocht van Jan Willem Frise, P. v. Orange, N. V. 8vo. Père Daniel Hist. de la milice Française, 2 vols. 4to. Boyer's Reign of Queen Anne, fol.

in their front; yet no sooner was the command intrusted to this favourite chief, than their defeats were forgotten, and they resumed their national ardour, which they testified, as he rode along the ranks, by exclaiming, "Vive le Roi, vive le Maréchal de Villars!" Many of the soldiers, though ill supplied with provisions for several days, even threw away their rations of bread in their eagerness to begin the engagement. At seven Villars mounted his horse, and requested Marshal Boufflers to assume the command of the right wing, while he himself superintended the movements of the left.

In the allied camp the national character of the troops was more sedately expressed, by the punctuality of obedience, by the stern frown or contemptuous sarcasm, and by the general exclamation in allusion to the French intrenchments, "that they were again obliged to make war upon moles." The whole army was in readiness to advance before dawn. The commanders-in-chief, with the prince royal of Prussia, and the deputy Goslinga, surveyed the execution of the preparatory dispositions in every part of the field.

The fog still lingering on the ground, protracted the moment of onset; but at half-past seven the sun broke forth, and as soon as the artillery could point with precision, the fire opened on both sides, with an animation and effect indicative of the ardour which reigned in every bosom. In a moment the French household troops in the rear of the lines had several killed and wounded, and the allied chiefs witnessed similar effects as they rode along their own ranks, although the two armies were almost concealed from each other, by the intrenchments and inequalities of the ground. Soon after the opening of the cannonade, Villars and Boufflers repaired to their respective posts; and the two confederate generals also separated, Eugene to direct the movements of the right, and Marlborough those of the centre and left.

The attack commenced on the side of the allies, against the right and centre of the French, in two dense columns, the first under the prince of Orange, and the other under Count Lottum. Suddenly the Dutch column halted, according to orders, and drew up in several lines beyond the reach of grape; while that of Lottum moved forward, regardless of the fire, to the rear of the principal allied battery,

and, wheeling to the right, formed in three lines. As these columns took their stations, Schulemburg advanced at the head of 40 battalions, ranged in three lines.

After a short pause in the cannonade, the signal of onset was given at nine, by a general volley from the grand battery. Schulemburg instantly advanced along the edge of the wood of Sart, direct upon the projecting point of the enemy's left wing, while Lottum marched round the grand battery, to attack the other face of the angle; and as he cleared the ground, Lord Orkney deployed his 15 battalions to cover his left, and face the hostile centre. The three battalions, drawn from the blockading corps before Mons, likewise pressed forward, under the orders of Gauvain, and entered the wood of Sart unperceived. At this moment Eugene came up to the troops of Schulemburg, and found them passing several streamlets, and entering the wood. They were suffered by the enemy to approach within pistol-shot, and then received a volley, which forced several battalions to recoil more than 200 yards. A furious storm of musketry ensued, and the French brigade of Charost, being partly advanced in an abatis, was either driven from its station, or withdrew, to avoid a flank attack. The Austrian battalions on the right, being impeded by a morass in front, made a circuitous movement, and fell in with the brigade of Gauvain. These corps, thus fortuitously united, began to penetrate into the wood, as fast as the obstructions which they encountered would permit, but were checked by the troops of Charost, and exchanged a vigorous fire of musketry with the enemy.

Scarcely was this attack begun, before Marlborough, advancing towards the centre, led on in person the troops of Count Lottum. At some distance they were greeted by volleys of musquetry from the brigade Du Roi, without shaking the firmness of their ranks; they passed some enclosures, descended the hollow bank of the rivulet, and waded through the swamp under a galling fire. Reaching the foot of the intrenchment, though disordered by the difficulty of the approach, and the loss they had sustained, they made the most furious effort to ascend the breastwork, but were repulsed by the French troops, who were encouraged by the presence of Villars himself.

Meanwhile, Withers advanced in silence though the woods,

in the direction of La Folie, and by this demonstration distracted the attention of the enemy; but as yet not a single shot was fired on that side. Both the first lines of attack on the right having suffered severely, Eugene and Schulemburg filled up the intervals, and extended the flanks with part of the second; they then advanced again, and dislodged the brigades of La Reine and Charost, but could not force those of Picardie and La Marine, notwithstanding the great exertions of the Danes, Saxons, and Hessians. Count Lottum now returned to the attack, while Marlborough placed himself at the head of d'Auvergne's cavalry to sustain him. At this moment the duke of Argyle ordered a British brigade of the second line to extend the left, and the whole renewed the charge. As the attacks embraced a wider front, this fresh brigade came opposite an opening in the intrenchments; but the access was through a marshy spot, almost impassable. While they were entangled in the swamp, the active Cheme-rault, with twelve battalions, drawn from the second line of the French left centre, passed the intrenchments, and prepared to charge their left flank. But Villars, who was on the border of the wood, remarking Marlborough with his staff, at the head of d'Auvergne's cavalry, galloped forward, and stopped them at the moment when their farther advance would have been fatal. Free on the flank, the left of Count Lottum then penetrated the intrenchment, turned the right of the brigade Du Roi, and forced the French gradually back in the wood.

The brigades of Champagne and Picardie, pressed by the double assault of Schulemburg on one side, and of Lottum on the other, found a momentary asylum behind an abatis; and the Royal Marine, after a vigorous stand, was compelled to follow their example. The rest retired in disorder through the wood, which was so close, that the lines were broken into parties, and every tree was disputed.

Meantime the appointed half-hour of the first onset had elapsed, when the prince of Orange, impatient of delay, resolved to attack, although not supported by the corps of Withers, and without waiting the consent of Marshal Tilly.\*

\* Marshal Tilly is scarcely mentioned by historians, and seems to have been little more noticed by his officers. Although he commanded

In obedience to the particular disposition issued the preceding evening, the left of the whole front was led by Major-general Hamilton, and Brigadier Douglas, with four battalions, among whom was the Scottish brigade, in four lines, with orders to enter the wood and attack the grenadiers, who covered the right flank of the enemy. Nine battalions, commanded by Lieutenant-generals Spaar and Oxenstiern, were to advance against the salient angle of the intrenchment next the wood; and to the right of these, six battalions, in three lines, led by Lieutenant-generals Dohna and Heyden, were to carry the battery on the road to Malplaquet. Generals Welderen and Rank, with four battalions, in two lines, received directions to skirt the hedges of Bleron, and force the intrenchment to the right of the battery. Beyond these, in the enclosures of Bleron, seven battalions, part of which had been destined at first to act defensively under Major-generals Pallant and Ammama, were now to advance in three lines, and attack the point of the projecting intrenchment, defended by the brigades of Laonois and Alsace.

The whole was supported by the hereditary prince of Hesse Cassel, with 21 squadrons, in two lines, and preceded by the cannon allotted to that corps. A few squadrons remained between Aulnoit and the farm of Nivergies, to observe the opening in rear of the left. On the word to march, all were instantly in motion, led on by the aspiring prince of Orange, at the head of the first nine battalions, under a tremendous shower of grape and musquetry. He had scarcely advanced a few paces, when the brave Oxenstiern was killed by his side, and several aides-de-camp and attendants successively dropped as he advanced. His own horse being killed, he rushed forward on foot; and as he passed the opening of the great flanking battery, whole ranks were swept away; yet he reached the intrenchment, and, waving his hat, in an instant the breastwork was forced at the point of the bayonet, by the Dutch guards and highlanders. But before they could deploy, they were driven from the post by an impetuous charge from the troops of the French left, who

the Dutch, all the officers obeyed the young prince of Orange. The marshal was a brave officer, the creature of the party in opposition to the house of Nassau, and consequently jealous, if not hostile, to the young prince.

had been rallied by Marshal Boufflers. At this moment the corps under Dohna moved gallantly against the battery on the road, penetrated into the embrasures, and took some colours; but ere they reached the front of the breastwork, were mowed down by the battery on their flank. A dreadful carnage took place among all the troops in this concerted attack; Spaar lay dead upon the field, Hamilton was carried off wounded, and the lines, beginning to waver, recoiled a few paces. Deriving fresh spirit from this repulse, the heroic prince of Orange mounted another horse, and when that was shot under him, his native energy was not shaken; he rallied the nearest troops, took a standard from the regiment of Mey, and marched on foot almost alone to the intrenchment. He planted the colours on the bank, and called aloud, "Follow me, my friends; here is your post." Foremost among the assailants was the heir of Athol, the gallant marquis of Tullibardine, followed by his faithful highlanders\*; he sought honour in a foreign service, and died the death of heroes. Lieutenant-general Week shared his glorious fate, and the Swiss brigadier Mey was severely wounded. Again the onset was renewed, but it was no longer possible to force the enemy; for their second line had closed up, and the whole breastwork bristled with bayonets and blazed with fire. The brigade of Navarre, which had been sent to reinforce the centre, was recalled; and the French soldiers, disregarding the control of their officers, opened the intrenchment, and made a furious charge. The disordered ranks of the Dutch battalions were beat back, over heaps of slain companions; they lost several colours, and their advanced battery fell into the hands of the French.

In this moment of confusion, though pursued by the horse grenadiers, whom Boufflers had sent forward to improve the advantage, they presented so firm a front as to awe their assailants, and were supported by the prince of Hesse and his brave squadrons. In these attacks near two thousand men were killed, and the number of wounded was still greater; two battalions of blue guards being nearly annihilated.

In the midst of the conflict Baron Fagel led on the seven battalions under Lieutenant-general Pallant, to storm the

\* The regiments of Tullibardine and Hepburn.

projecting intrenchment, near the farm of Bleron, through the enclosures which covered the front. Notwithstanding a heavy fire, they reached the breastwork, and drove the brigade of Laonois from the parapet; till meeting with an obstinate resistance from the veteran Brigadier Steckemberg and his valiant corps, they were compelled to relinquish the post.

During this unequal conflict, Goslinga had led on the troops with unexampled courage, and witnessing the danger of his gallant countrymen, galloped toward the right to demand assistance. Meeting Lieutenant-general Rantzau, who, with four battalions of Hanoverians, was posted on the edge of the rivulet near the wood of Tiry, he represented to him the critical situation of the Dutch; and when the general stated his positive instructions not to move without orders, he extorted, after much importunity, a reinforcement of two battalions.

While the deputy, not satisfied with this relief, hastened across the field in search of Marlborough, the attack on the left was renewed with the aid of this reinforcement, and the intrenchment carried; but, mowed down as before by grape-shot, and charged by Steckemberg, the assailants were again repulsed with prodigious loss. All the Hanoverian officers, except three, were killed or wounded, and the French maintained their post, though with the sacrifice of their best soldiers, and among others, of their veteran chief, who here closed his long and honourable career.

In this anxious crisis, Goslinga met Marlborough, who, leaving Lottum to continue his successful attack, was himself hastening to remedy the disorder on the left. As they rode together to join the prince of Orange, the duke perceived that Rantzau with his two battalions had attacked a party of the enemy, who quitted the intrenchment to occupy an advanced ravine. He likewise remarked the shattered remains of the Dutch infantry reluctantly measuring back their steps to the first enclosures beyond the reach of grape-shot. He accordingly ordered Rantzau to retire to his former post, and not to move again till he should receive directions from himself. With a heavy heart he beheld many victims of inconsiderate valour, and witnessed with equal concern and admiration numbers of the wounded Dutch returning from

the hands of the surgeons, to resume their station in the ranks. Here he was joined by Eugene, bending likewise his course to the left with no less solicitude. While they were giving precautionary orders to that wing, a British officer arrived from the right, to inform them that the enemy were attacking in turn with great fury, and evident advantage.

During this time Villars had ineffectually summoned reinforcements from his right; for Boufflers was too much weakened, even by his successful resistance, to detach a part of his infantry. Thus reduced to the necessity of drawing troops from his own centre, he reluctantly called the Irish brigade and that of Bretagne to his assistance, and was soon afterwards joined by the brigade of La Sarre. With the aid of these and other reinforcements, a furious charge was made into the wood of Taisniere upon the British and Prussians, who recoiled a considerable way before the impetuous onset of the Irish. But the nature of the spot upon which they fought soon divided their ranks and retarded their progress.

At this moment the allied troops were cheered by the return of Marlborough, who, on the intelligence of their critical situation, again hastened to the right of his centre, to co-operate with the attack from the army of Eugene. Meanwhile Schulemburg, having forced his way round the marsh, pushed the enemy gradually before him; and from the thickness of the wood, the fight became rather a multiplicity of skirmishes and single combats than a regular engagement; the sight of the contending parties being impeded by a thick foliage and a dense atmosphere of smoke.

The troops of the right were also animated by the return of Eugene, who, as he was rallying his men, and gallantly leading them to the charge, was struck by a musket-ball behind the ear. His attendants pressed him to retire, that the wound might be dressed; but the hero replied, "If I am fated to die here, to what purpose can it be to dress the wound? If I survive, it will be time enough in the evening;" and instantly rushed into the thickest of the fire. His presence roused the brave German battalions, and they recovered the lost ground, pressing forwards in great numbers by a kind of opening\* between the woods of Sart and Tais-

\* This the French call *une coulée*.

niere, along the road to the wood of Jean-Sart. His efforts were now seconded by General Withers, from his station at La Folie. As soon as this corps reached the debouché of the woods of Blangies and Jean-Sart, the squadrons drew up behind the hamlet of La Folie, while four battalions covered their left flank, and secured the avenues on the side of Sart. With the remaining fifteen, Withers passed the little rivulet, crossed a small coppice, and took post in the hedges of La Folie. The Danish and Saxon squadrons, who composed part of his corps, then advanced, with the intention of flanking the left of the position of Villars; but only six squadrons had formed, when the chevalier du Rosel, at the head of the carabineers, charged and drove them back.

Notwithstanding this repulse, it was the progress of the corps under Withers, which hastened the retreat of the enemy's left out of the wood of Taisniere, and alarmed Villars. In the carnage, Chemerault and Pallavicini fell; and the several brigades, fluctuating through the marshes and thickest parts of the wood, were mingled together in considerable disorder. Villars had hastened to sustain them with the Irish brigades drawn from the centre, while Albertgotti had posted those of Charost and Du Roi, to check Withers in the nearest hedges of the farm of La Folie. To their right was the brigade of Champagne, forming a flank in the last copses, with the left to the marshy streamlet which passes near the farm; in the rear of Champagne the brigades of Gondrin and Tourville drew up, and behind them was the cavalry on the plain. The regiments of La Reine and Xaintonges supported the brigade Du Roi, and covered its left flank. Before this disposition was arranged, Villars also formed a corps of twelve battalions, in two lines, at fifty paces from the wood.

At this moment Eugene advanced at the head of five German regiments, and opened a destructive fire. They were charged by the French with bayonets, under the immediate direction of Villars; but in the heat of the combat his horse was shot, and a second musket-ball struck him above the knee. Unable to move, he called for a chair, that he might continue in the field, till fainting from the anguish of the wound, he was carried senseless to Quesnoy. Notwithstanding his loss, the allied battalions were driven back

to the edge of the wood of Taisniere, from whence they did not again attempt to advance.

Thus, after an obstinate conflict of four hours, the confederate forces only obtained possession of the intrenchments and wood on the enemy's left, but realised so much of their plan, that while they compelled their opponents to employ almost all their infantry on both flanks, they were at liberty to execute the ulterior object of the disposition, by attacking the hostile centre.

The right of Marlborough forming the centre of the allied army, had coolly waited the proper moment of onset. As soon as the enemy began to draw their cannon out of the intrenchments, he ordered Lord Orkney to make a decisive effort upon the redans in the centre. This gallant officer, assisted by Rantzau, Vink, and other generals, had gradually advanced in proportion as Lottum gained ground; and behind him was the prince d'Auvergne with 30 squadrons of Dutch cavalry in two lines. In their rear was the British cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Wood; the Prussian and Hanoverian, commanded by General Bulau; and the whole imperial cavalry, under the duke of Wirtemberg and Count de Vehlen, stood formed in columns, ready to move at the first order. Lord Orkney, advancing in one line, at a single onset took possession of all the redans, overpowering the Bavarian and Cologne guards, who were left almost unsupported, in consequence of the draughts from the centre to reinforce the left. The heavy battery of the British centre had likewise been brought forward, and turned against these troops.

As soon, therefore, as the allies were masters of the redans, the guns of the central battery, which had been directed upon them, moved rapidly to the right and left, and opened a tremendous cannonade across their rear, upon the lines of hostile cavalry drawn up along the plain. The French horse receding, Rantzau, with his two battalions, turned the left flank of the French and Swiss guards, and dislodged them. At the same moment the prince of Orange, not daunted by his former repulse, renewed the attack, and the brigades of Laonois and Alsace were driven out of the projecting intrenchment. Meanwhile the Prince d'Auvergne passed the French works, and began to form his cavalry.

The crisis of this sanguinary battle was now arrived. The intrepid Auvergne was charged by the hostile cavalry, and though only a part of his front was in line, he withstood the shock and repulsed them. The foremost squadrons of the enemy were dispersed only to make room for nobler champions, who advanced in gallant order; the gay, the vain, yet truly valiant *gend'armerie* of France, headed by Boufflers. The marshal had remained with his wing, till he received the alarming intelligence that the allies had broken through the centre. Ordering the household horse to follow, he flew to the spot, and found the *gens d'armes* ready to charge; after a short and cheering address, he placed himself at their head, and darted upon his antagonists, who were extending their lines, in proportion as they came up, through the openings of the redans. Notwithstanding all the efforts of the gallant Auvergne, the allied squadrons were driven back to the intrenchments; but Lord Orkney, having taken the precaution to post his infantry upon the parapets, poured in a most destructive fire, which repulsed the *gens d'armes* in their turn. Thrice these charges were repeated, and thrice the impetuous assailants were repulsed, by the combined fires of the musquetry, and the cross batteries on the flanks.

In the midst of this arduous struggle Marlborough came up, and led forward a second line of British and Prussian cavalry, under the command of Bulau and Wood. They fell on the discomfited squadrons who were attempting to withdraw, and would have swept them from the field, but for the advance of a formidable body of 2000 men, consisting of the *gardes du corps*, light horse, *mousquetaires*, and horse grenadiers of the royal household.

These gallant cavaliers had hastened from the right to share the dangers of the centre, and were also led to the charge by Marshal Boufflers. Their onset was irresistible; they broke through the first and second lines, and threw the third into confusion. But the force of the allies on this point was now opportunely augmented, the whole of Eugene's cavalry having followed at a full gallop in rear of the duke's right wing. The presence of this illustrious hero animated his troops; and by the judicious dispositions of the two commanders, the assailants were outflanked, and being galled by a cross fire from the infantry, retreated to the plain. Their

spirit, however, was not subdued: for they still rallied, and renewed the charge several times, though without making any considerable impression. Glowing with zeal to encounter an enemy worthy of their valour, the allied cavalry moved forward with redoubled ardour, equal in spirit, but superior in numbers, and drove this intrepid and distinguished body behind the rivulet of Camp Perdu.

Before this charge took place, the prince of Hesse had watched with eager impatience the proper moment to act. Observing Lord Orkney's advance, and Rantzau's manœuvre upon the flank of the French guards, he pushed forward in column, passed the redans, and wheeling to the left, took the right of the hostile infantry in flank. This daring manœuvre had the desired effect; the enemy crowded to their right, and were again attacked by the prince of Orange, who had re-occupied the intrenchments with little resistance.

While the Marquis de Valière and his noble comrades rallied the household troops, and the rest of the cavalry on the plain, Boufflers cast an anxious and scrutinising eye over the field of battle. He beheld his centre pierced, his right dislodged, the communication with his left cut off, and the ablest officers under his command killed or wounded. Still, however, his gallant spirit was unwilling to recede, till he received advice that Legal, who commanded the left, was in full retreat with his cavalry, and about 50 battalions under Puysegur; he, therefore, reluctantly ordered a general retreat in the direction of Bavai. D'Artagnan\* marched off in close columns through the woods; Boufflers crossed the Hon at Taisniere and the neighbouring hamlet; Luxembourg covered the rear with the reserve. Beyond the woods, on the plain in front of Bavai, the infantry and cavalry rejoined, and after halting to collect the stragglers, and break down the bridges, passed the Honeau in the vicinity of that town. Their left withdrew towards Quevrain, and effected their retreat with

\* This brave general, Pierre d'Artagnan, a veteran in the service of Louis XIV., had three horses killed under him in the battle, and was deservedly raised to the rank of marshal. Having, soon after this engagement, by the death of a relative, succeeded to the title of Montesquiou, he is from that time distinguished as marshal Montesquiou, a change of title which has occasioned some confusion in military annals. — *Dubois, Dict. de la Noblesse Française* — Art. "Montesquiou."

little loss, because the allies were too much exhausted and reduced to pursue them in force. They passed the Honeau at Audrignies and Quevrain, where a brigade of their infantry was posted. In the course of the night they traversed the Ronelle, and gradually re-assembled at a camp between Quesnoy and Valenciennes. This has been justly considered as a masterly retreat, and was applauded by Eugene and Marlborough themselves.

The allied forces, exhausted with fatigue, halted near the field of battle on the plain, stretching from Malplaquet beyond Taisniere. The engagement being so desperate, and little quarter given on either side, not more than 500 prisoners were taken by the allies, except those who were left wounded on the field, and who amounted to about three thousand. Few cannon or colours were captured, and the victory was only manifested by the retreat of the French, and the subsequent investment of Mons.

The respective losses in this desperate engagement have been, as usual, erroneously stated. Villars, with his wonted exaggeration, estimates the number of killed and wounded at 35,000 on the side of the allies. The official accounts, however, return, of infantry alone, 5,544 killed, and 12,706 wounded and missing, making a total of 18,250; and among these 286 officers killed, and 762 wounded. But when we take into account the loss of the cavalry, and consider the obstinate resistance of the French behind their intrenchments, we may conclude that the killed and wounded on the side of the confederates did not fall short of 20,000 men.\*

Of course the French endeavour to extenuate their loss. In one of his letters to the king, Villars limits it to 6000 men†, and the highest estimate by other French writers gives

\* The battle of Waterloo was, in proportion to the number of the victors, still more destructive. According to Siborne, (*Waterloo*, ii. 352. 519.) there were in Wellington's army at Waterloo 69,686 men, and the loss was 22,469, or one in three nearly; at Malplaquet, it was one in five; at Talavera, one in four, — 5000 being killed and wounded out of 19,800 engaged.—En.

† We quote this passage from the valiant and skilful, but gasconading marshal: "Si Dieu nous fait la grace de perdre encore une pareille bataille, votre majesté peut compter que ses ennemis sont détruits: enfin, comme me le manda M. de Voisin, ce qui avoit paru une bataille perdue, devint une victoire glorieuse, après qu'on en eut connu les circonstances; puisque nous ne perdîmes pas six mille hommes."—*Mém. de Villars*.

only 8137 killed, wounded, and prisoners ; but, from a comparison of their own authorities, we may reasonably calculate their loss at not less than 14,000 men, exclusive of deserters.

By all the accounts, both of themselves and their opponents, the French displayed prodigious gallantry, and Marlborough himself allows that they fought with great spirit, and made a most obstinate resistance. Though we cannot say with Villars, that "the enemy would have been annihilated by such another victory," or with Boufflers, "that the French officers performed such wonders as even surpassed human nature," yet we do not wish to derogate from their valour and intrepidity. Nor ought we, on the other hand, to withhold a candid eulogium of the two confederate generals, and of the brave troops who acted under them, extracted from the letter of a French officer of distinction, written soon after the battle. "The Eugenes and Marlboroughs ought to be well satisfied with us during that day ; since till then they had not met with resistance worthy of them. They may say, with justice, that nothing can stand before them ; and, indeed, what shall be able to stem the rapid course of these two heroes, if an army of 100,000 of the best troops, posted between two woods trebly intrenched, and performing their duty as well as any brave men could do, were not able to stop them one day ? Will you not then own with me, that they surpass all the heroes of former ages ?"

In considering the consequences of this eventful day, we cannot but applaud the foresight of Marlborough, who before the opening of the campaign had so earnestly pressed for a powerful augmentation of troops. He was conscious that the French were prepared to make their final effort in the Netherlands, and that he should have to contend with a far greater force than he had yet encountered. The battle proved that his calculations were well founded, and that an additional number of 10,000 men would have more contributed to the advancement of peace, than all the efforts of the ablest negotiators in Europe. The allies, indeed, remained masters of the field ; but the laurels of the two great commanders were deeply tinged in blood, and the result of the campaign was far from being commensurate with the sacrifice of so many valuable lives.

Marlborough and Eugene exposed themselves no less on

this than on all other occasions, leading the columns into the midst of the fire in the thickest of the danger. "Although," says a German officer, in his letter, "no appearance of jealousy was ever observable between these two accomplished generals, yet on this day it was remarked that each endeavoured to surpass the other in conduct and valour."

Among the persons of rank who shed their blood upon this occasion, the allies lamented Lieut.-general Baron Spaar, Count Oxenstiern, Week, Tettau, and General Goor; Brigadier Lallo, and Colonel Lord Tullibardine. Among the wounded, besides Prince Eugene, we find Lieuts.-general Spaen and Webb, Majors-general Wackerbach and Hamilton; Brigadiers Cronstrom and Mey, and Colonel Sir John Pendergast.

Villars and Boufflers emulated their two great antagonists, and vied in exposing their persons. Villars was severely wounded in the front rank, and Boufflers, like Marlborough, miraculously escaped. The French lost the Marquis de Chemerault, Baron Pallavicini, Count de Beuil, Chevalier d'Ervi; Colonels Chardon and Moret of the guards; the Marquis de Charost, colonel of the regiment of Saillant d'Estain; Count Moncaut d'Autrey, colonel of La Sarre, and Colonel Steckemberg of Alsace. Among the wounded, besides Marshal Villars, were the young pretender, the Duke de Guiche, M. de Tournemine, Albergotti, Courceillon, Count Angeunes, the Duke de St. Agnan, the Marquis de Zele, and the Marquis de Gondrin.\*

\* Mr. Coxe has bestowed great pains in the composition of this chapter, and consulted, as appears from his list, every authority extant, for correct and complete information. It is not easy to make a great battle intelligible; but, in this instance, there is no ground for complaint of obscurity. Of all the conflicts in which Marlborough had been engaged, that of Malplaquet was most ably and obstinately contested; and of its various incidents, — preliminary, intermediate, and conclusive, — the historian has presented a faithful and masterly representation. On both sides the generals were first rate in science, valour, and experience; and no blunders appear to have been committed, unless it were in the impetuous advance of the prince of Orange. But the results bore no proportion to the magnitude of the conflict; and Marlborough himself seems, from the details of the next chapter, to have sickened over the profitless waste of life. The French, though beaten and compelled to retire, suffered less than the allies, owing to the strength of the latter's position. In England there was no exultation over so equivocal and

## CHAP. LXXXIII. — CAPTURE OF MONS. — 1709.

WE have found only two notes from the victorious general written on the field of battle, and in these we do not recognise that high tone of exultation which appeared in those announcing the victories of Blenheim, Ramilies, and Oudenard. The first of these forms part of a letter to the duchess, begun while his mind was occupied in those skilful manœuvres which brought on the engagement. It appears that his wife, in consequence of a violent quarrel with the queen, had importuned him to remonstrate with her majesty on her harsh behaviour, and that the duke, having declined this irksome office, from a conviction that it would be productive of no advantage, her importunities and bitter reproaches, for what she called his unkind refusal, drew from him this reply, which indicates great anxiety of mind. He seems, indeed, to have been more affected by this domestic misunderstanding, than by any apprehension of personal danger or risk of military fame.

“ \* \* \* I am obliged to you for the account you give of the building of Blenheim in yours of the 21st, and the farther account you intend me after the duke and duchess of Shrewsbury have seen what is done. You will see by my former letters, as well as by this, that I can take pleasure in nothing as long as you continue uneasy and think me unkind. I do assure you, upon my honour and salvation, that the only reason why I did not write was, that I am very sure it would have had no other effect than that of being shown to Mrs. Masham, by which she would have had an opportunity of turning it as she pleased; so that when I shall speak to the queen of her harsh behaviour to you, she would have been prepared. I beg you to be assured, that if ever I see the queen, I

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melancholy a triumph, especially when it was found that the capture of the paltry town of Mons would be the only prize of so costly a campaign. The victory, however, had one advantage in giving a more fixed desire for peace on both sides, from the hopelessness of entire conquest by either. France appeared exhaustless in resources: though repeatedly beaten, she could neither be subdued nor humbled; and, after every reverse, was ready to renew the contest with undiminished force and spirit. All, therefore, became impressed with the futile character of the war, and with the desirableness of terminating the uncompensated slaughter of brave men, and the waste of the resources of every European nation. It followed that Malplaquet was the last of the great battles fought in the war of the succession. — Ed.

shall speak to her just as you would have me; and all the actions of my life shall make the queen, as well as all the world, sensible that you are dearer to me than my own life; for I am fonder of my happiness than of my life, which I cannot enjoy unless you are kind.

"Having writ thus far, I have received intelligence that the French were on their march to attack us; we immediately got ourselves ready, and marched to a post some distance from our camp; we came in presence between two and three o'clock yesterday, in the afternoon; but as there was several \* \* \* † between us, we only cannonaded each other. They have last night intrenched their camp, by which they show plainly that they have changed their mind, and will not attack us; so that we must take our measures in seeing which way we can be most troublesome to them. This afternoon the regiments which made the siege of Tournay will join us, and then we shall have all the troops we can expect; for those we have left for the blocking up of Mons must continue where they are. I do not yet know if I shall have an opportunity of sending this letter to-night, if not, I shall add to it what may pass to-morrow. In the mean time, I can't hinder saying to you, that tho' the fate of Europe, if these armies engage, may depend upon the good or bad success, yet your uneasiness gives me much greater trouble."

The postscript, dated Sept. 11th, after the danger and anxiety of the day, briefly, and without any symptom of exultation, announces the result of this desperate and sanguinary conflict.

"I am so tired that I have but strength enough to tell you that we have had this day a very bloody battle; the first part of the day we beat their foot, and afterwards their horse. God Almighty be praised, it is now in our power to have what peace we please, and I may be pretty well assured of never being in another battle; but that nor nothing in this world can make me happy if you are not kind."

The note addressed to the treasurer is nearly similar.

"Sept. 11. — The English post of the 26th is come, but I have not strength to do any thing but that of letting you know that we have had this day a very murdering battle. God has blessed us with a victory, we having first beat their foot and then their horse. If the Dutch please, it is now in our power to have what peace we please, and I have the happiness of being pretty well assured that this is the last battle I shall be in; so that I may end my days in some quietness, and have the satisfaction of your company."

Marlborough had scarcely retired to enjoy a short repose after his incessant fatigues, before he was disturbed by the numerous appeals made by the officers of the different nations in the army, to give orders for relieving the wounded, and disposing of the sick. But on the ensuing morning his feel-

† Illegible. — Probably woods or heights.

ing mind was exposed to much more painful emotions; for that day was dedicated to the melancholy solemnity of burying the slain. On riding over the field of battle, he surveyed with a heavy heart the numerous bodies of the dead and dying, strewed over the plain, or heaped upon each other. Nor did he feel only for the sufferings of his companions in arms; the groans of the wounded enemies, and the sight of their mangled limbs, equally awakened his compassion. Learning also that many French officers and soldiers had crept into the neighbouring houses and woods, wounded, and in a miserable condition, for want of assistance, he ordered them every possible relief, and despatched a messenger with a letter to the French marshals, humanely proposing a conference at Bavai between General Cadogan and any officer whom they should choose to appoint, to arrange the means of conveying away these wretched sufferers. The meeting took place accordingly, between Cadogan and the Chevalier de Luxembourg, and the arrangements were amicably settled, two days being allowed for burying the dead and removing the wounded\*, the officers pledging their parole not to serve till regularly exchanged, and the soldiers to be considered as prisoners of war, for whom an equal number of the allied troops were to be returned. The number of the wounded, who might shortly have terminated their wretched existence, did not amount to less than 3000 men.

The generous commander was so deeply affected with this painful task, and so much harassed by continual exertions, as to be seriously indisposed. His faithful secretary, Cardonel, fearful lest some exaggerated account of his illness should reach England, communicated it to the duchess as the mere result of over-fatigue, adding that he had confined himself to his chamber, and was already recovering. The duke himself casually observed in his letters to his wife and Godolphin, that he had not recovered the fatigue of the battle, and the want of sleep for two days and two nights. He likewise complained of a continual head-ache and soreness of limbs, as well as of an inward heat which excoriated his lips, and was accompanied with feverish and nervous debility.

After this temporary illness had subsided, which he attri-

\* Letter from the Duke to Secretary Boyle, Sept. 16. — State Paper Office.

butes principally to anxiety for the loss of so many friends, he observes, in a letter to Godolphin (Oct. 3.), "I was so out of order the last post, that I could not give any answer to your four letters of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th. I am extremely obliged to you for your kind concern for my health and safety: my feverish and aguish distemper has taken a different course, by which I hope to be cured; at present it dispirits me."

"I should, after the battle, have preferred the siege of Maubeuge, but it was wholly impossible till we were first masters of Mons. The lines, which the Marshal de Boufflers is working from Valenciennes to the Sambre, are chiefly for the security of Maubeuge. In one of yours you lament the killed: in so great an action it is impossible to get the advantage, but by exposing men's lives; but the lamentable sight and thoughts of it have given me so much disquietude, that I believe it the chief cause of my illness; for it is melancholy to see so many brave men killed with whom I have lived these eight years, when we thought ourselves sure of a peace."

In the midst of the military movements for the investment of Mons, which seemed to occupy his whole attention, and during the feverish complaint which his incessant fatigues and acute feelings occasioned, we are pleased to recognise his satisfaction at the return of domestic harmony, expressed in affectionate terms and playful anticipations of future enjoyments. "Your last was from Althorpe," he writes to the duchess (Sept. 23.). "I hope we may be together there next summer, for the place and company will both be very agreeable to me; and I fancy there will be so much disorder at Blenheim, that we shall not have much pleasure in being there till the next year, and then I hope we may fix, for the little time I may yet have to live. I propose to make my court to you this winter, by being very much pleased with the great advance you have made in your building at London."\*

In the same letter he also, with great good humour, transmits a message to Lord Sunderland, in which he expresses his wishes, that the hopes of the Whigs respecting the barrier treaty will be realised.

"I am afraid I shall not have time to thank my Lord Sunderland for his of the 27th; it being writ at the same time you were there, I do not

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\* Alluding to Marlborough House, which the duchess was building.

doubt but he showed it to you. His reasoning is very good, and I wish it may all happen as he desires. I am sure nobody would venture more than myself for the keeping a good correspondence between England and Holland, for I think without it we are all undone; but to that end we must not pretend to wash a Blackamoor white, which I take the business of the barrier to be; but I see that Lord Somers, Lord Halifax, and all our friends, think it practicable, so that I hope at last Lord Townshend will be able to bring it to a happy conclusion."

In a similar strain of cordiality he likewise gratifies the duchess with the information, that he will write to the queen in conformity with her entreaties; and that he may not be considered as too timid and lukewarm, he says he will previously send the draught for her and the lord treasurer's approbation, and requests to have it returned with such alterations as they shall think fit, desiring it might be shown to no other person but to Lord Sunderland. By his subsequent correspondence we find that the draught having been sent and returned corrected, he fulfilled his promise, by transmitting the intended letter to the queen; and we have no doubt, though this letter is missing, that it contained a severe remonstrance on her usage of the duchess, and her partiality to Mrs. Masham.

The account of this victory was received in England with mixed sensations of triumph on the side of his friends, and of blame on that of his enemies. In public, a general joy seemed to prevail; the queen, though secretly indifferent to his successes, could not avoid manifesting exultation at the triumph of her arms, and ordering a day of thanksgiving. Godolphin, in consequence of this auspicious event, obtained a loan from the bank, which he had before solicited in vain; and all the true friends of England, as well as the partisans of the victorious general, lauded his military talents with increasing enthusiasm. But his numerous slanderers, both in the court and the country, cast upon him the most bitter reproaches, censuring the attack as rash and imprudent, and as a wanton sacrifice of so many gallant men to his personal ambition, without any solid advantage. Aggravated accounts of the killed and wounded were eagerly circulated, and the dreadful carnage of the left wing was attributed more to an inordinate lust of conquest in the British commander, than to its real cause. This calumny was as cruel as it was unfounded; for the rash attack of the prince of Orange was

contrary to his instructions, and had he adhered to the skilful dispositions issued in the general orders, he would have equally succeeded, and have spared a carnage which swept away the flower of the Dutch infantry, amounting to no less than 8000 men.\* Had this chosen body of veterans been reserved, the number of killed and wounded would have been diminished nearly one-half, and detachments of infantry might have been sent in sufficient force to intercept the retreat of the enemy. This false report had a free circulation, because the duke, from delicacy to the prince of Orange, could not attribute the disaster to its real cause.

With as little delay as possible, after this dreadful conflict, Mons was invested. On the 14th, the duke encamped in the vicinity of Belian, and Eugene, in his former position, at Quaregnon. The 15th was, to use his own expression, observed very devoutly throughout the whole army as a day of thanksgiving to Almighty God for the victory, and the evening concluded with a triple discharge of artillery and small arms.

After taking the necessary measures for the transport of the artillery from Brussels, as well as for the regular supply of ammunition and stores, the two confederate generals crossed the Trouille; Marlborough, with the covering army, encamped at Havre, and Eugene took up his quarters near Mons, to superintend the operations of the siege. The immediate direction of the attacks was intrusted to the prince of Orange, and a force of 30 battalions and as many squadrons was appointed for that service. From the distance of the French army, and the scantiness of the garrison, the besiegers did not deem it necessary even to draw a line of circumvallation. The only impediments to the formation of immediate approaches were the continuance of the violent rains, and the delays of the convoys with the heavy artillery. These having at length arrived from Brussels, the trenches, after some preparatory operations, were opened on the 25th of September, and two attacks formed against the gates of Bertiamont and Havre. This operation was interrupted by a sally of the garrison, in which General Cadogan was dangerously

\* We cannot avoid remarking, that Villars states the number of the Dutch killed in these attacks at not less than 20,000 men, probably more than the whole number of Dutch infantry in the army.

wounded, a circumstance of deep concern to the sensitive mind of Marlborough, whose anxiety, as appears in his letters, did not subside until this gallant officer was declared in a state of convalescence.

Meanwhile, reinforcements were drawn from the neighbouring garrisons to supply the losses in the battle, and the siege was vigorously prosecuted, notwithstanding the marshy nature of the ground, deluged by a succession of heavy rains. The approaches were pushed with celerity, and on the 9th of October a lodgment was effected on the covert-way on both attacks, with a loss of no more than 100 men. A heavy fire was continued on the place, and the trenches were carried forward with success until the 16th, when a lodgment was effected on the second counterscarp.

Among those who signally distinguished themselves during these operations, we may record the name of the gallant duke of Argyle, who was foremost in every situation of danger, and exposed his person like the meanest soldier. On one occasion, he joined an attacking corps at the moment when they were shrinking from the onset; and pushing among them, open breasted, he exclaimed, "You see, brothers, I have no concealed armour—I am equally exposed with you; I require none to go where I shall refuse to venture. Remember, you fight for the liberties of Europe and the glory of your nation, which shall never suffer by my behaviour, and I hope the character of a Briton is as dear to every one of you."\* His spirit animated the soldiers; the assault was made, and the work was carried.

On the 17th, at seven in the morning, the gate of Bertiamont was forced, as well as the ravelin, and an adjacent outwork, without the loss of a single man. This successful attack, which facilitated the further operations, was made under the inspection of Marlborough himself, who accele-

\* This anecdote is taken from a singular book, "The Memoirs of Mrs. Christian Davies," commonly called Mother Ross, who served as a common soldier in an English regiment of horse till her sex was discovered by a wound she received. She then continued to follow the camp as a sutler, and was several times rewarded for her exemplary courage and spirit. We should not quote the book as military authority, but, as she seems to have been an eye-witness of some of the duke of Argyle's gallant actions, we think her testimony, in this respect, worthy of credit.

rated the crisis by the impulse of his personal activity. After a tremendous fire from the batteries on the 20th, the breaches were declared practicable.

The danger to which Mons was reduced roused the French commander to make an attempt for its relief, or at least to interrupt the progress of the besiegers. Berwick, who was hastily recalled from Briançon, where he was stationed at the close of the campaign against the duke of Savoy, joined the main army under Boufflers on the 18th, near Quesnoy, and reconnoitred the allied camp; he found them posted with the left toward the Upper Trouille, and the right toward the Haine, their front covered by woods and marshes, and deemed the position too strong for him to risk the consequences of an attack.\*

While, however, the French commanders were reconnoitring and performing manœuvres, as if they menaced an immediate attack, Mons was vigorously pushed, breaching batteries opened against the body of the place, and, to escape the effect of an immediate assault, the governor beat a parley, and surrendered with such marks of honour as the confederate generals allowed. Of the 3500 men, who originally composed the garrison, a great number were killed or wounded, and many of the Walloons joined the besiegers; only 1500 men took advantage of the capitulation, to be conducted to Namur and Maubeuge.

By the capture of Mons, and the other conquests on the Lys and the Dyle, the great towns in Brabant and Flanders, the protection of which had previously occasioned much trouble, were entirely covered. The frontiers of the Dutch and the adjacent provinces were also exempted from the burden of supplying encamping and foraging armies; and the French were at length circumscribed within their own limits, and reduced to the resources which they could draw from their own territories.

On the loss of Mons, the French troops were divided into two bodies. Berwick, with 50 battalions and 100 squadrons, took post to cover Maubeuge; and Boufflers, with the rest of the army, protected Valenciennes and Quesnoy, in order to prevent any new operation of the allies. Their precautions were, however, groundless. The heavy rains, the advanced season of the year, the losses of the campaign, and the sick-

\* Mémoires de Berwick.

ness which was the consequence of the siege of Mons, prevented the allies from attacking Maubeuge, which Marlborough had much at heart. On the 26th the confederate generals moved from the camp before Mons, passed the Haine, and encamped at Thieusies, where they celebrated a solemn thanksgiving for the capture of Mons. They separated on the 28th for winter quarters, the English marching to Ghent, the Danes to Bruges, the Prussians to the Meuse, and the remainder of the army to Brussels, Louvain, and the neighbouring towns of Brabant. Eugene and Marlborough repaired to Brussels, and from thence to the Hague, by different routes.\*

During his continuance at the Hague, Marlborough, in concert with Eugene, made the necessary arrangements for the future campaign, and stimulated the Dutch to concur in the vigorous prosecution of the war. He likewise joined with the republic in representing to the states of the empire the necessity of furnishing their respective quotas, since they demanded, as the terms of peace, no less than the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, with Alsace and Franche Comté. He also obtained from Prince Eugene a solemn promise that his imperial master would join in pressing the states and princes of the empire punctually to fulfil their engagements. He arranged likewise the proper means for extinguishing the war in the north, or at least for preventing its extension into the empire, and affecting the interests of the grand alliance. Finally, he concerted with Eugene measures for despatching such a powerful reinforcement into Spain as would enable the confederates no longer to confine themselves to defensive warfare, but to undertake such operations as were likely to decide the fate of this protracted contest.

#### CHAP. LXXXIV.—OPERATIONS ON THE RHINE.—1709.

THE great effort of both powers being made in the Netherlands, the other parts of the theatre of war were of little importance.

\* Correspondence. Lediard. *Vie de Marlborough*. Complete History of Europe. Mémoires de Berwick. Brodrick, &c.

A grand project was indeed formed for a simultaneous invasion of France in two quarters where she was least provided with defence. We have already adverted to the plan concerted by the duke of Savoy, for penetrating into Dauphiné and the Lyonnais; and a co-operative invasion was projected in spring on the side of Germany, to enter Franche Comté, where the inhabitants, averse to the Bourbon government, were expected to rise in favour of their former masters, the Austrian sovereigns. The chiefs of the alliance likewise hoped to embarrass the French government, by fomenting an insurrection in the Cevennes, where the disaffected still maintained a clandestine correspondence with their refugee countrymen.

While the combined troops of the duke of Savoy and of the emperor were in motion towards Dauphiné, the elector of Hanover was to send a detachment from the army of the Upper Rhine, to make a rapid movement upon Alsace; and, before a sufficient body could be collected to oppose them, to push forward to Franche Comté, with the hope of establishing a communication with the army of Piedmont in the vicinity of Lyons.

Had this combined attack, which was planned with equal address and boldness, been successful, a fatal blow would have been given to the declining greatness of France. But many delays and obstacles occurred to delay the movements of the respective troops. Before the German army could assemble on the Rhine, a considerable force, under Marshal d'Harcourt, had been collected to defend the lines of Lauterburg, and to cover Alsace; and although he was prevented from undertaking offensive operations by the draughts which were detached to the Netherlands, he was in sufficient strength to impede the advance of the Germans under General Thungen, inferior in numbers, and unprovided with the requisites for opening the campaign.

During this suspense, the elector of Hanover made, as usual, numerous difficulties before he assumed the command; the want of money also delayed the necessary preparations, and it was not till the latter end of July that the expedition against Franche Comté marched from the army of the Rhine. Still, however, sanguine hopes of success were entertained; for while the elector amused Marshal d'Harcourt with a

feigned attack behind the lines of Lauterburg, Count Merciel led 6000 chosen and gallant troops, by forced and secret marches, into the canton of Basle. Passing under the walls of the town, notwithstanding the neutrality of the Swiss, he burst into Alsace, which was destitute of troops, and intrenched himself at Rumersheim, near Neuburg on the Rhine, waiting for the junction of another body, which was advancing to his support. In this situation, being apprised of the approach of a corps, under the command of the Count de Bourg, which had been detached from the army of Marshal d'Harcourt, he formed the imprudent resolution of quitting his intrenchments to oppose them, deceived by the false intelligence that they were greatly inferior in numbers. In a desperate conflict he was totally defeated, and compelled to retrace his march behind the Rhine, with the loss of half his army. The elector, during the remainder of the season, continued inactive.

This defeat put an end to the projected invasion of Franche Comté; while the military operations on the side of Piedmont were rendered abortive by the increase of the fatal misunderstanding between the courts of Turin and Vienna.

In conformity with the project of invading France, Victor Amadeus made active preparations for opening the campaign, and the Austrian forces were assembled by Marshal Daun to serve under his command; but he refused to take the field until he had received the investiture of the Vigevenasco, which had been promised to him in the treaty of 1703, by the emperor Leopold. Unfortunately, he claimed the district of the Langhes, and nine villages, as dependencies of the Vigevenasco, which, being fiefs of the empire, afforded the court of Vienna a new pretext for withholding the investiture.

In the midst of these disputes, the king of France artfully endeavoured to increase the misunderstanding, by making overtures to the duke of Savoy, through his daughter, the queen of Spain, promising to him the most advantageous terms of accommodation. England and the States were naturally interested in preventing the schism in the alliance, which the defection of the duke of Savoy was likely to occasion. They therefore used the utmost exertions to induce the court of Vienna to comply with his demands;

but the only concession which they could obtain was a vague promise of fulfilling the treaty, and a consent that commissaries should be appointed, to repair to Milan for the arrangement of the investiture. But these commissaries, though hourly expected, never arriving, the duke ordered his minister to deliver a memorial on the 24th of June to the queen and the States, declaring his resolution not to assume the command until his claims were satisfied. He at the same time demanded the arrears due to him for the pay and maintenance of the Austrian troops in Piedmont, which the court of Vienna had not liquidated. To conciliate him, the queen and States guaranteed the payment of this debt; but their intercession at the court of Vienna failing of effect, the duke made private and stronger appeals to Marlborough, to use his influence over Prince Eugene and the imperial ministers. The powerful intercession of the British general was equally fruitless; and the referees delaying to make the award, Victor Amadeus sullenly remained at Turin, and gave the command of the army to Marshal Daun, notwithstanding the urgent entreaties of the maritime powers, that he would suppress his resentment for the advantage of the common cause.\*

In consequence of these delays, the campaign was not opened till the middle of August, when, from the absence of the duke of Savoy, the movements were impeded by frequent altercations between the Piedmontese generals and Marshal Daun; and even after he had burst into Savoy, and advanced towards Briançon, he found the enemy, under the duke of Berwick, so strongly posted, that he could not venture to force the passage into Dauphiné. At the same time receiving intelligence of Count Merci's defeat, he gained no farther advantage over the enemy than to drive them beyond the frontiers of Savoy, and to capture the small post of Annecy. After this trifling success, he repassed the Alps, marched into Piedmont, and closed the campaign at the latter end of September.

In the midst of these operations, Berwick sent a detach-

\* Letters from the duke of Savoy, Count Briançon, and General Palmes, to the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Sunderland; also from Mr. Chetwynd, the British agent at Turin, to the same, from January to August.

ment into the Cevennes, defeated the insurgents without difficulty, captured their chief, and restored tranquillity.

Meanwhile, the duke of Savoy had remained at Turin, in a state of gloomy and anxious discontent. His enterprising spirit, eager for action, and panting for glory, brooded over his disappointment, and the conflicting passions of violent resentment and shame at his absence from the army\* working upon his feelings, brought on a feverish complaint, succeeded by a permanent indignation at the court of Vienna, who continued their delays of granting the investiture. This temper of mind augured ill of his future exertions. His gratitude and his attachment to the principles of the grand alliance alone kept him steady to his engagements, and he agreed to make the usual arrangements for the ensuing campaign.

The affairs of Spain assumed a new aspect in this eventful year. Hitherto the Spanish grandees had beheld with extreme jealousy the ascendancy of French counsels, and the paramount influence of the French ambassador; they now began to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Louis, in accepting such conditions of peace as would either lead to a partition of the monarchy, or force upon them an hostile sovereign, whom they despised and detested. They likewise gave credit to his assurances that France, distressed as she was on all sides, involved in financial embarrassments, and exhausted by famine, could not, at the same time, defend herself and assist Spain. They therefore evinced a patriotic resolution to defend their own country, and to prevent a scandalous and dishonourable partition. They were animated by the rising spirit and energy of their young sovereign, who called upon them to rally round the throne of his ancestors, declaring that he would tinge the soil of his beloved Castile with his own blood, rather than resign his crown at the will even of his grandfather, or at the dictates of insulting foes. He likewise gratified his Spanish subjects by agreeing to dismiss his French counsellors, and to consign the administration of affairs into the hands of natives. These spirited resolutions excited general enthusiasm among all ranks of people, and an unanimous determination was avowed to maintain the

\* Letters from Mr. Chetwynd to the Duke of Marlborough, July 24., and from General Palmes to Lord Sunderland.

sovereign on his throne. In a grand assembly of the Castilian and Andalusian nobles, it was pronounced to be a degradation to the national dignity to suffer England and Holland to parcel out their monarchy; and if the king of France could no longer furnish the requisite assistance, the whole people were summoned to rise at one and the same impulse, and sacrifice themselves for their sovereign, their country, and their honour. This solemn pledge was not belied. Levies of men, and contributions of money and plate were poured in; the enthusiasm of the nobles was communicated to the clergy, who not only lavished their treasures, but employed their powerful influence against a prince who, they declared, was supported by rebels and heretics; while the people, animated by the exhortations of their chiefs and pastors, flocked to the royal standard.

At the same time, Philip, in his own name and in that of the nation, as an independent sovereign and people, appointed the duke of Alva and Count Bergueik his plenipotentiaries at the Hague, though he knew that they could not be admitted. He also publicly protested against the terms proposed in the conferences for the dismemberment of his monarchy.

As a farther proof of his independence, he ordered Count Bergueik to address a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, intimating the willingness of his royal master to enter into a treaty of peace, and requesting to hold a conference either with him or any person whom he should be pleased to nominate. The British general received this overture while he was engaged in the siege of Tournay, but declined the proposal, as inconsistent with his instructions, since the acceptance of it would have been an acknowledgment of Philip as the lawful sovereign of Spain.

These resolutions afforded to Louis an opportunity to declare that his power was inadequate to the compulsory dethronement of his grandson; and to give a colour to his professions of no longer assisting Spain, he withdrew the garrisons and recalled his troops, though he soon afterwards permitted a part of them to remain, on the rupture of the negotiations. At the same time he privately encouraged Philip in the spirited resolution of defending his crown to the last extremity, and promised never to abandon him.\*

\* For a confirmation of this fact, which sufficiently proves the insin-

The spirit, therefore, which had been thus excited in Spain, sufficed to increase the army, though it did not produce any important effects, as the stress of the war lay in other quarters.

In Catalonia, the allied forces, though strengthened by British and Austrian troops, were inferior to the enemy; but, fortunately, the hostile operations were impeded by the altercations between the Spanish general, Count Aguilar, and the French general Bezons, as well as by the mutual hatred that subsisted between the soldiers of the two nations, who seemed more eager to turn their arms against each other than to unite against the common enemy. As in this inauspicious posture of affairs, they remained wholly on the defensive, the active Staremburg crossed the Segra, and invested Balaguer, in their very presence; and while the two commanders were hesitating about an attack, the fortress surrendered, with a garrison of three battalions, without resistance.

Irritated with this intelligence, Philip himself quitted Madrid, and assumed the command of the army, in the hope of terminating the disputes of the generals, and restraining the feuds of the soldiery; but his presence had no effect, for he had the mortification to regret the want of forage and subsistence, and to observe the unassailable position of the enemy. He therefore indignantly quitted the army, and transferring the command to the prince of Zerclaes, hurried away from a scene where he had experienced nothing but chagrin and disappointment. The only achievement which did honour to the French arms in the Peninsula was the irruption of Noailles into the northern part of Catalonia. He reduced Figueras, and surprising an Austrian camp under the walls of Gerona, killed, dispersed, or captured the troops, made the general prisoner, took the artillery and baggage, and after this brilliant exploit, returned to winter on the frontier of Roussillon.

During this year we find many letters from Charles to the Duke of Marlborough, in which he blends repeated offers of the government of the Low Countries, with the strongest remonstrances against the barrier treaty, and with claims

cerity of the French monarch, see St. Philippe, t. iii. p. 263—309, and *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon*, chaps. 16, 17.

equally strong for the restitution of the territories dismembered from Spain since the peace of the Pyrenees. The offers of the government Marlborough was obliged to decline, though he never wholly relinquished the hope of so honourable and splendid an establishment. He was, however, much embarrassed by the complaints and pretensions of Charles, because he partly admitted their justice, and was thereby involved in discussions with the British cabinet. He was still farther perplexed by the counter remonstrances of the States; for while they grasped at a large accession of territory, they were displeased that Minorca should be ceded to England, and that a treaty of commerce with Spain was negotiating by General Stanhope, which they considered as unfavourable to their interests. These unceasing bickerings and discordant sentiments harassed the British general, and exposed him to frequent altercations with the pensionary and his other friends in Holland; but they did not obstruct his grand designs for obtaining the evacuation of Spain rather by conquest than by negotiation.

The recent events in Spain seem to have convinced the Duke of Marlborough that Philip and his Castilians would resist to the utmost the transfer of their monarchy to the house of Austria. He therefore represented the necessity of hastening the conclusion of the treaty between England, the emperor, and Holland, for carrying on the war in the Peninsula with vigour, in which case, he observes, "I cannot see how it could last six months, considering the troops we have already in Spain, and that the remainder of the French must be recalled."\* This observation he makes upon the supposition that the allies would accept the preliminaries, with the modification of the 37th article, and that Louis was sincere. "But I am told," he adds, "that in England this is thought a continuation of the war, and a giving time to France to recover, so that whilst there are such people as Mr. Harley in the world, it is dangerous for honest men to give their opinion. But to you and the queen, I shall always, as long as I am in business, give mine very freely, and I confess I cannot but be of opinion, that if the war should be continued for some time longer, we shall at last be obliged to the ex-

\* Letter to Lord Godolphin, Aug. 26.

pense of reducing Spain. For I do not think it in the power of the French king or his ministers to oblige the Spaniards and the duke of Anjou to submit to the preliminaries." In regard to the continuance of hostilities in Spain, he farther observed, that it was necessary to act on a different method from that which had been hitherto pursued. He deemed it a waste of treasure and blood to limit the military operations to the conquest of a few frontier provinces, which he said would be to protract the war longer than he should live; on the contrary, he recommended the most active measures for collecting an efficient force, on both sides of the Peninsula, to advance into the heart of Spain, and take possession of Madrid.

With this view he laboured to organise powerful armies in Portugal and Catalonia, and, having obtained the concurrence of the British, imperial, and Dutch cabinets, actually accumulated a force in both quarters which was to assemble early in the spring, and which he deemed adequate to accomplish the grand object to which he directed his views.

On the side of Portugal the campaign was opened with sanguine hopes of brilliant success, by the advance of the united forces under Lord Galway and the Marquis of Frontera, towards the Caya, with a view of penetrating into the western provinces of Spain, and besieging the important fortress of Badajoz. They found the Spanish army, under the Marquis of Bay, posted on the opposite bank of the Caya. Disputes, as usual, arose between the Portuguese and British generals, and a resolution was adopted, contrary to the opinion of Galway, to cross the river, with the hopes of surprising the enemy, part of whom appeared to be in the act of foraging. In this operation the Portuguese horse of the left wing being attacked with great impetuosity by the Spanish cavalry, gave way as at the battle of Almanza, and left the flank of the infantry uncovered. After a desperate conflict, in which the united corps of infantry exerted themselves to repair this fatal disaster, they were defeated, but made an orderly retreat. During the engagement, Galway led up two battalions of British veterans and one of Spanish recruits, but, being unsustained by the horse, they were intercepted by the enemy, and surrendered prisoners of war. The general himself narrowly escaped the loss of his life or liberty, and,

after wandering during the whole night, with difficulty rejoined the army. With discouraged and defeated troops, however, he repulsed the pursuing enemy, and, occupying strong positions behind the Guadiana, covered the frontiers of Portugal. This petty defeat, in which the loss, exclusive of prisoners, was very inconsiderable, animated the spirit of the Spaniards as much as it depressed that of the Portuguese; but no event of consequence occurred during the remainder of the campaign, the allied forces continuing on the defensive, and the Spaniards not venturing to undertake active operations.

From the letters of Marlborough it appears that the repeated defeats of the Portuguese led him to place little reliance on the spirit of their troops, if left to their own direction. He therefore disapproved a project of Lord Galway, which was supported by the British cabinet, to raise six regiments of dragoons among the natives. "This scheme," he observes to Godolphin (July 1.), "can never be depended upon, nor be of any use, but for the subsisting of a few French officers; nor, I believe, was it ever heard of before, to be at the expense of raising new troops at the end of a war. Whatever may be pretended, you will find this will cost you a great sum of money; and when they are on foot, you will be told that they cannot subsist upon English pay. If one half of this money had been employed in hiring of old troops, that might have been of use; and you may depend upon it, that the Portuguese have been beaten too often this war to do any thing that may be vigorous."

This observation was perfectly just, as the Portuguese never more acted with spirit and energy; and the degraded state of the country is justly described by the unfortunate general, who, with great military spirit and perseverance, suffered more from the faults of others than from his own.

In a letter to Lord Godolphin, dated Sept. 4., Galway observes, "By the accounts you have heard since my return to Lisbon, you are prepared to expect no good from this court. It is every day worse and worse. The king is pretty well, but enters no more into affairs than if he were in his infancy. Nobody will appear to govern, for certainly no government was ever so abandoned; there is not a penny in the treasury, and less credit; and no care taken to remedy

it." Notwithstanding, however, this unfavourable representation, Marlborough still entertained hopes that the subsidies and reinforcements, contributed by the Maritime Powers, would stimulate the apathy of the Portuguese Court, and, at least, induce them to co-operate with the troops who were collected on the side of Catalonia to march upon Madrid.

This year was remarkable for the defeat of Charles XII. at the battle of Pultowa\*, a defeat which interrupted his splendid career of military glory, tranquillised the alarms of the emperor, and freed the belligerent powers from the dread of his formidable interference. The British general sympathised in the fate of the gallant monarch, from whom he had received the most distinguished marks of kindness and respect, and who, with all his eccentricities and chivalrous temerity, possessed many qualifications of a great and magnanimous mind. We observe, therefore, in the duke's letters, a few touches of his ardent sensibility and concern. "This afternoon" (Aug. 26.), he writes to the duchess, "I have received a letter from Prince Menzikoff, favourite and general of the czar, of the entire victory over the Swedes. If this unfortunate king had been so well advised as to have made peace the beginning of this summer, he might, in a great measure, have influenced the peace between France and the allies, and have made his kingdom happy; whereas now he is entirely in the power of his neighbours." And again, to Lord Godolphin:—"An officer from the czar's army is this afternoon come with letters, and the relation of the late

\* The Blenheim papers contain several interesting letters to the Duke of Marlborough from Count Piper, in which he details the rapid progress of Charles XII. through the western provinces of Muscovy, in his march towards the Ukraine. He describes the general consternation of the Russians, their abandonment of their homes, the voluntary conflagration of their towns and villages, and considers the conquest of the country and the dethronement of the czar as inevitable. These letters are very curious, as they resemble the accounts given in the bulletins of Buonaparte; both invaders mistook the flight of the peasantry and the devastation of their villages as indications of fear and submission, and both were equally deceived. These acts of patriotism and devotion to their country were, on the contrary, strong symptoms of a determined spirit of resistance which animated all ranks and distinctions. The destruction of the invading army was the consequence in both instances; and both generals terminated in that remote region a career of uninterrupted success.

victory, to the prince of Orange and myself. He left the czar twelve days after the action. I send to Mr. Secretary a copy of my letter from the czar's favourite and general, with the relation of the whole, so that I shall not trouble you with repeating, but cannot avoid telling you that the particular account the officer gives me is so terrible; and having once seen the king of Sweden, I am extremely touched with the misfortune of this young king. His continued successes, and the contempt he has of his enemies, have been his ruin."\*

The defeat of Charles and the destruction of his veteran army revived the hopes of his enemies; and a combination was formed between the northern powers of Germany with Denmark and Russia, not only to recover the territories which he had wrested from them, but to dismember the Swedish dominions. The king of Denmark made instant preparations for invading the western provinces of Sweden; King Augustus departed from Dresden for the recovery of Poland, and the two monarchs renewed their offensive alliance with the czar. At the same time the king of Prussia joined the alliance, with the prospect of conquering Pomerania. This confederacy alarmed the cabinets of Vienna, England, and Holland, and the treasurer intimated that instant precautions ought to be taken to prevent the overthrow of the balance of power in the North. Marlborough was, however, apprehensive lest any precipitate measures should be adopted which might offend the northern powers, and recommends, with his usual sagacity, a temperate and moderate course of policy. Alluding to the supposed treaty made by the three kings at Berlin, he observes to Godolphin, "If King Augustus marches for Poland, you cannot doubt of its being concerted between the three kings; so that the queen, in my poor opi-

\* "The overthrow at Pultowa was one of the most momentous that had occurred in modern times. Not only was a great and dreaded conqueror at once overturned, and, ere long, reduced to captivity; but a new balance of power was established in the north, which has never since been shaken. Sweden was reduced to her natural rank as a third-rate power, from which she had been only raised by the extraordinary valour and military talents of a series of warlike sovereigns, who had succeeded in rendering the Scandinavian warriors, like the Macedonians of old, a race of heroes. Russia, by the same event, acquired the entire ascendancy over the other Baltic powers, and obtained that preponderance which she has ever since maintained in the affairs of Europe."—*Alison*. — Ed.

nion, should be very careful of what steps she makes; for we have in this army upwards of 40,000 men which belong to these princes, and, should they withdraw their troops, the houses of Brunswick and Holstein would be obliged to do the same, which are 20,000 more. I need not mention what consequence this would have for the advantage of France; but I am sure you will do all you can for preventing the loss of these troops. The pensioner has desired my opinion on this affair, which I have given him, that our first and principal care should be to oblige these princes not to recall their troops, and afterwards to concert what measures are best to be taken, but not to be hasty in taking a resolution. But if the news be true, which comes from several parts, of the king of Sweden's being killed, that will make a great change in all the affairs of the North."

At the close of the campaign, the king of Prussia, as usual, expressed to the duke his dissatisfaction at the conduct of the allies, and at the little attention which was paid to his interests during the conferences at the Hague. He also renewed his threats of recalling his troops, and even affected to listen to overtures from France.

This letter was enclosed in one from Grumbkow (Dec. 21.), stating that there was a very serious cabal even among those who professed devotion to the duke, to thwart his views, and perhaps to confirm the king in his resolution of withdrawing his troops. He earnestly entreats the duke to gratify the king for the present, and to find some pretext for inducing his master to employ him on a mission to the Hague, that he might make those communications in person which he could not confide to writing; and entreats his grace not to betray him as the author of this intelligence, because his ruin would be inevitable.

In another letter of the same date, Grumbkow states that the king of Prussia bitterly complained of the distrustful reserve which the queen had maintained towards him, and that he had been neglected and insulted by the Dutch. He likewise observed that his royal master claimed the principality of Orange and the cession of Guelder, insisting that the emperor and the queen should bind themselves not to make peace till his demands were complied with.

It is almost needless to observe that Marlborough, as usual,

succeeded in conciliating the wayward monarch. At his request, Grumbkow was sent to the Hague. In his conferences with this confidential agent, he learnt that the king had not discontinued his secret negotiations with France, and that there were strong grounds for apprehension, lest his resentment against the States, who positively refused to satisfy his demands, should induce a prince of so choleric and suspicious a temper to secede from the alliance. As a means, therefore, of preventing the loss of so useful an ally, a sketch of a letter, containing new promises and offers, calculated to gratify the king, was drawn up by Grumbkow, and transmitted by Marlborough to the treasurer. A transcript of this letter, in her majesty's own hand, was remitted, and Grumbkow was charged with the delivery, accompanied with assurances of a similar tendency. This expedient succeeded in securing the continuance of the king of Prussia's co-operation and assistance.\*

#### CHAP. LXXXV.—INFLUENCE OF THE WHIGS.—1709.

WHILE Marlborough was conducting his military operations, he was again annoyed with the political feuds in the cabinet. We have already referred to the resolution adopted by the Whig leaders to place the earl of Orford at the head of the

\* The little truth and faith at this period in European diplomacy has been remarked on in Appendix, note F., p. 493. Public ministers and ambassadors were mostly in the pay of foreigners, and either openly betrayed or insidiously influenced their respective governments. The text affords a pertinent example of this diplomatic cozenage. Grumbkow, aware, from confidential intercourse, of the private inclinations of his master, clandestinely communicates them to Marlborough, who instructs the English prime minister, and the latter prepares a letter in conformity therewith, which Queen Anne copies and transmits in autograph, and as her own spontaneous offers, to the king of Prussia. The bait is taken, and the beguiled monarch remains steadfast to the Grand Alliance. A similar contrivance was frequently resorted to by the triumvirs in the government of the queen herself. If Anne demurred to any favourite project, the draught of a letter most likely to influence the queen, and the joint production of the duchess and Godolphin, was transmitted to Marlborough; this the duke copied and transmitted to her majesty as his own unbiassed opinion of the pending juncture in public affairs. The reader must have observed several instances of this management, and which was mostly successful in influencing the queen's determination.—Ed.

Admiralty. Relying on their services to government, and powerful ascendancy in parliament, they made strong solicitations for his promotion. But the treasurer eluded their application, in consequence of the queen's reluctance to admit another Whig into the only department from which that party had been hitherto excluded. They were, however, too conscious of their strength to regard such difficulties, and again stated to the ministers that their demands must be either immediately complied with, or the government must forego their farther support.

In the course of the summer, the same struggle took place as on the preceding occasions; the same jealousies against the two ministers revived, and the queen once more strongly appealed to Marlborough against this fresh attempt of the Whigs to monopolise the power of the state, expressing her indignation against them for repeatedly insulting her feelings, as well as for attempting to usurp her prerogative. Godolphin acted with his usual lukewarmness and timidity, and, unfortunately, Marlborough fostered no less dislike to Orford than to Halifax. Accordingly, in his letters to the duchess, he gave vent to the most splenetic effusions against this nobleman; but he was no sooner apprised that the Whigs were determined to extort his appointment, than he smothered his aversion, and promoted their demands. Meanwhile, the duchess had reconciled herself to Sunderland, and, with her characteristic ardour, resuming her predilections for the Whigs, wearied the duke with importunities to exert his influence over the queen, in order to accomplish the proposed change. As in the former contest for the promotion of Somers, Marlborough was again accused of lukewarmness by the duchess and Godolphin, and again importuned to enforce the demands of the Whigs in a tone and language which he did not approve. He was still actuated by respect for the queen, and gratitude for past benefits; and it was not till he found the necessity of compliance, that he acceded to their importunities. Apprehensive, however, that his language might be misconstrued, and considered as not sufficiently energetic, he again sent his draughts to be corrected, and finally wrote to the queen in a style which they deliberately approved.

At length the queen could no longer resist the accumulated representations of all her ministers, and reluctantly consented to the appointment of Orford. This difficulty was no sooner overcome than another arose on the formation of the board; for she objected to the admission of Sir George Byng and Sir John Jennings, whom the Whigs were equally anxious to introduce. This refusal led to new cabals and negotiations. Marlborough again became the mediator between the contending parties, and acted with equal firmness and discretion. He strongly supported the representations of Godolphin and the Whigs, though he acknowledged, with regret, that his application would be attended with little effect.

"I should be glad," he writes to the duchess (Nov. 1.), "to hear in your next that the queen had approved of such a commission [of the Admiralty] as you would think would make every thing easy; for though I am very fond of retirement, yet I am sensible that it will be a great pleasure to hear that every thing goes well. I am of opinion that my letter will make no alteration in the queen; however, I assure you that I am very well pleased that I have made her acquainted with my mind. I believe her easiness to Lord Sunderland proceeds from her being told that she can't do other than go on with the Whigs; but be assured that Mrs. Masham and Mr. Harley will, underhand, do every thing that can make the business uneasy, and particularly to you, the lord treasurer, and me; for they know very well that if we were removed, every thing would be in their power. This is what they labour for, believing it would make them both great and happy; but I am very well persuaded it would be their destruction. I shall leave this place to-morrow, and be at the Hague on Sunday, where I hope to find a letter from you."

All the letters which passed between Marlborough and the queen, on this occasion, are unfortunately missing, except one from the latter, which expresses the acuteness of her feelings, and will serve to show the embarrassments of the duke:—

"*Windsor, Oct. 29.* — The illness in my eyes has hindered me so long from writing to you, that I have now four of your letters to answer, of the 7th and 16th of September, and the 12th of this month, which I shall do in their order.

"The first is upon a matter of very great consequence, which in a little time will be put in another method, of which I don't doubt but you have had an account from other hands; but as yet I can give you none, not having heard what propositions are to be made to me on that subject; and I must own to you I am in a good deal of uneasiness to find in three conversations I have had with lord treasurer, since he came from New-

market, he has not mentioned the business of the Admiralty to me, fearing by that he intends to offer people he thinks will be disagreeable to me; and, therefore, out of good nature, defers it as long as 'tis possible. Whoever he proposes for this commission, it is a thing of that great consequence to the public, and particularly to myself, that I must consider it very well before I can come to any resolution. By the conclusion of this letter of yours, that I have in short answered, I flattered myself that you would have made me easy in every thing; but I find by yours of the 12th of this month that your mind is altered, which I am very sorry for. I am very willing to comply with yours of the 16th, concerning the duke of Argyle, thinking his behaviour in this campaign deserves it; but I desire you will not say any thing of it to him, till I have the satisfaction of seeing you, for a reason that is not proper to trust in a letter, but what I am sure you must think reasonable when you know it.

“ Your letter of the 10th of this month requires a longer and more particular answer than I have now time to give it, but I shall take the first opportunity to tell you my thoughts, very freely, on what you say.

“ I return you my thanks for yours of the 26th, which brought me the good news of the surrender of Mons, for which I congratulate you with all my heart, nobody, I am sure, doing it more sincerely than your humble servant.” \*

On the very day in which Marlborough landed in England this political feud was terminated. The Whigs were gratified by the appointment of Lord Orford at the head of the Admiralty, in the place of the earl of Pembroke, who was recompensed with a pension of 3000*l.* a year, and of Sir George Byng and Sir John Leake, as two of the commissioners. The queen on her part was pleased with the exclusion of Sir John Jennings, against whom she fostered a peculiar and personal antipathy.†

This new party contest for the appointment of the Admiralty board, served, as before, to inflame the spirit of discord which reigned between the queen and the duchess. Since the departure of the duke, their interviews were less frequent; but their correspondence was continued in the usual strain of perpetual altercation. The duchess did not spare her bitter invectives against the secret influence of Harley, the fondness of the queen for Mrs. Masham, and her reluctance to gratify those to whose zeal she was indebted for the glory of her reign. The replies of the queen were equally sarcastic and reproachful. Many of these were communicated

\* Copy in the hand-writing of the duchess.

† The four other commissioners were Dodington (afterwards Lord Melcombe), Paul Methuen, Sir Wm. Drake, and Aislachie.

to the duke, and increased his chagrin. His letters to the duchess are filled with expressions of concern for this fatal disagreement; and he strongly advises his wife to abstain from a correspondence which he justly considered as not calculated to have any other effect than to increase the misunderstanding.

"*Aug. 19.* — \* \* \* I shall say very little to you concerning the queen's letter, which was by no means obliging; but if you can't regain her affections, that matter will continue as it now is. I would go upon all-four to make it easy between you; but for credit, I am satisfied that I have none; so that I would willingly not expose myself, but meddle as little as possible."

"*Aug. 22.* — Since my last I have had yours by Mr. Carte, who came to the army last night. I see by it that the queen continues her cold and unkind proceedings towards you. That must be so, as long as Mrs. Masham has the opportunities of being daily with her; I agree with you that ill-nature and forgetfulness give just reason to those I am most concerned for, not to trouble themselves any further than what may concern the public good. It is impossible for me, by writing, to give you all the reasons that I have for the method I have prescribed to myself, as soon as there shall be peace, and which I hope you will approve of, since it is the only method in which I can enjoy any happiness. Be obliging and kind to all your friends, and avoid entering into cabals; and whatever I have in this world, if that can give you any satisfaction, you shall always be mistress of, and have the disposing of that and me."

"*Aug. 26.* — I received yours of the 5th so very late, that it was impossible for me to make you any answer by that post. I must own to you, that the queen's letter is very far from having any thing that looks like the least tenderness: it helps to confirm me in the resolution I have taken; and I am very confident, when I have an opportunity of giving you and the queen my reasons, that both of you will agree to the method of my future behaviour. The letter you were advised to write is very reasonable; but since the queen has not the consideration she formerly had for you and me, what good effect can you expect from it? It has always been my observation in disputes, especially in that of kindness and friendship, that all reproaches, though ever so reasonable, do serve to no other end but the making the breach wider. I can't hinder being of opinion, how insignificant soever we may be, that there is a power above which puts a period to our happiness or unhappiness; otherwise, should any body eight years ago have told me, after the success I have had, and the twenty-seven years' faithful services of yourself, that we should be obliged, even in the lifetime of the queen, to seek happiness in a retired life, I should have thought it impossible."

Unfortunately, the duchess was of too irritable a temper to follow this prudent advice in her demeanour to the queen, and a trifling incident will show the height to which their mutual resentment was carried. On the death of Mr. Howe,

envoy at the court of Hanover, his widow was left with a large family in considerable distress. After a painful visit to her afflicted friend, the duchess, from a laudable impulse of humanity, waited on the queen, and describing her lamentable situation, requested for her a pension, and apartments in Somerset-house. The queen coldly complied, saying she should refer the business to the lord treasurer.

The duchess then requested her majesty to grant some lodgings recently vacated in the palace of St. James, for the purpose of forming a more commodious entry to her own apartments, claiming a former promise. The queen, who seemed to have reserved these lodgings for the use of Mrs. Masham's sister, was much embarrassed at this unexpected request, and solemnly denied that she had ever made such a promise. An altercation ensued, in which the duchess repeated her assertion, and the queen as positively contradicted it, adding, "I do not remember that I was ever spoken to for them." "But supposing," replied the duchess, "that I am mistaken, surely my request cannot be deemed unreasonable." The queen rejoining, "I have a great many servants of my own, and some of them I must remove," the duchess smiled and said, "Your majesty then does not reckon Lord Marlborough or me among your servants?" On this the queen was again embarrassed, and murmuring some unintelligible words, the duchess observed, "Some of my friends having pressed me to wait oftener upon your majesty, I have been compelled, in vindication of my conduct, to relate the usage which I have received from your majesty; and this reason I have been under the necessity of repeating, and asserting the truth of what I said, before they could be induced to believe it; and I believe it would be thought still more strange, were I to repeat this conversation, and inform them, that after all Lord Marlborough's services, your majesty refused to give him a miserable hole to make a clear entry to his lodgings; I beg, therefore, to know, whether I am at liberty to repeat this to any of my friends." After some hesitation, and much disorder in her looks, the queen replied in the affirmative. The duchess, on retiring, added, "I hope your majesty will reflect upon all that has passed;" and, as no reply was given, she abruptly quitted the apartment.\*

\* This narrative is taken from an account in the hand-writing of the

Soon after this interview, the duchess again obtruded herself on the queen, and solicited her majesty to inform her what crime she had committed, which had produced so great an alteration in her behaviour. This question drew from her royal mistress a letter, in which she charged her with inveteracy to Mrs. Masham, and with having nothing so much at heart as the ruin of her cousin. After exculpating her from any fault, and imputing their misunderstanding to a discordance in political opinions, she added, "I do not think it a crime in any one not to be of my mind, or blameable, because you cannot see with my eyes, or hear with my ears." She concluded, "It is impossible for you to recover my former kindness, but I shall behave myself to you as the Duke of Marlborough's wife, and as my groom of the stole." \*

Stung with these unkind expressions, and this proof of further alienation, the discarded favourite drew up a copious narrative of the commencement and progress of their connexion.

She accompanied it with extracts from "The Whole Duty of Man," on the article of Friendship, and from the directions in the liturgy, prefixed to the communion service, that none could conscientiously partake of the Lord's Supper, unless they were at peace, and in charity with all mankind. To this was added, a passage from Bishop Taylor's works on the same subject. In transmitting this singular paper, she observed, "If your majesty will read this narrative of twenty-six years' faithful services, and write only in a few words, that you had read them, together with the extracts, and were still of the same opinion as you were when you sent me a very harsh letter, which was the occasion of my troubling you with this narrative, I assure you that I will never trouble you more upon any subject, but the business of my office." †

To this long memorial the queen briefly replied, that when she had leisure to read all the papers, she would send an answer to them. But she never sent any other answer, and the duchess, in concluding her relation, observes, "nor had

duchess, and endorsed by her, "An account of a conversation with the queen, when she refused to give me an inconsiderable lodging to make a clear way to mine."

\* Conduct, p. 267.

† From a letter written to the queen, June 13. 1710.

my papers any apparent effect on her majesty, except that after my coming to town, as she was passing by me, in order to receive the communion, she looked with much good-nature, and very graciously smiled upon me. But the smile and pleasant look, I had reason afterwards to think, were given to Bishop Taylor and the common prayer-book, and not to me." \*

This unfortunate breach was speedily followed by the most fatal consequences; for the indignation of the queen was still further inflamed by the intemperate zeal with which the duchess advocated the cause of the Whigs, and which increased her natural antipathy to a party which she equally feared and detested. Actuated by these feelings, Anne turned with additional confidence to her new favourite, in whom she found a congeniality of political principles, and a suppleness of manners, which formed a striking contrast with the overbearing temper of the duchess. In this state of mind, she listened more and more to the suggestions of Harley, whose intrigues began to acquire consistency, and who had obtained increasing influence by his private cabals. He was secure of the Tories, who were offended with the treasurer and general for their desertion, which they stigmatised as apostacy; and of the Jacobites, who were equally indignant at their abandonment of the Stuart family. He even tampered with the Whigs in general, as well as with several members of the administration and household. Among the Whigs, he succeeded in gaining Lord Rivers, who had hitherto professed an ardent attachment to the principles of the party, as well as an unbounded devotion to the two ministers; and even affected to betray to the treasurer the secret manœuvres of Harley.†

This political profligacy did not escape the penetration of Godolphin; and, in communicating his suspicions to the general, he recommended the policy of removing Lord Rivers from the theatre of intrigue, by appointing him to the command in Portugal, in the room of Lord Galway, who wished to retire. Marlborough, however, would not consent to risk the public welfare for a court intrigue; and Lord Rivers remained in England, where he continued to be the successful

\* Conduct, p. 270.

† Letters from Lord Godolphin to the duke, June 29. 1709.

agent of Harley. His influence increased the discontent of the duke of Somerset, who was already dissatisfied with Marlborough, for refusing to confer a vacant regiment on his son, Lord Hertford, notwithstanding the repeated requests of the queen. As a still more effectual means of detaching the duke of Somerset from the Whigs, she was induced, at the instigation of Harley, to honour him with the most distinguished marks of attention and regard. She affected to make him her confidant in the highest affairs of state, and admitted him to interviews of such unusual length as occasioned the treasurer afterwards to observe, that he was more hours in the day present with her majesty than he was absent.\* The natural ostentation of his character, which obtained him the nick-name of the Sovereign†, was gratified by these distinctions; and he not only over-rated his own abilities and importance, but flattered himself that he was now on the point of advancing from the secondary rank, which he had hitherto occupied, into one of the highest offices of state, from which he had been hitherto excluded by the jealousy of the two ministers, and the opposition of the Whigs.

At this period we find that Harley had also begun to tamper with the duke of Shrewsbury, though the latter, with his characteristic caution, was waiting, before he declared himself, the event of the pending political struggle.

Meanwhile Harley pursued his grand scheme of policy with increasing assiduity, and joined the Tories and Jacobites in decrying the conduct of the duke of Marlborough, both in war and negotiation. When he thought that peace would be concluded, he censured the preliminaries, as not sufficiently advantageous to England; and when Louis rejected them, he blamed the rupture of the negotiations. He even corresponded with Buys, and the disaffected party in Holland, to encourage their clamours for a speedy peace.

In military affairs he decried the siege of Tournay, as useless and expensive; he censured the battle of Malplaquet, as wanton carnage; and did not even refrain from so cruel an

\* Letter to the duchess, April 21. 1710.

† He is frequently called by that name in the letters of the duchess, Mr. Maynwaring, and Lord Sunderland.

aspersion as to stigmatise it as a selfish expedient of the duke to thin the number of officers, that he might profit by the disposal of their commissions. This slanderous imputation had the effect so maliciously intended, of prejudicing against the general many families of all ranks and distinctions, who were lamenting the loss of their relations in this dear-bought victory. Harley also represented Louis as invincible, and rising stronger from defeats; and imputed the prolongation of the war solely to the ambition of the chief. These accusations, re-echoed by the Tories, and repeated by Mrs. Masham to the queen, made a deep impression on her mind, and alienated her still more from the successful general, whose victories she was made to believe retarded the blessings of peace. She did not even offer the slightest tribute of congratulation to the duchess for the victory of Malplaquet, or express the smallest concern for the safety of his person.

In his attempts to decry the conduct of Marlborough, Harley exaggerated the popular clamour, that the queen was reduced to bondage by a single family, the members of which monopolised the honours and wealth of the state. Unfortunately, the duke gave colour to this imputation, by an act of indiscretion, which, at any period, would have been ill-timed, but which, in the actual situation of affairs, was, of all things, most calculated to excite the alarms of his royal mistress. Perceiving the loss of her favour, he formed the design of strengthening himself against the attacks of his enemies, and securing a permanent influence in the army, by obtaining a patent, constituting him captain-general for life.

With the hopes of ascertaining that such a grant was neither new nor unconstitutional, he applied to Lord Chancellor Cowper; that nobleman, however, would not suffer his obligations to the duke to bias his judgment as a servant of the crown, and candidly declared that this high office had never been conferred otherwise than during pleasure. The duke not being satisfied with a decision given in the freedom of conversation, the chancellor, at his request, searched the public records, and the result of the inquiry was a full conviction that such a grant was new and unprecedented, except for the obsolete office of constable, which since the 13th of

Henry VIII., had been conferred only for a limited time.\* Still not discouraged, the duke ordered Mr. Craggs to search for the licence granted to General Monk, but had the mortification again to be informed that it was only made during pleasure, and that a commission for life would, in the opinion of the chancellor, be an innovation, and liable to malicious constructions. Even after this second disappointment, he still persevered, and made a direct application to the queen, in the course of the campaign. Her majesty was naturally alarmed at so new and unexpected a demand, from a subject whose power she already dreaded; and having secretly referred to the advice of her private counsellors, positively declined compliance. Piqued at this refusal, the duke was so imprudent as to write a querulous letter, in which he not only reproached her majesty for this instance of disregard to his services, but even complained bitterly of her estrangement from the duchess, and the transfer of her attachment to Mrs. Masham, and announced his determination to retire at the end of the war.†

This reproachful letter inflamed the indignation of the queen, and gave force to the representations of the opposite party; and the malevolence of his enemies did not fail to exaggerate his indiscretion as a proof that he secretly aspired to power, which must prove dangerous to the crown.

\* Letter from Mr. Craggs, May 20., and from Lord Chancellor Cowper, June 23.

† Draught of a letter to the queen, in the hand-writing of the duchess, without date, but evidently written at this period. In relating this fact in his "Memoirs on the Change in the Queen's Ministry, in 1710," Swift observes, "When the duke of Argyle was consulted what course should be taken upon the duke of Marlborough's request to be general for life, and whether any danger might be apprehended from the refusal, *I was told*, he suddenly answered, that her majesty need not be in pain, for he would undertake, whenever she commanded, to seize the duke at the head of his troops, and bring him away either dead or alive." If this anecdote be true, the answer must have been intended to augment, as it naturally would do, the alarms of the queen.

# APPENDIX

OF

## NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

*By the Editor.*

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### (F. p. 58.)—DIPLOMATIC BRIBERY.

THE burgesse disguise adopted by the French envoy, safely to transmit to his court an account of Marlborough's conversations with the Swedish king, reminds one of the conjectural programmes that appear in the London newspapers on the morning of the opening of parliament. The writers of these anticipatory versions are, of course, not in the secret of the cabinet; though it becomes manifest, after the royal speech appears in the afternoon—the resemblance between the copy and original being so exact—that either they have been gifted with a mesmeric clairvoyance behind the scene, or held some telegraphic communication with those who are actually privy to the contents of the forthcoming address. In like manner, the feigned German merchant's "imaginings" of what the Duke said to Charles XII., tally so exactly with the quality of his utterances, that they can only have been reported to Besenval by one who heard them, or had received a faithful transcript of their purport.

Altogether, the text and the Archdeacon's note offer a curious illustration of the state of European diplomacy and the infidelity of postal communications. No doubt the treacherous part had been enacted by Count Piper or Hermelin, on both of whom the duke had conferred pensions, the better to secure their services. Piper was thus receiving bribes by both hands; for he was already in the pay of the French to betray the English and the interests of the Grand Alliance. He at first affected some difficulty in accepting the Duke's favour; but his scruples were overcome by his countess, with whom Marlborough had an interview for the purpose.

The treachery did not end here: the betrayers were betrayed. Besenval's letter was either intercepted in its passage through Germany, or surreptitiously copied by some spy at the court of France, and transmitted to England through the instrumentality of Robethon, the Duke's confidential agent for collecting continental intelligence.

When the first earl of Malmesbury visited the European courts as British minister, seventy or eighty years later, matters continued much

the same. Money formed the sinews of diplomacy. *Non sine pulvere palma*. All were accessible in this shape, from the highest minister to the humbler secretary, clerk, or messenger. Gifts of jewellery, pensions, or pecuniary gratuities were the usual forms of seduction, and the bribe nicely proportioned to the value of the intelligence given or the service rendered. The Dutch patriots his lordship found open to good dinners as well as lucre. Writing to Lord Stormont from St. Petersburg, December 24. 1780, Malmesbury says,—“Your lordship can conceive no idea of the height to which corruption is carried in this country, of the exorbitancy of the demands, or of the barefacedness with which they are made. The French, the Dutch, and even the Prussian ministers are most profuse in this article; and the first, I am certain, has expended (to very little purpose, indeed,) immense sums since his arrival. He has furnished to the two first cousins of Count Panin, and the vice-chancellor, to purchase houses, to the amount of 4000*l.* or 5000*l.* each. Every subaltern expects his fees, and these fees are according to the exigencies of the times.” A little later (March 22. 1781), he writes to the foreign secretary — “I am very happy to find that it does not appear I fling away *too much of the public money* in obtaining necessary intelligence. The lavishness of the French; and even of the Prussian party, in the present moment, is beyond conception; and their profusion will, I fear, make me appear very extravagant.” — *Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury*, vol. i. p. 405. So that there was quite a competition in corruption. Spies and informers of every grade were in the constant pay of the rival ambassadors; and thus, those who paid most were doubtless best served.

The Duke was not likely to be outdone in this line of traffic. His activity, penetration, and hardihood qualified him to be a successful chapman. Indeed, he seems to have had no objection to share in the diplomatic medium in general circulation. At parting with the king of Prussia, Marlborough observes (p. 53.), “he forced upon me a diamond ring valued at 1000 pounds.”

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(G. p. 297.)—UXORIOUSNESS OF MARLBOROUGH.

A remarkable trait in Marlborough is the constancy and ardour of his attachment for the duchess. It was the ruling passion of his life; even his love of glory was secondary to it. Amidst all his toils and dangers, one object was ever present — his adorable Sarah; and the last and exceeding great reward to which he looked forward, was to spend with her in privacy and peace his remaining years. This was no transient impulse; it began with the nuptial union, and never suffered any abatement: All his letters attest this. Throughout, wherever the duchess is concerned, they breathe the language of the gallant soldier, whose whole soul is absorbed in devotion to his mistress. If she were only kind, content, and satisfied — which, by the bye, was no easy or common case —

all the rest of the world was indifferent to him. We had marked several passages in this strain, and which genuine passion could alone have suggested, but must be content with a few examples of his unceasing love and fondness.

"My soul's soul," or "my dearest soul," is a frequent ejaculation of the affectionate Duke. Writing to his spouse, after a political broil, he says, "I do assure you I had rather the whole world should go wrong than you should be uneasy; for the quiet of my life depends only on your kindness. I beg of you to believe that you are dearer to me than all things in the world." In the hour of military movements, in the excitement of unparalleled triumphs, his heart was ever with her. "I am, heart and soul, yours," was his constant expression. "I can have no happiness till I am quiet with you." "I cannot live away from you." On one occasion, after thanking her, as for a boon, for some kind expressions to him in a letter, he says, "In short, my dear soul, if I could begin life over again, I would endeavour, every hour of it, to oblige you. But as we can't recall what is past, forget my imperfections; and, as God has been pleased to bless me, I do not doubt but he will reward me with some years to end my days with you; and if that be with quietness and kindness, I shall be much happier than I have ever yet been." Again, he piously concludes one letter—"Put your trust in God as I do, and be assured that I think I can't be unhappy as long as you are kind." Writing immediately after the battle of Ramillies, he begins—"I did not tell my dearest soul in my last the design I had of engaging the enemy, if possible, to a battle, fearing the concern she has for me might make her uneasy." He concludes,—"Pray believe me when I assure you that I love you more than I can express."

These and other fond asseverations that the reader cannot fail to have remarked in the correspondence, attest that Marlborough was a man of an affectionate and fervid soul, though of a mild and regulated temper. They are more remarkable, as he was then almost verging on old-age, and his wife had passed the bloom of youth; and, therefore, bespeak an endearment not based on personal or evanescent preferences. It may be doubted whether the duchess reciprocated the extreme fondness of her husband: not many of her letters to him have been preserved, and these are often cold and querulous. She evinced, however, a respect to his memory after his death, though capricious and arbitrary towards him during his lifetime; and to which the Duke's uxoriousness may have contributed.

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